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BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR

VOLUME TWO

THE DISPATCH BEARER.

FROM THE PAINTING BY GILBERT GAUL.

BATTLES AND LEADERS OF THE CIVIL WAR

Grant-Lee Edition

PART I

BEING FOR THE MOST PART CONTRIBUTIONS BY UNION AND CONFEDERATE OFFICERS. BASED UPON "THE CENTURY WAR SERIES." EDITED BY ROBERT UNDERWOOD JOHNSON AND CLARENCE CLOUGH BUEL, OF THE EDITORIAL STAFF OF "THE CENTURY MAGAZINE."

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

FORT PULASKI AFTER THE SURRENDER. FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF FORT PULASKI.

BY Q. A. GILLMORE, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. V.

THE capture of the forts at Port Royal was promptly followed by the abandonment by the Confederates of the entire coast and all the coast towns south of Charleston except Savannah, which was defended by Fort Pulaski, at the mouth of the Savannah River.

This work is of brick, with five faces, casemated on all sides, and has a wet ditch. The walls are seven and a half feet thick, and rise twenty-five feet above high water, mounting one tier of guns in casemates and one *en barbette*. The gorge face is covered by a demi-lune of good relief, arranged for one tier of guns *en barbette*. This also has a wet ditch.

The fort is situated on Cockspur Island, a marshy formation, surrounded by broad channels of deep water. The nearest approach to it on tolerably firm ground is from one to two miles distant, to the south-east, along a narrow strip of shifting sands formed on Tybee Island by the action of wind and waves. In the light of subsequent events it is of interest to recall the fact that before operations for investing the place were begun the fort was visited by several Confederate officers of rank, formerly of the regular army, who freely expressed the opinion that the isolated position of the work, and the nature of its environs, rendered any successful siege operations against it absolutely impracticable. The Confederate commander, Colonel Charles H. Olmstead, appears quite naturally to have been governed by the opinions of his superior officers;† and the measures adopted for adding strength and safety to the work were of the most meager character. Moreover, General Joseph G. Totten, Chief Engineer United States Army, wrote, in reply to a letter requesting his views on the subject, that "the work could not be reduced in a month's firing with any number of guns of manageable calibers."

† The officer in command of the department was Brigadier-General A. R. Lawton, C. S. A.—EDITORS.

I had been appointed chief engineer of the Expeditionary Corps, and in that capacity was directed by General T. W. Sherman, on the 29th of November, to make an examination of Tybee Island and Fort Pulaski, and to report upon the propriety of holding the island, and upon the practicability, and, if practicable, on the best method, of reducing the fort. I reported that I deemed the reduction of the work practicable with batteries of mortars and rifled guns established on Tybee Island, and recommended the occupation of the island, adding some details concerning the disposition of the batteries, the precautions to be observed in their construction, and the intensity of the fire to be delivered by them. This project having been approved by General Sherman and by the higher authorities, the 46th New York Infantry, Colonel Rosa commanding, took possession of the island early in December. In February, 1862, they were reënforced by the addition of the 7th Connecticut Infantry, two companies of New York Volunteer Engineers, and two companies of the 3d Rhode Island Artillery, and all were placed under command of Colonel (now Major-General) A. H. Terry, of the 7th Connecticut. By the labor of these troops eleven batteries were constructed, at distances from the fort varying from 1650 to 3400 yards.⚓

Tybee Island is mostly a mud marsh, like other marsh islands on this coast, varied, however, by ridges and hummocks of firm ground. The distance along the north shore, from the landing-place to the advanced batteries, on the sand ridge above mentioned, is about two and a half miles. Over the last mile, which is low and marshy, and within effective range of the guns of Fort Pulaski, was constructed a causeway of fascines and brushwood.

The work of unloading on the open beach the ordnance, implements, and equipments, and of transporting them to the batteries, was in charge of Lieutenant (afterward General) Horace Porter, and is thus described by him:

"The heavy guns were landed by lowering them from the vessels into lighters having a strong decking built aeross their gunwales. They were towed ashore by row-boats at high tide, often in a heavy surf, and careened by means of a rope from shore, manned by soldiers, until the piece rolled off. At low tide this was dragged above high-water mark.

"For the purpose of transporting the 13-inch mortars, weighing 17,000 pounds, a pair of skids was constructed of timber ten inches square and twenty feet long, held together by three cross-pieces, notched on. One end of the skids was lashed close under the axle of a large sling-cart, with the other end resting on the ground. The mortar was rolled up by means of ropes until it reached the middle of the skids and chocked. Another large sling-cart was run over the other end of the skids, which was raised by the screw, forming a temporary four-wheeled wagon. Two hundred and fifty men were required to move it over the difficult roads by which the batteries were reached.

"I can pay no greater tribute to the patriotism of the 7th Connecticut Volunteers, the troops generally furnished me for this duty, than to say that, when the sling-carts frequently sank to their hubs in the marshes, and had to be extricated by unloading the mortar, rolling it upon

⚓ No. 1,	3 heavy 13-inch mortars	3400	yards.
" 2,	3 " " "	3200	"
" 3,	3 10-inch Columbiads	3100	"
" 4,	3 8-inch "	3045	"
" 5,	1 heavy 13-inch mortar	2790	"
" 6,	3 " " "	2600	"
" 7,	2 " " "	2400	"
" 8,	3 10-in. Col'b'ds and 1 8-in.	1740	"
No. 9,	5 30-pounder Parrott rifles and 1 48-pounder James rifle (old 24-pounder)	1670	yards.
" 10,	2 84-pounder James rifles (old 42-pounders), and 2 64-pounder James rifles (old 32-pounders)	1650	"
" 11,	4 10-inch siege mortars	1650	"



planks until harder ground could be found, and then reloading it, they toiled night after night, often in a drenching rain, under the guns of the fort, speaking only in whispers, and directed entirely by the sound of a whistle, without uttering a murmur. When drilling the same men in the mortar-batteries, they exhibited an intelligence equaled only by their former physical endurance."

In constructing the batteries, as well as in transporting their armament, the greater part of the work was, of necessity, done under cover of night, and with the greatest caution. The positions selected for the five advanced batteries were artificially screened from the view of the fort by almost imperceptible changes, made little by little each night, in the condition and distribution of the brushwood and bushes in front of them. No sudden alteration in the outline of the landscape was permitted. After the concealment had been perfected to such a degree as to permit a safe parapet behind it, less care was taken, and some of the work requiring mechanical skill was done in the daytime, the fatigue parties going to their labor before break of day and returning to camp after nightfall. The garrison of the fort was either unsuspicious or indifferent; at any rate, the natural difficulties of our task received no increment through interference from that quarter. The ability of their guns to punish impertinent intrusion had been already shown. Two soldiers of the 46th New York, which had occupied the island as a precautionary measure before the siege operations began, having strolled out to



MARTELLO TOWER AND LIGHT-HOUSE, TYBEE ISLAND. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

the end of the sand point nearest the fort, conceived the idea of issuing a challenge to the enemy after the fashion described in the "Adventures of Robinson Crusoe." The fort accepted the situation and replied with a shot from a Blakely gun which had recently run the blockade at Wilmington. One of the men was cut in two; the other retreated in disorder, and could not be induced to return and pay the last offices to his ill-starred comrade till after dark. It was said that the gun was sighted by the colonel commanding. The experiment was encouraging, but the garrison did not seem to take the hint. Sometime after they dropped a shell near my headquarters at the light-house, but as it did not accord with our policy to exhibit any symptoms of annoyance, the attention was not repeated.

Meanwhile, in another quarter, operations for the investment of the fort, as complete as the peculiar topography of the region would permit, had been substantially completed by the establishment of two batteries of six guns each, about four miles above the fort,—one at Venus Point, on Jones Island, on the north bank of the Savannah River, and the other on Bird Island, nearly opposite. This latter point had been fixed upon after a reconnoissance made by Lieutenant P. H. O'Rorke, of the Engineers, who, with Major Oliver T. Beard, of the 48th New York, had gone in a small boat up the river as far as the west end of Elba Island, within two miles of Fort Jackson. In addition, two companies of infantry, with three pieces of artillery, were placed on a hulk anchored in Lazaretto Creek, about two and a quarter miles south of the fort, to intercept communication from the direction of Wassaw Sound. After all, even with the efficient aid of the vessels on the station, it was found impossible to isolate perfectly a place lying, as Fort Pulaski does, in a wilderness of low marsh islands submerged by spring-tides, intersected by numerous tortuous channels, and covered with a rank growth of reeds and tall grass. With light boats, small parties familiar with the locality could easily make their way from creek to creek and over the marshes by night, avoiding guards and pickets. It was known that messengers frequently passed in this way to and from the fort, and some of them were captured.

The construction of the Venus Point battery and the transportation of its armament had been effected in the face of difficulties of the same sort as were met with on Tybee Island, but much more discouraging. Jones Island is nothing but a mud marsh, whose general surface is about on the level of ordinary high tide, with a few spots of limited area which are submerged only by spring-tides or when the ordinary tide is favored by the wind. Even in the most elevated places the partly dry crust is only three or four inches in depth, the substratum being a semi-fluid mud, quivering like jelly at every slight blow. A pole or an oar can be forced into it with ease to a depth of twelve or fifteen feet, and the resistance seems to diminish with increase of penetration. The roots of reeds and grasses partly sustain the weight of a man, so that he will sink only a few inches; but when these give way, he goes down two feet or more.

Over this unpromising tract all the materials, sand-bags, planks, etc., used in constructing the battery were carried,—about three hundred yards on a causeway of poles, and for the remaining distance by a wheel-barrow track made of planks laid end to end. On the night of February 10th, Lieutenant O'Rorke, of the Engineers, began the construction of the magazine and gun platforms, while Lieutenant Horace Porter, assisted by Major Beard, 48th New York, and Lieutenant James H. Wilson, Topographical Engineers, undertook the task of bringing up the guns. A wharf of poles and sand-bags had been made in Mud River, about 1300 yards from the battery, to which all the materials were brought in boats from Daufuskie Island, the nearest dry land, four miles away.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL EGBERT L. VIELE, AT THE SIEGE OF FORT PULASKI COMMANDER OF THE UNION FORCES ON DAUFUSKIE ISLAND. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

It had been intended to carry the guns and ammunition for the Venus Point battery on flats through New River and Wall's Cut into Wright River, and thence by Mud River into the Savannah, under convoy of the gun-boats; but the delay threatened by tide and weather, and the probability of encountering torpedoes, for which the vessels were not prepared, determined a change of plan; and it was decided, without depending on the gun-boats, to tow the flats to the Mud River wharf, and haul the guns across the marsh. The landing was made without accident; and the pieces, mounted on their carriages and limbered up, were moved forward on shifting runways of 3-inch planks laid end to end. Lieutenant Wilson, with thirty-five men, took charge of the two pieces in advance, and Major Beard and Lieutenant Porter, with a somewhat larger force, of the four other pieces. Each party had two planks in excess of the number required for the guns and limbers when closed together. This extra

FORT PULASKI FROM TURTLE ISLAND (SEE MAP, PAGE 3). TYBEE LIGHT-HOUSE IN THE LEFT DISTANCE. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

pair of planks was successively taken up from the rear and laid down in front as the guns were moved forward.

By some mistake the men detailed for this work had already been on duty for twenty-four hours, and were in no condition for such fatiguing service. They sank to their knees at every step. The planks soon became slippery with mud, and were hauled forward with drag-ropes; the wheels frequently slipped off, sinking to the hubs, to be replaced only by the greatest exertions. The last gun had been landed at 10 o'clock, and by 2 A. M. two pieces had crossed about one-fourth of the marsh, and the men were utterly exhausted. The guns were concealed by reeds and grass and left until the next night, when a fresh detail carried them through to their position, crossing the worst part of the marsh and repeating all the experiences of the previous night. By half-past 8 on the morning of the 12th the battery was ready for service.

The Bird Island battery was established eight days later, the crossing being made on the night of the 20th.

The Venus Point battery was tested on the morning of the 13th, when the rebel steamer *Ida* passed down under full steam. In firing nine shots at her, all the guns but one recoiled off the platforms. These were at once enlarged to double their former size. The *Ida* was unhurt, but preferred to return to Savannah by another route. On the next day three gun-boats engaged the battery for a short time, withdrawing after one of them was struck.†

The first vessel, with ordnance and ordnance stores for the siege, had arrived in Tybee Roads on the 21st of February, and on the 9th of April the batteries were ready to open fire. Lieutenant Horace Porter says:

"So much were the preparations hurried for opening the bombardment, that we could not wait for many of the ordnance stores that had been ordered from the North. Powder-measures

† The 48th New York, which furnished the guard for the battery, had not a reputation for conspicuous sanctity, but it is doubtful whether one story told of them would not suffer in point by contact with hard facts.

There was an iron-clad at Savannah named the *Atlanta*, but commonly known as the "Ladies' gun-boat," from the fact that means for building it had been largely supplied by contributions of jewelry from the ladies of the city. Some time after our occupation of Jones Island, it was reported that the *Atlanta* was coming down to shell us out. The thoughts of the battery-guard naturally turned toward measures for meeting such an attack, and it was resolved to fire shot connected by chains, and so tangle her up and haul her ashore. When the question arose how they should get into their iron-bound prize, the officer in command of the detachment was ready with his solution: "I've got the men to do it." Then he paraded his men, and informed them of the facts. "Now," said he, "you've been in this cursed swamp for two weeks, up to your ears in mud,—no fun, no glory, and blessed poor pay. Here's a chance. Let every one of you who has had experience as a cracksman or a safe-blower step to the front." It is said that the whole detachment stepped off its two paces with perfect unanimity. The *Atlanta* did not, in fact, make any demonstration on the Savannah, but went, some time later, to Wassaw Sound, only to be captured by Commander John Rodgers with the monitor *Weehawken*.— Q. A. G.

were made out of copper from the metallic cases in which the desiccated vegetables are received. Columbiad shells were strapped with strips of old tents, rough blocks being used for sabots. A large party was kept working day and night, during the bombardment, making 10-inch Columbiad cartridge-bags, and wooden fuse-plugs for 10-inch mortars, in which paper fuses were used."

The men engaged in making the fuse-plugs were mostly Connecticut Yankees, and it was interesting to observe, in the expression of supreme content that settled upon their countenances, the manifest relief afforded by the change from the day and night toil of moving and mounting guns to the congenial employment of whittling.[1] Once, in passing, Lieutenant Porter asked how they were getting along. "Thank ye, Leftenant; we're undergoin' a consid'able degree o' comfort."

General orders were issued on the afternoon of the 9th, prescribing for each battery its point of attack, the rate of firing, and the charges and elevation of the pieces. The mortars were to drop their shells over and within the faces of the work; the fire of the guns should be directed partly against the barbette guns of the fort, and to take the gorge and north walls in reverse, but mainly upon the pan-coupé joining the south and south-east faces, with the double view of opening a practicable breach for assault and of exposing to a reverse fire the magazine in the opposite angle. With one or two exceptions, it was not found necessary to change these orders during the whole course of the bombardment. One officer, a German, commanding a battery, so far failed to imbibe the spirit of the order, that when the moment for opening fire came, he mounted the parapet on the flank of his battery, drew his sword with a melodramatic clash and flourish, and let off all his guns in one volley. The effect was grievously marred by the fact that in his enthusiasm he had overlooked instructions which he had personally received, to open embrasures through the sand ridge forming his parapet as the last thing before firing. Naturally the shot, glancing from the slope, took any direction but the one intended, part of them landing as far from the fort as they were when they left the pieces. The same officer, by the way, afterward expressed the hope that the methods pursued in the siege of Fort Pulaski would not become known in military circles in Europe, lest, being in violation of all the rules laid down in the books, they should bring discredit upon American military engineering.

Just after sunrise on the morning of the 10th, Major-General David Hunter, commanding the department (of the South), sent a flag under Lieutenant James H. Wilson to the fort, with a summons to surrender. Colonel Olm-

[1] "At the 10-inch mortar battery, fuse-plugs were still wanting, and the ordnance officer [Horace Porter] was in despair. He had brought out a specimen of one prepared for another piece, in hopes it might serve. . . . Here were these four pieces, at this most advanced position, rendered entirely useless. Not one could be fired. Finally, a happy thought struck him: there was a Yankee regiment on the island; all Yankees are whittlers; if this regiment could be turned out to-night, they might whittle enough fuse-plugs before morning to fire a thousand rounds. So we put spurs to our horses, and rode (in the darkness) . . . back to camp. The 6th Connecticut was ordered out to whittle, and did whittle to advantage, providing all the plugs that were used in Battery Totten on the two succeeding days." [Correspondence of the "New York Times."] — EDITORS.

stead briefly declined to comply with the demand, saying that he was there "to defend the fort, not to surrender it."

The first shell was fired at a quarter-past 8 o'clock A. M., from Battery Halleck, about the middle of the line, and by half-past 9 all the batteries were in operation, each mortar firing at fifteen-minute intervals, and the guns from two to three times as rapidly. The enemy replied vigorously, though at first not very accurately, with his barbette and casemate guns, following up our line as the batteries successively disclosed their position. It appeared subsequently that he knew the exact position of only two of our batteries—Nos. 5 and 6, which had been established with no special attempt at concealment.

BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL HORACE PORTER.\
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

By 1 o'clock in the afternoon it became evident that, unless our guns should suffer seriously from the enemy's fire, a breach would be effected: with a glass it could be seen that the rifled projectiles were surely eating their way into the scarp of the pan-coupé and adjacent south-east face. When the firing ceased for the night, after nine and a half hours' duration, the commencement of a breach was plainly visible. It was equally manifest, to the surprise and disappointment of all experienced officers present, that the 13-inch mor-

\ General Horace Porter, in a letter to the editors, records the subjoined incidents of the siege:

"One of the regiments which was assigned to duty on Tybee Island, and participated prominently in the siege operations, was the 46th New York, composed entirely of Germans. There was the savor of German cooking in their mess, the sound of German songs in their camp; all the commands were given in German at drill, and the various calls, such as reveille and tattoo, were the same as those used in the German army. We were at this time very anxious to get some information about the construction of the interior arrangements for the defense of the fort, and one morning a strapping fellow in the regiment, who looked as if he might have been a lineal descendant of a member of Frederick the Great's Potsdam Guards, became enthusiastic in the belief that if there was any son of Germany in the fort the playing of the strains of the Vaterland within hearing of the enemy would bring him promptly into camp. The plan was put into execution, and, sure enough, one dark night a German came floating over on a log from Cockspur to Tybee Island. We got from him some very useful information.

"When the white flag went up, General Gillmore, with a number of officers, started for the fort in a whale-boat to receive the surrender. The boat was loaded to the gunwales, as everybody was anxious to go on this mission and get a first sight of the captured work. There was a sea running which threatened at times to swamp the craft, and the rowers could make little headway against the wind and tide. In fact, the parties made such slow progress in pulling for the fort that the effort became rather ludicrous, and it looked for a time as if even the patience of a garrison waiting to surrender might become exhausted, and they be tempted to open fire again on their dilatory captors.

"Among the visitors to the fort was George W. Smalley, the correspondent of the 'New York Tribune,' and now the well-known London representative of that journal.

"One of the captured officers asked me who was the person in citizen's dress, and when I replied that he was a war correspondent of the 'Tribune,' exclaimed, 'What! that old abolition sheet?' 'Yes.' 'Edited by old man Greeley?' 'Yes.' 'And we're going to be written up by his gang?' 'Yes.' 'Well, I could have stood the surrender, but this humiliation is too much!'"

tars, though carefully and fairly well served, were from some cause practically inefficient, not more than one-tenth of the shells falling within the fort. It was clear that for the reduction of the work we should have to depend on breaching alone, ending, perhaps, in an assault. An assault was really impracticable, owing to the lack of boats to carry the troops, although these could have been procured from the navy after considerable delay.

To increase the security of our advanced batteries, a constant fire against the barbette guns of the fort had been kept up through the day. Two of these guns were disabled and three casemate guns silenced. During the night two or three pieces were kept at work to prevent the enemy from repairing the damage he had sustained.

Shortly after sunrise on the 11th our batteries again opened with vigor and accuracy, the enemy returning a resolute and well-directed fire. A detachment of seamen, furnished by Captain C. R. P. Rodgers, of the *Wabash*, who personally superintended their service, had been assigned to one of the most important batteries, where their skill and experience were applied with telling effect. By noon the first two casemates in the south-east face were opened to their full width, our shots passing through the timber blindage in their rear and reaching the magazine at the north-west angle of the fort.

It was plain that a few hours' work of this kind would clear away the scarp wall to a greater width than the small garrison could defend against assault, and preparations for storming were ordered. Meanwhile our guns were pounding at the next casemate, which was fast crumbling away, puffs of yellow dust marking the effect of shot and shell, when, at 2 o'clock, a white flag was shown, and the colors, fluttering for a few minutes at half-mast, came slowly down.

I was directed to receive the surrender, and crossed to the fort for that purpose. The articles were signed that afternoon, and the place occupied by our troops, between whom and the late garrison the best of feeling prevailed. ☆ Many a jest and repartee passed between them. One Georgian, of a sarcastic bent, recalled the ancient myth of wooden nutmegs. "We don't make them

☆ "At the entrance [of Fort Pulaski] stood Colonel Olmstead, the commandant. He showed the way to his own quarters, having previously requested that several National officers who were approaching might, as a matter of courtesy, be desired to remain outside until the preliminaries were adjusted. This was accorded him, and an interview of an hour took place, at which only himself and General Gillmore were present. The terms of the capitulation having been settled, General Gillmore was shown over the fort by the colonel, and then took his leave, accompanied by Colonel Rust. Messengers from General Hunter had meantime arrived. These, together with General Gillmore's aide, made the rounds of the fort under the escort of Colonel Olmstead, who introduced us to his officers, and were the only persons present when the swords were delivered. Major Halpine, as the representative of General Hunter, received the weapons. The ceremony was performed in the colonel's headquarters, all standing. It was just at dark, and the candles gave only a half-light. The weapons were laid on a table, each officer advancing in turn, according to his rank, and mentioning his name and title. Nearly every one added some remark. The colonel's was dignified: 'I yield my sword, but I trust I have not disgraced it.' . . . . Major Halpine, in reply, spoke gracefully of the painfulness of the duty he had been called upon to perform — to receive the swords of men who had shown by their bravery that they deserved to wear them. . . . As soon as the surrender was complete, Colonel Olmstead turned to his officers and began making some remarks to them, upon which his captors withdrew. The American flag was then raised on the ramparts." [Correspondence of the "New York Times" in Moore's "Rebellion Record."] EDITORS.

of wood any longer," retorted a Connecticut man, pointing to a 10-inch shot that one of our Columbiads had sent through the wall.

Among the articles of capitulation was one providing that the sick and wounded should be sent under a flag of truce to the Confederate lines. This article General Hunter declined to ratify, and the whole garrison were sent as prisoners to the forts in New York harbor.

BREVET BRIG.-GENERAL CHARLES G. HALPINE. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

The photograph was evidently intended to show General Halpine in his literary character of "Private Miles O'Reilly," whose war poems were among the most popular of that period. At Fort Pulaski, Major Halpine was Assistant Adjutant-General on the staff of General David Hunter, commanding the Department of the South, which included South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. He died August 3d, 1868.

The garrison was found to consist of 385 men, including a full complement of officers. Several of them were severely, and one fatally, wounded. Our own loss was limited to one man, killed through his own neglect of the proper precautions.

The full armament of the fort was 140 guns. At the time of the siege it contained 48, of which 20 bore on Tybee Island. After the position of our several batteries became known to the enemy, each of these guns was trained on a particular point, and was served unvaryingly in that direction. Our men soon learned the point of attack of each gun, and were warned by the cry of "Cover!" when a shot was coming. They took great satisfaction in seeing visitors to the batteries dodge at false alarms, in their pursuit of amusement, not always respecting even high rank. In all, 16 of these 20 guns were silenced by our fire, while not one of our pieces was struck.

During the siege our batteries fired 5275 shots, of which 3543 were from the 20 guns and 1732 from the 16 mortars. We were provided with ammunition for a week's firing, of which about one-fifth was expended.

The effect of our fire upon the walls of the fort is interesting, as the first example, in actual warfare, of the breaching power of rifled ordnance at long

THE OPPOSING LAND FORCES AT FORT PULASKI, GA.

UNION FORCES.

Maj.-Gen. David Hunter, department commander. Brig.-Gen. Henry W. Benham, division commander.

Daufuskie Island, Brig.-Gen. Egbert L. Viele: 6th Conn., Col. John L. Chatfield; 8th Me. (5 co's), Lieut.-Col. Ephraim W. Woodman; 48th N. Y., Col. James H. Perry. *Jones Island* (K, 1st N. Y. Engineers, Capt. H. L. Southard, and G, 3d R. I. Artillery, Capt. John H. Gould), Lieut.-Col. William B. Barton. *Bird Island* (E, 3d R. I. Artillery, Capt. James E. Bailey, and E, 1st N.Y. Engineers, Capt. James E. Place), Maj. Oliver T. Beard.

range. Not only were the two casemates opened to an aggregate width of thirty feet, but the scarp wall was battered down in front of three casemate piers, and the adjacent wall on each side was so badly shattered that a few hours' firing would have doubled the width of practicable breach, a ramp of débris reaching to the foot of the counterscarp. In repairing the work subsequently, one hundred linear feet of wall had to be rebuilt.

A messenger who escaped from the fort just before the surrender succeeded in making his way over the creeks and marshes, and carried to Savannah, fifteen miles up the river, the news that the fort had fallen.↓ The consternation was supreme. All hope of saving



VIEWS OF FORT PULASKI AFTER THE SURRENDER. FROM PHOTOGRAPHS.

the city seemed lost, and the citizens began to secure themselves by sending their families and property into the interior. Their confidence in the ability

Tybee Island, Acting Brig.-Gen. Q. A. Gillmore: 7th Conn., Col. Alfred H. Terry; 8th Mich., Col. William M. Fenton; 46th N. Y., Col. Rudolph Rosa; 1st N. Y. Engineers, (Co's A and D, Lieut. Thomas B. Brooks and Capt. Frederick E. Graef), Lieut.-Col. James F. Hall; B, F, and H, 3d R. I. Artillery, Capts. L. C. Tourtellot, Pardon Mason, and Horatio Rogers, Jr.; detachment A, U. S. Engineers, Sergeant James E. Wilson.

CONFEDERATE FORCES.

Col. Charles H. Olmstead: Montgomery Guard, Capt. L. J. Gilmartin; German Volunteers, Capt. John H. Steigen; Oglethorpe Light Infantry, Capt. T. W. Sims; Wise Guard, Capt. M. J. McMullan; Washington Volunteers, Capt. John McMahon.

Of the garrison and armament of Fort Pulaski, General A. R. Lawton said in his report: "As there have been no returns received from Fort Pulaski for some time, I cannot give you the precise strength of the garrison. It consisted, however, of five companies, numbering a little over 400 men, and commanded by Colonel C. H. Olmstead. The armament consisted of five 10-inch Columbiads, nine 8-inch Columbiads, three 42-pounders, three 10-inch mortars, one 12-inch mortar, one 24-pounder howitzer, two 12-pounder howitzers, twenty 32-pounders, and two 4½-inch (Blakely) rifled guns, with 130 rounds of ammunition per gun."

↓ "Corporal Law [who carried the news of the surrender to the Confederates] arrived in the fort in company with the signal man, whom he went to pilot, at 5 o'clock Friday morning, the day of the surrender. He remained inside the works during

of Fort Pulaski to sustain a siege had been absolute. General Henry C. Wayne, of the Confederate army, who was in Savannah at the time, was one of the first to doubt, and met with the usual fortune of prophets of evil in times of intense popular feeling. He had been an officer in the regular army, and his experience had taught him to distinguish the sound of guns at different distances and fired in opposite directions. As his trained ear noted how, from hour to hour, the guns pointed toward the city kept up their steady volume, while the intervals of reply grew longer and longer, he told the citizens on the second day that the guns of the fort were being gradually silenced, and that it could not hold out. Out of incredulity grew a suspicion that "the wish was father to the thought," and indignation was fast tending toward personal violence, when the truth became known, and the wrath of the people was lost in their fears.

The result of this victory was to close the Savannah River entirely to blockade-runners, and to set free for service elsewhere the naval force which had been employed there.

the whole of the bombardment on that day, and left as the flag was lowered [not being a member of the garrison], making his way to the south wharf as the enemy's steamer was approaching the north landing. When the bombardment commenced on Thursday none of the enemy's batteries on Tybee were visible, except from the smoke which pointed out the different localities to our garrison. . . . The firing of the enemy on Thursday was not so effective as to create an apprehension that the work would fall. The enemy were obtaining the range of their guns for the operations of night and the day following. . . . The north-east casemates were all in which the garrison could bunk with any security whatever through Thursday night, though but little sleep was enjoyed, as the enemy threw twelve shells per hour into the fort until daylight. . . . Corporal Law witnessed the whole of Friday's fight for himself, mingling freely with the garrison throughout the terrible scene. . . . At the close of the fight all the parapet guns were dismounted except three — two 10-inch Columbiads, known as 'Beauregard' and 'Jeff Davis,' but one of which bore on the island, and a rifle-cannon. Every casemate gun in the south-east section of the fort, from No. 7 to No. 13, including all that could be brought to bear upon the enemy's batteries except one, were dismounted, and the casemate walls breached, in almost every instance, to the top of the arch — say between five and six feet in width. The moat outside was so filled with brick and mortar that one could have passed over dry-shod. The officers' quarters were torn to pieces, the bomb-proof timbers scattered in every direction over the yard, and the gates to the entrance knocked off. The parapet walls on the Tybee side were all gone, in many places down to the level of the earth on the casemates. The protection to the magazine in the north-west angle of the fort had all been shot away; the entire corner of the magazine next to the passage-way was shot off, and the powder exposed, while three shots had actually penetrated the chamber. Of this, Corporal Law is positive, for he examined it for himself before leaving. Such was the condition of affairs when Colonel Olmstead called a council of officers in a casemate; and, without a dissenting voice, they acquiesced in the necessity of a capitulation, in order to save the garrison from utter destruction by an explosion, which was momentarily threatened. Accordingly, at 2 o'clock, P. M., the men were called from the guns and the flag was lowered. Early in the day Colonel Olmstead had no doubt of his ability to silence every battery on the island, and to this end he determined, when night came and the enemy's fire slackened, to change the position of all his heavy guns, so as to bring them to bear on the enemy. As the day progressed, however, his situation became desperate. . . . Every man did his duty with alacrity, and, there being few guns that bore on the enemy, there was a continued contest as to who should man them. When volunteers were called for to perform any laborious duty, there was a rush of the men from every company in the fort. . . . Among the last guns fired were those on the parapet, and the men stood there exposed to a storm of iron hail to the last." [Correspondence of the Savannah "Republican" of April 23d, 1862.] EDITORS.

EARLY OPERATIONS IN THE GULF.

BY PROFESSOR J. R. SOLEY, U. S. N.

AFTER the seizure of the Pensacola Navy Yard and the movements connected with the relief of Fort Pickens (Vol. I., p. 32), the Gulf Coast remained comparatively quiet until the establishment of the blockade. Hitherto the vessels in this quarter had formed a part of the Home Squadron, under Flag-Officer Pendergrast; but on June 8th, 1861, Flag-Officer William Mervine assumed command of the station, his vessels constituting the Gulf Blockading Squadron. Already the blockade had been set on foot by the *Powhatan*, at Mobile, and by the *Brooklyn*, at New Orleans; and soon after Mervine arrived in the steamer *Mississippi*, he had twenty vessels in his fleet. On July 2d, Galveston, the third port of importance in the Gulf, was blockaded by the *South Carolina*.

The first collision occurred in August, when one of the tenders of the *South Carolina*, blockading Galveston, was fired on by a battery on the shore. Commander Alden, commanding the *South Carolina*, laid his ship close to the shore and returned the fire. A few shells were accidentally discharged into the town, but the affair was in no sense a bombardment of Galveston.

In September Flag-Officer William W. McKean replaced Mervine in command of the squadron. Shortly after, the blockading vessels off the mouths of the Mississippi, commanded by Captain John Pope, moved up to the Head of the Passes. Early on the morning of the 12th of October this squadron, consisting of the *Richmond*, *Vincennes*, *Preble*, and *Water Witch*, was attacked by the ironclad ram *Manassas*, under Lieutenant A. F. Warley. The *Manassas* rammed the *Richmond* without inflicting serious injury, and, being herself damaged by the blow, withdrew up the river. At the same time, the *Richmond* and her consorts turned their heads down-stream, and retreated as fast as possible to the mouth of South-west Pass. The *Preble* got over the bar, but the *Vincennes* and the *Richmond* grounded. In this position they were attacked by a small flotilla of converted river boats under Commodore G. N. Hollins. Notwithstanding the evident panic that prevailed in the fleet, the Confederate attack was not sustained with any great spirit, and the result was indecisive, neither party obtaining an advantage. The *Water Witch* was skillfully and boldly commanded by Lieutenant Francis Winslow; while the action of the captain of the *Vincennes* in abandoning his vessel while she was ashore, but under cover of the *Richmond's* heavy battery, was a subject of well-merited reproach.

On the night of the 13th of September occurred the destruction of the Confederate privateer *Judah*, in Pensacola harbor (see Vol. I., p. 32).

A similar exploit was performed at Galveston early in November. The attacking party, under Lieutenant James E. Jouett, set out in two launches from the frigate *Santee*, Captain Henry Eagle, on the night of the 7th, and captured and burnt the privateer schooner *Royal Yacht*, carrying one 32-pounder. Thirteen prisoners were taken. The casualties in the Union force were 2 killed and 7 wounded.

On the 16th of September, Ship Island, an important point commanding the passage of Mississippi Sound, which formed the water connection between New Orleans and Mobile, was evacuated by the Confederate forces. On the next day the steamer *Massachusetts*, under Captain Melancton Smith, landed a force and took possession of the island. The fort was strengthened by a formidable armament of rifles and 9-inch Dahlgren guns. Occasional attempts were made to recover the island, but without success. On the 19th of October the Confederate steamer *Florida* (Captain George N. Hollins) made a demonstration, and an encounter took place between that vessel and the *Massachusetts*. The *Florida*, having the advantage of higher speed and less draught, was able to choose her distance, and exploded a 68-pounder rifle shell in the *Massachusetts*, but without doing serious damage. The engagement was indecisive. In December a detachment of 2500 troops under Brigadier-General John W. Phelps was posted on the island, which had up to this time been held by the navy.

According to Secretary Welles (in "The Galaxy" for Nov., 1871), the Navy Department first conceived the idea of an attack on New Orleans in September, 1861, and the plan took definite shape about the middle of November, ¦ from which time the department was busily engaged in preparation for the expedition. As a part of the plan, it was decided to divide the Gulf Squadron into two commands, and when, on the 23d of December, Farragut received his preparatory orders, they directed him to hold himself in readiness to take command of the West Gulf Squadron and the expedition to New Orleans. Farragut received his full orders as flag-officer on the 20th of January, 1862, and sailed from Hampton Roads in the *Hartford* on the 3d of February, arriving at Ship Island on the 20th.

The East Gulf Squadron, comprising the vessels on the west coast of Florida, remained under the command of Flag-Officer McKean. On May 10th, 1862, Pensacola was evacuated, and came once more into the possession of the United States. A month later, on June 4th, Flag-Officer McKean was relieved by Captain J. L. Lardner, who was followed by Commodores Theodorus Bailey and C. K. Stribling. Operations in this quarter during the remainder of the war consisted chiefly of boat expeditions, encounters with blockade-runners or armed schooners, attacks upon guerrillas in the neighborhood of the coast, raids upon salt-works, and other small affairs of like character.

¦ Commander D. D. Porter undoubtedly had the scheme in mind as early as June, 1861, when he was off the Passes in the *Powhatan*.—J. R. S.



THE CONFEDERATE CRUISER "SUMTER," CAPTAIN SEMMES, LEAVING NEW ORLEANS, JUNE 18, 1861. FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

NEW ORLEANS BEFORE THE CAPTURE.

BY GEORGE W. CABLE, CO. 1, 4TH MISSISSIPPI CAVALRY.

IN the spring of 1862, we boys of Race, Orange, Magazine, Camp, Constance, Annunciation, Prytania, and other streets had no game. Nothing was "in"; none of the old playground sports that commonly fill the school-boy's calendar. We were even tired of drilling. Not one of us between seven and seventeen but could beat the drum, knew every bugle-call, and could go through the manual of arms and the facings like a drill-sergeant. We were *blasé* old soldiers—military critics.

Who could tell us anything? I recall but one trivial admission of ignorance on the part of any lad. On a certain day of grand review, when the city's entire defensive force was marching through Canal street, there came along, among the endless variety of good and bad uniforms, a stately body of tall, stalwart Germans, clad from head to foot in velveteen of a peculiarly vociferous fragrance, and a boy, spelling out the name upon their banner, said:

"H-u-s-s-a-r-s: what's them?"

"Aw, you fool!" cried a dozen urchins at once, "them's the Hoosiers. Don't you smell 'em?"

But that was earlier. The day of grand reviews was past. Hussars, Zouaves, and numberless other bodies of outlandish name had gone to the front in Tennessee and Virginia. Our cultivated eyes were satisfied now with one uniform that we saw daily. Every afternoon found us around in Coliseum Place, standing or lying on the grass watching the dress parade of

the "Confederate Guards." Most of us had fathers or uncles in the long, spotless, gray, white-gloved ranks that stretched in such faultless alignment down the hard, harsh turf of our old ball-ground.

This was the flower of the home guard. The merchants, bankers, underwriters, judges, real-estate owners, and capitalists of the Anglo-American part of the city were "all present or accounted for" in that long line. Gray heads, hoar heads, high heads, bald heads. Hands flashed to breast and waist with a martinet's precision at the command of "Present arms,"—hands that had ruled by the pen—the pen and the dollar—since long before any of us young spectators was born, and had done no harder muscular work than carve roasts and turkeys these twenty, thirty, forty years. Here and there among them were individuals who, unaided, had clothed and armed companies, squadrons, battalions, and sent them to the Cumberland and the Potomac. A good three-fourths of them had sons on distant battle-fields, some living, some dead.

We boys saw nothing pathetic in this array of old men. To us there was only rich enjoyment in the scene. If there was anything solemn about it, why did the band play polkas? Why was the strain every day the same gay



Away down to the far end of the line and back again, the short, stout German drum-major—holding his gaudy office in this case by virtue of his girth, not height (as he had himself explained)—flourished his big stick majestically, bursting with rage at us for casually reiterating at short intervals in his hearing that "he kot it mit his size."

In those beautiful spring afternoons there was scarcely a man to be found, anywhere, out of uniform. Down on the steamboat landing, our famous Levee, a superb body of Creoles drilled and paraded in dark-blue uniform. The orders were given in French; the manual was French; the movements were quick, short, nervy. Their "about march" was four sharp stamps of their neatly shod feet—*un, deux, trois, quatre*—that brought them face about and sent them back, tramp, tramp, tramp, over the smooth white pavement of powdered oyster-shells. Ah, the nakedness of that once crowded and roaring mart!

And there was a "Foreign Legion." Of course, the city had always been full of foreigners; but now it was a subject of amazement, not unmixed with satire, to see how many whom every one had supposed to be Americans or "citizens of Louisiana" bloomed out as British, or French, or Spanish subjects. But, even so, the tremendous pressure of popular sentiment crowded them into the ranks and forced them to make every show of readiness to "hurl back the foe," as we used to call it. And they really served for much. Merely as a gendarmerie they relieved just so many Confederate soldiers of police duty in a city under martial law, and enabled them to man forts and breastworks at short notice whenever that call should come.

That call, the gray heads knew, was coming. They confessed the conviction softly to one another in the counting-room and idle store-fronts when they thought no one was listening. I used to hear them — standing with my back turned, pretending to be looking at something down street, but with both ears turned backward and stretched wide. They said under their breath that there was not a single measure of defense that was not behindhand. And they spoke truly. In family councils a new domestic art began to be studied and discussed — the art of hiding valuables.

There had come a great silence upon trade. Long ago the custom-warehouses had begun to show first a growing roominess, then emptiness, and then had remained shut, and the iron bolts and cross-bars of their doors were gray with cobwebs. One of them, in which I had earned my first wages as a self-supporting lad, had been turned into a sword-bayonet factory, and I had been turned out. For some time later the Levee had kept busy; but its stir and noise had gradually declined, faltered, turned into the commerce of war and the clatter of calkers and ship-carpenters, and faded out. Both receipts and orders from the interior country had shrunk and shrunk, and the brave, steady fellows, who at entry and shipping and cash and account desks could no longer keep a show of occupation, had laid down the pen, taken up the sword and musket, and followed after the earlier and more eager volunteers. There had been one new, tremendous sport for moneyed men for a while, with spoils to make it interesting. The sea-going tow-boats of New Orleans were long, slender side-wheelers, all naked power and speed, without either freight or passenger room, each with a single tall, slim chimney and hurrying walking-beam, their low, taper hulls trailing behind scarcely above the water, and perpetually drenched with the yeast of the wheels. Some merchants of the more audacious sort, restless under the strange new quiet of Tchoupitoulas street, had got letters of mark and reprisal, and let slip these sharp-nosed deerhounds upon the tardy, unsuspecting ships that came sailing up to the Passes unaware of the declaration of war. But that game too was up. The blockade had closed in like a prison-gate: the lighter tow-boats, draped with tarpaulins, were huddled together under Slaughterhouse Point, with their cold boilers and motionless machinery yielding to rust; the more powerful ones had been moored at the long wharf vacated by Morgan's Texas steamships; there had been a great hammering, and making of chips, and clatter of railroad iron, turning these tow-boats into iron-clad cotton gunboats, and these had crawled away, some up and some down the river, to be seen in that harbor no more. At length only the foundries, the dry-docks across the river, and the ship-yard in suburb Jefferson, where the great ram *Mississippi* was being too slowly built, were active, and the queen of Southern commerce, the city that had once believed it was to be the greatest in the world, was absolutely out of employment.

There was, true, some movement of the sugar and rice crops into the hands of merchants who had advanced the money to grow them; and the cotton-presses and cotton-yards were full of cotton, but there it all stuck; and when one counts in a feeble exchange of city for country supplies, there was nothing

more. Except — yes — that the merchants had turned upon each other, and were now engaged in a mere passing back and forth among themselves in speculation the daily diminishing supply of goods and food. Some were too noble to take part in this, and dealt only with consumers. I remember one odd little old man, an extensive wholesale grocer, who used to get tipsy all by himself every day, and go home so, but who would not speculate on the food of a distressed city. He had not got down to that.

Gold and silver had long ago disappeared. Confederate money was the currency; and not merely was the price of food and raiment rising, but the value of the money was going down. The State, too, had a paper issue, and the city had another. Yet with all these there was first a famine of small change, and then a deluge of "shinplasters." Pah! What a mess it was! The boss butchers and the keepers of drinking-houses actually took the lead in issuing "money." The current joke was that you could pass the label of an olive-oil bottle, because it was greasy, smelt bad, and bore an autograph — Plagniol Frères, if I remember rightly. I did my first work as a cashier in those days, and I can remember the smell of my cash-drawer yet. Instead of five-cent pieces we had car-tickets. How the grimy little things used to stick together! They would pass and pass until they were so soft and illegible with grocers' and butchers' handling that you could tell only by some faint show of their original color what company had issued them. Rogues did a lively business in "split tickets," literally splitting them and making one ticket serve for two.

Decay had come in. In that warm, moist climate it is always hungry, and wherever it is allowed to feed, eats with a greed that is strange to see. With the wharves, always expensive and difficult to maintain, it made havoc. The occasional idle, weather-stained ship moored beside them, and resting on the water almost as light and void as an empty peascod, could hardly find a place to fasten to. The streets fell into sad neglect, but the litter of commerce was not in them, and some of their round-stone pavements after a shower would have the melancholy cleanness of weather-bleached bones. How quiet and lonely the harbor grew! The big dry-docks against the farther shore were all empty. Now and then a tug fussed about, with the yellow river all to itself; and one or two steamboats came and went each day, but they moved drowsily, and, across on the other side of the river, a whole fleet of their dingy white sisters laid tied up to the bank, *sine die*. My favorite of all the sea-steamers, the little *Habana*, that had been wont to arrive twice a month from Cuba, disgorge her Spanish-American cargo, and bustle away again, and that I had watched the shipwrights, at their very elbows, razee and fit with three big, raking masts in place of her two small ones, had long ago slipped down the river and through the blockaders, and was now no longer the *Habana*, but the far-famed and dreaded *Sumter*.

The movements of military and naval defense lent some stir. The old revenue-cutter *Washington*, a graceful craft, all wings, no steam, came and went from the foot of Canal street. She was lying there when Farragut's topmasts hove in sight across the low land at English Turn. Near by, on her starboard side, lay a gun-boat, moored near the spot where the "lower coast"

packet landed daily, to which spot the crowd used to rush sometimes to see the commanding officer, Major-General Mansfield Lovell, ride aboard, bound down the river to the forts. Lovell was a lithe, brown-haired man of forty-odd, a very attractive figure, giving the eye, at first glance, a promise of much activity. He was a showy horseman, visibly fond of his horse. He rode with so long a stirrup-leather that he simply stood astride the saddle, as straight as a spear; and the idlers of the landing loved to see him keep the saddle and pass from the wharf to the steamboat's deck on her long, narrow stage-plank without dismounting.

Such petty breaks in the dreariness got to be scarce and precious toward the last. Not that the town seemed so desolate then as it does now, as one tells of it; but the times were grim. Opposite the rear of the store where I was now employed,—for it fronted in Common street and stretched through to Canal,—the huge, unfinished custom-house reared its lofty granite walls, and I used to go up to its top now and then to cast my eye over the broad city and harbor below. When I did so, I looked down upon a town that had never been really glad again after the awful day of Shiloh. She had sent so many gallant fellows to help Beauregard, and some of them so young,—her last gleaning,—that when, on the day of their departure, they marched with solid column and firm-set, unsmiling mouths down the long gray lane made by the open ranks of those old Confederate Guards, and their escort broke into cheers and tears and waved their gray shakoes on the tops of their bayonets and seized the dear lads' hands as they passed in mute self-devotion and steady tread, while the trumpets sang "Listen to the Mocking-bird," that was the last time; the town never cheered with elation afterward; and when the people next uncovered it was in silence, to let the body of Albert Sidney Johnston, their great chevalier, pass slowly up St. Charles street behind the muffled drums, while on their quivering hearts was written as with a knife the death-roll of that lost battle. One of those—a former school-mate of mine—who had brought that precious body walked beside the bier, with the stains of camp and battle on him from head to foot. The war was coming very near.

Many of the town's old forms and habits of peace held fast. The city, I have said, was under martial law; yet the city management still went through its old routines. The volunteer fire department was as voluntary and as redundantly riotous as ever. The police courts, too, were as cheerful as of old. The public schools had merely substituted "Dixie," the "Marseillaise," and the "Bonnie Blue Flag" for "Hail Columbia" and the "Star-Spangled Banner," and were running straight along. There was one thing besides, of which many of us knew nothing at the time,—a system of espionage, secret, diligent, and fierce, that marked down every man suspected of sympathy with the enemy in a book whose name was too vile to find place on any page. This was not the military secret service,—that is to be expected wherever there is war,—nor any authorized police, but the scheme of some of the worst of the villains who had ruled New Orleans with the rod of terror for many years—the "Thugs."



MAJOR-GENERAL MANSFIELD LOVELL, COMMANDER OF CONFEDERATE DEPARTMENT NO. 1, WITH HEADQUARTERS AT NEW ORLEANS. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

But the public mind was at a transparent heat. Everybody wanted to know of everybody else, "Why don't you go to the front?" Even the gentle maidens demanded tartly, one of another, why their brothers or lovers had not gone long ago, though, in truth, the laggards were few indeed. The very children were fierce. For now even we, the uninformed, the lads and women, knew the enemy was closing down upon us. Of course we confronted the fact very valorously, we boys and mothers and sisters—and the newspapers. Had we not inspected the fortifications ourselves? Was not every man in town ready to rush into them at the twelve taps of the fire-alarm bells? Were we not ready to man them if the men gave out? Nothing afloat could pass the forts. Nothing that walked could get through our swamps. The *Mississippi*—and, in fact, she was a majestically terrible structure, only let us *complete* her—would sweep the river clean!

But there was little laughter. Food was dear; the destitute poor were multiplying terribly; the market men and women, mainly Germans, Gascon-French, and Sicilians, had lately refused to take the shinplaster currency, and the city authority had forced them to accept it. There was little to laugh at. The Mississippi was gnawing its levees and threatening to plunge in upon us. The city was believed to be full of spies.

I shall not try to describe the day the alarm-bells told us the city was in danger and called every man to his mustering-point. The children poured out from the school-gates and ran crying to their homes, meeting their sobbing mothers at their thresholds. The men fell into ranks. I was left entirely alone in charge of the store in which I was employed. Late in the afternoon, receiving orders to close it, I did so, and went home. But I did not stay. I went to the river-side. There until far into the night I saw hundreds of drays carrying cotton out of the presses and yards to the

wharves, where it was fired. The glare of those sinuous miles of flame set men and women weeping and wailing thirty miles away on the farther shore of Lake Pontchartrain. But the next day was the day of terrors. During the night fear, wrath, and sense of betrayal had run through the people as the fire had run through the cotton. You have seen, perhaps, a family fleeing with lamentations and wringing of hands out of a burning house: multiply it by thousands upon thousands; that was New Orleans, though the houses were not burning. The firemen were out; but they cast fire on the waters, putting the torch to the empty ships and cutting them loose to float down the river.

Whoever could go was going. The great mass, that had no place to go to or means to go with, was beside itself. "Betrayed! betrayed!" it cried, and ran in throngs from street to street, seeking some vent, some victim for its wrath. I saw a crowd catch a poor fellow at the corner of Magazine and Common streets, whose crime was that he looked like a stranger and might be a spy. He was the palest living man I ever saw. They swung him to a neighboring lamp-post, but the Foreign Legion was patroling the town in strong squads, and one of its lieutenants, all green and gold, leaped with drawn sword, cut the rope, and saved the man. This was but one occurrence: there were many like it. I stood in the rear door of our store, Canal street, soon after reopening it. The junior of the firm was within. I called him to look toward the river. The masts of the cutter *Washington* were slowly tipping, declining, sinking—down she went. The gun-boat moored next to her began to smoke all over and then to blaze. My employers fell into ranks and left the city—left their goods and their affairs in the hands of one mere lad (no stranger would have thought I had reached fourteen) and one big German porter. I closed the doors, sent the porter to his place in the Foreign Legion, and ran to the levee to see the sights.

What a gathering! The riff-raff of the wharves, the town, the gutters. Such women—such wrecks of women! And all the juvenile rag-tag. The lower steamboat landing, well covered with sugar, rice, and molasses, was being rifled. The men smashed; the women scooped up the smashings. The river was overflowing the top of the levee. A rain-storm began to threaten. "Are the Yankee ships in sight?" I asked of an idler. He pointed out the tops of their naked masts as they showed up across the huge bend of the river. They were engaging the batteries at Camp Chalmette—the old field of Jackson's renown. Presently that was over. Ah, me! I see them now as they come slowly round Slaughterhouse Point into full view, silent, grim, and terrible; black with men, heavy with deadly portent; the long-banished Stars and Stripes flying against the frowning sky. Oh, for the *Mississippi!* the *Mississippi!* Just then she came down upon them. But how? Drifting helplessly, a mass of flames.

The crowds on the levee howled and screamed with rage. The swarming decks answered never a word; but one old tar on the *Hartford*, standing with lanyard in hand beside a great pivot-gun, so plain to view that you could see him smile, silently patted its big black breech and blandly grinned.

And now the rain came down in sheets. About 1 or 2 o'clock in the afternoon (as I remember), I being again in the store with but one door ajar, came a roar of shoutings and imprecations and crowding feet down Common street. "Hurrah for Jeff Davis! Hurrah for Jeff Davis! Shoot them! Kill them! Hang them!" I locked the door on the outside, and ran to the front of the mob, bawling with the rest, "Hurrah for Jeff Davis!" About every third man there had a weapon out. Two officers of the United States navy were walking abreast, unguarded and alone, looking not to right or left, never frowning, never flinching, while the mob screamed in their ears, shook cocked pistols in their faces, cursed and crowded, and gnashed upon them. So through the gates of death those two men walked to the City Hall to demand the town's surrender. It was one of the bravest deeds I ever saw done.

Later events, except one, I leave to other pens. An officer from the fleet stood on the City Hall roof about to lower the flag of Louisiana. In the street beneath gleamed the bayonets of a body of marines. A howitzer pointed up and another down the street. All around swarmed the mob. Just then Mayor Monroe — lest the officer above should be fired upon, and the howitzers open upon the crowd — came out alone and stood just before one of the howitzers, tall, slender, with folded arms, eying the gunner. Down sank the flag. Captain Bell, tall and stiff, marched off with the flag rolled under his arm, and the howitzers clanking behind. Then cheer after cheer rang out for Monroe. And now, I dare say, every one is well pleased that, after all, New Orleans never lowered her colors with her own hands.

THE UNION FLEET ARRIVING AT NEW ORLEANS.



FARRAGUT'S FLAG-SHIP THE "HARTFORD."

THE OPENING OF THE LOWER MISSISSIPPI.

BY DAVID D. PORTER, ADMIRAL U. S. N.

THE most important event of the War of the Rebellion, with the exception of the fall of Richmond, was the capture of New Orleans and the forts Jackson and St. Philip, guarding the approach to that city. To appreciate the nature of this victory, it is necessary to have been an actor in it, and to be able to comprehend not only the immediate results to the Union cause, but the whole bearing of the fall of New Orleans on the Civil War, which at that time had attained its most formidable proportions.

Previous to fitting out the expedition against New Orleans, there were eleven Southern States in open rebellion against the Government of the United States, or, as it was termed by the Southern people, in a state of secession. Their harbors were all more or less closed against our ships-of-war, either by the heavy forts built originally by the General Government for their protection, or by torpedoes and sunken vessels. Through four of these seceding States ran the great river Mississippi, and both of its banks, from Memphis to its mouth, were lined with powerful batteries. On the west side of the river were three important States, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas, with their great tributaries to the Mississippi,— the White, the Arkansas, and the Red,— which were in a great measure secure from the attacks of the Union forces. These States could not only raise half a million soldiers, but could furnish the Confederacy with provisions of all kinds, and cotton enough to supply the Rebel Government with the sinews of war. New Orleans was the largest Southern city, and contained all the resources of modern warfare, having great workshops where machinery of the most powerful kind could be built, and having artisans capable of building ships in wood or iron, casting heavy guns, or making small arms. The people of the city were in no way

behind the most zealous secessionists in energy of purpose and in hostility to the Government of the United States.

The Mississippi is thus seen to have been the backbone of the Rebellion, which it should have been the first duty of the Federal Government to break. At the very outset of the war it should have been attacked at both ends at the same time, before the Confederates had time to fortify its banks or to turn the guns in the Government forts against the Union forces. A dozen improvised gun-boats would have held the entire length of the river if they had been sent there in time. The efficient fleet with which Du Pont, in November, 1861, attacked and captured the works at Port Royal could at that time have steamed up to New Orleans and captured the city without difficulty. Any three vessels could have passed Forts Jackson and St. Philip a month after the commencement of the war, and could have gone on to Cairo, if necessary, without any trouble. But the Federal Government neglected to approach the mouth of the Mississippi until a year after hostilities had commenced, except to blockade. The Confederates made good use of this interval, putting forth all their resources and fortifying not only the approaches to New Orleans, but both banks of the river as far north as Memphis.

While in command of the *Powhatan*, engaged in the blockade of the southwest Pass of the Mississippi,—a period of seventy-six days,—I took pains to obtain all possible information concerning the defenses of the river. I learned from the fishermen who supplied the city with oysters and fish that very little progress had been made in strengthening the forts, and that no vessel of any importance was being built except the ram *Manassas*, which had not much strength and but a single gun. The only Confederate vessel then in commission was a small river-boat, the *Ivy*, mounting one 4-pounder rifled gun. Had I been able to cross the bar with my ship, I would have felt justified in going up to the city and calling on the authorities to surrender. I could easily have passed the forts under cover of the night without the aid of a pilot, as I had been up and down the river some thirty times in a large mail steamer. But the *Powhatan* drew three feet too much water, and there was no use thinking about such an adventure.

This was the position of affairs on May 31st, 1861, only forty-nine days after Fort Sumter had been fired on.

On the 9th of November, 1861, I arrived at New York with the *Powhatan* and was ordered to report to the Navy Department at Washington, which I did on the 12th. In those days it was not an easy matter for an officer, except one of high rank, to obtain access to the Secretary of the Navy, and I had been waiting nearly all the morning at the door of his office when Senators Grimes and Hale came along and entered into conversation with me concerning my service on the Gulf Coast. During this interview I told the senators of a plan I had formed for the capture of New Orleans, and when I had explained to them how easily it could be accomplished, they expressed surprise that no action had been taken in the matter, and took me

in with them at once to see Secretary Welles. I then gave the Secretary, in as few words as possible, my opinion on the importance of capturing New Orleans, and my plan for doing so. Mr. Welles listened to me attentively, and when I had finished what I had to say he remarked that the matter should be laid before the President at once; and we all went forthwith to the Executive Mansion, where we were received by Mr. Lincoln.

My plan, which I then stated, was as follows: To fit out a fleet of vessels-of-war with which to attack the city, fast steamers drawing not more than 18 feet of water, and carrying about 250 heavy guns; also a flotilla of mortar-vessels, to be used in case it should be necessary to bombard Forts Jackson and St. Philip before the fleet should attempt to pass them. I also proposed that a body of troops should be sent along in transports to take possession of the city after it had been surrendered to the navy. When I had outlined the proposed movement the President remarked:

"This should have been done sooner. The Mississippi is the backbone of the Rebellion; it is the key to the whole situation. While the Confederates hold it they can obtain supplies of all kinds, and it is a barrier against our forces. Come, let us go and see General McClellan."

At that time General McClellan commanded all of the military forces, and was in the zenith of his power. He held the confidence of the President and the country, and was engaged in organizing a large army with which to guarantee the safety of the Federal seat of Government, and to march upon Richmond.

Our party was now joined by Mr. Seward,[1] the Secretary of State, and we proceeded to McClellan's headquarters, where we found that officer diligently engaged in the duties of his responsible position. He came to meet the President with that cheery manner which always distinguished him, and, seeing me, shook me warmly by the hand. We had known each other for some years, and I always had the highest opinion of his military abilities.

"Oh," said the President, "you two know each other! Then half the work is done."

He then explained to the general the object of his calling at that time, saying:

"This is a most important expedition. What troops can you spare to accompany it and take possession of New Orleans after the navy has effected its capture? It is not only necessary to have troops enough to hold New Orleans, but we must be able to proceed at once toward Vicksburg, which is the key to all that country watered by the Mississippi and its tributaries. If the Confederates once fortify the neighboring hills, they will be able to hold that point for an indefinite time, and it will require a large force to dislodge them."

In all his remarks the President showed a remarkable familiarity with the state of affairs. Before leaving us, he said:

[1] Secretary Welles, in a paper printed in "The Galaxy" for November, 1871, says: "The President, General McClellan, and the two gentlemen named [Assistant-Secretary Fox and Commander D. D. Porter] with myself, were the only persons present at the conference."—EDITORS.



MAPS OF THE LOWER MISSISSIPPI.

"We will leave this matter in the hands of you two gentlemen. Make your plans, and let me have your report as soon as possible."

General McClellan and myself were then left to talk the matter over and draw up the plan of operations. With a man of McClellan's energy, it did not take long to come to a conclusion; and, although he had some difficulty in finding a sufficient number of troops without interfering with other important projects, he settled the matter in two days, and reported that his men would be ready to embark on the 15th of January, 1862.

The plan of the campaign submitted to the President was as follows: A naval expedition was to be fitted out, composed of vessels mounting not fewer than two hundred guns, with a powerful mortar-flotilla, and with steam transports to keep the fleet supplied. The army was to furnish twenty thousand troops, not only for the purpose of occupying New Orleans after its capture, but to fortify and hold the heights about Vicksburg. The navy and army were to push on up the river as soon as New Orleans was occupied by our troops, and call upon the authorities of Vicksburg to surrender. Orders were to be issued to Flag-Officer Foote, who commanded the iron-clad fleet on the upper Mississippi, to join the fleet above Vicksburg with his vessels and mortar-boats.

The above plans were all approved by the President, and the Navy Department immediately set to work to prepare the naval part of the expedition,

while General McClellan prepared the military part. The officer selected to command the troops was General B. F. Butler, a man supposed to be of high administrative ability, and at that time one of the most zealous of the Union commanders.

The Assistant-Secretary of the Navy, Mr. G. V. Fox, selected the vessels for this expedition, and to me was assigned the duty of purchasing and fitting out a mortar-flotilla, to be composed of twenty large schooners, each mounting one heavy 13-inch mortar and at least two long 32-pounders. It was not until December, 1861, that the Navy Department got seriously to work at fitting out the expedition. Some of the mortar-vessels had to be purchased; the twenty mortars, with their thirty thousand bomb-shells, had to be cast at Pittsburg and transported to New York and Philadelphia, and the mortar-carriages made in New York. It was also necessary to recall ships from stations on the coast and fit them out; also to select officers from the few available at that time to fill the various positions where efficiency was required — especially for the mortar-flotilla, the operation of which imposed unfamiliar duties.

By the latter part of January the mortar-flotilla got off. In addition to the schooners, it included seven steamers (which were necessary to move the vessels about in the Mississippi River) and a store-ship. Seven hundred picked men were enlisted, and twenty-one officers were selected from the merchant marine to command the mortar-schooners.

An important duty now devolved on the Secretary of the Navy, viz., the selection of an officer to command the whole expedition. Mr. Fox and myself had often discussed the matter. He had had in his mind several officers of high standing and unimpeachable loyalty; but, as I knew the officers of the navy better than he did, my advice was listened to, and the selection fell upon Captain David Glasgow Farragut.

I had known Farragut ever since I was five years old. He stood high in the navy as an officer and seaman, and possessed such undoubted courage and energy that no possible objection could be made to him. On the first sign of war Farragut, though a Southerner by birth and residence, had shown his loyalty in an outspoken manner. The Southern officers had used every argument to induce him to desert his flag, even going so far as to threaten to detain him by force. His answer to them has become historical: "Mind what I tell you: You fellows will catch the devil before you get through with this business." ⚓ Having thus expressed himself in a manner not to be misunderstood, he left Norfolk with his family and took a house on the Hudson River, whence he reported to the Navy Department as ready for duty. I knew Farragut better than most other officers of the navy knew him; and as he is here to appear as the central figure of the greatest naval achievement of our war, I will give a brief sketch of his early naval life.

Farragut was born in Tennessee, from which State his family moved to New

⚓ It is worthy of note that in 1833, during the nullification troubles, Farragut was sent by Andrew Jackson to South Carolina to support his mandate that "the Union must and shall be preserved."— EDITORS.

Orleans. His father was not a man of affluence, and had a large family to support. In 1807 Captain David Porter, United States Navy, was appointed to the command of the New Orleans station. His father, David Porter, senior (who had been appointed by General Washington a sailing-master in the navy, for services performed during the Revolution), accompanied him to this post and served under his command. Being eighty-four years of age, his services were nominal, and he only lived in New Orleans for the sake of being near his son. One day, while fishing on Lake Pontchartrain, the old gentleman fell over with a sunstroke, and Farragut's father took him to his house near by, and treated him with the most assiduous attention. Mr. Porter died at the residence of Mr. and Mrs. Farragut, it being considered dangerous to move him. Captain Porter then, in order to show his gratitude to the Farraguts for their kindness to his father, offered to adopt their son Glasgow. This offer was gladly accepted, and from that time young Farragut became a member of Captain Porter's family, and was recognized as his adoptive son. The boy was placed at school when he was eight years old, and on the 17th of December, 1810, he was appointed an acting midshipman in the navy. He accompanied Captain Porter in the cruise of the *Essex* around Cape Horn, and was with him at the memorable capture of that frigate, on which occasion he showed the spirit of a brave boy. He remained with his adopted father some years, and served under him in the "mosquito fleet" of the West India squadron. In whatever position he was placed, Farragut maintained his reputation as a fine officer and genial, cheery companion. He was esteemed by all who knew him, and no one in the navy had more personal friends or fewer enemies. At the time of his appointment to the command of the New Orleans expedition, he was over sixty years of age; but he was as active as a man of fifty, with an unimpaired constitution, and a mind as bright as ever.

On his return to the North with his family, he had been assigned to duty by the department as president of a board for the examination of officers, and he accepted it as an acknowledgment on the part of the Government that he was a loyal man. The department hesitated for some time, however, when his name was proposed for commander of the important expedition against New Orleans. A wide-spread feeling prevailed at that time that Southern officers should not be given active duty afloat; for, although their loyalty was not doubted, it was naturally thought that they would find no duty congenial that would compel them to act offensively against their friends and relations. It was afterward proved that this opinion was unjust, for among the officers who hailed from the South were some of the most zealous and energetic defenders of the Union flag — men who did their duty faithfully. When Farragut came North he simply reported himself to the department as ready for duty, without applying for active service against the enemy. It was owing to this fact that the department was so long in coming to a conclusion, and this explains why the commander of the expedition was not (as he ought to have been) the very first man selected.

I continually urged Farragut's appointment, and finally the department directed me to go on to New York, and ascertain in a personal interview



CONFEDERATE SHARP-SHOOTERS AND SWAMP HUNTERS ATTACKING MORTAR-BOATS.

whether he would accept the command and enter warmly into the views of the Government. I found him, as I had expected, loyal to the utmost extent; and, although he did not at that time know the destination of the expedition, he authorized me to accept for him the Secretary's offer, and I telegraphed the department: "Farragut accepts the command, as I was sure he would."

In consequence of this answer he was called to Washington, and on the 20th of January, 1862, he received orders to command the expedition against New Orleans. In the orders are included these passages: "There will be attached to your squadron a fleet of bomb-vessels, and armed steamers enough to manage them, all under command of Commander D. D. Porter, who will be directed to report to you. As fast as these vessels are got ready they

will be sent to Key West to await the arrival of all and the commanding officers, who will be permitted to organize and practice with them at that port.

"When these formidable mortars arrive, and you are completely ready, you will collect such vessels as can be spared from the blockade, and proceed up the Mississippi River, and reduce the defenses which guard the approaches to New Orleans, when you will appear off that city and take possession of it under the guns of your squadron, and hoist the American flag therein, keeping possession until troops can be sent to you. If the Mississippi expedition from Cairo shall not have descended the river, you will take advantage of the panic to push a strong force up the river to take all their defenses in the rear."

As soon as possible Farragut proceeded to his station and took command of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron. In the meantime the Confederates had not been idle. They had early been made acquainted with the destination of the expedition, and had put forth all their energies in strengthening Forts Jackson and St. Philip, obstructing the river, and preparing a naval force with which to meet the invaders. The ram *Manassas* was finished and placed in commission, and the iron-clad *Louisiana*, mounting sixteen heavy guns and heavily armored, was hurried toward completion. Besides these vessels there was another powerful iron-clad, building at New Orleans, which was expected to sweep the whole Southern coast clear of Union vessels. Two iron-clad rams, the *Arkansas* and *Tennessee*, were building at Memphis, and several other iron-clad vessels were under construction at different points on the tributaries.

This energy and forethought displayed by the South seems marvelous when compared with what was done by the North during the same period of time; for among all the ships that were sent to Farragut there was not one whose sides could resist a twelve-pound shot. Considering the great resources of the Northern States, this supineness of the Government appears inexcusable. Up to the time of the sailing of the expedition, only three iron-clads, the *Monitor*, *Galena*, and *New Ironsides*, had been commenced, in addition to the gun-boats on the Upper Mississippi; and it was only after the encounter of the *Monitor* with the *Merrimac* that it was seen how useful vessels of this class would be for the attack on New Orleans, particularly in contending with the forts on the banks of the Mississippi.

Flag-Officer Farragut did not arrive at Ship Island with the *Hartford* until the 20th of February, 1862, having been detained for some time at Key West, where he began to arrange his squadron for the difficult task that lay before him.

The vessels which had been assigned to his command soon began to arrive, and by the middle of March all had reported, together with six steamers belonging to the mortar-flotilla: the *Harriet Lane*, *Owasco*, *Clifton*, *Westfield*, *Miami*, *Jackson;* besides the mortar-schooners. The frigate *Colorado*, mounting fifty guns, had arrived, but Flag-Officer Farragut and Captain Bailey both came to the conclusion that she could not be lightened sufficiently to cross the bar.

On the 18th of March all the mortar-schooners crossed the bar at Pass à l'Outre, towed by the steamers *Harriet Lane*, *Owasco*, *Westfield*, and *Clifton*. They were ordered by Farragut to proceed to South-west Pass.

As yet the only ships that had crossed the bar were the *Hartford* and *Brooklyn*. The Navy Department had made a mistake in sending vessels of too great draught of water, such as the *Colorado*, *Pensacola*, and *Mississippi*. The two latter succeeded in crossing with great difficulty, but the whole fleet was delayed at least twelve days.

The first act of Farragut was to send Captain Henry H. Bell, his chief-of-staff, up the river with the steamers *Kennebec* and *Wissahickon*, to ascertain, if possible, what preparations had been made by the enemy to prevent the passage of the forts. This officer reported that the obstructions seemed formidable. Eight hulks were moored in line across the river, with heavy chains extending from one to the other. Rafts of logs were also used, and the passage between the forts was thus entirely closed.

The Confederates had lost no time in strengthening their defenses. They had been working night and day ever since the expedition was planned by the Federal Government. Forts Jackson and St. Philip were strong defenses, the former on the west and the latter on the east bank of the Mississippi. As they are to hold an important place in the following narration of events, it will be well to give a description of them.

Fort Jackson was built in the shape of a star, of stone and mortar, with heavy bomb-proofs. [See page 34.] It was back about one hundred yards from the levee, with its casemates just rising above it. I am told that the masonry had settled somewhat since it was first built, but it was still in a good state of preservation. Its armament consisted of 42 heavy guns in barbette, and 24 in casemates; also 2 pieces of light artillery and 6 guns in water-battery — in all, 74 guns. The last was a very formidable part of the defenses, its heavy guns having a commanding range down the river. The main work had been strengthened by covering its bomb-proofs and vulnerable parts with bags of sand piled five or six feet deep, making it proof against the projectiles of ordinary guns carried by ships-of-war in those days. The fort was also well supplied with provisions and munitions of war, which were stowed away in a heavily built citadel of masonry situated in the center of the works. Altogether, it was in a very good condition to withstand either attack or siege. Fort Jackson was under the immediate command of Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Higgins, formerly an officer of the United States navy, and a very gallant and intelligent man.

Fort St. Philip was situated on the other side of the river, about half a mile above Fort Jackson, and, in my opinion, was the more formidable of the two works. It covered a large extent of ground, and although it was open, without casemates, its walls were strongly built of brick and stone, covered with sod. The guns were mounted in barbette, and could be brought to bear on any vessel going up or down the river. There were in all 52 pieces of ordnance. One heavy rifled gun bore on the position of the mortar-fleet, and caused us considerable disturbance until the second or third day after the bombardment commenced, when it burst.

Each of the forts held a garrison of about seven hundred men, some of whom were from the Northern States, besides many foreigners (Germans or

Irish). The Northern men had applied for duty in the forts to avoid suspicion, and in the hope that they would not be called upon to fight against the Federal Government. In this hope they had been encouraged by their officers, all of whom, including the colonel in command, were of the opinion that no naval officer would have the hardihood to attack such strong positions.

All of the land defenses were under Brigadier-General Johnson K. Duncan, who showed himself to be an able and gallant commander.

The best passage up the river was near the west bank close under the guns of Fort Jackson, where the current was not very rapid and few eddies existed. Across this channel the Confederates had placed a raft of logs, extending from the shore to the commencement of a line of hulks which reached to the other side of the river. These hulks were anchored and connected to each other by chains. The raft was so arranged that it could be hauled out of the way of passing vessels, and closed when danger threatened. Although this plan of blocking the river was better than the first one tried by the Confederates, viz., to float a heavy chain across on rafts, it was not very formidable or ingenious.

In addition to the defenses at the forts, the Confederates worked with great diligence to improvise a fleet of men-of-war, using for this purpose a number of heavy tugs that had been employed in towing vessels up and down the river, and some merchant steamers. These, with the ram *Manassas* and the iron-clad *Louisiana*, made in all twelve vessels. The whole naval force was nominally under the control of Commander John K. Mitchell, C. S. N.[1]

The iron-clad *Louisiana*, mounting 16 heavy guns, with a crew of 200 men, was a powerful vessel, almost impervious to shot, and was fitted with a shot-proof gallery from which her sharp-shooters could fire at an enemy with great effect. Her machinery was not completed, however, and during the passage of the Union fleet she was secured to the river-bank and could only use one broadside and three of her bow guns. At this time she was under the immediate command of Commander Charles F. McIntosh, formerly of the United States navy. The *McRae*, Lieutenant Thomas B. Huger, was a sea-going steamer mounting 6 32-pounders and 1 9-inch shell-gun; the steamer *Jackson*, Lieutenant F. B. Renshaw, mounting 2 32-pounders; the iron-clad ram *Manassas*, Lieutenant A. F. Warley, mounting 1 32-pounder (in the bow); and two launches, mounting each one howitzer. Two steamers had been converted into Louisiana State gun-boats, with pine and cotton barricades to protect the machinery and boilers: the *Governor Moore*, Commander Beverley Kennon, and the *General Quitman*, Captain Grant. "All the above steamers, being converted vessels," says Commander Mitchell, "were too slightly built for war purposes."

The River Defense gun-boats, consisting of six converted tow-boats under the command of a merchant captain named Stephenson, were also ordered to report to Commander Mitchell; but they proved of little assistance to

[1] The finding of the Confederate Court of Inquiry, December 5th, 1863, states that Commander Mitchell assumed command of the *Louisiana* at New Orleans, April 20th.— EDITORS.

MORTAR-SCHOONERS ENGAGED AGAINST FORT JACKSON.

Distance of leading schooner from the fort, 2850 yards. Duration of fire, six days. Total number of shells fired, 16,800.

him owing to the insubordination of their commander. "All of the above vessels," says Commander Mitchell, "mounted from one to two pivot 32-pounders each, some of them rifled. Their boilers and machinery were all more or less protected by thick, double pine barricades, filled in with compressed cotton." They were also prepared for ramming by flat bar-iron casings around their bows.

The Confederate fleet mounted, all told, 40 guns, of which 25 were 32-pounders, and one-fourth of them rifled.

It is thus seen that our wooden vessels, which passed the forts carrying 192 guns, had arrayed against them 126 guns in strongly built works, and 40 guns on board of partly armored vessels.†

In addition to the above-mentioned defenses, Commodore Mitchell had at his command a number of fire-rafts (long flat-boats filled with pine-knots,

† To the 192 guns of the vessels making the passage should be added those on board the mortar-flotilla, 110 in number (including 9 howitzers), which performed their part in the reduction of the forts, thus making the aggregate of guns on the Union side 302.— EDITORS.

etc.), which were expected to do good service, either by throwing the Union fleet into confusion or by furnishing light to the gunners in the forts. On comparing the Confederate defenses with the attacking force of the Union fleet, it will be seen that the odds were strongly in favor of the former. It is generally conceded by military men that one gun in a fort is about equal to five on board of a wooden ship, especially when, as in this case, the forces afloat are obliged to contend against a three-and-a-half knot current in a channel obstructed by chains and fire-rafts. [See p. 75.] Our enemies were well aware of their strength, and although they hardly expected us to make so hazardous an attack, they waited impatiently for Farragut to "come on," resting in the assurance that he would meet with a disastrous defeat. They did not neglect, however, to add daily to the strength of their works during the time that our ships were delayed in crossing the bar and ascending the river.

Farragut experienced great difficulty in getting the larger vessels over the bar. The *Hartford* and *Brooklyn* were the only two that could pass without lightening. The *Richmond* stuck fast in the mud every time she attempted to cross. The *Mississippi* drew two feet too much water, and the *Pensacola*, after trying several times to get over, ran on a wreck a hundred yards away from the channel. There she lay, with her propeller half out of water, thumping on the wreck as she was driven in by the wind and sea. Pilots had been procured at Pilot Town, near by; but they were either treacherous or nervous, and all their attempts to get the heavy ships over the bar were failures. Farragut felt extremely uncomfortable at the prospect before him, but I convinced him that I could get the vessels over if he would place them under my control, and he consented to do so. I first tried with the *Richmond* (Commander Alden), and, although she had grounded seven times when in charge of a pilot, I succeeded at the first attempt, crossed the bar, and anchored off Pilot Town. The next trial was with the frigate *Mississippi*. The vessel was lightened as much as possible by taking out her spars, sails, guns, provisions, and coal. All the steamers of the mortar-fleet were then sent to her assistance, and after eight days' hard work they succeeded in pulling the *Mississippi* through. To get the *Pensacola* over looked even more difficult. I asked Captain Bailey to lend me the *Colorado* for a short time, and with this vessel I went as close as possible to the *Pensacola*, ran out a stream-cable to her stern, and, by backing hard on the *Colorado*, soon released her from her disagreeable position. The next day at 12 o'clock I passed her over the bar and anchored her off Pilot Town.

The U. S. Coast Survey steamer *Sachem*, commanded by a very competent officer, Mr. F. H. Gerdes, had been added to the expedition for the purpose of sounding the bar and river channel, and also to establish points and distances which should serve as guides to the commander of the mortar-flotilla. Mr. Gerdes and his assistants selected the positions of the bomb-vessels, furnished all the commanders of vessels with reliable charts, triangulated the river for eight miles below the forts, and planted small poles with white flags on the banks opposite the positions of the different vessels, each flag marked with the



PLAN OF FORT JACKSON, SHOWING THE EFFECT OF THE BOMBARDMENT, APRIL 18TH TO 24TH. FROM THE GOVERNMENT MAP SURVEYED BY J. S. HARRIS UNDER THE DIRECTION OF F. H. GERDES, U. S. COAST SURVEY.

"All the scows and boats near the fort except three small ones were sunk. The drawbridge, hot-shot furnaces, and fresh-water cisterns were destroyed. The floors of the casemates were flooded, the levee having been broken.

"All the platforms for pitching tents on were destroyed by fire or shells. All the casemates were cracked (the roof in some places being entirely broken through) and masses of brick dislodged in numerous instances. The outer walls of the fort were cracked from top to bottom, admitting daylight freely."—Inscription on the original plan.

name of a vessel and the distance from the mouth of its mortar to the center of the fort. The boats of the surveyors were frequently attacked by sharpshooters, who fired from concealed positions among the bushes of the river bank. During the bombardment the Coast Survey officers were employed day and night in watching that the vessels did not move an inch from their places, and the good effect of all this care was shown in the final result of the mortar practice.

Having finished the preliminary work, on the 16th of April Farragut moved up with his fleet to within three miles of the forts, and informed me that I might commence the bombardment as soon as I was ready. The ships all anchored as they came up, but not in very good order, which led to some complications.

The place which I had selected for the first and third divisions of the mortar-vessels was under the lee of a thick wood on the right bank of the river, which presented in the direction of the fort an almost impenetrable mass. The forts could be plainly seen from the mast-heads of the mortar-schooners, which had been so covered with brush that the Confederate gunners could not distinguish them from the trees. The leading vessel of the first

division, of seven vessels, under Lieutenant-Commanding Watson Smith, was placed at a point distant 2850 yards from Fort Jackson and 3680 yards from Fort St. Philip. The third division, commanded by Lieutenant Breese, came next in order, and the second division, under Lieutenant Queen, I placed on the east side of the river, the head of the line being 3680 yards from Fort Jackson.

The vessels now being in position, the signal was given to open fire; and on the morning of the 18th of April the bombardment fairly commenced, each mortar-vessel having orders to fire once in ten minutes.

The moment that the mortars belched forth their shells, both Jackson and St. Philip replied with great fury; but it was some time before they could obtain our range, as we were well concealed behind our natural rampart. The enemy's fire was rapid, and, finding that it was becoming rather hot, I sent Lieutenant Guest up to the head of the line to open fire on the forts with his 11-inch pivot. This position he maintained for one hour and fifty minutes, and only abandoned it to fill up with ammunition. In the meantime the mortars on the left bank (Queen's division) were doing splendid work, though suffering considerably from the enemy's fire.

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

BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHNSON K. DUNCAN, C. S. A., IN COMMAND OF FORTS JACKSON AND ST. PHILIP. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

I went on board the vessels of this division to see how they were getting on, and found them so cut up that I considered it necessary to remove them, with Farragut's permission, to the opposite shore, under cover of the trees, near the other vessels, which had suffered but little. They held their position, however, until sundown, when the enemy ceased firing.

At 5 o'clock in the evening Fort Jackson was seen to be on fire, and, as the flames spread rapidly, the Confederates soon left their guns. There were many conjectures among the officers of the fleet as to what was burning. Some thought that it was a fire-raft, and I was inclined to that opinion myself until I had pulled up the river in a boat and, by the aid of a night-glass, convinced myself that the fort itself was in flames. This fact I at once reported to Farragut.

At nightfall the crews of the mortar-vessels were completely exhausted; but when it became known that every shell was falling inside of the fort, they redoubled their exertions and increased the rapidity of their fire to a shell every five minutes, or in all two hundred and forty shells an hour. During the night, in order to allow the men to rest, we slackened our fire, and only sent a shell once every half hour. Thus ended the first day's bombardment, which was more effective than that of any other day during the siege.

Next morning the bombardment was renewed and continued night and day until the end, with a result that is thus described in a letter from Colonel Edward Higgins, dated April 4th, 1872, which I received in answer to my inquiry on the subject:

"Your mortar-vessels were placed in position on the afternoon of the 17th of April, 1862, and opened fire at once upon Fort Jackson, where my headquarters were established. The practice was excellent from the commencement of the fire to the end, and continued without intermission until the morning of the 24th of April, when the fleet passed at about 4 o'clock. Nearly every shell of the many thousand fired at the fort lodged inside of the works. On the first night of the attack the citadel and all buildings in rear of the fort were fired by bursting shell, and also the sand-bag walls that had been thrown around the magazine doors. The fire, as you are aware, raged with great fury, and no effort of ours could subdue it. At this time, and nearly all this night, Fort Jackson was helpless; its magazines were inaccessible, and we could have offered no resistance to a passing fleet. The next morning a terrible scene of destruction presented itself. The wood-work of the citadel being all destroyed, and the crumbling walls being knocked about the fort by the bursting shells, made matters still worse for the garrison. The work of destruction from now until the morning of the 24th, when the fleet passed, was incessant.

"I was obliged to confine the men most rigidly to the casemates, or we should have lost the best part of the garrison. A shell, striking the parapet over one of the magazines, the wall of which was seven feet thick, penetrated five feet and failed to burst. If that shell had exploded, your work would have ended. Another burst near the magazine door, opening the earth and burying the sentinel and another man five feet in the same grave. The parapets and interior of the fort were completely honeycombed, and the large number of sand-bags with which we were supplied alone saved us from being blown to pieces a hundred times, our magazine doors being much exposed.

"On the morning of the 24th, when the fleet passed, the terrible precision with which your formidable vessels hailed down their tons of bursting shell upon the devoted fort made it impossible for us to obtain either rapidity or accuracy of fire, and thus rendered the passage comparatively easy. There was no very considerable damage done to our batteries, but few of the guns being dismounted by your fire; everything else in and around the fort was destroyed."

I was not ignorant of the state of affairs in the fort; for, on the third day of the bombardment, a deserter presented himself and gave us an account of the



MAP SHOWING THE DEFENSES OF THE MISSISSIPPI AND THE POSITIONS OF THE MORTAR-FLEET AT THE OPENING OF THE BOMBARDMENT.

havoc created by our shells, although I had doubts of the entire truth of his statements. He represented that hundreds of shells had fallen into the fort, breaking in the bomb-proofs, setting fire to the citadel, and flooding the interior by cutting the levees. He also stated that the soldiers were in a desperate

REAR-ADMIRAL HENRY H. BELL, AT NEW ORLEANS FARRAGUT'S CHIEF-OF-STAFF.

and demoralized condition. This was all very encouraging to us, and so stimulated the crews of the mortar-boats that they worked with unflagging zeal and energy. I took the deserter to Farragut, who, although impressed by his statement, was not quite prepared to take advantage of the opportunity; for at this time the line of hulks across the river was considered an insurmountable

obstruction, and it was determined to examine and, if possible, remove it before the advance of the fleet.

On the night of the 20th an expedition was fitted out for the purpose of breaking the chain which was supposed to extend from one shore to the other. Two steamers, the *Pinola*, Lieutenant Crosby, and *Itasca*, Lieutenant Caldwell, were detailed for the purpose and placed under the direction of Captain Bell, chief-of-staff. Although the attempt was made under cover of darkness, the sharp eyes of the Confederate gunners soon discovered their enemies, and the whole fire of Fort Jackson was concentrated upon them. I had been informed of the intended movement by Farragut, so was ready to redouble the fire of the mortars at the proper time with good effect. In Farragut's words: "Commander Porter, however, kept up such a tremendous fire on them from the mortars that the enemy's shot did the gun-boats no injury, and the cable was separated and their connection broken sufficiently to pass through on the left bank of the river."



COMMANDER JOHN K. MITCHELL, IN COMMAND OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES NAVAL FORCES AT NEW ORLEANS. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

The work of the mortar-fleet was now almost over. We had kept up a heavy fire night and day for nearly 5 days — about 2800 shells every 24 hours; in all about 16,800 shells. The men were nearly worn out for want of sleep and rest. The ammunition was giving out, one of the schooners was sunk, and although the rest had received little actual damage from the enemy's shot, they were badly shaken up by the concussion of the mortars.

On the 23d instant I represented the state of affairs to the flag-officer [see p. 72], and he concluded to move on past the works, which I felt sure he could do with but little loss to his squadron. He recognized the importance of making an immediate attack, and called a council of the commanders of vessels, which resulted in a determination to pass the forts that night. The movement was postponed, however, until the next morning, for the reason that the carpenters of one of the larger ships were at work down the river, and the commander did not wish to proceed without them. The iron-clad *Louisiana* had now made her appearance, and her commander was being strongly urged by General Duncan to drop down below the forts [see the map, p. 36] and open fire upon the fleet with his heavy rifle-guns. On the 22d General Duncan wrote to Commander Mitchell from Fort Jackson:

"It is of vital importance that the present fire of the enemy should be withdrawn from us, which you alone can do. This can be done in the manner suggested this morning under the cover of our guns, while your work on the boat can be carried on in safety and security. Our position is a critical one, dependent entirely on the powers of endurance of our casemates, many

of which have been completely shattered, and are crumbling away by repeated shocks; and, therefore, I respectfully but earnestly again urge my suggestion of this morning on your notice. Our magazines are also in danger."

Fortunately for us, Commander Mitchell was not equal to the occasion, and the *Louisiana* remained tied up to the bank, where she could not obstruct the river or throw the Union fleet into confusion while passing the forts.

While Farragut was making his preparations, the enemy left no means untried to drive the mortar-boats from their position. A couple of heavy guns in Fort St. Philip kept up a continual fire on the head of the mortar column, and the Confederates used their mortars at intervals, but only succeeded in sinking one mortar-schooner and damaging a few others. A body of riflemen was once sent out against us from the forts, but it was met by a heavy fire and soon repulsed.

Two o'clock on the morning of the 24th instant was fixed upon as the time for the fleet to start, and Farragut had previously given the necessary orders to the commanders of vessels, instructing them to prepare their ships for action by sending down their light spars, painting their hulls mud-color, etc.; also to hang their chain-cables over the sides abreast the engines, as a protection against the enemy's shot. He issued the following "General Order":

UNITED STATES FLAG-SHIP *Hartford*, MISSISSIPPI RIVER, April 20th, 1862.

The flag-officer, having heard all the opinions expressed by the different commanders, is of the opinion that whatever is to be done will have to be done quickly, or we shall be again reduced to a blockading squadron, without the means of carrying on the bombardment, as we have nearly expended all the shells and fuses, and material for making cartridges. He has always entertained the same opinions which are expressed by Commander Porter; that is, there are three modes of attack, and the question is, which is the one to be adopted? His own opinion is that a combination of two should be made, viz.: the forts should be run, and when a force is once above the forts, to protect the troops, they should be landed at quarantine from the gulf side by bringing them through the bayou, and then our forces should move up the river, mutually aiding each other as it can be done to advantage.



LIEUTENANT THOMAS B. HUGER, C. S. N., IN COMMAND OF THE "McRAE." FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

When, in the opinion of the flag-officer, the propitious time has arrived, the signal will be made to weigh and advance to the conflict. If, in his opinion, at the time of arriving at the respective positions of the different divisions of the fleet, we have the advantage, he will make the signal for close action, No. 8, and abide the result, conquer or to be conquered, drop anchor or keep under way, as in his opinion is best.

Unless the signal above mentioned is made, it will be understood that the first order of sailing will be formed after leaving Fort St. Philip, and we will proceed up the river in accordance with the original opinion expressed. The programme of the order of sailing accompanies this general order, and the commanders will hold themselves in readiness for the service as indicated.\ Very respectfully, your obedient servant, D. G. FARRAGUT, Flag-Officer West Gulf Blockading Squadron.

\ The order of battle for the fleet was inclosed with this, but as it was not adopted and contained errors afterward officially corrected by Farragut, it is here omitted.—EDITORS.

WRECKS OF CONFEDERATE RIVER FLEET.
FORT ST. PHILIP AND CONFEDERATE IRON-CLAD "LOUISIANA."

MORTAR-FLEET IN THE DISTANCE.
MORTAR-STEAMERS ATTACKING WATER-BATTERY, FORT JACKSON.
FARRAGUT'S DIVISION OF THE FLEET, LED BY THE "HARTFORD."

"RICHMOND."
"MANASSAS," CONFEDERATE.
CONFEDERATE RAMS AND SINKING VESSELS.

FORT JACKSON.
"IROQUOIS."
"McRAE," CONFEDERATE.
REAR VESSEL OF SAILEY'S DIVISION.

BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF THE PASSAGE OF THE FORTS BELOW NEW ORLEANS, APRIL 24, 1862. THE SECOND DIVISION IN ACTION, 4:15 A. M.

Farragut's first plan was to lead the fleet with his flag-ship, the *Hartford*, to be closely followed by the *Brooklyn*, *Richmond*, *Pensacola*, and *Mississippi*, thinking it well to have his heavy vessels in the van, where they could immediately crush any naval force that might appear against them. This plan was a better one than that afterward adopted; but he was induced to change the order of his column by the senior commanders of the fleet, who represented to him that it was unwise for the commander-in-chief to take the brunt of the battle. They finally obtained his reluctant consent to an arrangement by which Captain Bailey was to lead in the gun-boat *Cayuga*, commanded by Lieutenant N. B. Harrison,—a good selection, as it afterward proved, for these officers were gallant and competent men, well qualified for the position. Captain Bailey had volunteered for the service, and left nothing undone to overcome Farragut's reluctance to give up what was then considered the post of danger, though it turned out to be less hazardous than the places in the rear.

The mortar-flotilla steamers under my command were directed to move up before the fleet weighed anchor, and to be ready to engage the water-batteries of Fort Jackson as the fleet passed. These batteries mounted some of the heaviest guns in the defenses, and were depended upon to do efficient work.

The commanders of vessels were informed of the change of plan, and instructed to follow in line according to the subjoined order of attack:

ORDER OF ATTACK.

First Division,
Captain Bailey.

- *Cayuga.*
- *Pensacola.*
- *Mississippi.*
- *Oneida.*
- *Varuna.*
- *Katahdin.*
- *Kineo.*
- *Wissahickon.*

Center Division,
Flag-Officer Farragut.

- *Hartford.*
- *Brooklyn.*
- *Richmond.*

Third Division,
Captain H. H. Bell.

- *Sciota.*
- *Iroquois.*
- *Kennebec.*
- *Pinola.*
- *Itasca.*
- *Winona.*

At 2 o'clock on the morning of April 24th all of the Union vessels began to heave up their anchors. It was a still, clear night, and the click of the capstans, with the grating of the chain-cables as they passed through the hawse-holes, made a great noise, which we feared would serve as a warning to our enemies. This conjecture proved to be correct, for the Confederates were on the alert in both forts and steamers to meet the invaders. One fact only was in our favor, and that was the division of their forces under three different heads, which prevented unanimity of action. In every other respect the odds were against us.

Before Farragut ascended the river, the French admiral and Captain Preedy, of the English frigate *Mersey*, had both been up as far as the forts and had communicated with the military commanders. On their return, they gave discouraging accounts of the defenses, and pronounced it impossible for our fleet to pass them. This, of course, did not tend to cheer our sailors. There were some in the fleet who were doubtful of success, and there was not that confidence on our side that should have existed on such an occasion; but when it was seen that the river obstructions and rafts had been washed away by the currents, and that there appeared to be an open way up the river, every one became more hopeful.

CAPTAIN THEODORUS BAILEY, IN THE "CAYUGA," BREAKING THROUGH THE CONFEDERATE FLEET.

The entire fleet did not get fully under way until half-past 2 A. M. The current was strong, and although the ships proceeded as rapidly as their steam-power would permit, our leading vessel, the *Cayuga*, did not get under fire until a quarter of 3 o'clock, when both Jackson and St. Philip opened on her at the same moment. Five steamers of the mortar-flotilla took their position below the water-battery of Fort Jackson, at a distance of less than two hundred yards, and, pouring in grape, canister, and shrapnel, kept down the fire of that battery. The mortars opened at the same moment with great fury, and the action commenced in earnest.

Captain Bailey, in the *Cayuga*, followed by the other vessels of his division in compact order, passed the line of obstructions without difficulty. He had no sooner attained this point, however, than he was obliged to face the guns of Fort St. Philip, which did him some damage before he was able to fire a shot in return. He kept steadily on, however, and, as soon as his guns could be brought to bear, poured in grape and canister with good effect and passed safe above. He was here met by the enemy's gun-boats, and, although he was beset by several large steamers at the same time, he succeeded in driving them off. The *Oneida* and *Varuna* came to the support of their leader, and by the rapid fire of their heavy guns soon dispersed the enemy's flotilla. This was more congenial work for our men and officers than that through which they had just passed, and it was soon evident that the coolness and discipline of our navy gave it a great advantage over the fleet of the enemy. Bailey dashed on up the river, followed by his division, firing into everything they met; and soon after the head of the flag-officer's division had passed the forts, most of the river craft were disabled, and the battle was virtually won. This was evident even to Lieutenant-Colonel Higgins, who, when he saw our large ships pass by, exclaimed, "Better go to cover, boys; our cake is all dough!"

In the meantime the *Varuna*, being a swift vessel, passed ahead of the other ships in the division, and pushed on up the river after the fleeing enemy, until she found herself right in the midst of them. The Confederates, supposing in the dark that the *Varuna* was one of their own vessels, did not attack her until Commander Boggs made himself known by

delivering his fire right and left. One shot exploded the boiler of a large steamer crowded with troops, and she drifted ashore; three other vessels were driven ashore in flames. At daylight the *Varuna* was attacked by the *Governor Moore*, a powerful steamer, fitted as a ram, and commanded by Lieutenant Beverley Kennon, late of the U. S. Navy. This vessel raked the *Varuna* with her bow-gun along the port gangway, killing 5 or 6 men; and while the Union vessel was gallantly returning this fire, her side was pierced twice by the iron prow of the ram. The Confederate ram *Stonewall Jackson* also attacked the *Varuna*, ramming her twice about amidships; the *Varuna* at the same moment punished her severely with grape and canister from her 8-inch guns, and finally drove her out of action in a disabled condition and in flames.☆ But the career of the *Varuna* was ended; she began to fill rapidly, and her gallant commander was obliged to run her into shoal water, where she soon went to the bottom. Captain Lee, of the *Oneida*, seeing that his companion needed assistance, went to his relief, and rescued the officers and men of the *Varuna*. The two Confederate rams were set on fire by their crews and abandoned. Great gallantry was displayed on both sides during the conflict of these smaller steamers, which really bore the brunt of the battle, and the Union commanders showed great skill in managing their vessels.

Bailey's division may be said to have swept everything before it. The *Pensacola*, with her heavy batteries, drove the men from the guns at Fort St. Philip, and made it easier for the ships astern to get by. Fort St. Philip had not been at all damaged by the mortars, as it was virtually beyond their reach, and it was from the guns of that work that our ships received the greatest injury.

As most of the vessels of Bailey's division swept past the turn above the forts, Farragut came upon the scene with the *Hartford* and *Brooklyn*. The other ship of Farragut's division, the *Richmond*, Commander James Alden, got out of the line and passed up on the west side of the river, near where I was engaged with the mortar-steamers in silencing the water-batteries of Fort Jackson. At this moment the Confederates in Fort Jackson had nearly all been driven from their guns by bombs from the mortar-boats and the grape and canister from the steamers. I hailed Alden, and told him to pass close to the fort and in the eddy, and he would receive little damage. He followed this advice, and passed by very comfortably.

By this time the river had been illuminated by two fire-rafts, and everything could be seen as by the light of day. I could see every ship and gunboat as she passed up as plainly as possible, and noted all their positions.

It would be a difficult undertaking at any time to keep a long line of vessels in compact order when ascending a crooked channel against a three-and-a-half-knot current, and our commanders found it to be especially so under the present trying circumstances. The *Iroquois*, Commander De Camp, as gallant an officer as ever lived, got out of line and passed up ahead of her

☆ According to the testimony of Captain Philips, of the *Stonewall Jackson*, the shock which she received in striking the *Varuna* shifted the boiler and broke the steam-pipe connections, thus disabling the vessel. — EDITORS.



REAR-ADMIRAL THEODORUS BAILEY, AT NEW ORLEANS IN COMMAND OF THE FIRST DIVISION OF THE FLEET. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

consorts; but De Camp made good use of his opportunity by engaging and driving off a ram and the gun-boat *McRae*, which attacked him as soon as he had passed Fort Jackson. The *McRae* was disabled and her commander (Huger) mortally wounded. The *Iroquois* was much cut up by Fort St. Philip and the gun-boats, but did not receive a single shot from Fort Jackson, although passing within fifty yards of it.

While the events above mentioned were taking place, Farragut had engaged Fort St. Philip at close quarters with his heavy ships, and had driven the men from their guns. He was passing on up the river, when his flag-ship was threatened by a new and formidable adversary. A fire-raft in full blaze was seen coming down the river, guided toward the *Hartford* by a tug-boat, the *Mosher*. It seemed impossible to avoid this danger, and as the helm was put to port in the attempt to do so, the flag-ship ran upon a shoal. While in this position the fire-raft was pushed against her, and in a minute she was enveloped in flames half-way up to her tops, and was in a condition of great peril. The fire department was at once called away, and while the *Hartford's* batteries kept up the fight with Fort St. Philip, the flames were extinguished and the vessel backed off the shoal into deep water,— a result due to the cool-

ness of her commander and the good discipline of the officers and men. While the *Hartford* was in this perilous position, and her entire destruction was threatened, Farragut showed all the qualities of a great commander. He walked up and down the poop as coolly as though on dress-parade, while Commander Wainwright directed the firemen in putting out the flames. At times the fire would rush through the ports and almost drive the men from the guns.

"Don't flinch from that fire, boys," sang out Farragut; "there's a hotter fire than that for those who don't do their duty! Give that rascally little tug a shot, and don't let her go off with a whole coat!" The *Mosher* was sunk.

While passing the forts the *Hartford* was struck thirty-two times in hull and rigging, and had 3 men killed and 10 wounded.

The *Brooklyn*, Captain Thomas T. Craven, followed as close after the flag-ship as the blinding smoke from guns and fire-rafts would admit, and the garrison of the fort was again driven to cover by the fire of her heavy battery. She passed on with severe punishment, and was immediately attacked by the most powerful vessel in the Confederate fleet, excepting the *Louisiana* — the ram *Manassas*, commanded by Lieutenant Warley, a gallant young officer of the old service. The blow that the *Manassas* struck the *Brooklyn* did but little apparent injury, [1] and the ram slid off in the dark to seek other prey. (It must be remembered that these scenes were being enacted on a dark night, and in an atmosphere filled with dense smoke, through which our commanders had to grope their way, guided only by the flashes of the guns in the forts and the fitful light of burning vessels and rafts.) The *Brooklyn* was next attacked by a large steamer, which received her broadside at the distance of twenty yards, and drifted out of action in flames. Notwithstanding the heavy fire which the *Brooklyn* had gone through, she was only struck seventeen times in the hull. She lost 9 men killed and 26 wounded.



REAR-ADMIRAL MELANCTON SMITH, AT NEW ORLEANS IN COMMAND OF THE "MISSISSIPPI." DRAWN FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

When our large ships had passed the forts, the affair was virtually over. Had they all been near the head of the column, the enemy would have been crushed at once, and the flag-ship would have passed up almost unhurt. As it was, the *Hartford* was more exposed and imperiled than any of her consorts, and that at a time when, if anything had happened to the commander-in-chief, the fleet would have been thrown into confusion.

[1] Owing to the chain armor and to the full coal-bunker; but when the bunker was emptied later, the wound was found to be serious. See Commander Bartlett's article, page 56.— EDITORS.

The forts had been so thoroughly silenced by the ships' guns and mortars that when Captain Bell came along in the little *Sciota*, at the head of the third division, he passed by nearly unharmed. All the other vessels succeeded in getting by, except the *Itasca*, Lieutenant Caldwell, the *Winona*, Lieutenant Nichols, and the *Kennebec*, Lieutenant Russell. The first two vessels, having kept in line, were caught at daylight below the forts without support, and, as the current was swift and they were slow steamers, they became mere targets for the Confederates, who now turned all that was left of their fighting power upon them. Seeing their helpless condition, I signaled them to retire, which they did after being seriously cut up. The *Itasca* had a shot through her boiler, and was so completely riddled that her commander was obliged to run her ashore just below the mortar-fleet in order to prevent her sinking. She had received fourteen shot and shell through her hull, but her list of killed and wounded was small. Had not the people in the forts been completely demoralized, they would have sunk these two vessels in ten minutes.

While these events were taking place, the mortar-steamers had driven the men from the water-batteries and had kept up a steady fire on the walls of Fort Jackson. Although at first sight my position in front of these batteries, which mounted six of the heaviest guns in the Confederate works (1 10-inch and 2 8-inch Columbiads, 1 10-inch sea-coast mortar, and 2 rifled 32-pounders), seemed a very perilous one, it was not at all so. I ran the steamers close alongside of the levee just below the water-batteries, and thus protected their hulls below the firing-decks. I got in my first broadside just as the middle of Bailey's column was opened upon by Fort Jackson. The enemy responded quickly, but our fire was so rapid and accurate that in ten minutes the water-battery was deserted. I had 25 8-inch and 32-pounders on one side and 2 11-inch pivot-guns. During the remainder of the action I devoted most of



THE COURSE OF THE UNITED STATES SCREW-SLOOP "MISSISSIPPI" IN THE PASSAGE OF THE FORTS.



THE UNITED STATES STEAMER "MISSISSIPPI" ATTEMPTING TO RUN DOWN THE CONFEDERATE RAM "MANASSAS."

my attention to the battlements of the main fort, firing an occasional shot at the water-battery. The *Harriet Lane* had two men killed, but the only damage done to the vessels was to their masts and rigging, their hulls having been well protected by the levees.

While engaged on this duty I had an excellent opportunity of witnessing the movements of Farragut's fleet, and, by the aid of powerful night-glasses, I could almost distinguish persons on the vessels. The whole scene looked like a beautiful panorama. From almost perfect silence — the steamers moving slowly through the water like phantom ships — one incessant roar of heavy cannon commenced, the Confederate forts and gun-boats opening together on the head of our line as it came within range. The Union vessels returned the fire as they came up, and soon the guns of our fleet joined in the thunder, which seemed to shake the very earth. A lurid glare was thrown over the scene by the burning rafts, and, as the bomb-shells crossed each other and exploded in the air, it seemed as if a battle were taking place in the heavens as well as on the earth. It all ended as suddenly as it had commenced. In one hour and ten minutes after the vessels of the fleet had weighed anchor, the affair was virtually over, and Farragut was pushing on toward New Orleans, where he was soon to crush the last hope of Rebellion in that quarter by opening the way for the advance of the Union army.

From what I had seen of the conflict I did not greatly fear for the safety of our ships. Now and then a wreck came floating by, all charred and disabled, but I noted that these were side-wheel vessels, and none of ours.

I must refer here to a gallant affair which took place between the *Mississippi* and the ram *Manassas*. The latter vessel proved the most troublesome of the Confederate fleet. She had rammed the *Brooklyn* and the *Mississippi* at different times during the action.

At early daylight, as the vessels approached the quarantine above the forts, the *Manassas* was seen coming up the river as rapidly as her steam would allow.



THE CONFEDERATE IRON-CLAD, "LOUISIANA" ON THE WAY TO FORT ST. PHILIP.[1]

As she approached the fleet, Flag-Officer Farragut directed Commander Smith in the *Mississippi* to turn and run her down. The order was instantly obeyed by the *Mississippi* turning and going at the ram at full speed; but when it was expected to see the *Manassas* annihilated, the vessels being within fifty yards of each other, the ram put her helm hard-a-port, dodged the *Mississippi*, and ran ashore, where her crew deserted her. Commander Smith set fire to her, and then so riddled her with shot that she was dislodged from the bank and drifted below the forts, where she blew up and sank.

Previous to this a kind of guerrilla warfare had been carried on, and most of the enemy's river boats had been run ashore or otherwise destroyed, while the *Varuna* lay sunk at the bank with two of her adversaries wrecked beside her, a monument to the gallantry of Commander Boggs.

When the fleet had passed the forts, and there was no longer any necessity for me to hold my position, I dropped down the river with the steamers to where the mortar-boats were anchored, and gave the signal to cease firing. I knew that our squadron had failed to destroy all of the enemy's fleet. The iron-clad *Louisiana* lay at the bank apparently uninjured, the *McRae* was at anchor close to Fort Jackson, and three other vessels whose character I could not make out were moving back and forth from one shore to the other.

[1] Mr. William C. Whittle, who was third lieutenant on the *Louisiana* during the contest against Farragut's fleet in the Mississippi, has sent to the Editors the following statement concerning her armament:

"The hull of the *Louisiana* was almost entirely submerged. Upon this were built her heavy upper works, intended to contain her battery, machinery, etc. This extended to within about twenty-five feet of her stem and stern, leaving a little deck forward and aft, nearly even with the water, and surrounded by a slight bulwark. The structure on the hull had its ends and sides inclined inward and upward from the hull, at an angle of about forty-five degrees, and covered with T railroad iron, the lower layer being firmly bolted to the woodwork, and the upper layer driven into it from the end so as to form a nearly solid plate and a somewhat smooth surface. This plating resisted the projectiles of Farragut's fleet (none of which perforated our side), although one of his largest ships lay across and touching our stem, and in that position fired her heavy guns. Above this structure was an open deck which was surrounded by a sheet-iron bulwark about four feet high, which was intended as a protection against sharp-shooters and small arms, but was entirely inefficient, as the death of our gallant commander, McIntosh, and those who fell around him, goes to prove. The plan for propelling the *Louisiana* was novel and abortive. She had two propellers aft, which we never had an opportunity of testing. The novel conception, which proved entirely inefficient, was that right in the center section of the vessel there was a large well in which worked the two wheels, one immediately forward of the other. I suppose they were so placed to be protected from the enemy's fire. The machinery of these two wheels was in order when my father, Commodore W. C. Whittle, the naval commanding officer at New Orleans, against his better judgment, was compelled to send the vessel down to the forts. The vessel left New Orleans on the 20th of April, I think. The work on the propellers was incomplete, the machinists and mechanics being still on board, and most of the guns were not mounted. The center wheels were started, but were entirely inefficient, and, as we were drifting helplessly down the stream, tow-boats had to be called to take us down to the point about half a mile above Fort St. Philip, on the left side of the river, where we tied up to the bank with our bow down-stream. Thus, as Farragut's fleet came up and passed, we could only use our bow-guns and the starboard broadside. Moreover, the port-holes for our guns were entirely faulty, not allowing room to train the guns either laterally or in elevation. I had practical experience of this fact, for I had immediate charge of the bow division when a vessel of Admiral Farragut's fleet got across our stem, and I could only fire through and through her at point-blank instead of depressing my guns and sinking her."

This looked serious, for such a force, if properly handled, was superior to mine; and I had to provide immediately against contingencies. There were now seven efficient gun-boats under my command, and I at once prepared them to meet the enemy. My plan was to get as many of my vessels as possible alongside of the *Louisiana*, each one to make fast to her, let go two anchors, and then "fight it out on that line."

Meantime Farragut was speeding on his way up the river with all his fleet except the *Mississippi* ☆ and one or two small gun-boats, which were left to guard the lazaretto. On his way up the flag-officer encountered more Confederate batteries at Chalmette, the place made famous by the battle of January 8th, 1815.

The Chalmette batteries on both sides of the river mounted twenty heavy guns, and were all ready to meet our fleet, which was advancing toward them in two lines as rapidly as the swift current would permit. Farragut made short work of them, however, and our fleet, meeting with no further resistance, passed on and anchored before New Orleans. The Queen City of the South lay at the conqueror's feet, unable to do anything in the way of defense, as the Confederate General Lovell had retreated, leaving the city in the hands of the civil authorities.



THE PLAN OF THE "LOUISIANA." AFTER A SKETCH MADE BY COMMANDER J. K. MITCHELL ABOUT THE TIME OF THE ENGAGEMENT.

A A, Bulkhead around wheels. B B, Guns used in action.

At noon of the 25th instant I sent Lieutenant-Commanding Guest with a flag of truce to Fort Jackson, to call on the commanding officer to surrender the two forts and what was left of the Confederate navy into the possession of the United States, telling him that it was useless to have any more bloodshed, as Farragut had passed up the river with very little damage to his fleet, and was now probably in possession of New Orleans. I also took advantage of the occasion to compliment the enemy on his gallant resistance, and further to inform him that, if his answer was unfavorable, I would renew the bombardment. General Duncan sent me a very civil reply, but declined to surrender until he should hear from New Orleans; whereupon I immediately opened a very rapid fire on Fort Jackson with all the mortars, and with such good effect that a mutiny soon broke out among the Confederate gunners, many of whom, refusing to stay in the fort and be slaughtered uselessly, left

☆ In a letter to the Editors, Rear-Admiral Melancton Smith, who commanded the *Mississippi*, says: "The *Mississippi* proceeded with the fleet up the river and was present at the engagement with the Chalmette batteries. At 3 P. M. the same day, when at anchor off New Orleans, I was ordered to return to the quarantine station (just above Fort St. Philip) to look after the *Louisiana* and to cover the landing of the troops under General Butler. Admiral Porter, seeing the *Mississippi* the morning after the fleet passed up, doubtless supposed it had remained at anchor below."—EDITORS.



"CLIFTON" AND "WESTFIELD," ALTERED NEW YORK CITY FERRY BOATS. "OWASCO." "HARRIET LANE."

MORTAR-STEAMERS ATTACKING THE WATER-BATTERY OF FORT JACKSON.

their posts and went up the bank out of range of our shell. Those who remained declined to fight any longer. They had borne without flinching a terrible bombardment, and their officers had exposed themselves throughout the trying ordeal with great courage; but it was now the opinion of all that the fort should be surrendered without further loss of life. The mortars kept up their fire until late in the evening, when their bomb-shells were all expended. On the 26th instant I ordered the schooners to get under way, proceed to Pilot Town, and fill up with ammunition. Six of them were ordered to cross the bar and proceed to the rear of Fort Jackson, and be ready to open fire when signaled.

In the meantime we kept an eye upon the *Louisiana* and the Confederate gun-boats. On the 27th instant five mortar-vessels appeared in the rear of Fort Jackson, and the U. S. steamer *Miami* commenced landing troops close to Fort St. Philip. The garrison of Jackson was still mutinous, refusing to do duty, and General Duncan at midnight of the 28th sent an officer on board the *Harriet Lane* to inform me of his readiness to capitulate. On the following day I proceeded with nine gun-boats up to Fort Jackson, under a flag of truce, and upon arrival sent a boat for the commanding officer of the river defenses, and such others as he might think proper to bring with him.

I received these officers at the gangway, and treated them as brave men who had defended their trusts with a courage worthy of all praise; and though I knew that they felt mortified at having to surrender to what they must have known was in some respects an inferior force, their bearing was that of men who had gained a victory, instead of undergoing defeat.

I knew nothing of the mutiny in the forts, or the inconvenience to which the people there were subjected; I was in total ignorance of what was happening up the river, whether Farragut had sustained much damage in

passing the forts, or whether he had been able to get by the formidable batteries at English Turn. In any case I knew that it was important to obtain possession of the forts as quickly as possible, and had prepared terms of capitulation, which were accepted by General Duncan and Lieutenant-Colonel Higgins As we were about to sign the articles, I was quite surprised to find that it was not expected that the vessels of war were to be included in the terms agreed to by the Confederate officers.⚓ General Duncan told me that he had no authority whatever over the naval vessels, and that, in fact, Commander Mitchell, of the regular naval forces, had set the military authorities at defiance. So I waived the point, being determined in my own mind what I would do when the forts were in our possession.

We were all sitting at the table on board the *Harriet Lane*, with the terms of capitulation before us; I had signed the paper, as had also Commander Renshaw, of the *Westfield;* and Lieutenant-Commanding Wainwright, of the *Harriet Lane*, was about to follow our example, when he was suddenly called on deck by one of his officers. He returned immediately, and informed me that the iron-clad *Louisiana* was in flames and was drifting down the river toward the mortar-flotilla (steamers), through which there was not room for her to pass, as our vessels were anchored within thirty yards of each other.

"This is sharp practice," I said to the Confederate officers, "but if *you* can stand the explosion when it comes, we can. We will go on and finish the capitulation." At the same time I gave Lieutenant Wainwright orders to hail the vessel next to him and pass the word to each of the others to veer to the end of their chains and be ready, by using steam, to sheer out of the way of the *Louisiana* if necessary, but not to leave their anchorage. Then I handed the pen to General Duncan and Colonel Higgins, who coolly signed their names in as bold a hand as if they were not momentarily in danger of being blown up. Then we all sat quietly awaiting the result. In a few moments an explosion took place that fairly shook us all out of our seats and threw the *Harriet Lane* over on her side, but we finished the terms of capitulation. The *Louisiana* had blown up before reaching the flotilla. The Confederate officers severely condemned this performance, and assured us that they did not feel responsible for anything that the navy did, as it was entirely under Commander Mitchell's control.

When I went on deck the *Louisiana* was nowhere to be seen, and not even a ripple showed where she had gone down. Thus we lost a powerful vessel, which would have been of much use to us in our future operations.

⚓ Mention is made in Commander Porter's letter of April 26th to Lieut.-Colonel Higgins of the Confederate vessels of war, for he says: "And the vessels lying near the forts will be surrendered to the United States Government." Lieut.-Colonel Higgins replied on April 27th that he could then entertain no proposition for a surrender; he did not allude to the Confederate war vessels. The next day he wrote as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS, FORTS JACKSON and ST. PHILIP, April 28th, 1862.— COMMODORE DAVID D. PORTER, United States Navy, Commanding Mortar Fleet.—*Sir:* Upon mature deliberation, it has been decided to accept the terms of surrender of these forts, under the conditions offered by you in your letter of the 26th inst., viz., that the officers and men shall be paroled — officers retiring with their side-arms. We have no control over the vessels afloat. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, EDWARD HIGGINS, Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding.

Admiral Porter says in a recent note [November, 1887] that he never received this letter. In his official report, dated April 30th, 1862, he says:

"On the 28th a flag of truce came on board the *Harriet Lane* proposing to surrender Jackson and St. Philip on the terms offered." EDITORS.



COMMANDER PORTER RECEIVING CONFEDERATE OFFICERS ON THE "HARRIET LANE."

General Duncan and his companions now left the *Harriet Lane* and went on shore. In less than ten minutes afterward the Confederate flags were hauled down, and both forts were delivered over to the officers appointed to take possession of them. Our victory was not yet complete, however, for the enemy's flag still floated on the river, and my next duty lay in this direction. When Commander Mitchell set fire to the *Louisiana*, he transferred his officers and men to a river steamer and ran over to the opposite shore, a mile above the forts. His movements had been reported to me, and as soon as General Duncan had left the ship I gave orders for the *Harriet Lane* to weigh anchor and beat to quarters. We steered directly for the vessel carrying Mitchell's flag, and the order was given to fire at the flag-pole; but the smoke was not out of the gun before the Confederate flag was hauled down. Lieutenant Wainwright was sent on board the enemy to take possession, and was met by Commander Mitchell, who demanded the same terms as the officers of the forts had received.† Wainwright informed him that no terms

† Commander Mitchell, in a communication to the Editors, states that "no such demand was made, but . . . the right to be treated as prisoners of war was claimed." — EDITORS.

would be granted him or his officers, that he and they would be held as close prisoners to answer for violating the sanctity of a flag of truce, and that they would all be sent to the North. Mitchell at once wrote me a letter relieving all the officers (except three or four) from the odium of having set fire to the *Louisiana*, and thus endangering the Union vessels while under a flag of truce.

I sent the prisoners up to Flag-Officer Farragut, to be disposed of as he thought best, and that was the end of the affair. The forts were ours, the city was ours, and the river was open and free all the way up to New Orleans.

After the battle the officers of the Confederate army complained greatly of Commander Mitchell's behavior, saying, first, that he had failed to coöperate heartily with the land forces; secondly, that he had not made good use of the *Louisiana* (as far as I can learn she was not ready for action when the fleet passed up, and I am of the opinion that had she been properly managed, she might have thrown our fleet into confusion); thirdly, that he had failed to ignite and send down all the fire-rafts that were under his charge, at the proper time to meet our fleet as it came up the river. He had quite a number of these tied up to the bank, and it can well be imagined what the effect of millions of burning pine-knots on thirty or forty rafts would have been, when it is remembered how seriously the *Hartford* was endangered by one of those which were actually sent.[1]



CHARLES F. McINTOSH, COMMANDER OF THE "LOUISIANA." FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

After all the defenses were in our power, I sent a steamer down to the bar and brought up one of General Butler's ships, on board of which was General Phelps with one or two regiments of infantry, who took possession of the forts.

[1] It is but just to say that Commander Mitchell and the other Confederate naval officers denied that they had any intention of endangering the Union vessels, or that they were guilty of any "sharp practice" in destroying the *Louisiana*. They were put in close confinement at Fort Warren, Boston harbor; but on making the above representations to the Secretary of the Navy they were treated as ordinary prisoners of war. A Confederate naval court of inquiry afterward investigated and approved the conduct of Commander Mitchell. The following extract from the letter from Lieutenant Whittle, quoted on page 48, bears on the point in question: "On the morning of the 24th, when Farragut's fleet passed, the work on the propellers was still incomplete, and so our vessel was only an immovable floating battery. When, on the morning of April 28th, the work was finished, and we were about to test the efficiency of the motive power, we were notified by General Duncan, commanding Forts Jackson and St. Philip, that he had accepted the terms of capitulation offered by Commander Porter and before rejected. As the *Louisiana* was not included in the surrender, and Commander Porter's fleet was coming up under a flag of truce, in answer to a flag of truce from the forts, a council of war decided to destroy the *Louisiana*, and I was dispatched by Commander Mitchell to notify Commander Porter that although we had done what we could to drown the magazine and the charges in the guns, our hawsers might burn, and the *Louisiana* drift down among his vessels. While on my way to deliver this message the *Louisiana* blew up. I continued, however, and delivered the message in person to Commander D. D. Porter on board his flag-ship, the *Harriet Lane*." — EDITORS.

EXPLOSION OF THE CONFEDERATE RAM, "LOUISIANA."

Farragut's vessels were only struck twenty-three times in their hulls by shots from Fort Jackson, while they received their great damage from Fort St. Philip, as appears from the official reports. This shows how difficult it was for the Confederate gunners in the former work to fight while enduring the terrible pounding of the mortars. There can be no doubt that their fire prevented a greater loss of life in the Federal fleet and materially assisted toward the final result. Our total loss in the fleet was—killed, 37; wounded, 147. The ships which suffered most were the *Pensacola*, 37; *Brooklyn*, 35; and *Iroquois*, 28.

When the sun rose on the Federal fleet the morning after the fight, it shone on smiling faces, even among those who were suffering from their wounds. Farragut received the congratulations of his officers with the same imperturbability that he had exhibited all through the eventful battle; and while he showed great feeling for those of his men who had been killed or wounded, he did not waste time in vain regrets, but made the signal, "Push on to New Orleans." The fact that he had won imperishable fame did not seem to occur to him, so intent were his thoughts on following up his great victory to the end.



THE CONFEDERATE "RIVER DEFENSE" RAM "STONEWALL JACKSON."



FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN VIRGINIA IN 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL BENJAMIN F. BUTLER, COMMANDER OF THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE NEW ORLEANS EXPEDITION.



ASPECT OF FORT JACKSON IN 1885. FROM THE SUMMIT OF THE LEVEE LOOKING SOUTH FROM THE RIVER.

THE "BROOKLYN" AT THE PASSAGE OF THE FORTS.

BY COMMANDER JOHN RUSSELL BARTLETT, U. S. N.

FROM February 2d to March 7th, 1862, the United States steamer *Brooklyn*, Captain Thomas T. Craven, was engaged in blockading Pass à l'Outre, one of the mouths of the Mississippi River. It is impossible to describe the monotony of the life on board ship during this period. Most of the time there was a dense fog, so thick that we could not see the length of the ship. The fog collected in the rigging, and there was a constant dripping from aloft like rain, which kept the decks wet and made things generally uncomfortable. No news was received from the North, and our waiting and watching seemed endless. We had our routine of drill each day, but nothing to talk about. Our only excitement was the lookout at the main-topgallant cross-tree, who was above the fog-bank, shouting "Smoke h-oo!" It was a great relief to shout through the deck-trumpet, "Where away?" but the answer was always the same,—"Up the river, sir!" Days and weeks went by, and the smoke came no nearer. Once only, on February 24th, it came out of the river, and we had an exciting chase of a blockade-runner, following her for miles, with an officer aloft conning the ship by the smoke seen above the fog; we captured the chase, which proved to be the steamer *Magnolia* with 1200 bales of cotton.

At last the spell was broken, for on the 7th of March the *Hartford* and *Pensacola* arrived with Captain D. G. Farragut, then flag-officer commanding the West Gulf Blockading Squadron, and we learned that we were going to open the Mississippi River.

I had never met Farragut, but had heard of him from officers who were with him in the *Brooklyn* on her previous cruise. He had been represented as a man of most determined will and character—a man who would assume any responsibility to accomplish necessary ends. I saw a great deal of him at the Head of the Passes and after we passed the forts. Often, when I came on board the *Hartford* with a message from the captain of the *Brooklyn*, Farragut sent me somewhere to carry an order or to do certain duty. I was much impressed with his energy and activity and his promptness of decision and action. He had a winning smile and a most charming manner and was jovial and talkative. He prided himself on his agility, and I remember his telling

FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

D. H. Hill

me once that he always turned a handspring on his birthday, and should not consider that he was getting old until he was unable to do it. The officers who had the good fortune to be immediately associated with him seemed to worship him. He had determination and dash in execution, but in planning and organizing he appeared to want method. He showed me one day an old envelope containing memoranda, and said that that was all the record or books that he kept. He had, however, the good fortune to have on his staff two of the best organizers and administrators of detail in the service,—Captains Henry H. Bell at New Orleans and Percival Drayton at Mobile.

On the 15th of March we began to congregate at the Head of the Passes, and at this time the energy and activity of the flag-officer made themselves felt. We lay here several weeks preparing our ships for the coming action, drilling the crews, firing at targets, and getting in provisions and coal. Farragut was about the fleet from early dawn until dark, and if any officers or men had not spontaneous enthusiasm he certainly infused it into them. I have been on the morning watch, from 4 to 8, when he would row alongside the ship at 6 o'clock, either hailing to ask how we were getting along, or, perhaps, climbing over the side to see for himself. One of the preparations that we made at the Head of the Passes was to hang the chain-cables along each side, abreast of the engine and boilers. A jack-stay, or iron rod, was fastened by means of eye-bolts to the ship's side about eight feet above the water, and one of the chain-cables in bights was suspended to it and fastened with spun yarn. The links of the cable were of iron an inch and a half in diameter, and each strand, or bight, was lapped over the next, the links fitting between each other so that it made an almost continuous coat of mail. It extended about two feet below the water-line. Around the steam-drum, which rose five feet above the berth-deck, sand-bags were piled, and the sick-bay, in the bow, was filled solid with hawsers and rigging, taken from the hold, which had been cleared to form a hospital for the surgeon. Everything was arranged for the convenience of the surgeon in attending the wounded. At the main hatch a cot-frame was rigged and slung from two davits so that the wounded men could be lowered to the berth-deck and thence carried to the surgeon in the forehold. A howitzer was placed in the foretop and one in the maintop. A large kedge-anchor was hung to the main brace bumkin on each quarter, with a hawser attached, to be used whenever it became necessary to turn the ship suddenly.



SECTION OF CHAIN ARMOR PLACED ON THE SIDE OF THE "BROOKLYN" TO PROTECT HER BOILERS. FROM A SKETCH LENT BY COMMANDER BARTLETT.

There was considerable delay in getting the larger vessels over the bar and in filling up with ammunition and coal. At last, on April 16th, Farragut steamed up with the fleet and anchored just below the point where Porter's mortar-



ADMIRAL DAVID D. PORTER, IN COMMAND OF THE MORTAR-FLEET AT FORTS JACKSON AND ST. PHILIP. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

vessels, or, as the sailors used to call them, the "bummers," had taken their position and had made ready to open fire upon the forts. Admiral Porter has described in this work the part taken by these vessels in the opening of the lower Mississippi. I can vouch for the accuracy of their aim, for I used to sit on the cross-trees all day, when not on duty, seeing the shells fall into the fort and witnessing the havoc they made in it.

We had plenty of occupation while anchored below the forts, and as an accompaniment one of the mortars was fired every half minute all day. It was trying work for the poor fellows on the mortar-schooners, for when their mortar was fired, all of them were obliged to go aft and stand on tiptoe with open mouths to receive the concussion. The powder blackened everything.

and the men looked like negroes. At intervals fire-rafts came down. The first one caused much alarm, and we prepared to slip our cable and get out of the way. The rafts were immense flat-boats with wood piled loosely twenty feet high and saturated with tar and resin, and the flame from them would rise a hundred feet into the air. They certainly looked dangerous, but they were set adrift only one at a time and otherwise were so badly managed that in a little while they merely served to amuse us. The fleet lay under the point on the right bank, and the rafts would tend to the left bank with the strength of the current, and so pass harmlessly by or ground on the bank. Others caught in the obstructions and failed to come down. Sometimes boats from the ships were sent to help tow them away. If there had been any one man to direct the enemy's operations, and so secure concert of action, we should have fared badly; for half a dozen rafts chained together and pushed into position by their gun-boats would have made havoc with the fleet. One night five rafts were sent down, one of which had been towed over to the right bank and came almost directly into the fleet; the *Westfield* made for it and pushed it out into the stream; but it came so near that even with hose playing on the side and rigging the *Brooklyn's* paint was badly blistered.

The forts kept up a continual fire from their rifle-guns, and now and then a shell would pass uncomfortably near the ship. To keep down this fire as much as possible, and thus protect the mortar-vessels, one of the smaller sloops or two of the gun-boats were kept under way. They would steam up to the west bank under cover of the trees and suddenly shoot out into the stream and open fire with their 11-inch pivots, and then drift down-stream. As they were always in rapid motion, it was difficult for the gunners in the forts to hit them; still, a number of men were wounded.[1]

On the 23d, after five days of continual firing, Commander Porter informed the flag-officer that his men were worn out from want of sleep and rest, and that his ammunition was nearly expended. The obstructions, which had formed an apparently impassable barrier, had now been overcome. The opening of a passage through the hulks [see p. 38] was one of the most daring feats of the war, and here again the want of concert among the independent floating commands of the enemy led him to neglect the protection of what was really his main reliance for defense. The only cause for delay was now removed. Councils of war were held on board the *Hartford* every day during the bombardment, and the plan of running by the forts was fully discussed. Some of the captains thought it suicidal and believed that the whole fleet would be annihilated; others, that perhaps one or two vessels might get by, but they would be sunk by the rams. All this time Farragut maintained that it must and should be done, even if half the ships were lost. A final council was called on the afternoon of the 23d, and it was decided to attempt the passage that night. ⚓

[1] There were none killed in the sloops or gun-boats in the bombardment preceding the battle. Twenty-four men were wounded, including one on board the schooner *Norfolk Packet*. Two deaths are reported April 18th–24th, one of them on board the mortar-schooner *Arletta*, and one by a fall from the mast-head on board the *Katahdin*.—J. R. B.

⚓ In July, 1861, I was on board the steam frigate *Mississippi* when she made a visit to the South-west Pass, and having been sent to the *Powhatan*, commanded by Lieutenant D. D. Porter, near by, I

The present article is intended merely as a personal narrative of the passage of the forts as seen from the deck of the *Brooklyn*. This vessel was a flush-deck sloop-of-war, carrying 22 9-inch guns, 1 80-pounder Dahlgren rifle, and 1 30-pounder Parrott rifle. A small poop-deck extended about fifteen feet from the taffrail, and under this were the steering-wheel and binnacles. I was a midshipman on board doing lieutenant's duty, having charge of a regular watch and in command of a division of guns. My division consisted of 4 guns (2 guns' crews) at the after end of the ship. The guns were numbered in pairs 10 and 11. The No. 11 gun on the starboard side was shifted over to the port side under the poop-deck, and both the No. 11 guns were manned by the marines. It was expected that our principal work would be with our port battery directed against Fort Jackson on the right bank. My two crews manned the No. 10 gun on each side, and also prepared to man the 30-pounder on the poop if occasion should require. On each side of the poop there was a ladder to the main deck. While steaming up to the hulks and until it was necessary for me to be at my guns, I stood on the port ladder with my head above the rail, where I could watch our approach to the forts, and I mounted this ladder several times to see what was going on as we advanced.

REAR-ADMIRAL THOMAS T. CRAVEN, IN COMMAND OF THE "BROOKLYN" AT NEW ORLEANS. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

On the poop were Captain Craven, Midshipman John Anderson, who had volunteered a few days before from the *Montgomery*, which did not take part in the action, Captain's Clerk J. G. Swift, afterward a graduate of West Point and a lieutenant in the army, and two quartermasters. There was a small piece of ratline stuff carried around the poop, about waist-high. Captain Craven stood at the forward edge of the poop with his hands on this line, and did not move during the whole passage. I had the good fortune during the war to serve with many brave commanders, but I have never met in the service, or out of it, a man of such consummate coolness, such perfect apparent indifference to danger as Admiral Craven. As I write, I hear the sad news of his death.

At 2 o'clock on the morning of the 24th two red lights were hoisted at the peak of the flag-ship as a signal to get under way. All hands had been on deck since midnight to see that everything about the deck and guns was

walked up and down the quarter-deck with the commanding officer. He was very much exasperated that the department at Washington delayed sending vessels of proper draught to enter the river, and said that if he had half a dozen good vessels he would undertake to run by the forts and capture New Orleans. Admiral Porter has already recounted in this work the prominent part that he took in the opening of the Mississippi, and I therefore omit further reference to it.—J. R. B.



THE COURSE OF THE "BROOKLYN" IN THE PASSAGE OF THE FORTS.
FROM A DRAWING LENT BY COMMANDER J. R. BARTLETT.

B—*Brooklyn*, and course taken. H—*Hartford* aground. M—*Manassas* ramming the *Brooklyn*.

ready for action, and when the decks were wet down and sanded, it really began to look as if we were going to have some pretty hot business on our hands. The anchor was hove up with as little noise as possible, and at half-past 2 we steamed off, following the *Hartford* toward the entrance to the opening which had been made in the obstructions. The Confederates opened fire about 3 o'clock, when the advance division came in sight and range of the forts, and as we passed ahead of the mortar-vessels we also came in range; but the forts were so far ahead that we could not bring our broadside guns to bear. For twenty minutes we stood silent beside the guns, with the shot and shell from Forts St. Philip and Jackson passing over us and bursting everywhere in the air. As we came to the obstruction the water-battery on the Fort Jackson side opened a most destructive fire, and here the *Brooklyn* received her first shot. We gave the water-battery a broadside of grape. With our own smoke and the smoke from the vessels immediately ahead, it was impossible to direct the ship, so that we missed the opening between the hulks and brought up on the chain. We dropped back and tried again; this time the chain broke, but we swung alongside of one of the hulks, and the stream-anchor, hanging on the starboard quarter, caught, tore along the hulk, and then parted its lashings. The cable secured us just where the Confederates had the range of their guns, but somebody ran up with an axe and cut the hawser, and we began to steam up the river.† A few moments later there was a sudden jar, and the engines stopped. The propeller had no doubt struck some hard object, but no one knew the cause of the stoppage; and as Craven called out, "Stand by the starboard anchor," and a fatal pause under

†I went on the poop to help clear the hawser, and looked around for my classmate Anderson. He must have been knocked overboard by a shot when we first came to the obstructions. The anchor on the port quarter was broken off close to the stock at this point by a shot from Fort Jackson.—J. R. B.

the enemy's fire seemed imminent, a thrill of alarm ran through the ship. The alarm was groundless, however, as no injury was done, and presently the engines started again, and the ship moved on.

There were many fire-rafts, and these and the flashing of the guns and bursting shells made it almost as light as day, but the smoke from the passing fleet was so thick that at times one could see nothing ten feet from the ship. While entangled with the rafts, the *Brooklyn* was hulled a number of times; one shot from Fort Jackson struck the rail just at the break of the poop and went nearly across, plowing out the deck in its course. Another struck Barney Sands, the signal quartermaster, and cut his body almost in two. The first lieutenant, Lowry, coming along at the time, inquired who it was, and understanding the response to be "Bartlett," instead of "Barney," he passed the word that he had sent down "all that was left of poor Bartlett." As he came on deck and was about in all parts of the ship during the fight, he gave the men news of the progress of the fight and of the casualties, and for once I was completely out of existence.

The ship was now clear of the hulks and steamed up the river, throwing shells and shrapnel into Fort Jackson as fast as the guns could be loaded and fired. When just abreast of the fort a shot struck the side of the port of No. 9 gun on the port side, and at the same time a shell burst directly over the gun. The first captain's head was cut off and nine of the gun's crew were wounded. I was standing amidships between the two No. 10 guns, and was struck on the back by the splinters and thrown to the deck. I was on my feet in a moment and turned to my port gun. There were only two men standing at it, the first loader and the first sponger, who were leaning against the side of the ship: the others were all flat on deck, one of them directly in the rear of the gun. The gun had just been loaded, and I pulled this man to one side, clear of the recoil, and fired the gun. It was a time when every one felt that he must do something. After the discharge of the gun the men on the deck got up and came to their places. None of them were seriously hurt. The captain of the gun found a piece of shell inside his cap, which did not even scratch his head; another piece went through my coat-sleeve.



STAND TO HOLD GRAPE,—CALLED "LAMP-POSTS" BY THE CONFEDERATES. (SEE P. 65.)

Just after passing Fort Jackson we saw a bright glare on the starboard quarter, and a moment after Captain Craven said, in his deep bass voice, "One bell!" (to slow down), and then, "Two bells!" (to stop her). I went up the poop ladder, and there in plain sight on the left bank, just below Fort St. Philip, was the *Hartford*, with a fire-raft alongside and with flames running up the rigging on the tarred rope to the mast-head. The tug *Mosher* was near by, but I did not see the ram *Manassas*. It was evidently Craven's intention when he saw Farragut's trouble to go to his rescue. As the engine stopped, the *Brooklyn* dropped down, her head swinging to starboard, until she was on a line between Fort Jackson and the *Hartford*. The

FLAG-SHIP "HARTFORD" ATTACKED BY A FIRE-RAFT, PUSHED BY THE CONFEDERATE TUG-BOAT "MOSHER."

fort immediately opened fire on the *Brooklyn* with renewed energy, and she would have been blown out of the water had not the enemy aimed too high and sent the shot through the rigging, boats, and hammock-nettings, many of them just clearing the rail. The port battery was manned, and shell and shrapnel were fired as fast as the guns could be loaded. The *Brooklyn* remained under the fire of Fort Jackson until Craven saw Farragut free from the fire-raft, and then she steamed ahead. This was one of the coolest and bravest acts that I saw during the war, but it was not mentioned in any official report or newspaper account at the time. In fact, the *Brooklyn's* passage of the forts was hardly noticed by the newspaper correspondents, as Craven had old-fashioned ideas and would allow no reporters on board. I am glad, even at this late date, that I can put on record this act of heroism.

As the *Hartford* lay aground with the fire-raft alongside, her crew were at their work, and I saw the flag-officer distinctly on the port side of the poop looking toward us. From this point the *Brooklyn* steamed ahead, toward Fort St.

Commander Albert Kautz, who was at this time lieutenant on the *Hartford*, in a letter to the Editors thus describes this memorable scene:

"No sooner had Farragut given the order 'Hard-a-port,' than the current gave the ship a broad sheer, and her bows went hard up on a mud bank. As the fire-raft came against the port side of the ship, it became enveloped in flames. We were so near to the shore that from the bowsprit we could reach the tops of the bushes, and such a short distance above Fort St. Philip that we could distinctly hear the gunners in the casemates give their orders; and as they saw Farragut's flag at the mizzen, by the bright light, they fired with frightful rapidity. Fortunately they did not make sufficient allowance for our close proximity, and the iron hail passed over our bulwarks, doing but little damage. On the deck of the ship it was bright as noonday, but out over the majestic river, where the smoke of many guns was intensified by that of the pine-knots of the fire-rafts, it was dark as the blackest midnight. For a moment it looked as though the flag-ship was indeed doomed, but the firemen were called away, and with the energy of despair rushed aft to the quarter-deck. The flames, like so many forked tongues of hissing serpents, were piercing the air in a frightful manner that struck terror to all hearts. As I crossed from the starboard to the port side of the deck, I passed close to Farragut, who, as he looked forward and took in the situation, clasped his hands high in air, and exclaimed, 'My God, is it to end in this way!' Fortunately it was not to end as it at that instant seemed, for just then Master's Mate Allen, with the hose in his hand, jumped into the mizzen rigging, and the sheet of flame succumbed to a sheet of water. It was but the dry paint on the ship's side that made the threatening flame, which went down before the fierce attack of the firemen as rapidly as it had sprung up. As the flames died away the engines were backed 'hard,' and, as if providentially, the ram *Manassas* [mistake: see p. 90] struck the ship a blow under the counter, which shoved her stern in against the bank, causing her bow to slip off. The ship was again free; and a loud, spontaneous cheer rent the air, as the crew rushed to their guns with renewed energy." EDITORS.

Philip, and passed close to the fort, firing grape from the starboard battery. When she first came abreast of the fort there was a long blaze of musketry from the parapet, but it soon stopped when she got to work.[1] We were at this time less than one hundred feet from the bank, and the *Hartford* had passed ahead. The barbette guns of the fort not being depressed sufficiently, we received no damage while passing, but we were so close that the powder scorched the faces and clothes of the men. A bullet entered the port of No. 1 gun and struck Lieutenant James O'Kane, who had charge of the first division, in the leg. He fell to the deck, but would not allow himself to be carried below until he had himself fired two of the broadside guns into Fort St. Philip. But the most uncomfortable position on board the ship, during this part of the engagement, was that of the quartermaster, Thomas Hollins, who stood in the starboard main chains, heaving the lead and calling out the soundings. The outside of the ship near him was completely peppered with bullets, and the flames from the enemy's guns seemed almost to reach him; still he stood coolly at his post, and when abreast of the fort he was heard calling out, "Only thirteen feet, sir."



SECTION OF FORT ST. PHILIP DURING THE ENGAGEMENT. THE DETAILS OF THE FORT DRAWN FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

As we passed clear of Fort St. Philip, Captain Craven gave orders to load the starboard battery with solid shot. He had seen the iron-clad *Louisiana*, moored just above the fort. She gave us one or two shots, but when we came directly abeam of her, she closed her port shutters and received our broadside. We could hear our shot strike against her iron sides. We gave but one broadside and then sheered out into the river. A 9-inch shell, fired by the *Louisiana*, struck the *Brooklyn* about a foot above the water-line, on the starboard side of the cutwater, near the wood ends, forced its way for three feet through the dead-wood and timbers, and remained there. At New Orleans this shot was cut out, and it was found that in their hurry the gunners had neglected to remove the lead patch from the fuse, so that the shell did not explode. Had it done so it would have blown the whole bow off, and the *Brooklyn* would have gone to the bottom.

As we swung out into the current and steamed up the river, we began to see the vessels ahead fighting with the Confederate gun-boats, and a few moments later the cry came aft, "A steamer coming down on our port bow." We could see two smoke-stacks and the black smoke from them. I took a look from the poop ladder, and saw a good-sized river steamer coming down on us, crowded with men on her forward deck, as if ready to board. The order had

[1] I was afterward in charge of a boat from the *Brooklyn* which landed the paroled Confederate prisoners at New Orleans, and they said that the grape came like rain, but that the worst of all were the "infernal lamp-posts" that we fired; that the fort was full of them. These were the stands that held the grape — cylinders attached to a cast-iron base, around which the grape-shot are secured.—J. R. B.

THE "BROOKLYN" ATTACKED BY THE CONFEDERATE RAM "MANASSAS."

The *Manassas* was described by her commander, Lieutenant Warley, as "a tug-boat that had been converted into a ram, covered with half-inch iron, and had a 32-pounder carronade; her crew consisted of thirty-five persons, officers and men. She was perforated in the fight by shot and shell as if she had been made of paper."

Admiral Melancton Smith thus describes his encounter with the ram: "Having discovered the *Manassas* stealing up along the St. Philip side of the river behind me, I signaled Farragut for permission to attack, which was given. The *Mississippi* turned in mid-stream and tried to run down the ram, barely missing her, but driving her ashore, when her crew escaped, fired at by the *Kineo*, which had not yet anchored. The ram's engines were found to be still in motion, but the approach of a burning wreck compelled me to abandon the idea of attaching a hawser. Her machinery was destroyed by my boats, and after receiving a broadside or two from the *Mississippi*, she floated down the river in flames and blew up."

already been given, "Stand by to repel boarders," and to load with shrapnel; the fuses were cut to burn one second. As she approached, Craven gave the vessel a sheer to starboard, and we began with No. 1 gun, the guns aft following in quick succession, the shells bursting almost immediately as they left the guns. There was a rush of steam, shrieks from the people on board the steamer, and, when it came time for my No. 10 gun to fire, the steamer was lost in the smoke. This was the only one of the river flotilla which we encountered or fired into. Just after our engagement with this steamer, a column of black smoke, which came from the dreaded *Manassas*, was seen on the starboard side, and the cry was passed along by men who were looking out of the ports, "The ram, the ram!" Craven called out, "Give her four

bells! Put your helm hard-a-starboard!" Then I saw the smoke-stacks of the *Manassas* and the flash from her gun, and the next moment I was nearly thrown on the deck by the concussion, caused by her striking us just amidships. The ram was going full speed but against the current, and, with our helm to starboard, the blow was not at right angles to our keel, though nearly so. I ran to the No. 10 port, the gun being in, and looked out, and saw her almost directly alongside. A man came out of her little hatch aft, and ran forward along the port side of the deck, as far as the smoke-stacks, placed his hand against one, and looked to see what damage the ram had done. I saw him turn, fall over, and tumble into the water, but did not know at the moment what caused his sudden disappearance, until I asked the quarter-master, who was leadsman in the chains, if he had seen him fall.

"Why, yes, sir," said he, "I saw him fall overboard,— in fact, I helped him; for I hit him alongside of the head with my hand-lead."

No guns were fired at the ram from the starboard battery; all the crews a moment before had been at the port guns. As the *Manassas* drifted by I ran up on the poop, calling the gun's crew with me, to see if I could hit her with the 30-pounder Parrott, but we were unable to depress it sufficiently, at its high elevation, to bring it to bear before she was lost to sight in the smoke. The shot which she had fired came through the chain and planking, above the berth-deck, through a pile of rigging placed against the ship's side, and just entered the sand-bags placed to protect the steam-drum.

A few moments after this incident a vessel passed on our starboard side, not ten feet from us, and I could see through the port the men loading a pivot gun. She was directly abreast of No. 10 gun and I took the lock-string to fire, when a cry came from on board the vessel, "Don't fire, it is the *Iroquois!*" At the same moment, Lieutenant Lowry also shouted from near the mainmast, "Don't fire!" Seeing the black smoke pouring from her stack, and noticing that it was abaft the mainmast, I called to Captain Craven, "It can't be the *Iroquois!* It is not one of our vessels, for her smoke-stack is abaft her mainmast!" Captain Craven, however, repeated the order, "Don't fire!" and I obeyed. I was sure it was one of the Confederate gun-boats, but it was my duty to obey orders, and thus the Confederate gun-boat *McRae* escaped being sunk by the *Brooklyn;* for the gun had been depressed, and a 9-inch shell would have gone through her deck and out below the water-line.

Just after leaving Fort St. Philip a shot came in on the starboard quarter and went across the deck, taking off a marine's head and wounding three other men. Lieutenant Lowry came along about this time, and I heard him report to Captain Craven that Lieutenant O'Kane had been wounded. Craven directed him to put me in charge of the First Division, to which Lowry answered:

"I sent poor Bartlett down below half an hour ago cut in two."

"Oh, no, you did not," said Craven; "he is on deck close to you."

Lowry turned and was as much surprised as if he had seen a ghost, and told me to run forward and take charge of the First Division. There had been terrible havoc here. The powder-man of the pivot gun had been struck by a

REAR-ADMIRAL CHARLES S. BOGGS, AT NEW ORLEANS IN COMMAND OF THE "VARUNA." FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

shell, which exploded and blew him literally to atoms, and parts of his body were scattered all over the forecastle. The gun was disabled, a primer having broken off in the vent; but there was nothing to fire at, as all the vessels that we passed had been run on the bank and either set on fire or deserted. It was now almost daylight, and we could see the crews of the deserted boats running for cover to the woods a little way back. Shortly after, the *Brooklyn* came up with the other vessels and anchored near a point where there had been an encampment of troops. They only remained long enough to land and bury the dead. The commanding officers assembled on board the *Hartford* to offer their congratulations to the flag-officer.

About the time that the *Brooklyn* arrived at quarantine the *Manassas* was seen steaming up the river, and Farragut made signal to the *Mississippi* to attack her. [See note, p. 66.] She ran down toward her, but the *Manassas* sheered toward the left bank and ran her nose ashore. When the *Mississippi* opened fire upon her, the crew poured out of the little hatch aft, ran along the deck, and jumped on shore and over the levee into the swamp beyond.

The fleet steamed up the river during the afternoon of the 24th until dark, and then came to anchor. Nothing of importance occurred during the passage. Soon after midnight a great blaze of light was seen up the river, and fearing fire-rafts, all the vessels got under way, and remained so until daylight, when they proceeded up the river toward New Orleans. At 6 o'clock we passed a large vessel loaded with cotton on fire, and at 7:30 passed two more in the same condition. Arrived at Chalmette, four miles below the city, we found that batteries had been erected on both banks, armed with field-pieces. A few broadsides made the troops leave their guns and disperse into the country. The *Brooklyn* fired 21 shells from the 80-pound Dahlgren into the battery on the left bank and a couple of broadsides into that on the right.

The fleet steamed on to the city, passing close to the levees, which were swarming with people. They were simply a howling mob. The Confederate flags were flying about the city, and we passed so close—not more than two hundred feet from the bank—that the people called out abusive names and shouted at us in derision. In the French quarter there was apparently some disturbance, and a body of troops was seen firing a volley into the crowd. As the ship arrived abreast of the Custom-house and anchored off Canal street, a pouring rain came down, but even this did not seem to reduce the crowd.

Soon after we had anchored, burning steamers, barges, and other vessels loaded with cotton came drifting down on fire. Among the burning vessels was the Confederate iron-clad *Mississippi*. It seemed the purpose of the mob to destroy everything. During the night the city was set on fire in a dozen different places, and there was a continual ringing of fire-alarm bells.

The next day we steamed up the river, as obstructions and batteries had been reported above the city. All the fortifications were deserted, but an immense raft was found lying along the left bank. This was made of four logs lashed together side by side, with a heavy chain extending their whole length. It had been the intention of the Confederates to stretch this boom across the river to prevent Foote and his flotilla from reaching New Orleans. The barrier looked formidable as it lay under the river-bank, but when the Confederates had finished their work they could not get the raft across the river on account of the current. They made the lower end fast to the bank, and with three steamboats took the upper end and endeavored to reach the opposite bank, but the huge structure was more than they could manage, and the current swept it down the river with such force that it broke, drifted from the steamers, and swung around against the bank and so proved a failure.☆

On the day after the passage of the forts, it was noticed that the *Brooklyn* leaked more than usual, but not enough to give any alarm, as the steam-pumps were able to keep her free, and in the course of a few days the leak diminished. It was not until the coal in the starboard bunker had been used up and the side of the ship was uncovered that we realized what a blow she had received from the *Manassas*. On the outside the chain had been driven its depth into the planking, and on the inside, for a length of five feet or more, the planking was splintered and crushed in. The only thing that prevented the prow of the *Manassas* from sinking us was the fact that the bunker was full of coal.

The wound gave no trouble so long as we remained in the river, as the mud held in suspension in the river water filled up all the interstices between the fibers of the wood. When we went out to sea and rolled about a little, and the ship began to work, it was found that she leaked very badly, and she was obliged to go to Pensacola, heave down, and bolt on a large patch of plank to cover the spot where the ram had struck.

☆ The river, when we arrived at New Orleans, was higher than it ever had been known to be before, and the levees had been added to, to prevent the water from overflowing. As we found it, the water was within a few inches of the top of the levee.— J. R. B.

NOTE.— Since writing the above article, I have compared it carefully with letters I wrote to my father from New Orleans. In some instances I do not agree with the official reports in the sequence of events, but I hold to my own account. Craven says he encountered the *Manassas* a few minutes after passing the obstructions. I place this event well above the forts, and this is corroborated by Captain Warley of the *Manassas*. Farragut, in his official report, does not state exactly where he encountered the fire-raft, but says: "The fire was extinguished. In the meantime our battery was never silent, but poured its missiles of death into Fort St. Philip, opposite to which we had got by this time." I place the *Hartford* at this time just below the fort, or abreast of the lower flanking battery, as the iron-clad *Louisiana* was moored to the bank immediately above. When the *Manassas* rammed the *Brooklyn* she had two smoke-stacks, but she lost one before she drifted down the river.— J. R. B.

FARRAGUT'S CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS.

BY WILLIAM T. MEREDITH, LATE U. S. N., AND SECRETARY TO ADMIRAL FARRAGUT.

It has astonished a great many people to learn from Admiral Porter's article in "The Century" magazine [reprinted in the present work] that he was the first man to propose the opening of the Mississippi. Montgomery Blair, in the "United Service Magazine" for January, 1881, and ex-Secretary Welles, in "The Galaxy" for November, 1871, both fix the time when the discussion of the question was begun by the naval authorities, which was before the appearance of Porter on the scene at Washington. And, indeed, the importance of the great river to the South was so evident to any one who studied our coast and the South-west, that it is safe to say that the eyes of the whole nation were bent on New Orleans as a point of attack just about the time that Porter imagines he suggested it.

Why was Farragut chosen flag-officer of the squadron to attack New Orleans? The answer is that he was known as an experienced and capable officer, who was on record as having plans to capture forts with ships. He was one of the few officers of sufficient rank to command a squadron who also had the strength and vigor necessary to bear the strain of arduous duty. These were the main reasons that Mr. Welles, the Secretary, and Mr. Fox, the Assistant Secretary, had for selecting him. Besides this, his appointment met the approval of Porter, who, when consulted by the Secretary, gave his voice for Farragut. It is easy now to understand how with the lapse of time Admiral Porter has learned to think that he chose the commander of the expedition. That he could have defeated Farragut's appointment is probably true, but that he chose him is a mistake; he simply assented to the previous choice of Mr. Welles and Mr. Fox. (See articles by Welles and Blair, above referred to.)

Ex-Secretary Welles relates that the armament of the fleet had been determined, *before Farragut's appointment to the command*, after consultation with the War Department and with General McClellan, who detailed General Butler to command the land forces of the expedition. Porter, whose advice was listened to, insisted on the importance of a fleet of schooners carrying 13-inch mortars, and asserted that a bombardment of forty-eight hours would reduce Forts Jackson and St. Philip to a heap of ruins. Mr. Welles says that Mr. Fox, who was a trained naval officer, at first objected to the mortars, and advocated running by the forts with the fleet, but finally was won over by the forcible arguments of Porter, whose plan the Department fully adopted. There is evidence, given by Commander Porter himself, that he advocated bombarding the forts till they surrendered or could be captured by assault, and that he was opposed to running the fire with the fleet leaving an enemy in the rear. (See his letter on p. 71.)

The forces to attack New Orleans were fixed, measures were taken to cast thirty thousand mortar-shells, collect the fleet and transport the soldiers, before Farragut was summoned to Washington from New York. Mr. Blair says positively that he was not to be given the command until he had been subjected to a critical overhauling by the authorities. We hear of Farragut at breakfast with Mr. Blair and Mr. Fox, probably on the morning of his arrival at the capital. Mr. Fox then showed him the point of attack, the plans, and the force to be employed. Farragut said he would engage to capture New Orleans with two-thirds the naval force. Mr. Blair tells us that he was so enthusiastic and confident of success that when he went away Mr. Fox thought him over-sanguine, and was a little inclined to distrust his ability. Mr. Welles relates that after this interview Farragut was brought to him, and they entered at once into all the plans of the expedition. When they came to the mortar-flotilla, Farragut said that he placed little reliance on mortars, and that they would not have been part of his plan and advisement, but that he would take the mortar-fleet with him, as it had been adopted as part of the equipment of the fleet and might prove of more advantage than he anticipated.

At 10 o'clock on the 20th of April, while the bombardment by the mortars was at its height, the flag-ship made signal that Farragut wanted to hold a conference of commanding officers. In an hour they had all arrived excepting three, who commanded vessels detailed that day for guard duty above the fleet, and Commander Porter, who was probably too much occupied with the mortars to leave his command.

Thirteen boats trailed at the stern of the *Hartford*, while the captains waited anxiously in the cabin to hear what the flag-officer would say. A private journal kept by Commodore Bell, who led the 2d division of gun-boats in the attack, describes as follows what took place at the conference:

"The flag-officer [Farragut] unfolded his plan of operations. Some discussion ensued, and Commander Alden read a written communication to Farragut from Porter, expressing his views as to the operations against the forts. Having read them, Alden folded up the paper and returned it to his pocket, whereupon I [Commodore Bell] suggested the propriety of the document's being left with Farragut, and the paper was accordingly placed in his hands. It was therein stated that the boom, being a protection to the mortars against attack from above, should not be destroyed, upon which Farragut remarked that Porter had that morning assented to the boom's being broken, and again (it was stated in the communication) that the fleet should not go above the forts, as the mortar-vessels would be left unprotected. Farragut said he thought the mortars would be as well protected (with the fleet) above as below the forts, and that the coöperation of the army, which entered into the plans of both parties, could not be effectual unless some of the troops were introduced above the forts at the same time that they were below. He intended to cover their landing at the Quarantine, five miles above, they coming to the river through the bayou. Once above, the forts cut off, and his propellers intact for ascending the river to the city, if he found his ships able to cope with the enemy he would fight it out. Some of the officers con-

sidered it a hazardous thing to go above out of the reach of supplies. Farragut remarked that our ammunition was being rapidly exhausted, without a supply at hand, and that something must be done immediately. He believed in celerity."

Farragut "believed in celerity." He saw that while the ammunition was being exhausted but little impression had been made on the forts, and he felt sure that the time had come to carry out his plan of dashing boldly up the river through the fire of the forts.

The communication from Commander Porter containing his plans of attack, to which I have already alluded, and which was referred to by Commodore Bell, is as follows:

"When the ships are over the bar, guns mounted, coal-bunkers filled, sick on shore, hospital arrangements made for the wounded, the fleet should move up, mortar-fleet all in tow; the chain across the river to remain untouched for the present, or until after the mortars get their position and open their fire. It is a good defense on our side against fire-ships and rams which may be sent down the river, and our ships can so command the opening that nothing can pass down. As the mortar-vessels are somewhat helpless, they should be protected at all points by vessels of war, which should be ready at a moment's notice to repel an attack on them by rams, floating torpedoes, or fire-ships; the two latter to be towed out of the way, the rams to be run down by the heavy ships, while such vessels as the *Westfield* and *Clifton* attack them end on with cannon, while gun-boats try to force them to the shore. When everything is ready for the assault, a demand for surrender should be made in language least calculated to exasperate, and of such a nature as to encourage those who might be disposed to return to their allegiance. There is evidence of a strong Union feeling in New Orleans, and everything should be done without losing by delay to prevent a counter-feeling.

"When it is evident that no surrender of the forts will be made, the mortars should open deliberate fire, keeping two shells in the air all the time, or each mortar-vessel should fire once in every ten minutes. Fort Jackson, being casemated, should receive the largest share of the bombardment, three or four vessels being employed against Fort St. Philip, firing as often as they can coolly and conveniently load and point. In the meantime preparations should be made to destroy at a moment's notice the vessels holding up the chain, or the chain itself, which can be done by applying a petard to the bobstays of the vessels or to the chain, all of which petards are prepared, and a man accustomed to the business with a galvanic battery will accompany the expedition.

"In my opinion there are two methods of attack,—one is for the vessel to run the gauntlet of the batteries by night or in a fog; the other is to attack the forts by laying the big ships close alongside of them, avoiding the casemates, firing shells, grape, and canister into the barbette, clearing the ramparts with boat-guns from the tops, while smaller and more agile vessels throw in shrapnel at shrapnel distance, clearing the parapets, and dismounting the guns in barbette.

"The larger ships should anchor with forty-five fathoms of chain with slip-ropes; the smaller vessels to keep under way and be constantly moving about, some to get above and open a cross-fire; the mortars to keep up a rapid and continuous fire, and to move up to a short range.

"The objections to running by the forts are these: It is not likely that any intelligent enemy would fail to place a chain across above the forts, and to raise such batteries as would protect them against our ships.

"Did we run the forts we should leave an enemy in our rear, and the mortar-vessels would have to be left behind. We could not return to bring them up without going through a heavy and destructive fire. If the forts are run, part of the mortars should be towed along, which would render the progress of the vessels slow against the strong current at that point. If the forts are first captured, the moral effect would be to close the batteries on the river and open the way to New Orleans, whereas, if we don't succeed in taking them, we will have to fight our way up the river. Once having possession of the forts, New Orleans would be hermetically sealed, and we could repair damages and go up on our own terms and our own time.

"Nature points out the English Turn as the position to be strongly fortified, and it is there the enemy will most likely make his strongest stand and last effort to prevent our getting up. If this point is impassable there is solid ground there, and troops can be brought up and landed below the forts and attack them in the rear while the ships assail them in front. The result will doubtless be a victory for us. If the ships can get by the forts, and there are no obstructions above, then the plan should be to push on to New Orleans every ship that can get there, taking up as many of the mortar-fleet as can be rapidly towed. An accurate reconnoissance should be made, and every kind of attainable information provided before any movement is made.

"Nothing has been said about a combined attack of army and navy. Such a thing is not only practicable, but, if time permitted, could be adopted. Fort St. Philip can be taken with three thousand men covered by the ships; the ditch can be filled with fascines, and the walls can be easily scaled with ladders. It can be easily attacked in front and rear."—D. D. PORTER.

Farragut stood facing his destiny, imperishable fame or failure. He was determined to run by the forts with his ships. It was plain to him that nothing more would be accomplished by the mortars. He would not cumber his fleet during the passage by towing the mortars as Porter desired him to do. Once above the defenses, and the enemy's fleet overcome, he would either push on to New Orleans past the batteries, which he knew were at Chalmette, or cover with his guns the landing of the army through the bayou in the rear of the forts. In his heart he was determined, if events favored him, to push right on seventy-five miles up the river to New Orleans without waiting for the army. Porter's views expressed in his letter to the conference gave no support to these plans. He speaks of three methods of attack: *First*, by running the forts; *second*, bombardment by the whole fleet, mortars included, with a view to the reduction of the defenses; and *third*, a combined attack of the navy and army. The first method, which was Farragut's plan and the plan that succeeded, he strongly condemns. He feared the result of leaving an enemy in the rear. Some of the commanding officers agreed with him.

On the next day Farragut issued a General Order [see p. 39], which bears date one day earlier than its issuance, and is at once a reply to Porter's communication to the conference of officers and an announcement of the flag-officer's determination to challenge all objections, run the forts, conquer or be conquered.

No one can read Commodore Bell's journal and Flag-Officer Farragut's general order without seeing that there was cause for disappointment in the fleet. After a bombardment of three days the defense was still vigorous and the Confederates were undismayed. As a consequence of this Farragut had lost the little faith he ever had in mortars, and

was prepared to carry out his own plans, differ as they might from the instructions of the Navy Department.

Farragut had a stupendous undertaking before him. A river with a current of three and a half miles an hour against the line of attack; two forts on opposite sides of the stream mounting 126 guns, and above them the Confederate steamers carrying 40 guns, while in the river, both above and below the forts, rafts were floating ready to be fired and cut loose on the first sign of an attempt to pass the boom. His fleet consisted of 8 steam sloops-of-war, 15 gun-boats, 1 sailing sloop, and 19 mortar-schooners. The 17 vessels which were to attempt the passage carried 166 guns and 26 howitzers. It is true that the mortar-shells were of assistance to Farragut in the passage, as they helped his own guns to distract the fire of the enemy and added to the confusion and distress in Fort Jackson. But that the passage would have been made in the darkness without the assistance of the mortars has never been seriously questioned, and is proved by Farragut's successful passage of Fort Morgan at the battle of Mobile Bay in broad daylight, which involved exactly the same principles of attack and was achieved without the use of a single mortar. The protraction of the bombardment gave the Confederates just six days more to push forward the work on the iron-clad and the fleet. Mr. Welles, in "The Galaxy," quotes a dispatch from Porter himself which shows his recognition of the fact that the Confederates were strengthening their defenses during this period. Porter says, speaking of the siege, that the enemy was "daily adding to his defense and strengthening his naval forces with iron-clad batteries."

What was the situation of affairs in Fort Jackson and Fort St. Philip about this time—the 22d of April—as shown by the testimony before the Confederate Court of Inquiry? In the two garrisons of 1100 men, 4 soldiers had been killed and 14 wounded—7 guns of the armament of 126 had been disabled. The barracks and citadel of Fort Jackson had been destroyed by fire.

There was nothing more to burn. Whenever the gun-boats approached the defenses a vigorous fire was opened on them by both forts, but when they retired the soldiers withdrew to the casemates out of reach of the mortar-fire.

And up to this time the mortar-flotilla had fired more than 13,500 shells. Porter had expected to reduce the forts to a heap of ruins in forty-eight hours, but at the end of ninety-six hours the defense was as vigorous as ever.

Did Porter believe that Farragut's passage of the forts and appearance before New Orleans would result in a speedy downfall of the defenses and the capture of the river and city? He did not, and he was very uneasy about the fleet after it passed the forts. He wondered how Farragut would return down the river to the mortar-fleet and to the army. He could not appreciate the fact that it was not necessary for him to come back; that all the defenses must soon fall, Forts Jackson and St. Philip among them, as the effect of the occupation of the river and New Orleans. He feared that Farragut was caught in a trap. He thought he would find the forts harder to take than ever, and that he would have to fight his way down the river and attack them again. All this appears in the letter of Commander Porter, which is given below. It was written to Farragut from below the forts on the morning after the passage, three days before they surrendered. The italics are not in the original:

"MORTAR-FLOTILLA, April 25th, 1862.

"DEAR SIR: Captain Boggs has arrived. I congratulate you on your victory. I witnessed your passage with great pleasure. My hopes and predictions were at last realized. You left at the forts four steamers and the famous iron-clad battery; they are mounting guns on it, and one thousand men are at work on it. She is unhurt and moves about with the stream. How fast she is I don't know. One of the steamers is iron-clad on the bow. The *McRae* is also at the fort. I sent a summons to surrender, but it was politely declined. As we have used up all the shells in the schooners, and wishing to be unhampered with the mortar-vessels, sent everything down and collected boats and spars. . . .

"They are moving all their heavy guns upon the riverside. *You will find the forts harder to take now than before unless their ammunition gives out.* I threw bombs at them all day, and tantalized them with rifle-shot, but they never fired a gun. *I hope you will open your way down, no matter what it costs.* I am sending some of the schooners down to blockade back of Fort Jackson to prevent their escaping by way of Barataria.

"D. D. PORTER."

Porter overlooks the difference between his hopes and his predictions, as shown by his communication to the conference of officers, which he says are realized in this letter, and Farragut's achievement. He had opposed the plan of attack by which Farragut succeeded.

Porter's letter to the Secretary of the Navy, written before the surrender, also shows his distrust of the result of Farragut's bold ascent of the river, leaving an enemy in his rear. He says, speaking of the Confederate iron-clad below Farragut's fleet at the forts, "She mounts sixteen guns, and is almost as formidable as the *Merrimac*. This is one of the ill effects of leaving an enemy in the rear." And again, "These forts can hold out still for some time. I would suggest that the *Mystic* and *Monitor*, if they can be spared, be sent here without a moment's delay to settle the question."

On the 28th of April, three days later, the forts surrendered, and Farragut, who was then in possession of New Orleans, did not find it necessary to open his way down the river as advised by Porter, to whom the surrender must have been a surprise.

What was the immediate cause of the surrender of the forts? This is exactly the question that was asked of Colonel Edward Higgins, who had commanded Fort Jackson, by the Confederate Court of Inquiry, and his reply was: "The mutiny of the garrison." But what was the cause of the mutiny? General Duncan, who had commanded the lower defenses, including the forts, answered this in his report: "The garrison mutinied on the night of the 27th of April, giving as a reason that the city had surrendered and there was no further use in fighting." And why did the city surrender? Was it because Porter bombarded Fort Jackson 75 miles below the city, for six days, disabling, up to the night of the passage of the fleet, only 9

guns of the armament of 128, with a loss to the Confederates of less than 40 men in both garrisons? ☆ Or was it because Farragut dashed through the fire of the forts, destroyed the Confederate fleet, and then pushed on past the Chalmette batteries 75 miles up the river, cutting off all communication, till he anchored before the city with his torn fleet?

☆ The following official statements made by Confederate and Union officers are given to show the condition of Fort Jackson and the garrison after the bombardment. On the 30th of April, 1862, in a letter to Adjutant-General Bridges, Colonel Edward Higgins says: "I have the honor to report that on the morning of the 27th of April a formal demand for the surrender of Forts Jackson and St. Philip was made by Commander Porter; the terms which were offered were liberal, but so strong was I in the belief that we could resist successfully any attack, either by land or by water, that the terms were at once refused. Our fort was still strong."

General Duncan, commanding all the lower Confederate defenses, says after the passage: "We are just as capable of repelling the enemy to-day as we were before the bombardment."

General Weitzel, of the United States Engineer Corps, in a report of the condition of Fort Jackson dated in May, 1862, says: "Fort St. Philip, with one or two slight exceptions, is to-day without a scratch. Fort Jackson was subjected to a torrent of 13-inch and 11-inch shells during 140 hours. To an inexperienced eye it seems as if this work were badly cut up. It is as strong to-day as when the first shell was fired at it."

Captain Harris, of the Coast Survey, whose map of the forts is published in Porter's article, says in his report after the surrender that of the "75 guns in Fort Jackson 4 guns were dismounted and 11 carriages were struck." But this was not done by the mortars alone. The fleet did its share in the passage. Granting that the injury of 11 gun-carriages permanently disabled 6 guns, the disablement of 10 guns in 75 is scarcely worth considering, with 116 guns in both forts still intact.

Comparing the losses on both sides during the bombardment and the passage of the forts, it will be seen that Farragut's loss, nearly all of which occurred in the passage of the lower defenses on the night of the final attack, was four times the Confederate list of killed and wounded at the forts during the entire siege. Does this look as if Fort Jackson had been disabled by the mortars before the final attack?

Colonel Edward Higgins on the 27th of April says: "Orders had been issued to the officers and men to retire to the casemates of the fort the moment the bombardment began; but when it became necessary to repel the attack our batteries were instantly in readiness and were at once engaged in a most terrific conflict with the enemy."

I have taken no notice in this article of a letter written to Admiral Porter by the above-mentioned Colonel Higgins dated April 4th, 1872, ten years after the occurrence of the events which he professes to describe. This letter is useless as evidence, because it contradicts Colonel Higgins's own report to the Confederate authorities quoted here. Surely the official evidence of a man fresh from the scene of action is to be believed in preference to an account given by him ten years afterward in a letter.

W. T. M.

THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE OPERATIONS AT NEW ORLEANS, LA.

The composition, losses, and strength of each force as here stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the Official Records. K stands for killed; w for wounded; m w for mortally wounded; m for captured or missing; c for captured.

THE UNION FORCES.

UNION FLEET: West Gulf Blockading Squadron, Flag-Officer D. G. Farragut.

FIRST DIVISION OF GUN-BOATS, Captain Theodorus Bailey.
SECOND DIVISION OF GUN-BOATS, Fleet-Captain Henry H. Bell.

UNION CASUALTIES.	PRIOR TO THE ACTION OF APR. 24th.			DURING THE ACTION OF APR. 24th.			Total Casualties.
	Killed.	*Wounded.*	*Total.*	*Killed.*	*Wounded.*	*Total.*	
Hartford	..	5	5	3	10	13	18
Brooklyn	..	..	..	9	26	35	35
Richmond	..	..	..	2	4	6	6
Pensacola	..	..	..	4	33	37	37
Mississippi	..	..	..	2	6	8	8
Oneida	..	15	15	..	3	3	18
Varuna	..	..	..	3	9	12	12
Iroquois	..	3	3	6	22	28	31
Cayuga	..	..	..	..	6	6	6
Itasca	..	..	..	..	4	4	4
Katahdin	1	..	1	..	..	..	1
Kineo	..	..	..	1	8	9	9
Pinola	..	..	..	3	7	10	10
Sciota	..	..	..	..	2	2	2
Winona	..	..	..	3	5	8	8
Portsmouth	..	..	..	..	1	1	1
Harriet Lane	..	..	..	1	1	2	2
Norfolk Packet	..	1	1	..	..	..	1
Arletta	1	..	1	..	..	..	1
Total	2	24	26	37	147	184	210

FIRST-CLASS SCREW SLOOPS: Flag-ship *Hartford*, Commander Richard Wainwright; *Brooklyn*, Captain Thomas T. Craven; *Richmond*, Commander James Alden; *Pensacola*, Captain Henry W. Morris. Side-wheel steamer: *Mississippi*, Commander Melancton Smith. Second-class screw sloops: *Oneida*, Commander S. Phillips Lee; *Varuna*, Commander Charles S. Boggs; *Iroquois*, Commander John De Camp. Screw gun-boats: *Cayuga*, Lieutenant N. B. Harrison; *Itasca*, Lieutenant C. H. B. Caldwell; *Katahdin*, Lieutenant George H. Preble; *Kennebec*, Lieutenant John H. Russell; *Kineo*, Lieutenant George M. Ransom; *Pinola*, Lieutenant Pierce Crosby; *Sciota*, Lieutenant Edward Donaldson; *Winona*, Lieutenant Edward T. Nichols; *Wissahickon*, Lieutenant A. N. Smith. Sailing sloop (stationed with mortar division) · *Portsmouth*, Commander Samuel Swartwout.

MORTAR DIVISION: Commander David D. Porter. Flag-ship: *Harriet Lane*, Lieutenant J. M. Wainwright. Gun-boat: *Owasco*, Lieutenant John Guest. Side-wheel steamers (ferry-boats): *Clifton*, Lieutenant C. H. Baldwin; *John P. Jackson*, Lieutenant Selim E. Woodworth; *Westfield*, Commander W. B. Renshaw. Side-wheel steamer (double-ender): *Miami*, Lieutenant A. D. Harrell. First division of schooners, Lieutenant Watson Smith, commanding: *Norfolk Packet*, Lieutenant Watson Smith; *Oliver H. Lee*, Acting Master Washington Godfrey; *Para*, Acting Master Edward G. Furber; *C. P. Williams*, Acting Master Amos R. Langthorne; *Arletta*,

ARMAMENTS OF UNION FLEET.

VESSELS.	13-in. mortar.	11-in. S. B.	10-in. S. B.	9-in. S. B.	8-in. S. B.	32-pdr. S. B.	100-pdr. R.	80-pdr. R.	50-pdr. R.	30-pdr. R.	20-pdr. R.	6-in. Sawyer Rifle, 8½ cwt.	Total guns.	HOWITZERS. 24-pdr.	12-pdr.	Total.	Total including Howitzers.
Hartford	..	..	..	24[1]	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	..	26	..	2	2	28
Brooklyn	..	..	..	22	..	..	..	1	..	1	..	..	24	..	2	2	26
Richmond	..	..	..	20	..	..	..	1	..	1	..	..	22	..	..	..	22
Pensacola	..	1	..	20	..	..	1	1	..	..	..	..	23	..	2	2	25
Mississippi	..	..	1	..	19[2]	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	21	..	1	1	22
Oneida	..	2	..	..	..	4	..	..	..	3	..	..	9	..	1	1	10
Varuna	..	..	..	..	8	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	10	..	..	..	10
Iroquois	..	2	..	2[3]	..	4	..	..	1	..	..	1[4]	10	..	1	1	11
Cayuga	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	2	2	..	2	4
Itasca	..	..	1	..	..	2	..	..	..	..	1	..	4	..	..	..	4
Katahdin	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	2	2	..	2	4
Kennebec	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	2	2	..	2	4
Kineo	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	2	2	..	2	4
Pinola	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	2	..	3	2	..	2	5
Sciota	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	2	3[5]	..	3	5
Winona	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	2	2	..	2	4
Wissahickon	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	2	2	..	2	4
Total	..	13	2	88	27	10	1	3	1	8	12	1	166	17	9	26	192

MORTAR DIVISION.

VESSELS.	13-in. mortar.	11-in. S. B.	10-in. S. B.	9-in. S. B.	8-in. S. B.	32-pdr. S. B.	100-pdr. R.	80-pdr. R.	50-pdr. R.	30-pdr. R.	20-pdr. R.	6-in. Sawyer Rifle.	Total guns.	HOWITZERS. 24-pdr.	12-pdr.	Total.	Total including Howitzers.
Harriet Lane	..	..	..	3	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	3	2	..	2	5
Owasco	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	2	2	..	2	4
Clifton	..	..	..	2	..	4	..	..	..	1	..	..	7	..	..	..	7
John P. Jackson	..	..	..	1	..	4	..	..	..	..	1	..	6	..	..	..	6
Westfield	..	..	..	1	4	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	6	..	..	..	6
Miami	..	..	..	2[6]	..	..	1	..	..	..	..	..	3	4	..	4	7
Portsmouth	..	..	..	..	16	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	17	..	1	1	18
Nineteen Mortar Schooners	19	..	..	..	..	38	..	..	..	..	..	..	57	..	..	..	57
Total mortar division	19	1	..	9	20	46	1	1	..	1	2	1	101	8	1	9	120
Total ships and gun-boats	..	13	2	88	27	10	1	3	1	8	12	1	166	17	9	26	192
Total fleet	19	14	2	97	47	56	2	4	1	9	14	2	267	25	10	35	302

NOTES.

[1] 2 of these were transferred from the Colorado.
[2] 14 of these were transferred from the Colorado.
[3] Transferred from the Colorado.
[4] Transferred from the army.
[5] One of these was transferred from the Colorado.
[6] One of these was transferred from the Colorado.

The Colorado supplied altogether:
2 9-inch to the Hartford.
2 9-inch to the Iroquois.
1 9-inch to the Miami.
14 8-inch to the Mississippi.
1 24-pounder howitzer to the Sciota.
—
20 guns.

Acting Master Thomas E. Smith; *William Baeon*, Acting Master William P. Rogers; *Sophronia*, Acting Master Lyman Bartholomew. Second division of schooners, Lieutenant W. W. Queen, commanding: *T. A. Ward*, Lieutenant W. W. Queen; *Maria J. Carlton*, Acting Master Charles E. Jack; *Matthew Vassar*, Acting Master Hugh H. Savage; *George Mangham*, Acting Master John Collins; *Orvetta*, Acting Master Francis E. Blanchard; *Sidney C. Jones*, Acting Master J. D. Graham. Third division of schooners, Lieutenant K. Randolph Breese, commanding: *John Griffith*, Acting Master Henry Brown; *Sarah Bruen*, Acting Master Abraham Christian; *Racer*, Acting Master Alvin Phinney; *Sea Foam*, Acting Master Henry E. Williams; *Henry James*, Acting Master Lewis W. Pennington; *Dan Smith*, Acting Master George W. Brown.

UNION ARMY. ☆

Major-General Benjamin F. Butler.

BRIGADE COMMANDERS, Brig.-Gen'ls John W. Phelps and Thomas Williams.

Infantry: 9th Conn., Col. Thomas W. Cahill; 12th Conn., Col. Henry C. Deming; 21st Ind., Col. James W. McMillan; 26th Mass., Col. Edward F. Jones; 30th Mass., Col. N. A. M. Dudley; 31st Mass., Col. Oliver P. Gooding; 6th Mich., Col. Frederick W. Curtenius; 4th Wis., Col. Halbert E. Paine. *Cavalry:* 2d Mass. Battalion (2 cos.), Capts. S. Tyler Read and Henry A. Durivage. *Artillery:* 4th Mass. Battery, Capt. Charles H. Manning; 6th Mass. Battery, Capt. Charles Everett; 2d Vt. Battery, Capt. P. E. Holcomb.

The strength of this command is reported at 6000 ("Official Records," Vol. VI., p. 708).

☆ Not engaged.

THE CONFEDERATE FORCES.

FORCE AFLOAT — COMMANDER JOHN K. MITCHELL.

NAME.	7-in. R.	9-in. S. B.	8-in. S. B.	32-pdr. R.	32-pdr. S. B.	24-pdr.	9-pdr.	Howitzers.	Total including Howitzers.
NAVAL VESSELS.									
Louisiana, Comr. Charles F. McIntosh (m w)	2	3	4	7	..	..	..	..	16
McRae, Lieut. Thos. B. Huger (m w)	..	1	..	..	6	..	1[1]	..	8
Jackson (at Quarantine), Lieut. F. B. Renshaw	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	..	2
Manassas, Lieut. A. F. Warley	..	..	..	..	1[2]	..	..	..	1
Launch No. 3, Acting Master Telford	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	1
Launch No. 6, Acting Master Fairbanks	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	1
Louisiana State Gun-boats									
Governor Moore, Lieut. Beverley Kennon	..	..	..	2	..	..	..	..	2
General Quitman, Capt. Alexander Grant	..	..	..	..	2	..	..	..	2
River Defense Boats.									
Warrior, Capt. John A. Stephenson	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	1
Stonewall Jackson, Capt. Geo. W. Philips	..	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	1
Defiance, Capt. Joseph D. McCoy	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	1
Resolute, Capt. Isaac Hooper	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	1
General Lovell, Capt. Burdett Paris	..	..	..	1	1	..	..	..	2
R. J. Breckinridge, Capt. James Smith	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	..	1
Total	2	4	4	10	15	2	1	2	40

[1] Experimental gun. [2] Carronade.

UNARMED TUGS. *Landis,* Captain Davis, and *W. Burton,* Captain Hammond (tenders to the *Louisiana); Phœnix,* Captain James Brown (tender to the *Manassas); Mosher,* Captain Sherman, and *Belle Algerine,* Captain Jackson (k); *Music,* Captain McClellan (tender to the forts); *Star,* Captain Laplace (telegraph boat). The last four were chartered by the army.

Grand total of Confederate guns, 166.

CONFEDERATE ARMY.

Major-General Mansfield Lovell.

COAST DEFENSES, Brig.-Gen. Johnson K. Duncan.

FORTS JACKSON AND ST. PHILIP, Lieut.-Col. Edward Higgins.

Fort Jackson: La. Scouts and Sharp-shooters, Capt. W. G. Mullen; St. Mary's (La.) Cannoneers, Capt. F. O. Cornay; other company and battery commanders, Capt. James Ryan (detached on the *Louisiana),* Capt. J. B. Anderson (w), Lieut. William M. Bridges, Capt. W. B. Robertson, Capt. R. J. Bruce, Lieut. Eugene W. Baylor, Lieut. A. N. Ogden, Lieut. Beverly C. Kennedy, Lieut. William T. Mumford, Lieut. J. W. Gaines, Capt. S. Jones, Capt. F. Peter, and Lieut. Thomas K. Pierson (k).

Fort St. Philip, Capt. M. T. Squires: La. Scouts and Sharp-shooters, Capt. Armand Lartigue; other company and battery commanders, Capt. R. C. Bond, Capt. J. H. Lamon, Lieut. Lewis B. Taylor, Lieut. J. K. Dixon (detached on the *Louisiana),* Lieut. A. J. Quigley, Capt. Charles Assenheimer, and Capt. Massicott. *Quarantine:* Chalmette (La.) Regt., Col. Ignatius Szymanski.

BATTERIES OF THE FORTS.

Fort Jackson. Barbette: 2 10-inch Columbiads; 3 8-inch Columbiads; 1 7-inch rifle; 2 8-inch mortars; 6 42-pounders; 15 32-pounders, of which 2 were dismounted in the action; 11 24-pounders, of which 2 were dismounted in the action; 1 8-inch howitzer, dismounted; 1 7⅘-inch howitzer. Casemates: 10 24-pounder howitzers (flank); 14 24-pounder guns. Parade: 1 6-pounder; 1 12-pounder howitzer. Water-battery: 1 10-inch Columbiad; 2 8-inch Columbiads; 1 10-inch sea-coast mortar; 2 32-pounders, rifled. Total, 74 guns.

Fort St. Philip. On face 8: 4 8-inch Columbiads. On salient: 1 24-pounder. On covered way: 1 8-inch mortar; 1 10-inch siege mortar; 1 13-inch sea-coast mortar (disabled: bed broke in two at thirteenth round). In upper battery: 16 24-pounders (of the 16, 2 were disabled — 1 broken in two by a shot, and one platform undermined). In lower battery: 9 32-pounders; 6 42-pounders; 1 7-inch rifle (burst by shell exploding in bore); 1 8-inch Columbiad (dismounted); 4 24-pounders. In north-east battery (field-work): 4 10-inch sea-coast mortars. On parade: 1 6-pounder; 1 12-pounder; 1 24-pounder field howitzer. Total, 52 guns.

CHALMETTE AND McGEHEE LINES, Brig.-Gen. Martin L. Smith. *Subordinate Commanders:* Brig.-Gen. Benjamin Buisson, Lieut.-Col William E. Pinkney, Capt. Patton, Lieut-Butler, *et al.*

General Lovell reports that the city of New Orleans "was only garrisoned by about 3000 ninety-day troops." The strength of the garrisons of the two forts is stated by Col. Higgins, in his testimony before the Court of Inquiry, as 1100 men. The loss at Forts Jackson and St. Philip was 11 killed and 39 wounded; and at the upper batteries 1 killed and 1 wounded. At Fort Jackson 121 officers and men were surrendered; number at other points not fully reported.

RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE OPPOSING FORCES.

IN a letter to the Editors, Professor J. R. Soley, U. S. N. says: "In discussing the question of the relative force of the two sides (see p. 33), it should be borne in mind that of the Confederate total of 166 guns, 117 were 32-pounders or smaller; while out of the Union total of 302 guns, only 114 were 32-pounders and smaller. In other words, 70 per cent. of the Confederate batteries were 32-pounders or below, while only 37 per cent. of the Union batteries were 32-pounders or below. This difference in the caliber of the guns goes a great way to offset the advantage of fort guns over ship guns, where the ships are trying to reduce the forts. But in this case it was not a question of reducing the forts, but of running by the forts. In such an action the advantage of guns in forts over guns on shipboard may be regarded as very much reduced; indeed, if the passage is open, so that the ships are not kept under fire for a long time (as later at Port Hudson) by natural or artificial obstructions, and especially if made at night, it may be said to be zero.

"On the other hand, the value of the Confederate fleet, at New Orleans, made up as it was chiefly of fast tow-boats, with plated bows, cannot be estimated alone in guns. It was essentially a ram fleet, and, if it had been handled efficiently, might have thrown Farragut's advance into confusion. As Commander Bartlett suggests also, the fire-rafts, with attendant tugs, might have been put to formidable use. This was shown in the case of the *Hartford.* Doubtless the Confederate flotilla, however efficiently handled, would have had hard work to check such an impetuous onset as that of Farragut.

"Out of a nominal total of 14 vessels (9 of them rams and 2 of them iron-clad) and 40 guns, Commander Mitchell had practically only 4 vessels and 12 guns — the *McRae, Manassas, Governor Moore,* and perhaps the *Stonewall Jackson.* For this Mitchell was in no way responsible. It was due to the delays in completing the *Louisiana,* to the absurd organization of the River Defense Fleet, to the want of seamen, and to the bungling of the civil administration at Richmond. The materials of Mitchell's force, if they had been completed and properly officered force, if they had been completed and properly officered and manned, would have made a very pretty force for the purpose; but no commander taking hold of them four days before the fight could have made much out of them."

EDITORS.

FIGHTING FARRAGUT BELOW NEW ORLEANS.

BY BEVERLEY KENNON, CAPTAIN, LA. S. N., COMMANDER OF THE "GOVERNOR MOORE."



RIVER-SIDE INTERIOR OF FORT ST. PHILIP.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

THIS narrative will be occupied with the operations of the State and River Defense gunboats, and especially with the movements of my vessel, the *Governor Moore*, and without particular reference to the forts. No men ever endured greater hardships, privations, and sufferings than the garrison of Fort Jackson during the eight days and nights of the bombardment, when more than fourteen hundred 13-inch shells struck within their fort. When the "run by" took place, the garrisons of both forts left no stone unturned to stem the tide of battle, but to no purpose.

Nor shall I refer especially to the *Louisiana*, *Manassas*, and *McRae*, of the regular C. S. Navy. Of these I saw nothing after the battle began. I did see and do know of the movements of all the other gun-boats, which, to avoid confounding with the regular navy vessels, I will refer to as "rams."

The *Louisiana* was simply an iron floating battery. She was in an unfinished state, and although officered from the regular navy, her crew was composed exclusively of volunteer soldiers, totally unused to ships and the handling of heavy guns. Her ports were too small to admit of the elevation or depression of her guns, thereby almost entirely destroying their efficiency. The responsibility for this was long since placed with Secretary Mallory, who did not order the construction of the *Louisiana* until four months before New Orleans fell, and *after* Stephenson had fashioned that "pigmy monster" the *Manassas*, and in a measure had tested her power. The *Louisiana* was decked over, roofed, iron-plated, armed, and given engines which never propelled her. Commander McIntosh, her "fighting captain," was mortally wounded early in the action, and was succeeded by Lieutenant John Wilkinson, and his brave officers and men did all in their power to beat back the enemy, but to little purpose, as fourteen of the enemy's seventeen vessels passed their vessel and the forts.

The *McRae*, a small vessel mounting a battery of 1 9-inch and 6 32-pounders, lost her commander, T. B. Huger, early in the battle, and as it happened, he was killed by a shot fired from the *Iroquois*, the vessel on which he was serving when he resigned his commission in the United States Navy. He was succeeded by Lieutenant Read, who fought the ship gallantly until the end.

The *Manassas*, commanded by Lieutenant Warley, had previously done good service, and this time came to grief after two hours' fighting, because every ship that neared her selected her thin, half-inch-iron roof and sides for a target. In considering the responsibility for the fall of New Orleans, it should be remembered that Messrs. Benjamin and Mallory were better fitted for the law than to preside over the War and Navy departments of a newly fledged government.

The vessel which I commanded was formerly the ocean-built wooden paddle steamship *Charles Morgan*, of about nine hundred tons, and having a walking-beam engine. When armed by the State of Louisiana, she was named the *Governor Moore*, and received 2 rifled 32-pounders (not banded and not sighted) and a complement of 93 persons. She was not iron-plated in any manner whatever. Her stem was like that of hundreds of other vessels, being faced its length on its edges above water, with two strips of old-fashioned flat railroad iron, held in place by short straps of like kind at the top, at the water-line, and at three intermediate points. These straps extended about two feet abaft the face of the stem, on each side, where they were bolted in place. The other "rams" had their "noses" hardened in like manner. All had the usual-shaped stems. Not one had an iron beak or projecting prow under water. All of them had their boiler-houses, engines, and boilers protected by a bulkhead of cotton bales which extended from the floor of the hold to five feet or more above the spar-deck. These and other such vessels were fitted out by the State and the city of New Orleans after the regular navy neglected to take them, and to Lieutenant-Colonel W. S. Lovell (ex-lieutenant United States Navy) is due the credit of their novel construction.



CAPTAIN BEVERLEY KENNON, LA. S. N., COMMANDER OF THE "GOVERNOR MOORE." FROM A TINTYPE.

Of the other seven "rams" the *General Quitman* was like my ship, but smaller. The remaining six had been tug-boats, and were of wood, with walking-beam engines. Each of them mounted one or two guns, had about 35 men, and measured not far from 150 tons.

These six "rams" were an independent command, and recognized no outside authority unless it suited their convenience; and it was expected that this "fleet" and its branch at Memphis "would defend the upper and lower Mississippi, without aid from the regular navy." We lay at the head of the turn in the river just above the forts, the place of all others for all the Confederate vessels to have been. Here they would have been less liable to be surprised; they would have been clear of the cross-fire from the forts and not exposed to the broadsides of the enemy when passing them, while both guns of each ram could have raked the enemy for over a mile as they approached; they would have been out of the smoke, and would have had extra time to raise steam, to prepare to fire and to ram; moreover, they would have been at a great advantage in ramming, since the advancing vessels



MAP SHOWING FINAL DISPOSITION OF THE CONFEDERATE FLEET. FROM A DRAWING LENT BY COMMANDER J. R. BARTLETT.

1.—The *Governor Moore* ramming the *Varuna*. 2.—The *Stonewall Jackson* ramming the *Varuna*.

would have had to incline to the eastward on reaching them. Not one of them to my knowledge, nor was it ever reported, availed itself of one of these advantages, for when they saw the enemy approaching, those having steam tried to escape, whilst others that did not have it were set afire where they lay, as I myself witnessed. Not one of them made the feeblest offensive or defensive movement, excepting in the case of the *Stonewall Jackson* nearly three hours after, as I shall relate. Had they done their duty simply in firing, what might they not have accomplished! Nearly every United States ship reports firing into them, but not a single one reports having been rammed or fired at by one of them, with the exception of the *Stonewall Jackson* and my ship.

As an act of fairness to the people on board the "rams" who so signally failed to coöperate with the forts and the regular war-ships, I must say it was attributable to their commander, Captain Stephenson. On the purchase by the Confederate Government of the *Manassas* (which was his creation from the tug-boat *Enoch Train*), the command of her was refused him; hence his insubordination and its evil results. None of the men on the rams were wanting in courage. They simply needed competent officers to command, lead, and instruct them, for they were totally "at sea" in their new vocation. After the war, one of them said to me, "If the forts and you fellows could not prevent the enemy from reaching you, how could you expect us with a dozen guns to check their further advance? I saw there was no use risking life for nothing, so I fired the vessel and skipped." The fault rests with those who kept them there. Had regular naval officers, instead of being kept in the mud forts on the creeks in Virginia, and in the woods of the Carolinas cutting timber to build iron-clads, been sent to these vessels, even at the eleventh hour, they would have proven very formidable.

The Confederates had in all thirteen vessels, and but fourteen of Farragut's vessels passed the forts. The former lost a fine opportunity here. Richmond, in the minds of some officials, bore the same relation to the Confederacy that Paris has ever done to France; hence the delay for several months to prepare for the defense of New Orleans, whilst Richmond was being fortified, and the mistake in not sending Commander John K. Mitchell to the "three fleets," near the forts, until three and a half days before the fight, and then with a vessel (the *Louisiana)* which could simply float, but nothing more!

The *Governor Moore*, which was anchored near Fort St. Philip opposite Fort Jackson, could not have been surprised at any time. I slept for the most part only during the day, and but rarely at night. At 8 P. M. four sentinels were always posted on the spar-deck and wheel-houses, and a quartermaster in the pilot-house; an anchor and engine-room watch was set; the chain was unshackled and the fires were banked; both guns were carefully pointed at the opening in the obstructions through which the enemy had to pass to reach us. The vessel being secured as firmly as if at a dock, effective firing of her guns was assured. Every opening in the vessel's side through which a light might be seen was kept closed. At dark the vessel's holds and decks and magazines were brightly lighted to save delay in the event of a sudden call to quarters. Two guns' crews were ready for service, and the officer of the deck and myself were always at hand.

The evening previous to the battle I reported to General Duncan, the commander of the two forts, my observations on the enemy's movements as seen by myself from the mast-head. Yet to my knowledge no picket boat was sent down by us, or any means adopted to watch the enemy and guard against surprise.[1] The result was they were abreast the forts before some of our vessels fired a shot. In a few moments this space was filled with smoke from the guns and exploded shells, intensifying the darkness of the night. A slackening of the fire on both sides was necessary, since neither could distinguish friend from foe. In some places no object was distinguishable until directly upon it, when it was as soon lost to view, yet the United States squadron steamed ahead, blindfolded, as it were, through the darkness and confusion, soon to find themselves in places of absolute safety and with comparatively few casualties.

At about 3:30 A. M. (April 24th, 1862) an unusual noise down the river attracted my attention. As we expected to be attacked at any moment I descended the ladder to near the water, where I distinctly heard the paddles of a steamer (the *Mississippi*). I saw nothing on reaching the deck, but instantly fired the after gun, the one forward being fired by the sentry there; at the same moment the water-batteries of Fort Jackson and Fort St. Philip let drive, followed in an instant by a general discharge from all the available guns in the forts, and both batteries of the advancing fleet, mounting 192 guns, and Commander Porter's squadron of 7 vessels, mounting 53 guns,

[1] Commander Mitchell, in his testimony before the Confederate Court of Inquiry, states that launch No. 6 was stationed below St. Philip as a guard-boat, but on the enemy's approach deserted her station.—EDITORS.

which attacked Fort Jackson's flank below the obstructions. There was also a splendid practice from 19 Federal mortars, which fired their 13-inch shells at intervals (between the vessels) of 10 seconds.

The bursting of every description of shells quickly following their discharge, increased a hundred-fold the terrific noise and fearfully grand and magnificent pyrotechnic display which centered in a space of about 1200 yards in width. The ball had not more than fairly opened before the enemy's ships were between the forts, and the Uncle Sam of my earlier days had the key to the valley of the Mississippi again in his breeches-pocket, for which he had to thank his gallant navy and the stupidity, tardiness, ignorance, and neglect of the authorities in Richmond.

The first gun fired brought my crew to their stations. We had steam within 3 minutes, it having been ordered by that hour; the cable was slipped, when we delayed a moment for Lieutenant Warley to spring the *Manassas*, then inside of us, across the channel. A little tug-boat, the *Belle Algerine*, now fouled us — to her mortal injury. By the time we started, the space between the forts was filling up with the enemy's vessels, which fired upon us as they approached, giving us grape, canister, and shell. My vessel being a large one, we had too little steam and elbow-room in the now limited and crowded space to gather sufficient headway to strike a mortal blow on ramming. So rather than simply "squeeze" my adversary, I made haste slowly by moving close under the east bank to reach the bend above, where I would be able to turn down-stream ready for work. I took this course also, to avoid being fired and run into by the Confederate rams moored above me; but the ground for this fear was soon removed, as, on getting near them, I saw that one had started for New Orleans, while the telegraph steamer *Star*, ram *Quitman*, and one other had been set afire at their berths on the right bank, and deserted before any of the enemy had reached them, and were burning brightly. They being in a clear space were in full view, and I was close to them. Another reason for leaving our berth directly under Fort St. Philip, where the *Louisiana*, *McRae*, and *Manassas* also lay, was to get clear of the cross-fire of the forts, and that of each ship of the enemy as they passed up close to us, for we sustained considerable damage and losses as we moved out into the stream.

When we were turning at the head of the reach we found ourselves close to the United States steamer *Oneida*, 10 guns, with the United States steamer *Cayuga*, 4 guns, on our port beam. On being hailed with "What ship is that?" I replied, "United States steamer *Mississippi*," to deceive, she being a side-wheel vessel also, but, seeing our distinguishing light, the *Oneida* raked with her starboard broadside at a few feet distance; the *Cayuga* delivered her fire thirty yards distant; the *Pensacola*, 25 guns, a little farther from us, at one fire with shrapnel from the howitzers in her tops cleared out 12 men at our bow-gun. Beyond her the firing of single guns in quick succession, as some vessel, unseen to any one, was moving rapidly up-stream, attracted my attention. At the same instant the United States steamer *Pinola*, 5 guns, close to on our port quarter, delivered her fire,

FIRING AT THE "VARUNA" THROUGH THE BOW OF THE "GOVERNOR MOORE."

killing 5 men in our bunkers. This combined attack killed and wounded a large number of men, and cut the vessel up terribly. Suddenly two, then one Confederate ram darted through the thick smoke from the right to the left bank of the river, passing close to all of us. They missed the channel for New Orleans, grounded on and around the point next above and close to Fort St. Philip; one was fired and deserted, and blew up soon after as we passed her; the others were disabled and were soon after abandoned by their crews. One (the *Resolute)* was taken possession of later by men from the Confederate steamer *McRae.* I do not know what became of the other, the smoke was so dense. All this passed in a few moments. Suddenly I saw between my vessel and the burning *Quitman*, close to us on the west bank, a large, two-masted steamer rushing up-stream like a racer, belching "black smoke," firing on each burning vessel as she passed, and flying her distinguishing white light at the mast-head and red light at the peak. I thought of General Lovell, not far ahead of her on board the passenger steamer *Doubloon*, and quickly made a movement to follow this stranger in the hope of being able to delay or destroy her. Besides, the four or even more large ships so close to us, but obscured from view, needed but a little more room, and one good chance and a fair view of us, quickly to annihilate my old "tinder-box" of a ship. I therefore slipped out in the smoke and darkness around us after the advancing stranger, which proved to be the *Varuna*, Captain Charles S. Boggs, mounting 8 8-inch guns and 2 30-pounder rifles, with a complement of

about 200 persons. My whereabouts remained unknown to my former adversaries until all of them came to the *Varuna's* assistance at 6:20 A. M., nine miles above, where she sank, and where parts of her wreck are yet to be seen (1885).

When I started after the *Varuna*, I shot away our blue distinguishing light at the mast-head with a musket, as to have hauled it down would have attracted notice. We could see her, as she was in a clear space, and her lights showed her position. But she soon lost sight of us, for, besides being somewhat in the smoke, there were back of us at this location moderately high trees thickly placed, the spaces filled with a luxuriant undergrowth, making a high dark wall or background on both sides of the river. Until we got clear of this, there was nothing to attract attention toward us, the *Varuna* being half a mile ahead, as shown by her lights. Her engines were working finely and driving her rapidly on her "spurt."[1] We too, by using oil on our coal, had all the steam we needed. My old ship, shaking all over and fairly dancing through the water, was rapidly lessening the distance between us.

As soon as we reached an open space we hoisted a white light at our mast-head and a red light at the peak. This ruse worked successfully, as the sequel proves. Since our existence depended upon closing with her before she made us out, I urged the men to resist the temptation to fire, and to be quiet and patient, otherwise we would soon be put under water from the effects of her broadsides. We were now one and a half miles from the forts, and one mile from where we gave chase. On our port bow and the *Varuna's* port beam, close under the land, I saw the runaway ram *Stonewall Jackson* making slow progress for want of steam, but working hard to get out of danger. She did not notice us. The *Varuna* could not have seen her or would have fired at her. We soon left the *Stonewall Jackson* astern. Four miles more and we were nearly abreast of Szymanski's regiment at Chalmette camp. Still the *Varuna* had not recognized us. I wanted assistance from that regiment, for I could now see that I had a far superior vessel to mine on my hands. I hoped also for assistance from the ram *Stonewall Jackson*, now a mile or two on our quarter, and from the Confederate States gun-boat *Jackson*, over one mile above us, serving as guard-boat at the quarantine station. To secure all this assistance I had but to show our colors and make ourselves known. The day was just dawning, and there was no smoke about us; so as a bid for help from the sources named, we hauled down the enemy's distinguishing lights and opened fire for the first time upon the *Varuna*, distant about one hundred yards, and with a surprise to her people plainly to be seen. This shot missed her! She replied quickly with one or more guns, when a running fight commenced, she raking us with such guns as she could bring to bear, but not daring the risk of a sheer to deliver her broadside, as we were too close upon her. Her former great superiority was now reduced to a lower figure than that of our two guns, for we, having assumed the offensive, had the advantage and maintained it until she sank.

[1] Lieutenant C. H. Swasey, of the *Varuna*, remarks in his report upon the slowness of the *Varuna* at this point: "Owing to the small amount of steam we then had (17 pounds), he [Kennon] soon began to come up with us."—EDITORS.



THE "STONEWALL JACKSON" RAMMING THE "VARUNA."

Our hoped-for and expected aid never came from any source. So far from it the gun-boat *Jackson*, lying at quarantine, slipped her cable when the fight commenced, firing two shots at both of us, believing us both enemies (one striking our foremast), and started with all haste for the head-waters of the Mississippi, delaying at New Orleans long enough for her people with their baggage to be landed, when Lieutenant F. B. Renshaw, her commander, burnt her at the levee! The infantry at Chalmette camp could not help us, and the "ram" *Stonewall Jackson*, as it then seemed to us, would not!

Then I saw that we had to fight the *Varuna* alone. On finding our bow gun useless because it was mounted too far abaft the knight-heads to admit of sufficient depression to hull the enemy, then close under our bows, and noting that every shell from the enemy struck us fair, raking the decks, killing former wounded and well men, and wounding others, I realized that something had to be done and that quickly. I then depressed the bow-gun to a point *inside our bow* and fired it, hoping to throw its shell into the engine-room or boiler of the chase. It went through our deck all right but struck the hawse-pipe, was deflected and passed through the *Varuna's* smoke-stack. It was soon fired again through this hole in our bows, the shell striking the *Varuna's* pivot-gun, where it broke or burst, and killed and wounded several men. Until we had finished reloading, the *Varuna* was undecided what to do, when suddenly and to my surprise she ported her helm.

Not wishing to avoid her fire any longer, being quite near to her, we put our helm to port and received the fire from her pivot-gun and rifles in our port bow, but as her shot struck us, under the cover of the smoke our helm was put hard to starboard,—she not righting hers quickly enough,—and before she could recover herself, we rammed her near the starboard gangway, receiving her starboard broadside and delivering our one shot as we struck her.

Her engines stopped suddenly. We backed clear, gathered headway again, and rammed her a second time as near the same place as possible.ℑ Before separating, the two vessels dropped alongside each other for a couple of minutes and exchanged musket and pistol shots to some injury to their respective crews, but neither vessel fired a large gun. I expected to be boarded at this time and had had the after gun loaded with a light charge and three stand of canister, and pointed fore and aft ready for either gangway. It was an opportunity for the *Varuna's* two hundred men to make a second Paul Jones of their commander, but it was not embraced. As for ourselves, we had neither the men to board nor to repel boarders. The vessels soon parted, hostilities between them ceased, and the *Varuna* was beached to prevent her sinking in deep water. Then and not until then did the *Varuna's* people know that any other Confederate vessel than mine was within several miles of her. Suddenly the ram *Stonewall Jackson*, having to pass the *Varuna* to reach New Orleans, rammed deep into the latter's port gangway.ɬ When close upon her, the *Varuna* delivered such of her port broadside guns as could be brought to bear. The *Stonewall Jackson* backed clear, steamed about four miles up the river, and was beached on the opposite bank, fired, and deserted. Her wreck is there now. Having but one gun, and that mounted aft, she did not fire it. Soon after the *Stonewall Jackson* struck the *Varuna* the latter finished sinking, leaving her topgallant forecastle out of the water, and upon it her crew took refuge.

The United States ships *Oneida*, *Iroquois*,ʃ *Pensacola*, *Pinola*,ʃ and *Cayuga* were now rapidly approaching and near at hand. I started down-stream to meet and try to ram one of them. On passing abreast the *Varuna* some thoughtless man, knowing her forecastle rifle was loaded, fired it and killed and wounded five of our men, one officer included. Had I returned the fire with our after gun, which was loaded with canister, at the crowd of people closely packed upon and near that little shelf, the damage to life and limb would have been fearful. But not a shot did we fire at her after she was disabled.

We had proceeded down-stream but a short distance when Mr. Duke, the first lieutenant, then at the conn,ʅ where, though wounded, he had remained throughout the fight doing his duty like a brave man, exclaimed, "Why do this? We have no men left; I'll be —— if I stand here to be murdered," so he slapped the helm hard-a-starboard. As we came round, the enemy's ships, being near, fired a shower of heavy projectiles which struck the vessel in every part. One gun was dismounted. The boats had already been destroyed. The wheel-ropes, the head of the rudder, the slide of the engine, and a large piece of the walking-beam were shot away; the latter fell on the cylinder-

ℑ The first instance of a wooden vessel ramming her adversary in battle as her principal means of offensive-defensive action.— B. K.

ɬ Commander Boggs and Lieutenant Swasey, of the *Varuna*, and Captain Philips, commanding the *Stonewall Jackson*, agree in saying that the *Stonewall Jackson* rammed the *Varuna* while she was afloat, and that it was *in consequence* of this blow that the *Varuna* was disabled and beached. Boggs says both vessels rammed the *Varuna* twice.— EDITORS.

ʃ As the *Iroquois* and *Pinola* were the last vessels to pass the forts, it is difficult to see how they could have been up with the other three vessels at this time.— EDITORS.

ʅ The person who stands at the compass in a man-of-war, to see that the correct course is steered, is "at the conn."— EDITORS.



THE "PENSACOLA" DISABLING THE "GOVERNOR MOORE."

Captain H. W. Morris of the *Pensacola* says, in his report: "The ram [*Governor Moore*], after having struck the *Varuna* gun-boat, and forced her to run on shore to prevent sinking, advanced to attack this ship, coming down on us right ahead. She was perceived by Lieutenant F. A. Roe just in time to avoid her by sheering the ship, and she passed close on our starboard side, receiving, as she went by, a broadside from us." Until I read this, I thought the vessel that did us most damage was the *Oneida*, the other vessels being astern of her. Captain Lee of the *Oneida* in his report speaks of firing into the *Governor Moore*.— B. K.

head and cracked it and filled the engine-room with steam, driving every man out of it. The head of the jib was now hoisted, and with a strong current on the port bow, assisted by the headway left on the vessel, we succeeded in reaching the river-bank just above the *Varuna's* wreck, where the anchor was let go to prevent drifting into deep water to sink, the last heavy firing having struck the vessel on and under her water-line. At this place she was destroyed by fire, her colors burning at her peak. The vessel was not disabled until this last attack upon her, although much cut up. By it no one on the *Governor Moore* outside the cotton bulkhead protection to the engine, excepting those in the magazine and shell-room, escaped being struck by shot, bullets, or splinters. Additional men were killed, several more of the wounded were killed, and others wounded. It should be remembered that my vessel had been under a terrific fire for 3 hours, in a narrow river with unruffled surface, and at close quarters, from vessels [the *Oneida*, *Cayuga*, *Pensacola*, and *Varuna*] mounting in the aggregate over 30 of the heaviest guns afloat. Out of 93 all told we lost 57 killed and 17 wounded, of whom 4 died in the hospital.☆

Twenty-four years have now passed without any Confederate account of this fight being made public. Now that "the fictions of hastily compiled histories of partisan writers" are being corrected, I add my mite as an act of justice to all interested, and to the gallant dead and those living, of the *Governor Moore*.¦

The burning of my ship has ever been a source of regret to me, as it was done by my order, and by me individually, simply because I did not wish to

☆ My officers were merchant mates, so were the quartermasters; the gunner had been to sea as a sailor on a man-of-war. My crew consisted of artillery and infantry detachments, and of 'longshoremen, cotton-pressers, and river boatmen.— B. K.

¦ When the *Governor Moore* was destroyed she was four miles from any Confederate vessel under water, and nine miles from any on the water, and surrounded on the water front by five United States ships.— B. K.

surrender her. Finding that the boats of the United States ships were picking up the *Varuna's* people, I ordered the uninjured of my crew to assist our wounded to our boat, and to the shore. Many took hold, others did not. I saw several wounded men landed. I aided several to leave the vessel, and called to men then standing in the water to help them, which they did. I placed life-preservers on others. One man who was wounded in the arm was afraid to jump; he had on two life-preservers. I shoved him overboard and saw him assisted to the shore. When the boats reached the ship I tried to save my servant, he having had his leg shot clean off; but we had to leave him, because on moving him to the gangway his body broke open near the shattered thigh. These two cases, in part, led to my being put in solitary confinement on board the *Colorado*, and in close confinement on board the *Rhode Island*, and at Fort Warren—in all, three months. Some one had reported that "I had killed my steward because he had failed to call me at 3 o'clock in the morning, and that then I had thrown his half-dead body overboard." I did not depend upon any one to call me. Moreover, the steward and his eight-year-old boy, who was on a visit to him (and who was to have returned on the steamer *Doubloon*), being in the magazine, were not touched. They were made prisoners.

I set fire to the ladders leading to the magazine and shell-room, first pouring oil over them and over clothing hanging in some of the state-rooms to insure the ship's destruction. I went then to the gangway, expecting to find what remained of one of our boats, into which I had ordered Lieutenants Haynes and Henderson (both wounded slightly) to place such of the wounded as were unable to move themselves. I found those two had taken it *alone*, and left the vessel. As they were quite near, I "persuaded" the return of the boat, which the latter brought back, the former jumping overboard and being picked up by the *Oneida's* boat. He was taken to Fort Warren. Into our boat I was preparing to lower some wounded men when the boats of the squadron came alongside, and took them and myself off the burning ship. When I



THE "GOVERNOR MOORE," AT THE END OF THE FIGHT.

THE "GOVERNOR MOORE" IN FLAMES.

The Union ships in their order, beginning with the left, are the *Oneida*, the *Pinola*, the sunken *Varuna*, the *Iroquois*, and, in the foreground, the *Pensacola*. [See note concerning the *Pinola* and the *Iroquois*, p. 84.] — EDITORS.

went to the gangway to see if any wounded had been placed in our boat, for I expected the boilers and the magazines to explode at any moment, I found the wounded men referred to, in the gangway. They said, "Captain, we stood by you; do not desert us now." I told them I would not, and I remained with them until they left the vessel, and then I left in the *Oneida's* boat, and not half a second too soon. I was too much bruised to help any one overmuch, but I did all I could. Had no uninjured man left the vessel until the wounded had been cared for, I could have escaped capture, like Lieutenants Duke and Frame and the purser, the two former being wounded.

When the *Oneida's* boat approached the *Governor Moore*, one of its crew recognized me. The officer of the boat wished to know if there was danger of an explosion. I replied, "You surely can come where I can stay; come and take off these wounded men." In a moment it was done. One of the boat's crew asked, pointing to a room close by, "Is that your trunk?" I no sooner said it was than he had it in the boat.

We soon reached the *Oneida*, whose captain, S. P. Lee, having known me from a child, received me kindly and entertained me most hospitably. The wounded of my vessel were attentively cared for on the *Oneida* and other United States ships. They ultimately went to the city hospital. The uninjured prisoners of my crew (eighteen men) were transferred to the *Hartford*, where I saw them. I do not think any of my wounded were burned. If they were, it was because they were stowed out of sight, and I was left alone (as is well known) to care for them.

As to the fate of the thirteen Confederate vessels, Commander Porter in his official report states that "the *Louisiana*, *McRae*, and ram *Defiance*, with the *Burton* and *Landis*, both river passenger boats, which had been used by the *Louisiana*, close to which they lay, to berth her officers and crew, were still at the forts flying their colors two days after the battle." The *Jackson*, 2 guns, escaped before daylight to New Orleans from Quarantine Station, 6 miles above the forts, without being seen by any other United States vessel than the *Varuna*. The *Manassas*, disabled by the *Mississippi*, aided by other vessels, was destroyed by her commander, who swam to the *Louisiana* with his crew and was made prisoner with her people two days after. The *Stonewall Jackson*, seen in the distance only, excepting by the *Varuna's* and *Governor Moore's* people, was destroyed by her officers about 13 miles above the forts, and out of gun-shot of the enemy; and my ship was destroyed by my own hand about 9 miles above them. The *Quitman* and another gun-boat, with the telegraph steamer *Star*, were fired on the report of the first gun. They were blazing when my ship reached them. I have already described the fate of the *Resolute* and one other ram. The passenger boat *Doubloon* reached New Orleans all right. My vessel ran over the little tug *Belle Algerine*. The *Mosher* was destroyed when taking a fire-raft alongside the *Hartford*. Of the little tug *Music* and three of the rams I know nothing beyond seeing them burn and explode their magazines after being deserted.

My old classmates and messmates among the officers, and shipmates among the crews of the United States ships at New Orleans, treated me with great kindness. To mention a few, Captain Lee shared his cabin with me; Lieutenant J. S. Thornton gave me his room on board the *Hartford*, and with Lieutenant Albert Kautz made it possible for me to extend some hospitality to friends who called upon me. Lieutenant-Commanding Crosby on receiving me on board the *Pinola* gave me the freedom of the cabin. When taking me to the *Colorado* Lieutenants Kidder Breese and Phil Johnson, both my classmates, came with offers of money and clothes, as did Acting Master Furber. When on board the *Oneida*, anchored close to the levee at the city, I slept from choice under a shelter aft — not a poop deck exactly — which was under the orderly's eye. Near daylight something called him away. An old sailor who had been on several ships with me, and who by my evidence in his favor was once rescued from much discomfort and trouble, suddenly jumped to my cot, saying, "The preparations are made, lose no time, out of the port by the line there ready for you," and, handing a paper inclosing several gold pieces, was off as suddenly as he came. I watched my opportunity and returned his money to him rolled up in a tobacco wrapper, saying in as few words as possible why I would not betray the confidence placed in me.

When General Butler came on board the *Cayuga* he asked of Lieutenant-Commanding Harrison, pointing with his thumb over his shoulder at me as he walked aft, "Where did you catch him?" Loud enough for Butler to hear I replied, "Where you were not on hand, or your army either."

I was to have been paroled, but the burning of my vessel and the reported killing of the steward and reported burning of my wounded, changed my

destination to Fort Warren, where, although I was denied the freedom enjoyed by the other prisoners, I was treated with much consideration by Colonel Justin Dimick, who made fast friends of every prisoner under his charge for his kindness to them.

The war has long been over with me, and the most "uncompromising" on both sides must acknowledge the creation of a new, richer, happier, and better South and mightier common country as the result of the unhappy strife.

My old antagonists have ever been kind to me, and to many others of their old ante-bellum companions and friends. In 1867 a Union man gave me the command of a vessel he owned. In 1868 a Boston company offered me the position of first mate of one of their new iron steamships. In 1869 the colonel of a New York regiment and a rear-admiral of the United States Navy secured my appointment as Colonel of Coast Defenses in the Egyptian Army; and I am now holding positions for which I was recommended by an officer whose ship fought mine below New Orleans.



ENTRANCE TO FORT ST. PHILIP. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1884.

THE RAM "MANASSAS" AT THE PASSAGE OF THE NEW ORLEANS FORTS.

BY A. F. WARLEY, CAPTAIN, C. S. N.

Just after the war I thought "bygones" had better be "bygones" and the stirring up of bitter memories was a thing to be avoided; now that so many years have passed, it seems to me almost impossible for one who was observant, and had good opportunities to observe, to tell all he believed he witnessed without in some way reflecting upon one or another of those in position who have gone to their rest and are no longer able to meet criticism.

But from the day of the veracious historian Pollard to the present one of Captain Kennon, no mention has been made of the vessel under my command on the night Admiral Farragut passed "the Forts," except in slighting, sneering, or untruthful statements.

There are only a few of those who were with me left, and I think it due to them and to the memory of those gone that I tell in as few words as I can what the *Manassas* did on the night in question.

The *Manassas* was made fast to the bank on the Fort St. Philip side above the forts, and had alongside of her a heavy steam-tug to enable her to be turned promptly down the river. On the evening before the attack I went on board of the Confederate steamer *McRae*, carrying some letters to put in the hands of my friend Captain Huger, and found him just starting to call on me, on the same errand. Both of us — judging from the character of the officers in the enemy's fleet, most of whom we knew — believed the attack was at hand, and neither of us expected support from the vessels that had been sent down to help oppose the fleet.

Before night all necessary orders had been given, and when at 3:30 A. M. the flash of the first gun was seen on the river below the forts, the *Manassas* was cut away from the bank, turned downstream, cast off from the tug, and was steaming down to the fleet in quicker time than I had believed to be possible.

The first vessel seen was one of the armed Confederate steamers. She dashed up the river, passing only a few feet from me, and no notice was taken of my hail and request for her to join me. The next vessel that loomed up was the United States steamer *Mississippi*. She was slanting across the river when the *Manassas* was run into her starboard quarter, our little gun being fired at short range through her cabin or ward-room. What injury she received must be told by *her* people. She fired over the *Manassas*, tore away, and went into the dark. While this was going on other vessels no doubt passed up, but the first I saw was a large ship (since known to have been the *Pensacola*). As the *Manassas* dashed at her quarter, she shifted her helm, avoided the collision beautifully, and fired her stern pivot-gun close into our faces, cutting away the flag-staff.

By that time the *Manassas* was getting between the forts, and I told Captain Levin, the pilot, that we could do nothing with the vessels which had passed, but we could go down to the mortar-fleet; but no sooner had we got in *seeing range* than both forts opened on us, Fort Jackson striking the vessel several times on the bend with the lighter guns. I knew the vessel must be sunk if once under the 10-inch guns, so I turned up the river again, and very soon saw a large ship, the *Hartford* ☆ [meaning the *Brooklyn*], lying across-stream. As I was not fired upon by her I thought then that her crew were busy fending off what I think now to have been a burning pile-driver, and could not see the *Manassas* coming out of the dark. The *Manassas* was driven at her with everything open, resin being piled into the furnaces. The gun was discharged when close on board. We struck her fairly amidship; the gun recoiled and turned over and remained there, the boiler started, slightly jamming the Chief Engineer, Dearning, but settled back as the vessel backed off. Just then another steamer came up through the fire of the forts. I thought her the *Iroquois*, and tried to run into her, but she passed as if the *Manassas* had been at anchor.

Steaming slowly up the river,— very slow was our best,— we discovered the Confederate States steamer *McRae*, head up-stream, receiving the fire of three men-of-war. As the *Manassas* forged by, the three men-of-war steamed up the river, and were followed, to allow the *McRae* to turn and get down to the forts, as she was very badly used up.

Day was getting broader, and with the first ray of the sun we saw the fleet above us; and a splendid sight it was, or rather would have been under other circumstances. Signals were being rapidly exchanged, and two men-of-war steamed down, one on either side of the river. The *Manassas* was helpless. She had nothing to fight with, and no speed to run with. I ordered her to be run into the

☆ Professor J. Russell Soley, U. S. N., in a communication to the Editors, gives the following discussion of the question, Did the *Manassas* ram the *Hartford* at the battle of New Orleans? "In the affirmative is the following testimony: (1) 'Captain Kautz, a lieutenant on board the *Hartford*, says that immediately after the *Hartford* went ashore she was struck by the fire-raft which was pushed up by the tug *Mosher*, and immediately after that event the *Manassas* struck her and turned her round so that she slid off the shoal. (2) Lieutenant Warley, commanding the *Manassas*, states that she struck the *Hartford*. He does not state that she struck the *Brooklyn*.' In the negative is the following testimony: (1) Admiral Farragut makes no mention of being struck by a ram. His report says: 'I discovered a fire-raft coming down upon us, and in attempting to avoid it ran the ship on shore, and the ram *Manassas*, which I had not seen, lay on the opposite side of it and pushed it down upon us.' Farragut evidently mistook the *Mosher* for the *Manassas*, as it is a well-established fact that the *Mosher* shoved the raft against the *Hartford*. (2) Commander Richard Wainwright, commanding the *Hartford*, makes no mention in his detailed report of having been struck by any ram. He describes the incident of the fire-raft thus: 'At 4:15 grounded on shoal near Fort St. Philip, in the endeavor to clear a fire-raft which was propelled by a ram on our port quarter, setting fire to the ship.' Wainwright also makes the mistake of calling the *Mosher* a ram, but this only bears out the general opinion among the Union officers as to the character of all the Confederate vessels. (3) The report of James H. Conley, carpenter of the *Hartford*, stating in detail the damages sustained by the ship in the action, makes no mention of any injury which could have been inflicted by a ram. (4) It seems impossible that the *Manassas* should have struck such a blow to the *Hartford* as Warley describes and have left no traceable injury. (5) It is exceedingly improbable that the *Manassas* would have struck the *Hartford* under such advantageous circumstances as Captain Kautz describes (when the *Hartford* was ashore) and have had no effect other than to turn the *Hartford* round so that she slid off the shoal. (6) Commander Watson informs me that he thinks it is a mistake to suppose that the *Manassas* touched the *Hartford* at any time. He goes on to say: 'Farragut thought it was the *Manassas* which pushed the fire-raft against the *Hartford's* port side, while the Confederate reports state that this was done by a certain tug-boat. The admiral never, to my knowledge, entertained the idea that such a blow' as the *Manassas* is supposed to have given 'would have released the *Hartford's* bow. I believe he ascribed her release to the backing of the screw as I did; I always understood him that way.' (7) Mr. Herbert B. Tyson says, in a recent letter (Mr. Tyson was a midshipman and the navigator of the *Hartford* at this time, but has since left the service): 'I am satisfied the *Hartford* was never rammed at the battle of New Orleans. The nearest approach to her being rammed was when a Confederate craft pushed a fire-raft under her port quarter while she was aground under Fort St. Philip.' (8) Lieutenant Warley mentions only one vessel rammed by him in this way, and his description certainly answers for what happened in the attack on the *Brooklyn*. (9) In reference to the *Brooklyn* there is no possible question. Captain Craven's and Commander Bartlett's testimony is absolutely conclusive. (10) Commander A. T. Mahan, U. S. N., in his book, 'The Gulf and Inland Waters' [pp. 76 and 77], does not mention any ramming of the *Hartford* by the *Manassas*. His statements are such that if he had supposed the *Manassas* rammed the *Hartford* he could not have omitted it. He says of the *Hartford*: 'She took the ground close under St. Philip, the raft lying on her port quarter, against which it was pushed by the tug *Mosher*,' adding in a foot-note, 'As this feat has been usually ascribed to the *Manassas*, it may be well to say that the statement in the text rests on the testimony of the commander of the ram, as well as other evidence.' He closes his description of this episode by saying: 'Then working herself clear, the *Hartford* passed from under their fire.' Finally he gives a minute description of the ramming of the *Brooklyn* by the *Manassas*."

NOTE.— Captain Warley, since the appearance of the first edition, writes to say that his conviction that the *Manassas* struck the *Hartford* was based upon an incorrect reading of a letter from Captain Mahan.

EDITORS.

bank on the Fort St. Philip side, her delivery-pipes to be cut, and the crew to be sent into the swamp through the elongated port forward, through which the gun had been used. The first officer, gallant Frank Harris, reported all the men on shore. We examined the vessel, found all orders had been obeyed, and we also took to the swamp.

I think our two attendants ran into each other. Harris said such was the case. At any rate I soon heard heavy firing,— some for our benefit, but most, I think, for the abandoned *Manassas*. I heard afterward that she was boarded, but, filling astern, floated off, on fire, and blew up somewhere below in the neighborhood of the mortar-fleet.

I have confined my remarks to the *Manassas*, and it is just that I should tell what the *Manassas* was,— a tow-boat *boarded* over with five-inch timber and armored with one thickness of flat railroad iron, with a complement of thirty-four persons and an armament of one light carronade and four double-barreled guns. She was very slow. I do not think she made at any time that night more than five miles an hour.

NEW ORLEANS, July 30th, 1886.

If on that occasion she was made to do less than she should have done, if she omitted any possible chance of putting greater obstructions in the track of the fleet, the fault was mine,— for I was trammeled by no orders from superior authority; I labored under no difficulty of divided counsel; I had not to guard against possible disaffection or be jealous about obedience to my orders.

I have finished, having endeavored to avoid personality even to omitting much in praise I could say of brother officers in the same fight, but not in any way connected with the *Manassas*.

Captain Squires, who commanded Fort St. Philip, informed me that his fort had fired seventy-five times at the *Manassas*, mistaking her for a disabled vessel of the enemy's floating down-stream. The *Manassas* was not struck once by Fort St. Philip.

The following are the only officers living, as far as I know, who were with me on the night referred to: Engineers George W. Weaver and T. A. Menzies, and Pilots Robert Levin and Robert Wilson.

INCIDENTS OF THE OCCUPATION OF NEW ORLEANS.

BY ALBERT KAUTZ, CAPTAIN, U. S. N.



THE MAINTOP OF THE "HARTFORD," WITH HOWITZER.

AT 1 o'clock P. M. of the 25th of April, 1862, Farragut's squadron, having completed its memorable passage of Forts Jackson and St. Philip, and having silenced the Chalmette batteries, anchored in front of the city of New Orleans in a drenching rain.

Captain Theodorus Bailey, being second in command, claimed the privilege of carrying ashore the demand for the surrender of the city. This was accorded him by the flag-officer, and the captain, accompanied by Lieutenant George H. Perkins (now captain), at once proceeded to the City Hall. Mayor Monroe took the ground that as General Lovell had not yet left the city, the demand should be made on him. At the captain's request the mayor sent for the general, who in a few moments appeared with his staff. General Lovell said he would not surrender the city, adding that he had already withdrawn his soldiers, and that at the close of the interview he intended to join his command. Captain Bailey had to return and report to Farragut that there was no one on shore willing to surrender the city. Two or three gentlemen had accompanied Captain Bailey and Lieutenant Perkins to the City Hall, and after the interview Colonel W. S. Lovell and one other of the general's staff escorted them to the landing.

The mob, overawed by the frowning batteries of the ships, really seemed dazed and did not offer to assault the Union officers. On the following morning, however, the people in the streets began to wonder whether anything more was going to be done, and became more violent and boisterous.

Farragut determined to make a formal demand for the surrender on Mayor Monroe, and at 10 o'clock on the morning of the 26th he sent me ashore, with instructions to deliver the official demand to the mayor. My little force on leaving the *Hartford* consisted of Midshipman John H. Read and a marine guard of twenty men under command of Second Lieutenant George Heisler. We landed on the levee in front of a howling mob, which thronged the river-front as far as the eye could reach. It was expected that I would take the marines with me to the City Hall, as a body-guard, and Farragut informed me that if a shot was fired at us by the mob, he would open fire from all the ships and level the town. The marines were drawn up in line, and I attempted to reason with the mob, but soon found this impossible. I then thought to clear the way by bringing the marines to an aim, but women and children were shoved to the front, while the angry mob behind them shouted: "Shoot, you ——

CAPTAIN THEODORUS BAILEY AND LIEUTENANT GEORGE H. PERKINS ON THEIR WAY TO DEMAND THE SURRENDER OF NEW ORLEANS.

Yankees, shoot!" The provocation was certainly very great, and nothing but the utter absence of respectability in the faces of the people caused me to refrain from giving the order to fire.

Fortunately at this critical moment I discovered an officer of the City Guards, whom I hailed and told that I wished to communicate with the mayor. He begged me to leave the marines on the levee, for he felt sure that to march them through the streets at this time would provoke a conflict. As my object was to communicate with the mayor without unnecessary shedding of blood, I sent the marine guard back to the ship, retaining only one non-commissioned officer, with a musket.

I tied my handkerchief on the bayonet, and with Midshipman Read and this man took up the march for the City Hall. We were cursed and jostled by the mob which filled the streets, but no actual violence was offered us. We found the mayor in the City Hall with his council. The Hon. Pierre Soulé was also there, having doubtless been called in as an adviser. The mayor declined to surrender the city formally, but said as we had the force we could take possession.

While we were in the City Hall a mob came up from the lower part of the city with an American ensign, and when they saw us they tore the flag to shreds and threw them into the open window at us. I did not comprehend the meaning of this singular and wild demonstration at the time, but afterward learned that on the morning of this same day Farragut had instructed Captain H. W. Morris

of the *Pensacola*, then at anchor abreast of the United States Mint, to hoist a flag on that building, it being United States property. Captain Morris accordingly sent Lieutenant Stillwell with some officers and men from the ship, and the flag was hoisted. It was up only a short time when Mumford hauled it down. It was seized by the mob, which paraded it through the streets with fife and drum until they reached the City Hall, where it was destroyed, as above described. I afterward happened to be present when Farragut reported the hauling down of this flag to General Butler, and I heard the latter say, "I will make an example of that fellow by hanging him." Farragut smiled and remarked, "You know, General, you will have to catch him before you can hang him." General Butler said, "I know that, but I will catch him, and then hang him." History attests how well he kept his word, and there is no doubt but that this hanging proved a wholesome lesson.

The mob soon appeared to be growing more violent, and above the general din was heard an occasional invitation to "the —— Yankees" to "come out and be run up to lamp-posts." At this time Mr. Soulé suggested to me that it would save much trouble to all concerned if I would take my party in a carriage from the rear exit of the hall, the mayor's secretary, Mr. Marion Baker, going with us, while he addressed the mob. He did not hope to have the mob obey him, he only expected to hold it long enough to give us time to get to the landing; and he accomplished his undertaking admirably. Few people ever knew what an important service Mr. Soulé thus rendered to New Orleans.

Farragut fully approved my action. I was not expected to bring a satisfactory answer from the mayor, for he was really helpless and had no control over the city. All he could say was, "Come and take the city; we are powerless."

The 27th and 28th passed in rather a fruitless negotiation, but time did an important work.[1] The mob tired itself out, and no longer threatened such violence as on the 26th.

On the 29th Farragut decided that the time had come for him to take formal possession of the city; he felt that this was a duty he owed to the navy, and he accordingly sent an expedition on shore under command of Fleet Captain H. H. Bell, and of this party I was second in command. I had a detachment of sailors and two boat-howitzers, and was assisted by Midshipmen John H. Read and E. C. Hazeltine.[2] A battalion of marines made part of our expedition; this was under the command of Captain John L. Broome. We landed at the foot of Canal street and proceeded to a position in front of the Custom-house, where the marines were drawn up in line, with loaded pieces, and flanked by the howitzers loaded with shrapnel. The people made no demonstration, but looked on in sullen silence. Captain Bell and I, with a boatswain's mate carrying our ensign, entered the Custom-house, where the postmaster received us cordially, remarking, "Thank God that you are here. I have been a Union man all the time. I was appointed by Buchanan, not by Jeff Davis; he only allowed me to remain." The postmaster showed us to the roof of the building, where we found a flag-staff with halliards. The boatswain's mate bent on the flag and I reported all ready, when Captain Bell gave the order, "Hoist away!" and the boatswain's mate and I put our hands to the halliards, and "the Stars and Stripes rose into the sky and swelled on the breeze." A guard with the lieutenant of marines was left in charge of the flag at the Custom-house, and the landing party moved on to the City Hall, the crowd increasing as that small body of Union men approached the "State flag." There the marines were again drawn up in line, and the howitzers commanded the streets; thousands of spectators filled the open spaces. That immense assemblage had the will to annihilate the small force of sailors and marines, but they had begun to think, and the impression that resistance to United States authority would invoke the wrath of the squadron had gone abroad; still no one knew but that one or two desperate men were ready to fire the train that would lead to the magazine.

Captain Bell gave Mayor Monroe the privilege of hauling down the State flag, but he indignantly declined. Captain Bell then directed me to go to the roof of the building and haul the flag down, he remaining on the top floor at the foot of the ladder. An ordinary ladder led to the roof, through a small covered hatchway. The boatswain's mate ascended first, shoved the hatch cover to one side, and gained the roof. I followed him, and finding the halliards knotted, I drew my sword and cut them; we then hauled the flag down, took it to the floor below and handed it to Captain Bell, who on our return to the ship delivered it to Farragut. Before we ascended to the roof, the mayor informed Captain Bell, in the presence of his officers, that the men who attempted to haul down the flag might be shot by

[1] Of the occurrences of the 28th, Captain H. H. Bell says in his diary: "Apr. 28th, Delivered Flag-Officer's letter to the Mayor and Council, who in an address from the Mayor repeated all that was in their letters to [the] Flag-Officer, and nothing more; only wanting me to explain the last clause of Flag-Officer's last letter to them. I replied that I could say nothing that could add to or take away from the clause in question — that the language was very clear. It was suggested that the populace in front of the hall was violent, and that they would furnish me a guard for escort to boat, which I respectfully declined as unnecessary. They then ordered a hack, and, accompanied by Chief of Police McClelland, and Mayor's Clerk, and Master Tyson, U. S. N., passing out through a private way, drove to the landing without meeting mob. Mr. Soulé was present and seated on the right hand of Mayor — the only man seated in the chamber. Their countenances expressed consternation. They repeated that 'the man lived not in the city who dared to haul down the flag from over the City Hall.' The people — boys generally — were perfectly quiet until near the City Hall, when they began to give vent to their feelings by 'Hurrah for Jeff Davis!' 'Hurrah for Beauregard!' and the use of some angry language."— EDITORS.

[2] It is a strange fact that the three officers of the line with whom I went on shore on this occasion were all afterward drowned. Bell, who was then rear-admiral, and Read, who was lieutenant-commander, were swamped in a boat while going ashore from the *Hartford*, at Osaka, Japan, and Hazeltine as an ensign went down in the *Housatonic*. — A. K.



SCENE AT THE CITY HALL — HAULING DOWN THE STATE FLAG.

The local papers spoke of the State flag on the City Hall at the time as the "Lone Star flag." General Beauregard, in a letter to Admiral Preble, in 1872, says this flag was adopted in 1861 by the State Convention of Louisiana. It had thirteen stripes, four blue, six white, and three red, commencing at the top, with the colors as written. The Union was red, with its sides equal to the width of seven stripes. In its center was a single pale-yellow five-pointed star.— A. K.

the indignant populace assembled on the surrounding house-tops, and he expressed his fears in the hope that he would not be held responsible for the act, in case it should be perpetrated. Fortunately for the peace of the city of New Orleans, the vast crowd looked on in sullen silence as the flag came down. There was no flag hoisted on the City Hall in place of the State flag, for the reason that it had not covered United States property. The mission of the landing party having been accomplished, the officers and men returned to the levee in marching order, where they took boats for their respective vessels. The flag on the Custom-house was guarded by the marines of the *Hartford*, until the arrival of General Butler with his troops [May 1st].

On the morning of May 2d Farragut sent me with the keys of the Custom-house to the St. Charles Hotel, where I delivered them to General Butler, remarking as I did so, "General, I fear you are going to have rather a lawless party to govern, from what I have seen in the past three or four days." The general replied, "No doubt of that, but I think I understand these people, and can govern them." The general took the reins in his hands at once, and held them until December 23d, 1862, when he was relieved of the command of the Department of the Gulf by General N. P. Banks.

FARRAGUT'S DEMANDS FOR THE SURRENDER OF NEW ORLEANS.

BY MARION A. BAKER, THE MAYOR'S PRIVATE SECRETARY.

On the morning of the 25th of April, 1862, there being no longer any doubt as to the approach of the Federal fleet, Mayor Monroe determined to hoist the flag of Louisiana over the City Hall. At his request, I ascended to the roof of the building prepared to execute his design, but with instructions to await the issue of the possible contest at Chalmette, some four miles below the center of the city where our last line of defense was established. I waited accordingly with the flag bent on to the halliards, and my gaze fixed eagerly upon the approaching steamers. Suddenly quick flashes leaping from their dark sides indicated that they were abreast of the redoubts, but their fire was delivered without check to their speed, and in hardly more time than I take to tell of it, they were dark and silent once more.

I reported to Mr. Monroe, who was standing in the street below, that it was all over, and at a signal from him I ran up the flag whose lowering was to be the occasion of so much angry controversy.

There was now nothing left to do but to wait and speculate upon the probable course of the enemy, and we were not long kept in suspense. At half-past 1 came two officers, wearing the uniform of the United States Navy. Mr. Monroe received them courteously and presented them to the Hon. Pierre Soulé and a number of other gentlemen who chanced to be present, chiefly councilmen and members of the Committee of Public Safety. The senior officer, Captain Bailey, second in command of the fleet, then stated that he came as the bearer of a demand from Flag-Officer Farragut, for the surrender of the city, the lowering of the State flag on the City Hall, and the hoisting of the United States flag over the Post-office, Custom-house, and Mint.

The interview took the form of an informal, open conference between Captain Bailey and the mayor, Mr. Soulé, and the other gentlemen whose connection with public affairs gave them the right to engage in it. The mayor's advisers agreed with him that he had no authority to surrender the city, and that General Lovell was the proper person to receive and reply to that demand. To the second clause, relating to the lowering of the State flag, an unqualified refusal was returned. Mr. Monroe then sent for General Lovell, and while they waited for his coming, conversation turned upon other subjects.

General Lovell appeared promptly, and Captain Bailey repeated his demand to him, prefacing it with the statement that his mission was to the mayor and common council. The general refused to surrender the city or his forces, but stated that he would retire with his troops, and leave the civil authorities to act as they saw fit. The question of the surrender being thus referred back to him, the mayor said that he would submit the matter to the council, and send a formal reply as soon as their advice could be obtained, whereupon the officers withdrew, being furnished with an escort by General Lovell.

The council met at 6:30 that evening, and received a message from the mayor. As a civil magistrate, he held that he was incompetent to the performance of a military act, and thought it would be proper to say that the withdrawal of the troops rendering resistance impossible, no obstruction could be offered to the occupation of the place by the enemy; but that all acts involving a transfer of authority must be performed by the invading force themselves. "We yield to physical force alone," said the mayor, "and maintain our allegiance to the Goverument of the Confederate States. Beyond this a due respect for our dignity, our rights, and the flag of our country does not, I think, permit us to go."

The council, unwilling to act hastily in so important a matter, simply listened to the reading of this message, and adjourned to meet again at 10 A. M. of the next day. I saw the mayor at his own house that evening, and he requested me to go off to the *Hartford* as early as possible the next morning, and explain to Flag-Officer Farragut that the council would meet at 10 that morning, and that a written answer to his demands would be returned as soon as possible after that hour. Mr. Monroe took this step entirely upon his own responsibility, fearing probably that the delay in the official reply might in some way be construed to our disadvantage. About 6 o'clock the next morning, Mr. McClelland, chief of police, and myself took a boat at the foot of Lafayette street, and hoisting a handkerchief upon a walking-stick by way of a flag of truce, were pulled out to the flag-ship. Having made myself known as the bearer of a message from the mayor of the city to Captain Farragut, we were invited on board, and shown to the flag-officer's cabin, where we found assembled the three commanders, Farragut, Bailey, and Bell.

Captain Farragut, who had known me from my boyhood, received me with the utmost kindness, and when my errand was disposed of readily answered my inquiries about the battle at the forts. He took me over the ship and showed me with almost boyish interest the manner in which the boilers were defended, and the scars upon the ship's sides where the shots had taken effect. Then making me stand beside him upon the very spot where he had stood during the passage of the forts, he described in eloquent terms the conflict, perhaps the most terrific that had ever been withstood. "I seemed to be breathing flame," said the captain. It was still quite early when we reached the wharf on our return, and the levee appeared deserted, but, though we saw nobody, we were seen. We went at 8 o'clock to the mayor's office to make our report. While still with him Mr. Soulé entered, accompanied by his son, and with much excitement made known the fact that two

persons, traitors beyond doubt, had that very morning been seen to leave one of the enemy's ships and land at the levee. He strongly urged the arrest and punishment of the guilty persons, and the mayor blandly promised that it should be attended to, while the guilty persons silently enjoyed the little joke.

The council met at the appointed hour, and, having listened to a second reading of the mayor's message, unanimously resolved, that being "informed by the military authorities that the city was indefensible" no resistance would be made to the forces of the United States. Also that the "council and the entire population of this metropolis concurred in the sentiments expressed by the mayor, and that he be respectfully requested to act in the spirit manifested in said message." In anticipation of such a result, a letter had already been prepared embodying the views contained in the message, and reiterating the determination neither to hoist the United States flag nor lower that of our own adoption.

Mr. Monroe, though a man of much energy and decision of character, was entirely a "self-made" man, and his secretary was very young. Both were inexperienced in diplomatic correspondence; indeed, the emergency was one quite unexampled in the experience of the chief magistrate of an American city. We had, therefore, called to our assistance Mr. Durant da Ponte, at that time one of the editors and proprietors of the New Orleans "Delta," with which paper I had been connected previous to my appointment as private secretary to the mayor. At the invitation of the council I appeared before them and read the letter we had prepared. It was well received, and from expressions let fall by some of the members I retired with the impression that it was entirely satisfactory. Shortly afterward, however, a message was brought the mayor, requesting his presence in the council chamber. The object of this summons was to gain his consent to the substitution of a letter written by Mr. Soulé, and submitted to their consideration by one of the members.

The relations between the mayor and the council had not been of the most harmonious character, and he, wishing to conciliate them at this unfortunate juncture, yielded to their wish.

Before a copy of this letter could be made ready for transmission to the fleet, two officers, Lieutenant Albert Kautz and Midshipman John H. Read, appeared bearing a written demand, couched in the most peremptory terms, for the "unqualified surrender of the city," the hoisting of "the emblem of the sovereignty of the United States" over the Mint, Custom-house, and City Hall by meridian of that day (Saturday, April 26th), and the removal of all emblems of sovereignty other than that of the United States from all public buildings by that hour.

Mr. Monroe added a paragraph to the letter acknowledging the receipt of this last communication and promising a reply before 2 o'clock, if possible. I set out at once to convey it to Captain Farragut. As a matter of fact, the United States flag had already been raised on the Mint, and I called the attention of the Federal commander to the fact that a flag had been raised while negotiations were still pending. Captain Farragut replied that the flag had been placed there without his knowledge, but he could not now order it down. His men, he said, were flushed with victory, and much excited by the taunts and gibes of the crowd on the levee. Pointing to the "tops" where a number of men were stationed, some armed with muskets, others nervously clutching the strings of the howitzers, he called my attention to their excited appearance, and remarked that it was as much as he could do to restrain them from firing on the crowd, and should he attempt to haul that flag down, it would be impossible to keep them within bounds.]

I returned to the City Hall before Lieutenant Kautz and Midshipman Read had concluded their visit. A large and excited crowd were outside. Some of them pressed their way up the front steps, and seemed intent upon entering the building. In order to prevent their forcing an entrance, the mayor ordered the heavy doors to be closed. Upon

] This conversation, which was quite informal, did not at the time assume in my estimation the importance lent to it by subsequent events which occurred after I left the city as bearer of dispatches to President Davis at Richmond. In the excitement of the next few hours and the anomalous multiplication of my duties, it is possible that I may have even neglected to report it to the mayor, but it is certain that the impression obtained at the City Hall that the act was entirely unauthorized. Parton, whose account of the capture of the city is, in some respects, very incorrect, and who makes the tearing down of the United States flag from the Mint occur on Sunday the 27th, instead of Saturday the 26th, as shown by the record, says that General Butler arrived a few hours after that event, to share in the exasperation of the fleet and the councils of its chief. It was Butler, according to this historian, who advised the threat to bombard, and the order for the removal of the women and children. It may have been by his advice, also, that Captain Farragut assumed the placing of the flag on the Mint as his act, wishing to give it sufficient weight to make the tearing of it down a punishable offense.— M. A. B.

It will be noted that on page 92 Commander Kautz says the flag was raised over the Mint on the morning of April 26th in accordance with instructions from Farragut to Captain Morris of the *Pensacola*. But in a letter to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, dated April 27th, Farragut himself says: "This morning at 6 A. M. I sent to Captain Morris, whose ship commanded the Mint, to take possession of it and hoist the American flag thereon, which was done and the people cheered it."

The apparent contradictions of these various statements cannot be disposed of by a study of the "Official Records." Neither do military and naval histories shed clear light on the subject. But the facts, half-truths, and explainable misapprehensions that can be sifted from the mass, indicate that early on the morning of the 26th a boat's crew from the fleet, without orders from Farragut, raised a flag over the Mint. This flag was hauled down by Mumford on April 27th, as related above by Farragut, and another flag was raised over the Mint in accordance with the flag-officer's instructions to Captain Morris. Before the first flag had been hauled down, the flag-officer, as intimated in his conversation with Mr. Baker, had decided to assume responsibility for the raising of it; this he did officially in a communication to the mayor dated April 28th. Apparently, therefore, Kautz has made the mistake of connecting the first flag with the order for the raising of the second flag.— EDITORS.

PIERRE SOULÉ. FROM A DAGUERREOTYPE TAKEN ABOUT 1851.

my arrival, I learned that the United States flag had just been torn down from the Mint.

Mr. Monroe, thinking it unwise for the officers to attempt to return openly to their boat, proposed to send them back under military escort. Lieutenant Kautz thought that quite unnecessary, but the mayor persisting that there was danger, a carriage was sent for and was stationed at the corner of Carondelet and Lafayette streets. Aided by two special officers of the police, I conducted them through a rear entrance while the mayor occupied the crowd in front, and got them into the carriage, but we were discovered as we drove away, and some of the crowd started up St. Charles street with the evident expectation of heading us off. I ordered the driver to whip up his horses and turn into Julia street, the second street above, and drive post-haste to the river. Many of our pursuers were armed, and I expected that we would be fired at as we crossed St. Charles street, but we went by so rapidly that they had no opportunity to fire, even had they so intended. They kept up the chase for some distance, but we so outstripped them that the most enduring finally gave it up. The officers' boat was found lying some little distance off in the stream, and the coxswain explained that he had been compelled to push out from the landing to prevent his tiller-ropes from being cut. No violence was offered to our party. As we took our places in the boat a shot was fired from the bow-gun of the *Hartford*, and for a moment I fancied that the fleet was about to bombard the city, but the officers explained that it was the signal recalling them to the ship.

The police force being clearly inadequate for the preservation of order, the mayor now called to his assistance the European Brigade, an organization made up of foreign residents, and commanded by General Paul Juge, *fils*. This general issued a proclamation assuming command of all foreign troops "by order of his Honor John T. Monroe," and asking the aid of all good citizens in the preservation of order.

The mayor was thus constituted commander-in-chief of an army, as well as of the civil forces, and the City Hall became a sort of military headquarters. Officers in gorgeous uniforms glittering with gold lace clanked their swords across the

marble-paved halls, and from one to half a dozen mounted orderlies were constantly in waiting in the street, while I and the whole clerical force of the office were kept busy issuing requisitions for arms, horses, forage, and provisions for the home brigade, and orders for transportation, by steamboat and rail, for Confederate troops, en route from the outlying fortifications to General Lovell's headquarters, at Camp Moore. Martial law reigned, and a countersign was communicated to the patrol every night, without which no citizen was allowed to pass after 9 o'clock. A dispute arising between two officers of the French Legion as to precedence in rank, the matter was referred to the mayor for decision. Mr. Monroe improvised a military court, before which the disputants appeared, represented by learned counsel. Mr. Soulé was advocate for one side, and under the threatening guns of the fleet the momentous question was gravely argued and decided. I have still before me the dramatic figure of the victor as he issued from the tribunal, waving his cap in triumph, closely followed by the gorgeously equipped members of his staff.

Sunday passed without intercourse with the fleet, but Monday brought a still more vivid excitement in the shape of a communication from Flag-Officer Farragut, reciting all the evidences of insubordination and contumacy on the part of the citizens and authorities, and admonishing us that the fire of the fleet might be drawn upon the city at any moment. "The election is with you," says the flag-officer, "but it becomes my duty to notify you to remove the women and children within forty-eight hours if I have rightly understood your determination."

This communication was brought to the City Hall by Commander Henry H. Bell, who was accompanied by Acting Master Herbert B. Tyson. After reading it Mr. Monroe said: "As I consider this a threat to bombard the city, and as it is a matter about which the notice should be clear and specific, I desire to know when the forty-eight hours began to run."

"It begins from the time you receive this notice," replied the captain.

"Then," said the mayor, taking out his watch and showing it to the captain, "you see it is fifteen minutes past 12 o'clock."

Commander Bell acknowledged the correctness of the mayor's time, and went on to say that he was further charged to call attention to the "bad faith" of the commander of the *McRae*, the steamer which had brought up the wounded and dead from the forts under a flag of truce, in either sinking or allowing his steamer to sink without reporting to the flag-officer his inability to keep his pledge and take it back to the forts.

The council was convoked for the consideration of Captain Farragut's letter, and the mayor appeared before them and gave his views regarding the answer to be returned. Captain Farragut had assumed as his own act the raising of the flag on the Mint and alluded to an attempt having been made by him to place one upon the Custom-house. The mayor's reply, which was drafted by Mr. Soulé, renews his refusal to lower the flag of Louisiana. "This satisfaction," he says, "you cannot obtain at our hands. We will stand your bombardment, unarmed and undefended as we are."

Accompanied by Mr. Soulé I conveyed this reply to the *Hartford* early on the morning of the 29th. On our arrival Mr. Soulé at once entered upon a discussion of international law, which was listened to patiently by the flag-officer and Commanders Bailey and Bell. When Mr. Soulé had concluded, Captain Farragut replied that he was a plain sailor and it was not expected that he should understand the nice points of international usage; that he was simply there as the commander of the fleet and aimed only to do his duty in that capacity.

Mr. Soulé, having apparently fulfilled his mission, now asked to be set on shore, as he had an engagement at 9 o'clock. This engagement was to meet the mayor and some others, including, if I remember aright, General Lovell (who had come down to the city from Camp Moore), with a view of urging upon them a scheme for making a combined night attack, by means of a flotilla of ferry-boats, upon the fleet, whose ammunition it was generally believed had been exhausted. There had been an informal conference at the mayor's residence the evening previous, at which I was present, when Mr. Soulé unfolded his plan of the contemplated night attack and urged it strongly upon the mayor's attention. The meeting at 9 o'clock the following morning was for the purpose of discussing this matter more freely. It was, however, too late for such an undertaking, even had the plan been a much more feasible one. The forts had surrendered! Captain Farragut had already dispatched a message to the mayor notifying him of that event, and adding that he was about to raise the United States flag on the Mint and Custom-house. He still insisted that the lowering of the flag over the City Hall should be the work of those who had raised it, but before I left the ship he had yielded that point also, and I reported to my chief that there would be no bombardment and that the ungrateful task of lowering our flag would be performed by those who demanded its removal.

Mayor Monroe at once issued a proclamation requesting all citizens "to retire to their homes during these acts of authority which it would be folly to resist," and impressing upon them the melancholy consolation that the flag was not to be removed by their authorities, "but by those who had the power and the will to exercise it." I carried a copy of this proclamation on board the flag-ship.

The duty of raising and removing the flags was intrusted to Captain Bell. I left the ship in advance of his force, and returned to the City Hall to report their coming. The stage was now set for the last act, and soon the officers, marines, and sailors appeared in Lafayette square with bayonets and two brass howitzers glittering in the sunlight. The marines were formed in line on the St. Charles street side of the square near the iron railing which at that time inclosed it, while the guns were drawn through the gates out into the middle of the street, and placed so as to command the thoroughfare either way.

The crowd flowed in from every direction and filled the street in a compact mass both above and below the square. They were silent, but angry and threatening. Many openly displayed their arms. An open way was left in front of the hall, and their force being stationed, Captain Bell and Lieutenant Kautz passed across the street, mounted the hall steps, and entered the mayor's parlor. Approaching the mayor, Captain Bell said: "I have come in obedience to orders to haul down the State flag from this building."

Mr. Monroe replied, his voice trembling with restrained emotion, "Very well, sir, you can do it; but I wish to say that there is not in my entire constituency so wretched a renegade as would be willing to exchange places with you."

He emphasized this speech in a manner which must have been very offensive to the officers. Captain Bell visibly restrained himself from reply and asked at once that he might be shown the way to the roof. The mayor replied by referring him to the janitor, whom he would find outside.

As soon as the two officers left the room, Mr. Monroe also went out and placed himself immediately in front of the howitzer pointing down St. Charles street. There, folding his arms, he fixed his eyes upon the gunner who stood lanyard in hand ready for action. Here he remained until the flag had been hauled down and Lieutenant Kautz and Captain Bell had reappeared. At an order from the officers the sailors drew their howitzers back into the square, the marines fell into marching order behind them, and retired as they had come. As they passed out through the Camp street gate, Mr. Monroe turned toward the hall, and the people who had hitherto preserved the silence he had asked from them broke into cheers for their mayor.

THE WATER-BATTERY AT FORT JACKSON.

BY WILLIAM B. ROBERTSON, CAPTAIN, 1ST LOUISIANA ARTILLERY, C. S. A.

ON the 15th of April, 1862, I was directed by Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Higgins, commanding Forts Jackson and St. Philip, to take command of the water-battery. [See map, p. 34.] This was an outwork of Fort Jackson, separated from it by two moats. It was quadrilateral in shape, inclosed on three sides by a breastwork made of earth, the side next to the fort being open. The battery had no casemates or covered ways. It had been hastily prepared for use just previous to the appearance of the enemy's fleet in our front. During the siege it was directly in the line of fire from the mortar-boats, or very nearly so.

The battery was manned by a detachment of Company D, 1st Louisiana Artillery, under First Lieutenant R. J. Bruce, a detachment of the St. Mary's Cannoneers, under First Lieutenant George O. Foot, and a detachment of my company, "B," 1st Louisiana Artillery, under Sergeant Henry Herman, numbering, all told, about 100 men. There were mounted in the work 8 guns, viz., 2 rifled 32-pounders (old smooth-bores rifled), 1 10-inch Columbiad, 1 9-inch Columbiad, 3 smooth-bore 32-pounders, and 1 10-inch sea-coast mortar.] In the battery there were two magazines which had been hurriedly constructed. They were built of old flat-boat gunwales (pieces of timber about 12×24 inches square) placed close together, resting at one end on the edge of the parapet, and at the other on the *terre-plein* of the battery. These gunwales were laid on their flat sides and were covered with several courses of bags filled with sand to a depth of two or three feet. There were also two temporary hovels intended for shelter for the men while sleeping. They were so low that it was impossible to stand erect in them, and the men could not lie down at full length.

On the 18th of April the enemy commenced the bombardment of Fort Jackson and the water-battery with all his mortar-boats. The fort and the water-battery replied vigorously, but finding it impossible to reach them with any of my guns, owing chiefly to the inferiority of our powder, I was ordered to use my mortar only. This was the nearest piece in the fortifications to the enemy, and whenever it happened that the charge of powder was of good quality the shells from this mortar made it hot for the mortar-boats, though we could see that many of them fell short. During the first days of the bombardment the enemy's gun-boats appeared occasionally above the point of woods, but were soon driven to seek cover in every instance by the combined fire of Forts Jackson and St. Philip and the water-battery. On April 19th the bombardment was renewed with increased fury, and several of the enemy's gun-boats endeavored to maintain positions above the point of woods, about three miles below Fort Jackson, and behind which the mortar-boats lay concealed from view and in comparative safety, owing to the inferiority of our ordnance and ammunition,—but they were unable to withstand the fire from the forts and the water-battery, and soon retired. In these engagements I used only the rifle guns and Columbiads. That day the enemy's mortar fire was very accurate, and disabled both of the 32-pounder rifle guns in the water-battery. We patched them up as well as we could afterward, and made them serviceable.

On the 20th the bombardment continued, hav-

] Captain Robertson's enumeration of guns in the water-battery differs from that given on page 75. The latter, which was made up before the receipt of Captain Robertson's account, was based on the following facts: Admiral Porter, in his report of April 30th, 1862, written after a visit to the fort, states that the water-battery at Jackson contained 6 guns. The plan [see p. 34] made by Messrs. Harris and Gerdes of the coast survey gives 6 pieces, viz., 5 guns and 1 mortar. Lieutenant (now General) John C. Palfrey, being ordered by Lieutenant Weitzel to make a list of the ordnance in the fort, gives the armament of the outer battery as follows: "Two 32-pounders rifled, one 10-inch Columbiad, two 8-inch Columbiads, and one 10-inch sea-mortar,—total, 6."— EDITORS.

ing been maintained uninterruptedly all the previous night. The Federal gun-boats several times poked their noses cautiously around the point, delivered shots, and dodged back quickly.

Some time during the first days of the bombardment, the Confederate States steamer *McRae*, lying about the fort and in its rear, commenced firing at the mortar-fleet, with the good intention of aiding us. The projectiles from her guns passed directly over the water-battery, and many sabots from them fell in and around it. Seeing that her shot were falling far short of the enemy, and that it would be but a waste of ammunition for her to continue firing, I notified Colonel Higgins of the facts, and he requested her commander to cease firing, which he promptly did. This was the only attempt, according to my recollection, on the part of the navy, after the first day of the bombardment, to render us any assistance, until they were forced into action by Farragut's advance.

After the 20th of April the enemy's mortar-boats continued to rain shell incessantly, night and day, upon Fort Jackson and the water-battery, until nearly sundown on the 24th. During all this trying period the officers and men who served under me in the water-battery never wavered, *and not a single one was ever driven from his post.*

On the afternoon of the 23d I received a communication from Colonel Higgins, notifying me that the enemy were planting signals along the river-bank, just above the position of the mortar-fleet, and that this and other movements among them indicated that they would make an attempt that night to rush by our works, with their steamers, and ordering me to prepare to resist their passage. He also notified me that the river would be lit up by fire-rafts. I was very watchful all that night, hardly sleeping an instant. Every gun in the battery was loaded and pointed toward the river, and the men were kept at their posts.

At 3:30 the bombardment was redoubled, and soon afterward Sergeant Herman called my attention to several black, shapeless masses, barely distinguishable from the surrounding darkness, moving silently, but steadily, up the river. Not a light was visible anywhere; not a torch had been applied to a single fire-raft, and not one of them had been started from its moorings. As soon as I caught sight of the moving objects, I knew they were the enemy's vessels, and I ordered the guns to be trained upon the two which were in the lead, and to open a rapid fire upon them. Only a moment sufficed for the gunners to sight the guns, so thoroughly was everything prepared, and the water-battery thundered its greeting to the enemy. Fort Jackson followed instantly with a grand crash of artillery from the guns under Anderson and Ogden, Baylor and Agar along the lower and river fronts, and from those of Mumford in the mortar bastion and Kennedy in the flag-staff bastion. Fort St. Philip echoed with the boom of its guns. The Federal vessels replied with broadsides. The flashes of the guns, from both sides, lit up the river with a lurid light that revealed the outlines of the Federal steamers more distinctly.

I do not believe there ever was a grander spectacle witnessed before in the world than that displayed during the great artillery duel which then followed. The mortar-shells shot upward from the mortar-boats, rushed to the apexes of their flight, flashing the lights of their fuses as they revolved, paused an instant, and then descended upon our works like hundreds of meteors, or burst in mid-air, hurling their jagged fragments in every direction. The guns on both sides kept up a continual roar for nearly an hour, without a moment's intermission, and produced a shimmering illumination, which, though beautiful and grand, was illusive in its effect upon the eye, and made it impossible to judge accurately of the distance of the moving vessels from us; and this fact, taken in connection with their rapid and constant change of positions, as they speeded up the river, rendered it very difficult to hit them with our projectiles. On the other hand, our positions being stationary, they operated at no such disadvantage, though moving themselves. All the shore guns were served with great rapidity, until the vessels had passed beyond our range. As the vessels were masked by Fort Jackson from our view as they passed up the river, our attention was turned to those following, in succession; and no vessel stood in front of Fort Jackson and the water-battery many moments without receiving their compliments in the shape of iron missiles. *No guns were silenced in either Fort Jackson or the water-battery at any time during this engagement. Not a man was driven from his post at the guns in the water-battery, much less from the battery itself,* as is asserted by Admiral Porter. [See p. 43.]

After Farragut passed with most of his steamers there was a slackening of the fire in the forts and the water-battery, simply for the reason that it would have been madness to have wasted any more ammunition than was necessary to drive away Admiral Porter and all the vessels which had failed to pass the forts under cover of darkness. But as soon as it was light enough to see them plainly *we silenced* and drove rapidly down the river *all the vessels, including Admiral Porter's, that remained below the forts.* As soon as Farragut's vessels could, they pushed up the river out of our range.

The passage of the forts by Farragut and his fleet was an act of grand heroism that should forever shed luster on the American navy, and Porter and his mortar-fleet did splendid work, and contributed very materially to the success which the Federal navy achieved over us. I have no doubt he fought his flotilla in front of the water-battery with great courage. But some things he *did not* accomplish, and among them the silencing of Fort Jackson and the water-battery. I think it could be proven that it was a physical impossibility for him to have gotten as near the water-battery as he claims to have done, as I think the water-battery is farther from the *river-bank itself.* But to Farragut belongs the great glory of the capture.

In reference to the mutiny, I have only to say this, that there was no indication that any of the men in the water-battery were implicated in it. No officers and I believe no native Southerners were involved in this disgraceful affair.

CONFEDERATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR FARRAGUT'S SUCCESS.

I.— BY JAMES GRIMSHAW DUNCAN, SON OF THE COMMANDER OF FORTS JACKSON AND ST. PHILIP.

ON the 22d of April, by order of Major-General Lovell, everything afloat, including the tow-boats and the entire control of the fire-barges formerly under General J. K. Duncan, was turned over to Captain J. K. Mitchell, commanding the Confederate States naval forces on the lower Mississippi River; and 150 men from both forts were given him as gunners and sharp-shooters for the *Louisiana*.

In an interview with Captain Mitchell on the morning of this date, General Duncan learned that the motive power of the *Louisiana* was not likely to be completed in time to bring her, as an aggressive steamer, into the pending action. As an iron-clad floating battery, mounting sixteen guns of the heaviest caliber, she was then as complete as she would ever be. Under these circumstances General Duncan considered that her best possible position would be below the raft, close in on the Fort St. Philip shore. This position would give us three direct and cross fires upon the enemy's approach, and at the same time insure the *Louisiana* against a direct assault. Accordingly, General Duncan urged these views upon Captain Mitchell in the following letter:

"It is of vital importance that the present fire of the enemy should be withdrawn from us, which you alone can do. This can be done in the manner suggested this morning, under cover of our guns, while your work on the boat can be carried on in safety and security. Our position is a critical one, dependent entirely on the powers of endurance of our casemates, many of which have been completely shattered and are crumbling away by repeated shocks; and therefore I respectfully but earnestly again urge my suggestion of this morning on your notice. Our magazines are also in danger."

Captain Mitchell replied:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of yours of this date, asking me to place the *Louisiana* in position below the raft this evening, if possible. This vessel was hurried away from New Orleans before her steam power and batteries were ready for service, without a crew, and in many other respects very incomplete, and this condition of things is but partially remedied now. She is not yet prepared to offer battle to the enemy, but should he attempt to pass the forts, we will do all we can to prevent it; and it was for this purpose only that she was placed in position where necessity might force her into action, inadequately prepared as she is at this moment. We have now at work on board about fifty mechanics, as well as her own crew and those from other vessels doing work essential to the preparation of the vessel for battle. Under these circumstances it would, in my estimation, be hazarding too much to place her under the fire of the enemy. Every effort is being made to prepare her for the relief of Fort Jackson, the condition of which is fully felt by me; and the very moment I can venture to face our enemy with any reasonable chance of success, be assured, General, I will do it, and trust that the result will show you that I am now pursuing the right course."

On the 23d, Captain Mitchell replied to another urgent request from General Duncan:

"I know the importance to the safety of Forts Jackson and St. Philip and the city of New Orleans of having this vessel in proper condition before seeking an encounter with the enemy. If he seeks one or attempts the passage of the forts before this vessel is ready, I shall meet him, however unprepared I may be. We have an additional force of mechanics from the city this morning, and I hope that by to-morrow night the motive power of the *Louisiana* will be ready, and that in the meantime her battery will be in place and other preparations will be completed, so as to enable her to act against the enemy. When ready, you will be immediately advised."

In this refusal Captain Mitchell was supported by Captains McIntosh, Huger, and Warley. Two other notes were also addressed him this day, requesting that fire-barges be sent down and a vigilant outlook kept from all his vessels, and asking his coöperation should the enemy attempt to pass during the night. This was promised, but no success attended the attempts at sending down fire-barges, for which there was no excuse; for, although the tugs were not in working order, there were six boats of the river fleet available, and fire-barges were plentiful. No immediate relief being looked for from our fleet, the entire command of Fort Jackson was turned out to repair damages under a very heavy fire. The bombardment continued without intermission throughout the 23d, but slackened off about 12 o'clock M., at which time there was every indication of exhaustion on the part of the mortar-flotilla. The following letter was sent to Captain Mitchell by General Duncan:

"I am of the opinion that the mortar practice of the enemy against Fort Jackson must be nearly exhausted, and that there is every indication that the enemy, as the next plan of attack, is about to move up his large vessels to the point of woods, and open upon us with his broadsides. One of the large vessels has already been brought up and placed in position. Should the above prove to be the case, it is imperatively necessary that the batteries of the *Louisiana* should be brought into action at all hazards, as well as those of Forts Jackson and St. Philip. A proper position for the *Louisiana* would be on the Fort St. Philip side, a short distance below the raft and close to the shore, which will give us three direct and cross fires upon the point of attack."

To this Captain Mitchell replied as before. Nothing now could be expected of the *Louisiana;* the only position which offered every possible chance of success had been repeatedly refused. Still Captain Mitchell had other duties to perform, and at sundown General Duncan wrote to him:

"The enemy has just sent up a small boat, and planted a series of white flags on the Fort St. Philip side, commencing about 350 yards above the lone tree. It is the probable position of his ships in the new line of attack which, in my opinion, he contemplates for attacking Fort Jackson with his large vessels. As you may not have seen this operation, I furnish you with the information. Please keep the river well lit up with fire-rafts to-night, as the attack may be made at any time."

The flags referred to were planted under cover of a perfect hail of shells. At about 9 P. M., Lieutenant Shryock, C. S. N., Captain Mitchell's aide, came ashore to inform General Duncan that the *Louisiana* would be ready for service by the next evening (the 24th). General Duncan informed him "that time was everything to us, and that to-morrow would in all probability prove too late." Lieutenant-Colonel Higgins warmly seconded this opinion, and warned Lieutenant Shryock that the final battle was imminent within a few hours. In regard to lighting the river, Lieutenant Shryock

stated that fire-barges would be sent down regularly every two hours throughout the night, and as none had been sent up to that hour (9:30 P. M.), he left, informing these officers that the matter would be attended to as soon as he arrived on board. Hour after hour passed, and not a barge was lighted. In consequence of this neglect, the river remained in complete darkness the entire night. The bombardment continued all night, and toward morning grew furious. At 3:30 A. M. the large vessels of the enemy were observed in motion. General Duncan then made this, his last and final appeal to Captain Mitchell:

"FORT JACKSON, La., 3:30 A. M., April 24th, 1862.—CAPTAIN: As I anticipated, and informed you yesterday, the enemy are taking up their positions at the present moment, with their large ships, on the St. Philip shore, to operate against Fort Jackson. They are placing themselves boldly, with their lights at their mast-heads. You are assuming a fearful responsibility if you do not come at once to our assistance with the *Louisiana* and the fleet. I can say no more."

Mitchell did not come, but Farragut did.

II.—BY JOHN K. MITCHELL, COMMODORE, C. S. N.

THE article by Admiral D. D. Porter, entitled "The Opening of the Lower Mississippi," published in "The Century" magazine for April, 1885, is open to adverse criticism, and particularly where he indulges in personal reflections upon the officers of my command. He claims that

"one fact only was in our [Farragut's] favor, and that was the division of their [the Confederate] forces under three different heads, which prevented unanimity of action. In every other respect the odds were against us."

But taking Admiral Porter's own showing of the armaments, it appears that the weight of one entire round of projectiles was approximately: Confederate, 7139 pounds; Union, 20,224; making a difference in favor of the Union force of 13,085 pounds, or nearly 3 to 1 in weight of projectiles.

The weight of one entire round of all the Confederate forces *afloat* (including the 10 guns of the *Louisiana* that could not be used) was 1760 pounds, and did not equal one round of any one of 4 of the first class United States sloops of war, as, for instance, the *Pensacola*, which was 1860 pounds. The ordnance of the United States fleet was the heaviest known to any navy of that day; her vessels were inferior to those of no other nation in construction, equipment, and speed, and were manned by officers and crews of unsurpassed courage, skill, training, and discipline. The Confederate armament was composed of the old discarded guns of the United States army and navy, many of which were old smooth bores, rifled or reamed out to a larger caliber; or, if newly cast, made from scrap iron, insufficiently tested and inspected, and so, with good reason, distrusted by the crews that worked them. Admiral Porter further says:

"It is generally conceded by military men that 1 gun in a fort is about equal to 5 on board of a wooden ship, especially when, as in this case, the forces afloat are obliged to contend against a 3½-knot current in a channel obstructed by chains and fire-rafts." [See note, p. 75.]

Nowhere is it shown that any obstructions were encountered by the fleet in its passage by the forts, and it appears that the *Hartford* was the only vessel that got foul of a fire-raft. As to the *Louisiana*, Admiral Porter states:

"The *Louisiana* remained tied up to the bank, where she could not obstruct the river or throw the Union fleet into confusion while passing the forts."

The fact is that the *Louisiana*, being immovable, could use only her 3 bow guns and 3 of her starboard broadside guns, and those only as the vessels of the enemy passed directly in front of them, for they could be trained but 5 degrees either way. Her heterogeneous crew was sent on board in less than four days before the action; there was no time for the men even to know each other at the same gun, no time for training or practice, but they were occupied during this brief period in mounting or remounting their guns, few of them having ever seen a cannon fired.

In his account of the capitulation in the cabin of the *Harriet Lane*, Admiral Porter says:

"As we were about to sign the terms, I was quite surprised to find that it was not expected that the vessels of war were to be included in the terms agreed to by the Confederate officers."

"Surprised," indeed! when that very morning Colonel Higgins had sent his letter of the same day (April 28th), offering the "*surrender of these forts*" (Jackson and St. Philip), which he commanded; and closing with the words, "*we have no control over the vessels afloat.*" [See note, p. 51.] Moreover, in the terms presented to Duncan when he went on board, which the Admiral says he had prepared before, *nothing is said of the surrender of the naval forces.* Such a contradictory statement, however, has its parallel in the assertion as to the effect of the explosion of the *Louisiana*, that it

"*fairly shook us all out of our seats and threw the Harriet Lane over on her side*, but we finished the terms. . . . The *Louisiana* was blown up *just before* reaching the flotilla."

Lieutenant William M. Bridges, Adjutant of Fort Jackson, now (1887) a resident of Richmond, Va., was present in the cabin at the signing of the capitulation, and he denies, most emphatically, that such an effect was produced on the *Harriet Lane* and on those seated in her cabin.

My belligerent rights were not impaired or suspended by the surrender of General Duncan and the flying of a flag of truce, to which I was not a party; and had the effect of the explosion been to destroy the *Harriet Lane* and the entire Federal force, the laws of war would have justified it.

As to my difference of opinion with General Duncan: naval officers ought surely to be considered better judges of how the forces and appliances at their command should be managed than army officers. The conduct of the naval forces, by the finding of a Confederate court of inquiry, was fully sustained, and the court prolonged its session two months, vainly waiting for the appearance of General Lovell and Lieut.-Colonel Higgins, who were summoned to testify before the court at my instance, they being the most prominent complainants against the Navy, General Duncan having died.

THE CONFEDERATE INVASION OF NEW MEXICO AND ARIZONA.

BY GEORGE H. PETTIS, BREVET CAPT., U. S. V., LATE LIEUTENANT COMMANDING CO. K 1ST CALIFORNIA INFANTRY, AND LIEUTENANT AND ADJUTANT 1ST NEW MEXICO INFANTRY.

CAVALRY ORDERLY. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

THE buffalo hunt[1] of Captain John R. Baylor culminated on his reaching El Paso (Franklin), Texas, on the border of New Mexico, in the first week in July, 1861, with about three hundred men of his regiment, the 2d Texas Mounted Rifles, C. S. A., and occupying Fort Bliss, across the river, which had been abandoned by the regular troops. He was warmly welcomed by the few secessionists in that neighborhood, prominent among whom were Colonel B. Magoffin, Judge Simeon Hart, and Judge J. F. Crosby, who were the wealthiest persons in that vicinity. On the 23d of July Captain Baylor, with about two hundred and fifty men, advanced up the Rio Grande, crossing to the west side of the river at San Tomas, and proceeding to La Mesilla. On the afternoon of the 25th Major Isaac Lynde, 7th U. S. Infantry, who was in command at Fort Fillmore, a post about four miles distant from Mesilla, proceeded against the rebels with about four hundred men,—artillery, cavalry, and infantry,—and after a desultory attack on the town, involving a loss of three men killed and two officers and four men wounded, he cowardly returned to the adobe walls of Fort Fillmore. On the morning of the 27th Lynde evacuated the fort without reason, and commenced a retreat for Fort Stanton, having about five hundred men. When near San Augustine Springs, Baylor appeared in his rear with less than three hundred men; and without a shot on either side Lynde surrendered his entire force, which consisted of seven companies of the 7th Regular Infantry and three companies of Mounted Rifles.[2]

In the meantime, Fort Buchanan, situated near Tubac, and Fort Breckinridge, on the north side of the San Pedro River and above its confluence with the Gila, had been abandoned, and the troops ordered to Fort Fillmore. Upon reaching Cook's Cañon, this command, consisting of Captain Isaiah N. Moore, 1st Dragoons, with four companies, were informed of Major Lynde's disgraceful surrender, whereupon they destroyed a large amount of Government stores which they had in charge, as well as private property at the eastern end of the cañon, and fled precipitately to Fort Craig. On the 1st of August Captain Baylor issued a proclamation organizing all that part of the Territory of New Mexico lying south of the thirty-fourth parallel

[1] See Mrs. Caroline B. Darrow's "Recollections of the Twiggs Surrender," Vol. I., p. 33; also map on p. 8 of that volume.—EDITORS.

[2] On November 25th, 1861, for this conduct Major Lynde was dropped from the army. This action was revoked November 27th, 1866, by general orders, restoring him to his commission and placing him on the retired list of the army.—G. H. P.

of north latitude as the Confederate territory of Arizona, the seat of government being at Mesilla, and the authority of governor being assumed by himself. August 2d, Fort Stanton, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Benjamin S. Roberts, 3d U. S. Cavalry, was abandoned, all the public stores that could not be carried away being destroyed. During the month of September Baylor sent several small parties northerly toward Fort Craig, who had a number of skirmishes with the Union troops, in which the latter were usually worsted.

On the 8th of July, 1861, the Confederate Government at Richmond authorized General H. H. Sibley (who had formerly been a major in the army, and had recently served in New Mexico) to proceed to Texas and organize a brigade of troops for the conquest of New Mexico. On the 18th of November Sibley was ready to move from San Antonio, Texas. His brigade consisted of Colonel John R. Baylor's regiment of Texas Mounted Rifles (then in New Mexico), Reily's 4th Regiment, Green's 5th, and Steele's 7th Regiment of Texas mounted troops, and he arrived at Fort Bliss on the 14th of December, and assumed command of all the "forces of the Confederate States on the Rio Grande at and above Fort Quitman, and all in the territory of New Mexico and Arizona," and his command was designated as the "Army of New Mexico."

By General Orders, No. 97, November 9th, 1861, the United States Department of New Mexico was reëstablished and placed under the command of Colonel E. R. S. Canby, 19th U. S. Infantry, who had previously relieved Colonel W. W. Loring, commanding the regiment of Mounted Rifles, who had tendered his resignation to the President, and had left his station before its acceptance. After Lynde's surrender, New Mexico, south of the *Jornado del Muerto*, was in possession of the rebels, and Canby set about enlisting and reorganizing the militia of the Territory. He also caused Fort Craig to be strengthened by throwing up earth-works, while Fort Union, in the northeastern part of the Territory, was changed from its old location under the mesa, and moved about a mile into the plains, and converted into a field-work, all the quarters, both officers' and men's, being made bomb-proof. The Indians in the meantime were causing much trouble to both the Union and rebel commanders in their respective districts. The Mescalero Apaches, Kiowas, Comanches, and Navajoes were constantly making forays on Canby's district, while in the southern district the Gila River and Chiricahua Apaches were causing trouble for Baylor.

During the first week in January, 1862, Sibley commenced the march up the Rio Grande with his command, and arrived at Fort Thorn. On the 7th of February he left Fort Thorn for Fort Craig. On the 16th a reconnoissance in force was made to within two miles of the post, which was met by the dispatch of a force of cavalry, whereupon the Confederates withdrew a short distance down the river, and on the 19th crossed over to the eastern bank. On the 20th a considerable force of Union troops left the fort, and, crossing the river, made a feint of attack on the Confederate camp near the river crossing. The Confederates immediately placed all their artillery in



MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN AND OF SIBLEY'S RETREAT.



MAP OF FORT CRAIG AND VALVERDE.

battery and commenced firing, whereupon the Union artillery and cavalry returned to the fort, leaving the infantry to watch the enemy, who that night made a "dry camp" in the sand-hills directly opposite to and within sight of Fort Craig, at a distance of less than two miles. No operations were attempted by either party during the night, with the exception of "Paddy" Graydon's mule attack upon the Confederate camp.†

† Captain James Graydon (familiarly known as "Paddy" Graydon) had been a soldier in the regular army, and on the approach of the Confederates had been authorized to organize an independent spy company, and as such it was mustered into the service of the United States. As its name implies, it was truly an "independent" company. It was seldom under the restraint of a superior officer, as it was nearly all the time on the road, its captain not liking the monotony of garrison life. Captain Graydon was a brave man, and no undertaking was too hazardous for him to attempt. His company were nearly all natives of New Mexico, and they would go anywhere their captain would lead them. On the evening of February 20th, when the enemy were encamped opposite Fort Craig, Graydon was allowed to make a night attack upon them. Without explaining the details of his plan, he had prepared a couple of wooden boxes, in each of which half a dozen 24-pounder howitzer shells were placed, with the fuses cut. These boxes were securely lashed on the backs of two old mules,

Early on the morning of the 21st Sibley made a demonstration toward the fort, while the main part of his command, having abandoned a number of wagons at the camp with their contents, proceeded northerly, passing near the eastern end of the Mesa de la Contedera, and approaching the river again at Valverde. Sibley's command in this region consisted of about two thousand men.

Colonel Canby's command consisted of 3810 men, composed of 5 companies of the 5th, 3 of the 7th, and 3 of the 10th Regular Infantry; 2 companies of the 1st and 5 of the 3d Regular Cavalry; McRae's and Hall's batteries; and Ford's company of Colorado Volunteers. The New Mexico troops consisted of Kit Carson's 1st regiment, 7 companies of the 2d, 7 companies of the 3d, 1 of the 4th, 2 of the 5th, Graydon's Spy Company, and some unorganized militia. As the enemy commenced its movements at about 8 o'clock A. M., Colonel Benjamin S. Roberts with the regular and volunteer cavalry, two sections of McRae's (provisional) battery, Hall's section of 24-pounder howitzers, Captain David H. Brotherton's company of the 5th, Captain Charles H. Ingraham's company of the 7th, and two (Mortimore's and Hubbell's) selected companies of volunteers were sent from the fort to intercept them should they attempt to approach the river at Valverde. McRae's battery was composed of men of Company G of the 2d, and Company I of the 3d Regular Cavalry. Captain Alexander McRae, 3d Cavalry, was in command, with

and the captain with three or four of his men crossed the river just below the fort and proceeded in the darkness toward the Confederate camp. Graydon's project was to get the torpedo mules within sight of the enemy's picket-line without being discovered, when he was to light the fuses, and the mules being directed toward the picket-line, would move in the direction of the animals there. He finally arrived within 150 yards of the picket-line, and everything being in readiness, the fuses of the boxes were fired, and the captain and his party commenced their retreat, when to their consternation they found that the mules, instead of going toward the enemy, were following themselves; the shells soon began to explode, the Confederate camp was quickly under arms, and Graydon's party made its way back to Fort Craig without the mules.

On another occasion, when the enemy were on their retreat, Graydon, with one man, arrived late at night at the village of Socorro, when he was informed that there were seven Confederates in town, quartered in a house not far away. With his army of one soldier, Graydon approached the house, and commenced giving orders in a stentorian voice: "Captain Adams, move your company to the north side of the house, and commence firing as soon as you see a man move out of the building! Captain Brown, you proceed to the rear of the house with one platoon of your company, and send your second platoon to the south side, and observe the same orders that I have given Captain Adams!" Then, after much ordering of his own imaginary company, he called upon the enemy to surrender, which they soon proceeded to do by coming out of the house, without their arms, which were secured by the gallant captain, and the next day the seven men were delivered to the commanding officer at Fort Craig.†

Although the captain was in the service several months with his company, the same men and the same number were mustered out as had been originally mustered in, when in fact, *unofficially*, he had really lost more than a dozen men in action, and as many more by desertion. This was brought about as follows: When his first sergeant reported to him of a morning that private "Juan Chacon" or "José de Dios Montoyn y Armijo" had deserted during the previous night, no record was made, as the first Mexican peon he would chance to see that day would be pounced upon, and the captain would say, in Spanish: "Here Juan Chacon, get into your place. I have a great mind to shoot you for desertion." Whereupon the poor peon would probably answer: "No, señor; yo soy Jesus Garcia, y no estoy soldado" (No, sir; I am Jesus Garcia, and I am not a soldier). "Callo la boca, chevato" (Close your mouth, you brute). "Here, sergeant, give this man a uniform, and give him a horse, as I'll excuse him this time." At the next camp the recruit would get a suit of clothes and a good meal. The men picked up in this manner often became the best of soldiers.—G. H. P.

† Major Teel writes that the Confederate party consisted of four men under Lieutenant Simmons, and that they were surprised by Captain Graydon and his whole company, one Confederate being killed by Graydon's men in the attempt to escape.—EDITORS.

Lyman Mishler, 5th Infantry, and I. McBell, 2d New Mexico Volunteers, as lieutenants. Graydon's Spy Company, and five hundred mounted militia under Colonels Pino and Robert H. Stapleton, had already been sent to the eastern side of the river to watch the movements of the enemy. Colonel Roberts was too late to prevent the Confederates from reaching the river: when he arrived at the ford at the foot of the Mesa de la Contedera he found them already there. The action was immediately begun by sending Major Duncan with his regular cavalry across the river, who were dismounted and skirmished on foot. The enemy were soon driven back, the batteries were established on the western bank, and Roberts crossed his command to the eastern side. The action commenced at 10 o'clock A. M., and consisted of artillery firing on both sides, charging and countercharging, and by 12 o'clock the Confederates had been driven from all the positions they had taken, and were forced to move their heavy guns to a position higher up the river.

MAJOR-GENERAL EDWARD R. S. CANBY.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

During these hours the Confederates kept coming upon the field in companies and parts of companies, being strung out on their march. At 12 o'clock Colonel Roberts was reënforced by Captain Dick Selden's battalion of regular infantry and Colonel Carson's regiment of New Mexico Volunteers. These new troops were soon placed in position by Colonel Roberts, and every movement made by him up to this time was successful. Several parties of the enemy had been driven from their positions, to take up new ones farther away, and the superior service of the Union guns, under the skill and conduct of Captain McRae and Lieutenant Hall, silenced the Confederate batteries and seemed to assure victory to the Union forces. Thus matters stood when Colonel Canby reached the field and assumed command at 2:45 P. M. The enemy had been driven by Colonel Roberts from all their positions, and had retired behind a high drift of sand, where they re-formed undiscovered, and prepared to storm the two Union batteries. After a short lull in the action, the two storming parties, armed with shot-guns, squirrel rifles, revolvers, and lances, and on foot, made a charge with great fury. The force that charged on Hall's battery, on the Union right, met with such a gallant resistance from the battery's support, consisting of Captain Brotherton's company, Major Duncan's dismounted cavalry, Captain Wingate's battalion of regular infantry, and Kit Carson's regiment of volunteers, that they were repulsed with great slaughter, and fled from the field. But the result was different on the Union left. McRae's battery, though held with heroic determination, with the loss of every horse, and more than one-half the gunners

killed or disabled, was taken by the enemy. Captain McRae and Lieutenant Mishler were both killed at the guns. The Confederate charge was made on foot, and was led by the gallant Major S. A. Lockridge, of Colonel Green's 5th Regiment, who was the foremost to reach the battery. As he approached the battery Captain McRae was standing at one of the guns, with his left hand upon the knob of the cascabel. Lockridge placed his left hand upon the muzzle of the same piece and demanded McRae's surrender. Both raised their revolvers, which were not more than three feet apart, and fired together, and both dropped dead in their tracks.† After the enemy reached the battery, there was a short hand-to-hand fight, in which revolvers, clubbed rifles, and sponge staffs were used, but the support soon fell back and crossed the river in retreat. A panic now ensued among the New Mexicans, but the regulars and the Colorado Volunteers were all withdrawn across the river in comparatively good order. The captured guns of McRae's battery were manned by the Confederates, turned to the rear, and assisted in producing the disorder that ensued. Canby retreated to the adobe walls of Fort Craig, having sustained a loss on the field of 3 officers and 65 men killed, 3 officers and 157 men wounded, and 1 officer and 34 men prisoners. The enemy's loss was about 40 killed and 200 wounded. It will be observed that while Colonel Roberts was in command of the Union troops everything was moving in their favor, but when Canby assumed command the tide of battle turned, until finally the Union forces were beaten and in retreat. It was the almost unanimous opinion of the officers engaged at Valverde, that if Canby had remained at Fort Craig the Confederates would have commenced their retreat for Texas.

After remaining two days at Valverde, to bury the dead and give needed rest to his men, Sibley moved up the river to Albuquerque, leaving his sick and wounded at Socorro. Sibley found, upon his arrival at Albuquerque, that Captain Herbert M. Enos, assistant-quartermaster, U. S. A., who was in command there, had destroyed the larger part of the Government stores at that place and had retreated with his command toward Santa Fe. On the 4th of March, Major J. L. Donaldson, U. S. A., commanding at Santa Fe, destroyed the Government stores at that place, and retreated with his command to Fort Union. The enemy soon after occupied Santa Fe.

In the first week in March, 1862, Colonel John P. Slough, commanding the 1st Regiment Colorado Volunteers, arrived at Fort Union, having made some extraordinary marches, and relieved Colonel G. R. Paul, 4th Regiment New Mexico Volunteers, of the command of the Northern District of New Mexico. Colonel Slough, who was a thorough fighting-man, proceeded to form a command, composed of his own regiment, with what regulars and New Mexico Volunteers he found at Fort Union, for the purpose of operating against the Confederates, whose next movement was supposed to be toward Fort Union; or of forming a junction with Canby's force, which was supposed to have left Fort Craig. His command numbered 1342 officers and men, with a battery of 4 guns, under command of Captain J. F. Ritter, 15th

† Major T. T. Teel, C. S. A., who was in the engagement, writes: "There was no duel or fight between Major Lockridge and Captain McRae. . . . Captain McRae's pistol was not discharged; the chambers were loaded."—EDITORS.

Infantry, and a battery of 4 mountain howitzers commanded by Captain Ira W. Claflin, 3d Cavalry. Slough left Fort Union on March 22d. On the 26th, when at Bernal Springs, he dispatched Major Chivington, of the 1st Colorado Volunteers, with 200 cavalry and 180 infantry, toward Santa Fe. The enemy were encountered at Johnson's Ranch, in Apache Cañon, about fifteen miles from Santa Fe. An engagement followed, in which both sides claimed the victory: the Union loss was 5 killed and 14 wounded, while the Confederate loss was 32 killed, 43 wounded, and 71 prisoners. Chivington fell back to Pigeon's Ranch, and Major Pyron, who had commanded the Confederates, was reënforced during the night by Colonel W. R. Scurry and his command, who had been encamped at Galisteo. On the 27th Colonel Slough arrived at Koslowski's Ranch; on the 28th he moved toward Apache Cañon, and at 11 o'clock A. M. the enemy's pickets were encountered. This was a terrible place for an engagement—a deep gorge, with a narrow wagon-track running along the bottom, the ground rising precipitously on each side, with huge bowlders and clumps of stunted cedars interspersed. The batteries on both sides were brought forward, the infantry thrown out upon the flanks, and the firing soon became general. Colonel Slough had been informed that the entire baggage and ammunition train of the Confederates was at Johnson's Ranch, and before the action began Major Chivington's command was sent direct over the mountain, unobserved by the enemy, came down upon their camp, which was guarded by some two hundred men, and fell upon their train, consisting of sixty wagons, which, with their entire contents and a 6-pounder gun, were completely destroyed. Two Confederate officers and fifteen men were taken prisoners. This loss was the most serious that the enemy had met with in the whole of their campaign, as all their ammunition, baggage, and provisions—of which they were already short—were destroyed, and it was accomplished without the loss of a single Union man. The fight in the cañon continued until late in the afternoon, when Colonel Slough moved back to Koslowski's Ranch. This engagement is known in Union reports as "Apache Cañon," and at the South as the "battle of Glorieta." The Union loss was 1 officer and 28 men killed, 2 officers and 40 men wounded, and 15 prisoners; the Confederate, 36 killed, 60 wounded, and 17 prisoners. Colonel Scurry returned to Santa Fe in a completely demoralized condition, while Colonel Slough, having accomplished all that was desired, returned to Fort Union.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL HENRY H. SIBLEY, C. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

On April 1st Colonel Canby, who still remained at Fort Craig, left that post with a force consisting of 860 regulars and 350 volunteers, and arrived

at or near Albuquerque on the afternoon of the 8th. His intention was to effect a junction with the Fort Union troops. He made a feint of attack on Albuquerque by sending in Paddy Graydon's company, supported by a few regular cavalry under Major Duncan. The Confederates were ready to receive them, and fired a few rounds, when Canby retired and passed through Carnuel Cañon to the little adobe village of San Antonio on the east side of the Sandia Mountain, where he soon was joined by Colonel G. R. Paul and his command from that post. When news was received at Santa Fe that Canby had attacked Albuquerque, Colonel Scurry with his entire force started for that town.

General Sibley was now in straitened circumstances. Forts Union and Craig contained all the subsistence stores in the territory, with the exception of what was in the hands of the people, all of which was *cachéd*, or hidden away. He had no money to purchase with, except Confederate bills, which were valueless. He could not advance to Fort Union, as Colonel Slough could withstand any force that he could send in that direction, and he was not strong enough to attack Fort Craig. Accordingly, he determined upon retreating from the territory if Canby would allow him to do so. On the morning of April 12th, the evacuation of Albuquerque commenced by the crossing to the west side of the river of Scurry's and Steele's regiments, Pyron's battalion, and a part of the artillery. Green's regiment moved down on the east side of the river to Peralta, where it crossed over, after a serious skirmish with some of Canby's troops, in which the Confederates lost 6 killed, 3 wounded, and 22 prisoners. On the 15th and 16th the two commands moved down the river, on either side, in view of each other, and most of the time within easy cannon-range. Although Canby's force was double that of the enemy, he would not cross over the river and capture Sibley's forces, as he easily could have done, for he considered it more expedient to allow them to retreat out of the territory and through the wilderness to San Antonio, Texas, than to capture the entire party and be forced to subsist them. This action of Canby caused great discontent in his command, and the Union men of the territory never forgave him. On the evening of the 16th both forces went into camp on the river between Sabinal and La Joya. On the morning of the 17th reveille was sounded in Canby's camp, but no move could be observed in the enemy's, although their camp-fires were burning brightly. After waiting a long time for them to commence their march, Canby sent some scouts across, who soon returned with the information that the Confederate camp was vacant, and that it had been abandoned during the night. It was soon ascertained that Sibley had left the river, leaving behind all his wagons, thirty-eight in number, with their contents, and had proceeded to the westward in the direction of the northern end of the Sierra Madelena.

Canby now proceeded leisurely down the river, and arrived at Fort Craig on the afternoon of the 22d. Sibley's retreat was a most desperate one. He passed on the west side of the Sierra Madelena, through the Sierra de San Mateo, until he reached the dry bed of the Rio Palomas, down which he continued until he reached the Rio Grande, where supplies had been sent from Mesilla

to meet him. His command was entirely worn out, and nearly famished. The distance from where he left the Rio Grande until he reached it again was over one hundred miles, and the Confederates were ten days accomplishing this distance with five days of poor rations. The route was through the worst country in that territory, with no guides, trail, or road. What artillery they got through with was dragged uphill and lowered by the men, who used long ropes for that purpose. The undergrowth and brush were so dense that for several miles they were forced to cut their way through with axes and bowie-knives. Nearly all the ammunition was abandoned on the way, as was nearly everything else, except what the men carried upon their persons. On passing over the route of these unfortunate men, nearly a year after, I not infrequently found a piece of a gun-carriage, or part of a harness, or some piece of camp or garrison equipage, with occasionally a white, dry skeleton of a man. At some points it seemed impossible for men to have made their way. During this retreat the Confederates were unmolested by the Union troops, with the exception of the ubiquitous Captain Graydon,† who, with his company, followed them alone for a long distance, picking up a large amount of serviceable articles which they had abandoned on their way.

Sibley himself arrived at Fort Bliss in the first week of May, while his command was strung out for fifty miles to the rear. He remained here but a few days, and upon hearing that the "California Column," under the command of Colonel James H. Carleton, was rapidly approaching from Southern California, he commenced his farther retreat for San Antonio, Texas. His force was entirely demoralized, and moved on its way without discipline or command, every man for himself, until all finally arrived. Sibley's command, when he reached Fort Bliss, in 1861, numbered nearly or quite 3700 men; when he returned it was less than 2000, making a loss of over 1700 men, the bones of a large number of whom were left on the arid plains of Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas.

† Captain James Graydon's laconic report of the pursuit is dated Polvadera, N. M., May 14th, 1862. He says:

"Last night I reached here from Salada. On the 8th I reached Nugales Spring. From there the road ran between the hills for about 15 miles, then took toward the Magdalene Mountain, where they found water; distance from Nugales about 29 miles; road very rough. On the road they deserted 1 wagon and a camp and left 3 dead bodies half buried. . . . I had all buried. From there the road took to Feather Springs,—I called it so on account of feather-beds being strewed around; distance from Dead Man's Spring seventeen miles. They encamped there. From there they took the road to Ojo del Pueblo; distance fifteen miles; road very rough. Here they blew up a caisson, burned three wagons, hospital department, medicines, etc.; left a few shell and round shot. From there they took to the Salada; distance from Ojo del Pueblo about thirty miles; road very rough. On this road, near and at Salada, they blew up and burned 6 caissons, 1 12-pounder howitzer and 2 mountain-howitzer carriages. I found out where they had buried some 40 shell, loaded, in one place, and 38 in another: 78 in all. I took them up and hid them in another place. To-morrow the quartermaster from here sends for them. They burned up about 19 wagons, 10 ambulances, 6 caissons, and 3 carriages. I think they left 3 howitzers, 1 12-pounder and 2 mountain. I had with me a man who came with them, who saw them leave the howitzers. I believe the Mexicans have the large one buried, and by offering a reward we could find out. They destroyed six 100-pound barrels of powder at Salada, and a great deal of camp-equipage. The road from Ojo del Pueblo is strewn with old harness, iron ovens, and in fact everything but small ammunition. It seems they destroyed very little if any, of that. It appears that the Mexicans have carried off a great deal. There is nothing worth sending for in the shape of ammunition except the shell. The distance from Nugales to Rio Puerco is about 109 miles; road very bad. Sibley's command made it in five days. Left dead on the road about 60 or 70 mules and horses."

EDITORS.

PROVOST GUARD, WASHINGTON. FROM A SKETCH MADE IN 1862.

McCLELLAN ORGANIZING THE GRAND ARMY.

BY PHILIPPE, COMTE DE PARIS, AIDE-DE-CAMP TO GENERAL McCLELLAN.

NO one has denied that McClellan was a marvelous organizer. Every veteran of the Army of the Potomac will be able to recall that extraordinary time when the people of the North devoted all their native energy and spirit of initiative to the raising of enormous levies of future combatants and their military equipment, and when infantry battalions, squadrons of cavalry, and batteries of artillery sprung, as it were, from the earth in a night, and poured in from all sides upon the barren wastes of vacant building-lots that then went to the making up of fully three-quarters of the Federal capital.

It was in the midst of this herculean task of organization that two French aides-de-camp were assigned to duty as military attachés on McClellan's staff. His brilliant operations in Western Virginia against Lee,— who had not yet revealed the full extent of his military genius, and whom McClellan was destined to find again in his front but a year later,— the successes of Laurel Hill and Rich Mountain, gave evidence of what might be expected of the inexperienced troops placed in McClellan's hands. ☆ He had already shown rare strategic ability, and the President had confided to him the task of creating the Army of the Potomac from the disorganized bands who had fallen back on Washington under the brave and unfortunate McDowell. Surrounded for the most part by young officers, he was himself the most youthful of us all, not only by reason of his physical vigor, the vivacity of his impressions, the noble candor of his character, and his glowing patriotism, but also, I may add, by his inexperience of men. His military bearing breathed a spirit of frankness, benevolence, and firmness. His look was piercing, his voice gentle, his temper equable, his word of command clear and definite. His

☆ See "McClellan in West Virginia," by General J. D. Cox, Vol. I., p. 126.— EDITORS.

encouragement was most affectionate, his reprimand couched in terms of perfect politeness. Discreet, as a military or political chief should be, he was slow in bestowing his confidence; but, once given, it was never withdrawn. Himself perfectly loyal to his friends, he knew how to inspire others with an absolute devotion.

Unfortunately for himself, McClellan succeeded too quickly and too soon to the command of the principal army of the republic. His lieutenants were as new to the work as he — they had not been tested. Public opinion in the army itself — a judge all the more relentless for the very reason that discipline gives it no opportunity to express itself — had as yet been able neither to pronounce on them, nor to ratify the preferences of the general-in-chief. Paradoxical as it may seem, would it not really have been better could McClellan have received a check at first, as Grant did at Belmont, rather than to have begun with the brilliant campaign in West Virginia which won for him the *sobriquet* of "The Young Napoleon"? Just at the time when I joined his staff the exacting confidence of the people and the Government was laying on him an almost superhuman task. In forging the puissant weapon which, later, snatched from his grasp, was destined, in the hands of the Great Hammerer, to bray the army of Lee, he acquired an imperishable title to the gratitude of his compatriots. He wrought, will it be said, for the glory of his successors? No! He labored for his country, even as a private soldier who dies for her, with no thought of fame. In order to give to his weapon every perfection, he soon learned to resist the impatient solicitations of both the people and the Government.

At the end of September, 1861, while yet under the orders of General Scott, McClellan represented the ardent and impatient spirit of men chafing at the slowness of a chief whose faculties had been chilled by the infirmities of age.

Nevertheless, McClellan's first care was to place the capital beyond all peradventure of being carried by sudden attack: on the one hand, for the sake of reassuring the inhabitants and the political organism within its limits; and, on the other, that the army might be at liberty to act independently when it should be called to the field, leaving a sufficient garrison only to secure the defense of the city. He knew that an army tied up about a place it has to protect is virtually paralyzed. The events of 1870 have only too fully confirmed this view. An engineer of distinction, McClellan himself devised in all its details the system of defensive works from Alexandria to Georgetown. He gave his daily personal supervision to the execution of this work, alternating outdoor activity with office business. Tireless in the saddle, he was equally indefatigable with the pen. Possessed of a methodical and exact mind, he comprehended the organization of his army in every minute detail. The creation of all the material of war necessary to its existence and action was extraordinary proof of the wonderful readiness of the Americans in an emergency. . . .

But the season advanced. The army was being formed. At the end of September the enemy had fallen back on Fairfax Court House, leaving to us at Munson's Hill a few Quaker guns of logs and pasteboard. The time for action seemed to have come. The rigors of winter in Virginia hardly make

themselves felt before the beginning of December. By the 17th of October the enemy had again retreated. The Army of the Potomac replied with a commensurate advance. But this was a *faux pas*. The blunder was consummated at Ball's Bluff [see p. 123]. McClellan's orders had been given in entire ignorance of the topography of the environs of Edwards's Ferry (all the maps being inexact) and of the force of the enemy in front of Leesburg. In fact, at that time the organization of the secret service was entirely insufficient to the occasion, in spite of the praiseworthy efforts of Mr. Allen Pinkerton.‡ McClellan, who was established beyond Dranesville with McCall's division, believed himself to be within supporting distance of Baker's brigade. The latter was crushed on the 21st, before any one on the right bank of the Potomac knew of his fate. This disaster, of comparatively little moment by itself, led to the most acrimonious recriminations. It proved, above all, how slight and imperfect were the connections between the head of the army and the parts he was called on to manœuvre. On that day a fatal hesitation took possession of McClellan. If he did not then decide to postpone the campaign till the following spring, his conduct of affairs was such as soon to leave him no alternative but recourse to this lamentable necessity. Shortly thereafter a great change came over the military situation: a change which should have encouraged him to the promptest offensive action, but which, unfortunately for him, produced only a directly contrary result.

On the evening of November 1st the whole political world of Washington was in a flutter of agitation. It labored still under the effects of the displacement of General Frémont, guilty of having intruded upon political ground by the issue of an abolitionist proclamation [see Vol. I., p. 278]. The disgrace of "The Pathfinder," so popular with the Western Republicans, had caused some friction in Congress, and had provoked rejoicing among his numerous political enemies in the Army of the Potomac; and now it was learned that a measure of still graver importance had been forced on the Government: Scott had resigned his commission as commander-in-chief of the Federal armies,‡ the natural inference being that McClellan would be designated his successor. Of great stature and of a martial figure, General Scott

‡ Usually mentioned in the Official Records under the assumed name of E. J. Allen.— EDITORS.

‡ Early in August, 1861, General Scott had asked to be relieved. His request grew out of the irritation caused by a letter McClellan had addressed to him on August 8th, in which the junior officer gave his opinion that the enemy had at least 100,000 men in front of Washington, or in the vicinity, and put himself on record as to the measures (including an enlargement of his own command) deemed by him necessary for the safety of Washington. On the following day, August 9th, General Scott addressed the following letter to the Secretary of War:

"SIR: I received yesterday from Major-General McClellan a letter of that date, to which I design this as my only reply. Had Major-General McClellan presented the same views in person, they would have been freely entertained and discussed. All my military views and opinions had been so presented to him, without eliciting much remark, in our few meetings, which I have in vain sought to multiply. He has stood on his guard, and now places himself on record. Let him make the most of his unenvied advantages. Major-General McClellan has propagated in high quarters the idea expressed in the letter before me, that Washington was not only 'insecure,' but in 'imminent danger.' Relying on our numbers, our forts, and the Potomac River, I am confident in the opposite opinion; and considering the stream of new regiments that is pouring in upon us (before this alarm could have reached their homes), I have not the slightest apprehension for the safety of the Government here.

"Having now been long unable to mount a horse, or to walk more than a few paces at a time, and consequently being unable to review troops, much less to direct them in battle,— in short, being broken down by many particular hurts, besides the general infirmities of age, — I feel that I have become an incumbrance to the army as well as to myself, and that I ought, giving way to a younger commander, to seek the palliatives of physical pain and exhaustion. Accordingly, I must beg the President, at



CONFEDERATE WORKS ON MUNSON'S HILL, AS SEEN FROM THE UNION ADVANCE POST AT BAILEY'S CROSS-ROADS. [SEE MAP, VOL. I., P. 172.] FROM A SKETCH MADE IN SEPTEMBER, 1861.

joined to his physical advantages rare military and diplomatic attainments. He had known how to conquer Mexico without suffering a check; he had been able to establish a government that would warrant evacuation of the country, capable of maintaining itself without extraneous assistance, and he had secured a treaty with leonine conditions for the Americans. But age had attacked him physically and mentally. Obese and impotent, the brilliant Scott was in 1861 but the shadow of his former self. While recognizing the services rendered by him to the republic at the outbreak of the civil war, by his fidelity to the Stars and Stripes in spite of his Virginion origin, the young generals reproached him with paralyzing their ardor and interfering with their projects. The President and his Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, who, through political habitude, was also a temporizer, regretted the resignation of Scott, and augured ill of the youth and rashness of

the earliest moment, to allow me to be placed on the officers' retired list, and then quietly to lay myself up — probably forever — somewhere in or about New York. But, wherever I may spend my little remainder of life, my frequent and latest prayer will be, 'God save the Union.'"

On August 10th, at the request of the President, General McClellan gave the latter authority to withdraw this letter of August 8th, which, as he said, "was designed to be a plain and respectful expression" of his views. President Lincoln went with this letter to General Scott, and requested him to withdraw his reply. On August 12th General Scott wrote again to the Secretary of War, to say that he could not withdraw his letter, for three reasons; the third relating to his physical infirmities, and the first two being the following:

"1. The original offense given to me by Major-General McClellan (see his letter of the 8th inst.) seems to have been the result of deliberation between him and some of the members of the Cabinet, by whom all the greater war questions are to be settled, without resort to or consultation with me, the nominal General-in-Chief of the army. In further proof of this neglect,— although it is unofficially known that in the last week (or six days) many regiments have arrived and others have changed their positions; some to a considerable distance,— not one of these movements has been reported to me (or anything else) by Major-General McClellan; while it is believed, and, I may add, known, that he is in frequent communication with portions of the Cabinet and on matters appertaining to me. That freedom of access and consultation have, very naturally, deluded the junior general into a feeling of indifference toward his senior.

"2. With such supports on his part, it would be as idle for me as it would be against the dignity of my years, to be filing daily complaints against an ambitious junior, who, independent of the extrinsic advantages alluded to, has, unquestionably, very high qualifications for military command. I trust they may achieve crowning victories in behalf of the Union."

EDITORS.

McClellan. The latter, on the other hand, seemed to imagine that the withdrawal of the old warrior removed the last remaining obstacle to the realization of his vast strategic conceptions. But, as is not seldom the case in the course of human events, both these expectations were mistaken. In brief, McClellan, once invested with supreme command, proved himself more of a temporizer than his predecessor, and, as will soon be seen, his premature promotion to this post was the cause of all his subsequent mortification and misfortune.

The next day (November 2d), at 4 o'clock in the morning, we were at his side, mounted, to accompany to the railway station the commander whose place McClellan was about to occupy. As we went along every one chatted about the matter, and sought to penetrate the future and to divine the fortunes and rôle of the young general in the terrible crisis through which the republic was passing. It would have been easier to pierce the night and fog which enveloped us. An hour later McClellan was at his office. A new task of enormous proportions, whose difficulty he had not, perhaps, paused to contemplate, stared him in the face, and threatened him with destruction. Without giving him the full rank enjoyed by Scott, the President had given him full command of the armies of the republic. It should be said that he had the right to this position as the oldest major-general of the regular army. In assuming his new function he did not give up his own personal and particular direction of the Army of the Potomac. Here he was right; for he could neither have found any one to whom he might safely confide his own proper work of organization, nor could he have left the command of the first army of the republic without condemning himself to perpetual prison in the bureau at Washington.

It must be admitted, however, that his two functions were incompatible. As an old French proverb has it, "*Qui trop embrasse, mal étreint.*" When, two years later, Grant himself undertook to conduct the decisive campaign against Richmond, at the same time continuing the direction in chief of all the armies of the Union, he was not only surrounded by the aureole of his splendid victories and incontestable military authority, and not only had a cruel experience proved to the people the necessity for concentrating the military power in the hands of one man, but the different armies which he controlled were confided to approved chiefs whom he could trust with perfect liberty of action, while, in case of need, he might leave at the head of the Army of the Potomac the conqueror of Gettysburg. In Washington, Halleck presided as chief of staff, reduced by Grant to a subordinate function, it is true, but a function for which he possessed special aptitude. The situation of McClellan was different. He perceived this on the day when, entering on the campaign, he placed himself at the head of the Army of the Potomac. At first he was equal to the emergency by dint of incessant work; but he was obliged to renounce the daily routine which had served to maintain his relations with all his divisions, and had contributed to facilitate and hasten forward his schemes of organization. McClellan, confined to his office, undertook the orderly and methodical concentration of the immense number

of men enrolled in the service of the republic, in the formation of his armies, and in constructing a scheme for their concerted action. General Halleck, but just then arrived in Washington, was sent to the West with extensive powers [see Vol. I., p. 315]. McClellan assigned to him one of his best lieutenants, General Buell [see Vol. I., p. 385]. Finally, he prepared the great naval expeditions which should give to the Federal arms Port Royal, Roanoke, and New Orleans. Scarcely had he begun the work when the fact was borne in on him that the armies of the West were, as regarded material, less well prepared for the offensive than those of the East, and as it seemed requisite that they should act together, it may be inferred that from the first days of his assuming command, the scheme of post-



MT. OLIVET CHURCH ON THE OLD FAIRFAX ROAD — PICKET POST OF THE 40TH NEW YORK VOLUNTEERS. FROM A SKETCH MADE IN SEPT., 1861.

poning till spring the operations of the Army of the Potomac was explicitly determined on. McClellan wisely concealed from every one this resolution, the objections to which he understood better than any one. But his soldiers were not slow to comprehend; often the crowd has sagacious instincts, and may divine the calculations of even the most wary statesman. The army proved it in this case by constructing, with all the ready skill of American backwoodsmen, log-huts to protect them from the inclemencies of the season. They did well. When the snow and ice rendered military operations impossible, veritable pioneers' villages had grown up everywhere in the midst of the timber, and afforded the soldiers excellent shelter. The army had coolly taken the liberty of going into winter quarters, without consulting anybody.



"CLAREMONT," THE RESIDENCE OF COMMODORE FRENCH FORREST, C. S. N.— PICKET POST OF THE 40TH NEW YORK VOLUNTEERS. FROM A SKETCH MADE SEPT. 26, 1861.

The complications of foreign politics contributed their share to restrain McClellan, at a period when the season would yet have permitted him to act on the offensive. It was the 16th of November when the news reached

Washington of the incident afterward known as the *Trent* affair [see p. 134]. . . . The capture of the Confederate Commissioners on the high seas under a neutral flag, in flagrant violation of the law of nations,— a violation brutal in its method and useless in its results, most dangerous in its consequences,— was hailed by public opinion as a splendid victory for the Stars and Stripes. . . . Two men at Washington comprehended from the first the danger to their country of the inconsiderate act of Wilkes: these were Seward and McClellan. The former, burdened with an immense responsibility, patriotically dissimulated his opinion with extraordinary *finesse;* he permitted the excitement to spend itself, and, thanks to the slowness of communication with England, gained time enough] to extricate his Government at the critical juncture, by enveloping the decision he had succeeded in extorting from "the powers that be" in a specious web of plausibilities, calculated to sweeten the bitterness caused at home by England's exactions, and at the same time to satisfy her just demands. He succeeded in sparing his country and the world the horrors of a war the results of which could hardly be imagined. . . .

It was not for McClellan to implicate himself in questions of a purely political character, but he probably foresaw the consequences of a war in which England, mistress of the seas, would have inundated the Southern States with arms and munitions of war, with money and volunteers, blockading the Federal ports, and in the spring making Canada the base of operations for her regular army. The States of the North would have found themselves hemmed in along a vast line of boundary by two hostile powers, extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific. McClellan's care, in view of such an emergency, was to perfect and strengthen his army; but, above all, not to compromise the safety of his forces by any attempt at operations on the other side of the Potomac. Grand reviews established, to the satisfaction of the inexperienced, the fact of progress in the equipment, instruction, and drill of the troops. At Bailey's Cross-roads might have been seen a rendezvous of 50,000 men, with all the paraphernalia of a campaign, a large number of cavalry, and a formidable array of artillery. No such spectacle had ever been seen in the United States; the novelty of the display caused the liveliest interest among the inhabitants of Washington. But to a European, not the least curious part of the pageant was the President, with his entire Cabinet, in citizens' dress, boldly caracoling at the head of a brilliant military *cortége*, and riding down the long lines of troops to the rattle of drums, the flourish of trumpets, and the loud huzzas of the whole army. While his aides-de-camp were engaged in the field, McClellan worked ceaselessly with the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, Simon Cameron and Gideon Welles, preparing great expeditions, half military and half naval, that should plant the national flag on the principal points of the enemy's coast, and secure convenient bases for future operations. The success won at Port Royal encouraged the Federal Government in these projects. McClellan himself had brought back from the Crimea a personal experience which enabled him, better than any one else, to preside over the details of preparation.

] Seward's letter consenting to the return of the Commissioners bears date of Dec. 26, 1861.— EDITORS.



FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

Edwin M. Stanton

Mr. Seward, having courageously ended the *Trent* affair to the satisfaction of the public, now recovered from its first attack of folly, the only obstacle to be feared—the danger of a maritime war—was finally removed. Burnside embarked at New York, during the early days of 1862, with the little army that should seize Roanoke and march on the interior of North Carolina [see Vol. I., p. 632]. The troops destined for the attack on New Orleans were sent to Ship Island in detail. But an unusually severe winter followed. While the naval expeditions intended to land troops on the coasts of the Southern States might still have been fitted out, though the severe gales of the season would have subjected them to serious danger, deep snows and intense cold made movements on the part of the Army of the Potomac next to impossible. Even had it been desirable to expose raw troops to the rigors of a winter campaign, it would have been impracticable to provision an advancing army, on account of the impassable condition of the roads. This set McClellan, as well as many of his subordinates, to thinking of transportation by water, down the Western rivers, or through the deep estuaries of Eastern Virginia.

One day, I think it was the 20th of December, General McClellan, ordinarily so assiduous, did not appear at headquarters. The next day it was learned that he was ill. Three days later his life was in danger. Exhausted with work, his robust physique was seized with a typhoid of the most serious type. . . . His absence paralyzed work at headquarters. He had not regularly delegated his powers. His father-in-law and chief of staff, General Marcy, did not dare to act definitively in his name. McClellan had made the mistake of not creating a general field-staff service, with a duly appointed chief of staff. This might have aided him in securing a consistent *ensemble* of military operations. . . . On his return to the duties of his office [January 13], he realized that during his absence important changes had been arranged. On the 15th of January, Mr. Cameron was superseded by Mr. Stanton, a celebrated lawyer, who was spoken of as one of the coming men of the Democratic party. McClellan, who knew and appreciated him, had, before his illness, contributed materially to Stanton's nomination by recommending him earnestly to the President. But he was not slow to regret this. Mr. Stanton, endowed with a remarkable faculty for work, rendered incontestable service in the organization of the armies; but, fearing the growing importance of those who commanded them, and wishing to impose his authority, he was instrumental, more than any one else, in developing in Mr. Lincoln's mind the idea of directing military operations in person, from the depths of the White House itself. The personal intervention of the President, provoked by the inconsiderate impatience of the public and the precipitate solicitations of McClellan's political adversaries, first declared itself in a singular order, kept a secret as regards the public at the time, but given to the press on March 11th. This order ["President's General War Order No. 1"], dated the 27th of January, directed all the armies of the republic to take the field on the same day, that is, on the 22d of February, in honor of Washington's birthday! In the West, where the rivers



THE NORTH FRONT OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON. FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.

were open, everything was in readiness. Moreover, the order of the President was not necessary to warrant Grant, already under orders from McClellan, in beginning the campaign, and Grant anticipated that order. His début was as a lightning-stroke. His victory at Fort Donelson, followed by the capitulation of 15,000 Confederates, was the return for Bull Run. The impression created throughout the whole army was profound. The Federal volunteers took heart again. The confidence of the Army of the Potomac was redoubled. The general was now restored to health. The weather had moderated. The time had at last come for this army to act. . . . But the immense flotilla which should transport it to Urbana, near the mouth of the Rappahannock [see map, p. 164], or to Fort Monroe, another point of debarkation equally considered with the other, was not yet ready, and no one more than McClellan regretted the delay. It is well known that he was obliged to fight many objections in order to secure the adoption of his favorite plan. He was obliged to exhibit the details of his projects before numerous councils of war, some of them political and some of them military, some of the members of which were, perhaps, not possessed of absolute discretion. He was obliged to reassure and convince all those who feared lest Washington should be left without sufficient protection. He finally obtained the Government's approval.

At the very moment when all seemed ready for the realization of his grand design, two unforeseen circumstances arose to thwart the calculations of McClellan. The first was the sudden evacuation of Manassas by the Confederates. I do not believe that this could be attributed to indiscretions following the councils of war at Washington. I prefer, rather, to ascribe it to the military sagacity of the great soldier who then commanded the Army of Northern Virginia. His positions at Manassas were protected only by the snow and ice which paralyzed the Federals. With the opening of the season he would be obliged to withdraw behind the Rappahannock. This movement

brought the Southern army nearer to Richmond, at the same time placing it on the Urbana route, thus making a landing there impossible for us, and permitting Lee to anticipate McClellan on the Virginia peninsula. McClellan would not give up his plan of approaching Richmond from the south-east. Fort Monroe, occupied by the Federals, was chosen as the new point of debarkation, and the pursuit of the enemy on the road from Manassas to Fredericksburg had no other object than to deceive him as to the intentions of the Federals. The army, after having feigned pursuit, was ordered to concentrate near Alexandria, the rendezvous of the grand flotilla which McClellan awaited with so much impatience.

But on the 12th of March another unexpected event again caused consternation among the officers of the staff. The indefatigable newsdealers, who followed the army almost to the very line of battle, had brought papers from Washington, in which we read a decree ["President's War Order No. 3"], dated March 11th, in effect relieving McClellan from the direction in chief of the armies of the United States, the pretext being that McClellan had not taken the field on the 22d of February [see p. 167]. It was recalled to mind that on that very day, McClellan, on going upon the floor of the House of Representatives, had been greeted by a triple salvo of applause, a demonstration flattering enough, but damaging to a general, whose functions forbid even the suspicion of political partisanship. The measure in question was inept, since it virtually restricted McClellan within the Department of the Potomac, excluding West Virginia, then assigned to Frémont. The measure was especially disastrous in suppressing all general direction of military operations, and disintegrating the *ensemble*. It had been decided that Scott was too superannuated to attend to this general direction; it was not for the purpose of abolishing it entirely that command had been confided to younger and more energetic hands. Unfortunately, at this moment Mr. Lincoln had the weakness to think that he himself could effectively exercise the supreme control, assigned him in form, it is true, by a figment of the national Constitution. As for McClellan, the President's decision was mortifying in its method, Lincoln having delayed its promulgation till after the departure of his general, and having left it to be communicated to the latter by the daily papers. Yet McClellan would have consoled himself, had not this measure been followed by others still more harassing, and of a nature to completely cripple intelligent action. But he was relieved of an immense responsibility; he was left at the head of an army eager to follow his lead, eager for battle, and confident of victory under his orders. He alone seemed to preserve his *sang-froid* in the midst of officers of all grades who flocked to his headquarters at Fairfax Court House as the news spread rapidly from camp-fire to camp-fire. Among these officers were stanch supporters, secret foes, those jealous of his fame, would-be worshipers of the rising sun, and, last but not least, indiscreet and compromising friends. In this evil hour McClellan felt how sternly patriotic duty demanded of him that he should hide the mortification he felt at this wound to his feelings as an officer and a man. He sought for consolation only in the sympathy and confidence of his soldiers.

BALL'S BLUFF AND THE ARREST OF GENERAL STONE.

BY RICHARD B. IRWIN, LIEUT.-COLONEL AND ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. V.

ABOUT 1 o'clock on the morning of the 9th of February, 1862, General Charles P. Stone, a native of Massachusetts, a graduate with honors of the United States Military Academy, a distinguished officer of the ordnance corps during the Mexican war, colonel of the 14th regular infantry, and brigadier-general of volunteers, commanding a division of ten thousand men in the Army of the Potomac, was arrested in Washington, by the commander of the provost guard, and sent, in custody of a lieutenant and two policemen, to Fort Lafayette, in New York harbor. There, and at Fort Hamilton, he was kept in close and solitary confinement, his pockets being emptied and his letters examined, until the 16th of August, when, after the lapse of 189 days, he was set at liberty, under the peremptory requirements of an act of Congress, approved July 17th, 1862, forbidding the detention of any officer or soldier more than thirty days without charges.

It will be observed that he was held for a fresh period of thirty days before this law was allowed to operate, and it is also worth remarking that a law as old as the Government, known as the Articles of War, the fundamental law of the army of the United States, contained substantially the same provision, the only essential difference being that the new law, in effect, lengthened the time for preferring charges from eight days to thirty.

Though promptly and often asked for, and repeatedly promised, no statement of the charges was ever furnished to General Stone. In truth, no charges were ever preferred against him. No cause for his arrest has ever been shown. It has even been disputed upon whose initiative it was ordered. The vague and loose "evidence," and the floating suspicions engendered by it, that formed the groundwork for his arrest, never admitted of being condensed into an accusation, simply because there was nothing in them to condense. The real cause must be sought for amid the tangled mesh of a net-work of circumstances, such as is occasionally the despair of men who read history by the light of human sympathy.

Before trying to trace its threads, it may be well to recall how for weeks the safety, not only of Washington but of the President and his cabinet, had depended mainly upon the loyalty, the prudence, and the vigilance of Colonel Stone and his District of Columbia volunteers.[1] Well might Mr. Lincoln exclaim, with his smile, "Oh! I could never believe General Stone would be disloyal!"

In the autumn of 1861 Stone's division, comprising the brigades of Gorman, Lander, and Baker,[2] was observing the ferries or fords of the Potomac in front of Poolesville. On the 20th of October, McCall's division being at Dranesville, General McClellan telegraphed to General Stone directing

[1] See General Stone's article, "Washington on the Eve of the War," Vol. I., p. 7.—EDITORS.

[2] Afterward Sedgwick's division, Second Corps, brigade commanders Gorman, Dana, and Burns.—R. B. I.



MAP OF THE UPPER POTOMAC.

him to keep a good lookout on Leesburg to see if the operations of McCall should have the effect of driving the enemy away, adding, "perhaps a slight demonstration on your part would have the effect to move them." This slight demonstration resulted in the battle of Ball's Bluff.

On the morning of the 21st of October General Stone gave Colonel Baker discretionary authority to retire the small detachment then at Ball's Bluff, or to send over his brigade to support it. Colonel Baker at once, without further information, without visiting the Virginia shore, and without organizing the boat service, gave the order to cross. Early in the afternoon he crossed himself and posted his command. In support of this movement, and to hold the enemy's attention, Stone sent Gorman's brigade across at Edwards Ferry, where the principal force of the enemy had been seen.

The Confederate Commander, General Evans,† early discovering both movements and having the advantage of a shorter line, concealed, moreover, by the nature of the ground, gradually withdrew all his force, save one regiment, from Gorman's front, concentrated it against Baker, and about 3 o'clock attacked with vigor. Each side numbered about seventeen hundred; our troops had three light guns, soon disabled, the Confederates none; but their men moved to the attack from commanding ground, well covered by trees and bushes, while ours, badly posted and badly arranged, were held to the bluff without room to retire, or means of retreat.

We find the opening events described as follows, by Colonel Charles

† Colonel N. G. Evans, who distinguished himself at the first Bull Run.— EDITORS.

Devens, commanding the 15th Massachusetts Regiment, afterwards major-general of volunteers, and, under President Hayes, attorney-general of the United States:

"About 12 o'clock Sunday night, October 20th, I crossed the Potomac by your [Stone's] order from Harrison's Island to the Virginia shore with five companies, numbering about 300 men, of my regiment, with the intention of taking a rebel camp, reported by scouts to be situated at the distance of about a mile from the river, of destroying the same, of observing the country around, and of returning to the river, or of waiting and reporting if I thought myself able to remain for reënforcements, or if I found a position capable of being defended against a largely superior force. Having only three boats, which together conveyed about thirty men, it was nearly 4 o'clock when all the force was transferred to the opposite shore. We passed down the river about sixty rods by a path discovered by the scouts, and then up the bluff known as Ball's Bluff, where we found an open field surrounded by woods. At this point we halted until daybreak, being joined here by a company of one hundred men from the 20th Massachusetts, accompanied by Colonel Lee, who were to protect our return.

"At daybreak we pushed forward our reconnoissance toward Leesburg to the distance of about a mile from the river, to a spot supposed to be the site of the rebel encampment, but found on passing through the woods that the scouts had been deceived by a line of trees on the brow of the slope, the opening through which presented, in an uncertain light, somewhat the appearance of a line of tents. Leaving the detachment in the woods, I proceeded with Captain Philbrick and two or three scouts across the slope and along the other line of it, observing Leesburg, which was in full view, and the country about it, as carefully as possible, and seeing but four tents of the enemy. My force being well concealed by the woods, and having no reason to believe my presence was discovered, and no large number of the enemy's tents being in sight, I determined not to return at once, but to report to yourself, which I did, by directing Quartermaster Howe to repair at once to Edwards Ferry to state these facts, and to say that in my opinion I could remain until I was reënforced.

"The means of transportation between the island and the Virginia shore had been strengthened, I knew, at daybreak, by a large boat, which would convey 60 or 70 men at once, and as the boat could cross and recross every ten minutes, I had no reason to suppose there would be any difficulty in sending over 500 men in an hour, as it was known there were two large boats between the island and the Maryland shore, which would convey to the island all the troops that could be conveyed from it to the Virginia shore.

"Mr. Howe left me with his instructions at about 6:30 A. M. . . . I was rejoined at 8 A. M. by Quartermaster Howe, who reported to me that I was to remain where I was, and would be reënforced, and that Lieutenant-Colonel Ward would proceed to Smart's Mill [1] with the remainder of the regiment, that a communication should be kept up between us, and that 10 cavalry would report to me for the purpose of reconnoitering. For some reason they never appeared or reported to me, but I have since learned they came as far as the bluff. [2] If they had reported to me, they could have rendered excellent service. I directed Quartermaster Howe to return at once and report the skirmish that had taken place. . . .

"At about 10 o'clock Quartermaster Howe returned and stated that he had reported the skirmish of the morning, and that Colonel Baker would shortly arrive with his brigade and take command. Between 9 and 11 o'clock I was joined by Lieutenant-Colonel Ward with the remainder of my regiment, making in all, a force of 625 men, with 28 officers, from my regiment, as reported to me by the adjutant, many of the men of the regiment being at this time on other duty.

"About 12 o'clock it was reported to me a force was gathering on my left, and about 12:30 o'clock a strong attack was made on my left by a body of infantry concealed in the woods, and

[1] According to General Stone, he directed "five companies to be thrown into a strong mill on the right of Ball's Bluff. Colonel Baker allowed these companies to be directed to the front."—EDITORS.

[2] According to General Stone, he "sent cavalry scouts to be thrown out in advance of the infantry on the right. Colonel Baker allowed this cavalry to return without scouting, and did not replace it although he had plenty at his disposition."—EDITORS.



upon the skirmishers in front by a body of cavalry. The fire of the enemy was resolutely returned by the regiment, which maintained its ground with entire determination. Reënforcements not yet having arrived, and the attempts of the enemy to outflank us being very vigorous, I directed the regiment to retire about 60 paces into an open space in the wood, and prepare to receive any attack that might be made, while I called in my skirmishers. When this was done I returned to the bluff, where Colonel Baker had already arrived. This was at 2:15 P. M. He directed me to form my regiment at the right of the position he proposed to occupy, which was done by eight companies, the center and left being composed of a detachment of the 20th Massachusetts, numbering about 300 men, under command of Colonel Lee. A battalion of the California Regiment, numbering about 600 men, Lieutenant-Colonel Wistar commanding; 2 howitzers, commanded by Lieutenant French, and a 6-pounder, commanded by Lieutenant Bramhall, were planted in front, supported by Company D, Captain Studley, and Company F, Captain Sloan, of the 15th Massachusetts."

Himself remaining with Gorman at Edwards Ferry to direct the crossing there, General Stone placed Colonel E. D. Baker, of the 71st Pennsylvania Regiment (also called the "1st California," in compliment to Colonel Baker), in command of the movement by Harrison's Island and Ball's Bluff, under the following orders:

HEADQUARTERS CORPS OF OBSERVATION, EDWARDS FERRY, October 21st — 11:50.— COLONEL E. D. BAKER, Commanding Brigade. COLONEL: I am informed that the force of the enemy is about 4000, all told. If you can push them, you may do so as far as to have a strong position near Leesburg, if you can keep them before you, avoiding their batteries. If they pass Leesburg and take the Gun Spring road you will not follow far, but seize the first good position to cover that road. Their design is to draw us on, if they are obliged to retreat, as far as Goose Creek, where they can be reënforced from Manassas and have a strong position. Report

THE OPPOSING FORCES AT BALL'S BLUFF, VA.— OCTOBER 21ST, 1861.

Union Forces: Colonel Edward D. Baker [1] (k); Colonel Milton Cogswell (w and c): 15th Mass., Col. Charles Devens; 20th Mass., Col. William R. Lee (c); 42d New York (called "Tammany regiment"), Col. Milton Cogswell; 71st Pa. (also called 1st California), Lieut-Col. Isaac J. Wistar (w). *Artillery:* B, 1st R. I. (one gun), Lieut. Walter M. Bramhall (w); I, 1st U. S. (two guns), Lieut. Frank S. French.

Confederate Forces: Brigadier-General Nathan G. Evans: 17th Miss., Col. W. S. Featherston; 18th Miss., Col. E. R. Burt (m w), Lieut.-Col. Thomas M. Griffin; 8th Va., Col. Eppa Hunton; Co. D, 13th Miss., Capt. L. D. Fletcher; Va. Cavalry (3 co's), Col. Walter H. Jenifer.

The Confederate loss was 33 killed, 115 wounded, and 1 missing = 149.

The casualties in the Union forces were 49 killed, 158 wounded, and 714 captured or missing = 921.

[1] Colonel Baker received the appointment of Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers, August 6th, 1861, to rank from May 17th, 1861. This he declined, August 31st, 1861. On September 21st, 1861, he was appointed Major-General, U. S. Volunteers, but at the date of his death he had neither accepted nor declined the appointment. General McClellan was then the only other officer in the Army of the Potomac holding that rank.— EDITORS.

frequently, so that when they are pushed, Gorman [at Edwards Ferry] can come in on their flank. Yours respectfully and truly, CHAS. P. STONE, Brigadier-General, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS CORPS OF OBSERVATION. EDWARDS FERRY, October 21st, 1861.—COLONEL E. D. BAKER, Commanding Brigade. COLONEL: In case of heavy firing in front of Harrison's Island, you will advance the California regiment of your brigade, or retire the regiments under Colonels Lee and Devens upon the Virginia side of the river, at your discretion, assuming command on arrival. Very respectfully, Colonel, your most obedient servant, CHAS. P. STONE, Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Captain Francis J. Young, assistant quartermaster of Colonel Baker's staff, says that as soon as the latter order had been received

"Colonel Baker immediately sent for three regiments and a squadron of cavalry from his brigade and for Colonel Cogswell and the rest of his Tammany regiment.

"Proceeding to the crossing at Harrison's Island, we found the means of transportation to consist of two flat-boats of the capacity of 25 to 40 men, and a small skiff, which would carry but 3 or 4 men. The river was swollen and the current rapid, and there was much labor and delay in making use of the boats. Another flat-boat was found in the canal one mile distant, and, being towed down to the crossing, was with much difficulty got into the Potomac.‖ Colonel Baker immediately crossed with me and as many men as could be got into the boats to the island, and reaching the opposite side of the island found one flat-boat and a small metallic boat. He crossed to the Virginia shore without delay with Adjutant-General Harvey, sending me back with an order for Colonel Cogswell to bring over the artillery.

"It was now 2 o'clock P. M., and Colonel Cogswell coming over from the Maryland side with 2 pieces of artillery, horses, and men, we carried with us the 2 howitzers of the Rhode Island Battery and crossed to the Virginia side. The bank is of a miry clay, and the heights almost precipitous, with fallen trees and rocks, making it very difficult to get up the artillery. Arriving by circuitous routes on the summit, we found an open field of six acres, covered with wild grass, scrub oak, and locust trees, and forming a segment of a circle, the arc of which was surrounded with trees. Colonel Baker apprised Colonel Devens that he had been placed in command, and learned that the 15th Massachusetts, after having advanced for a mile in the direction of Leesburg, had been attacked and fallen back to the position which they then occupied, just in the edge of the woods on the right. The other forces were lying under the brow of the hill; and with the exception of an occasional rifle shot all was quiet, and no sight of an enemy. The 2 howitzers and 1 piece of artillery were drawn by the men out into the open field, pointing to the woods in front, the artillery horses not being brought up the steep."

Occurrences at Harrison's Island and at the bluff, during the arrival of reënforcements, are described by Colonel Milton Cogswell, of the "Tammany" or 42d New York regiment, whose report is dated New York, September 22d, 1862, after his return from captivity. At 2 o'clock on the 21st he received orders to cross the Potomac at Harrison's Island:

"Arrived at the landing opposite Harrison's Island, I found the greatest confusion existing. No one seemed to be in charge, nor any one superintending the passage of the troops, and no order was maintained in their crossing. The eight companies of my regiment on picket were rapidly concentrated at the crossing, and I moved with one company of my regiment and two pieces of artillery belonging to the 6th New York Battery to the island, leaving verbal orders with Major Bowe, who remained in charge, to push the remainder of my regiment on as soon as possible. I immediately crossed the island to make the passage of the second branch of the river, and there found still greater confusion existing than at the first landing. . . .

"I ascended the bluff (about 70 feet high) and reported myself to Colonel Baker. I found

‖ General Stone says in a report dated December 2d, 1861, that "Colonel Baker spent more than an hour in personally superintending the lifting of a boat from the canal to the river, when a junior officer or sergeant would have done as well, the meantime neglecting to visit or give orders to the advanced force in the face of the enemy."—EDITORS.



THE CLIFF AT BALL'S BLUFF. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

him near the bluff, on the edge of an open field of about 8 or 10 acres' extent, trapezoidal in form, the acute angle being on the left front, the shortest parallel side near the edge of the bluff, and along this line was the 1st California Regiment, while the 15th Massachusetts Regiment was formed in line in the open woods, forming the right-hand boundary of the field, its line being nearly perpendicular to that of the California regiment Two mountain howitzers, under Lieutenant French, of the United States artillery, were posted in front of the angle formed by these two regiments. A deep ravine, having its mouth on the left of the point where we landed, extended along the left of the open field and wound around in front of it, forming nearly a semicircle, bounded by wooded hills commanding the whole open space. Some companies of the 20th Massachusetts Regiment were posted in reserve behind the line of the California regiment.

"Colonel Baker welcomed me on the field, seemed in good spirits, and very confident of a successful day. He requested me to look at his line of battle, and with him I passed along the whole front. He asked my opinion of his disposition of troops, and I told him frankly that I deemed them very defective, as the wooded hills beyond the ravine commanded the whole so perfectly, that should they be occupied by the enemy he would be destroyed, and I advised an immediate advance of the whole force to occupy the hills, which were not then occupied by the enemy. I told him that the whole action must be on our left, and that we must occupy those hills. No attention was apparently paid to this advice, and Colonel Baker ordered me to take charge of the artillery, but without any definite instructions as to its service. About twenty minutes afterward the hills on the left front to which I had called attention were occupied by the enemy's skirmishers, who immediately opened a sharp fire on our left. I immediately directed the artillery to open fire on those skirmishers, but soon perceived that the fire was ineffectual, as the enemy was under cover of the trees, shooting down the artillerists at easy musket range.☆ Soon Lieutenant Bramhall and nearly all the artillerymen had been shot

☆ Captain William F. Bartlett, of the 20th Massachusetts, says of this attack: "The enemy now opened on us from the woods in front with a heavy fire of musketry, which was very effective. They fired low, the balls all going within from one to four feet of the ground. Three companies of the 20th were kept in reserve, but on the open ground, exposed to a destructive fire. It was a continual fire now, with occasional pauses of one or two minutes, until the last. The rifled cannon was on the left in the open ground, in front of a part of Baker's regiment, exposed to a hot fire. It was not discharged more than eight times. The gunners were shot down in the first of

down, and the pieces were worked for a time by Colonel Baker in person, his assistant adjutant-general (Captain Harvey), Captain Stewart, assistant adjutant-general of the division, a few other officers, and myself.

"Leaving the pieces, as I saw the whole strength of the enemy was being thrown on the left, I proceeded to the extreme left, where I found Lieutenant-Colonel Wistar had been badly wounded, and that the left wing, without a commander, was becoming disorganized. I then ordered Captain Markoe, of the 1st California Regiment, to move his company to the left, and hold the hill at all hazards. Captain Markoe moved as directed, engaged the enemy's skirmishers, and held his ground for some time, but could gain no advantage over the enemy. About half an hour afterward Colonel Baker came from the right of the line and passed in front of the line of skirmishers, when he was instantly killed by the fire of the enemy's sharp-shooters.



COLONEL EDWARD D. BAKER.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

"By this time the hills on the left front were fully occupied by the enemy. Two companies of my regiment, under Captain Alden, arrived on the field, cheering most heartily, and with this fresh force we pushed the enemy some fifty yards back, but they had now obtained too strong possession of the hills to be dislodged. An unequal contest was maintained for about half an hour, when Captain Harvey, assistant adjutant-general, reported to me that Colonel Baker having been killed, I was in command of the field, and that a council of war was being held by the remaining colonels. I repaired to the point occupied by Colonels Lee and Devens, and found that they had decided on making a retreat. I informed them I was in command of the field; that a retreat across the river was impossible, and the only movement to be made was to cut our way through to Edwards Ferry, and that a column of attack must be at once formed for that purpose. At the same time I directed Captain Harvey, assistant adjutant-general, to form the whole force into column of attack, faced to the left.

"Having given these orders, I proceeded to the front, and finding our lines pressed severely, I ordered an advance of the whole force on the right of the enemy's line. I was followed by the remnants of my two companies and a portion of the California regiment, but, for some reasons unknown to me, was not joined by either the 15th or the 20th Massachusetts regiments. We were overpowered and forced back to our original position, and again driven from that position to the river-bank by overwhelming numbers. On the river-bank I found the whole force in a state of great disorder. As I arrived, two companies of my own regiment [42d New York], under Captains Gerety and O'Meara, landed from the large boat. I ordered these fresh companies up the bluff, and they instantly ascended and deployed as skirmishers to cover the passage to the island, while I took about a dozen men and moved to the left to check a heavy fire of the enemy which had opened on us from the mouth of the ravine near. We were almost immediately surrounded and captured. This took place shortly after dark." ⚓

the engagement, and I saw Colonel Lee carry a charge to the gun with his own hands. The last time that it was fired the recoil carried it down the rise to the edge of the bank." Colonel Eppa Hunton, of the 8th Virginia, who made the attack, says: "At the first fire from my regiment nearly every man at the enemy's cannon was shot down, and so incessant and galling was the fire we kept up that there were only three discharges of cannon after the first fire from the 8th."—EDITORS.

⚓ Colonel Cogswell says in conclusion: "I deem it my duty as commander of the field during the last part of the action to state my convictions as to the principal causes of the untoward results of the day: First. The transportation of troops across the two branches of the river was in no way guarded or organized. There were no guards at any of the landings. No boats' crews had been detailed, and each command as it arrived was obliged to organize its own. No guns were placed in position either on the Maryland side or on the island to protect the passage, although several

Colonel Devens thus describes the closing events as observed by him:

"The action commenced about 3 P. M., and at about 4 P. M. I was ordered to detach two companies from the left of my regiment to the support of the left of the line, and to draw in, proportionately, the right flank, which was done, Companies G and H, Captains Forehand and Philbrick, being detached for that purpose. By this time it had become painfully evident, by the volume and rapidity of the enemy's fire and the persistency of his attacks, that he was in much larger force than we. The two howitzers were silent and the 6-pounder also. Their commanders came from the field wounded.

"Soon after, I was called from the right of my regiment, there being at this time a comparative cessation of the enemy's fire, to the center of the line, and learned for the first time that Colonel Baker had been killed and that Lieutenant-Colonel Ward, of the 15th Massachusetts, had been carried from the field severely wounded. Colonel Lee supposing it his duty to take command, I reported myself ready to execute his orders. He expressed his opinion that the only thing to be done was to retreat to the river, and that the battle was utterly lost. It soon appeared that Colonel Cogswell was entitled to the command, who expressed his determination to make the attempt to cut our way to Edwards Ferry, and ordered me, as a preliminary movement, to form the 15th Regiment in line toward the left. The 15th Regiment accordingly moved across from the right to the left of the original line. Two or three companies of the Tammany [42d New York] Regiment, just then arrived, formed also on his left. While endeavoring to make the necessary dispositions to retreat, confusion was created by the appearance of an officer of the enemy's force in front of the Tammany Regiment, who called on them to charge on the enemy, who were now in strong force along the wood occupied formerly by the 15th Massachusetts during the former portion of the action. The detachment of the Tammany Regiment, probably mistaking this for an order from their own officers, rushed forward to the charge, and the 15th Massachusetts, supposing that an order had been given for the advance of the whole line, rushed with eagerness, but was promptly recalled by their officers, who had received no such order. The detachment of the Tammany Regiment was received with a shower of bullets, and suffered severely. In the disturbance caused by their repulse the line was broken, but was promptly re-formed.

"After this, however, although several volleys were given and returned and the troops fought vigorously, it seemed impossible to preserve the order necessary for a combined military movement, and Colonel Cogswell reluctantly gave the order to retreat to the river-bank. The troops descended the bluff, and reached the bank of the river, where there is a narrow plateau between the river and the ascent of the bluff, both the plateau and the bluff being heavily wooded. As I descended upon this plateau, in company with Colonel Cogswell, I saw the large boat, upon which we depended as the means of crossing the river, swamped by the number of men who rushed upon it.

"For the purpose of retarding as much as possible the approach of the enemy, by direction of Colonel Cogswell I ordered the 15th Regiment to deploy as skirmishers over the bank of the river, which order was executed, and several volleys were given and returned between them and others of our forces and the enemy, who were now pressing upon us in great numbers and forcing down furious volleys on this plateau and into the river to prevent any escape. It was impossible longer to continue to resist, and I should have had no doubt, if we had been contending with the troops of a foreign nation, in justice to the lives of men, it would have been our duty to surrender; I had no hesitation in advising men to escape as they could, ordering them in all cases to throw their arms into the river rather than give them up to the enemy. This order was generally obeyed, although several of the men swam the river with their muskets on their backs, and others have returned to camp, bringing with them their muskets, who had remained on the Virginia shore for two nights rather than to part with their weapons in order to facilitate their escape. Having passed up along the line of that portion of the river occupied by my regiment, I returned to the lower end of it, and at dark myself swam the river by the aid of three of the soldiers of my regiment."

pieces were disposable on the Maryland shore near the landing. Had the full capacity of the boats been employed, more than twice as many men might have crossed in time to take part in the action. Second. The dispositions on the field were faulty, according to my judgment."—EDITORS.

The final effect of not looking after the boat service was seen in the presence of the fifteen companies at Harrison's Island on their way to the scene of action at the moment of defeat. This error, like the others, was the result of Colonel Baker's inexperience. No one has ever sought to blame him. The whole load was at once thrown upon General Stone, though not, indeed, by those who knew the facts and were capable of judging.

With the light we have to-day, it would, indeed, be easy to admit that, even with forces outnumbering the enemy as four to one, to cross a rapid river in a few boats at two points practically four miles apart, climb a steep bank, and thence advance against an enemy centrally posted within two miles of either landing, is too delicate an operation to be undertaken by inexperienced troops, without that knowledge of individual qualities which can only be gained by the test of actual warfare, and, moreover, without a positive command or an object adequate to the risk.

If we are to judge by the light of '61, then it must be remembered that General Stone supposed himself to be carrying out the wishes of his commanding general† in regard to dislodging the enemy from Leesburg, that the scouting parties found no large force of Confederates, that he had no reason to apprehend any one of the negligences and ignorances which followed, that the main body of the Confederates seemed to be in Gorman's front; finally, that he believed McCall to be still reconnoitering beyond Dranesville.‡

It was thus that General McClellan, no less just than generous to his subordinates, judged in vindicating Stone from reproach, and retaining him in command when self-interest would in any case have suggested his retirement, and duty would have demanded it if he were to blame.\ So, too, judged the leading officers who took part in the battle, including those who suffered wounds and long imprisonment.

But with the cry of grief that went up all over the land at the untimely death of the brave and eloquent Baker, who had left the Senate to take the field, was mingled the cry of rage of a few men among his personal followers. They filled the public ear with misrepresentations, to which Stone and his officers, restrained by discipline, were unable to reply.☆

† Although the strict letter of his instructions was admittedly exhausted. But this was not the only communication that had passed. Observe, that although surprised by the movement, and greatly distressed by the disaster, General McClellan uttered not a word of censure. He even telegraphed, "Take Leesburg." Curiously enough, this dispatch, being in cipher, could not be read by General Stone, who replied, "*I have the box, but not the key.*" At first this was supposed to refer to a box, and I was sent to General Stone's family for the key; of course, to no purpose.—R. B. I.

‡ General McClellan says he thinks notice was sent to General Stone of McCall's withdrawal from Dranesville. He had a right to think so; but the fact remains that *no such notice was sent.* I state this of my own knowledge.—R. B. I.

\ In "McClellan's Own Story," the general writes of Stone: "He was a most charming and amiable gentleman; honest, brave, a good soldier, though occasionally carried away by his chivalrous ideas. He was very unfortunate, and was as far as possible from meriting the sad fate and cruel treatment he met with."—EDITORS.

☆ The following extract denotes the substance of such irresponsible accusations against General Stone as reached the public at the time: "Brigadier-General Charles P. Stone was arrested in Washington this morning, at 2 o'clock, by a posse of the Provost Marshal's force, and sent to Fort Lafayette, New York harbor. The charges against General Stone are: First, for misbehavior at the battle of Ball's Bluff; second, for holding correspondence with the enemy before and since the battle of Ball's Bluff, and receiving visits from rebel officers in his camp; third, for treacherously suffering the enemy to build a fort or strong work, since the battle of Ball's Bluff, under his guns with-

General Stone asked his commanding general for a court of inquiry; it was refused as unnecessary and inexpedient.

Congress met and promptly called on the Executive for information and an investigation. Both requests were denied as contrary to the public interests, but the demand being repeated, the President so far yielded as to promise an immediate inquiry. This was not enough to satisfy Congress, which appointed the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, and began the investigation for itself, and in a mood which may be inferred from the denunciation of the affair, in advance, as "the most atrocious military murder in history."

JOHN A. ANDREW, WAR-GOVERNOR OF MASSACHUSETTS. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

In the meantime, a series of incidents had taken place, of a character tending to give point to the vague suspicions entertained against General Stone in some quarters. In September, two alleged fugitive slaves were returned to their master, under General Stone's orders, by a subaltern of the 20th Massachusetts regiment of his division. Not knowing, or perhaps ignoring, the fact that General Stone's action was in exact accord with the orders, and was sustained by the approval of his superiors, including the President, as well as in conformity with the policy of the Government, as then declared by Congress, Governor Andrew, upon the first information received, wrote a letter to the regimental commander, reprimanding the lieutenant.

A warm correspondence followed, in which, on the one hand, Governor Andrew maintained the correctness of his own action, and severely criticised General Stone's, while, on the other hand, General McClellan and General Stone protested against the governor's course as an unwarranted interference with the discipline of the armies of the United States.

Governor Andrew sent the correspondence to Senator Sumner, who laid it before the Senate, and denounced Stone in unmeasured terms.

Stung to the quick, Stone instantly replied in a letter to Mr. Sumner, for which I need seek no better description or criticism than is contained in Mr.

out molestation; fourth, for a treacherous design to expose his force to capture and destruction by the enemy, under pretense of orders for a movement from the commanding general, which had not been given."—["Diary of Events" for February 9th, 1862, in Vol. IV. of Moore's "Rebellion Record," published in 1862.] These few lines involve nine distinct misstatements or perversions, only the single fact embodied in the first paragraph being correctly set forth.—R. B. I.

Lincoln's remark, after reading the letter and patiently hearing the whole story, while it was still hot: "I don't know that I should have written such a letter; but if I had wanted to, I think, under the circumstances,— under the circumstances, mind you,—I would have had a right to do so."[1]

These circumstances, imperfectly known or understood, have caused many to suppose that Mr. Sumner was in some way the originator of General Stone's arrest; it is, however, as certain as any fact can be upon negative evidence, that Mr. Sumner had nothing whatever to do with the subsequent proceedings.

The Committee on the Conduct of the War proceeded to investigate Ball's Bluff by the methods common to nearly all similar bodies. Witnesses were summoned and examined without order; there was no cross-examination; the accused was not confronted with the witnesses nor told their names, nor the charge upon which he had been already tried, condemned, and sentenced before he was even allowed to appear. No one was responsible. Of many important details there was no record. The secrets of a committee may not be divulged even to the authority from which its existence is derived. On behalf of the committee, the responsibility has been sought to be avoided. It cannot avail. General McClellan's statement is explicit, that Mr. Stanton informed him, when ordering the arrest, that he did so "at the solicitation of the committee." General McClellan was one of the most truthful of men. Mr. Stanton, unfriendly as he had then become, did not deny it; but he explicitly denied the authorship of the arrest. On the part of the committee no such explicit denial was ever made. As a matter of fact, some, at least, of its members hailed the arrest with demonstrations of delight. In April, in the Senate, the committee vehemently opposed a resolution calling on the President for the evidence taken before the committee. The chairman, Mr. Wade, admitted that the committee had done something, and had suggested something, but his language, elsewhere so violent, was guarded when he came to tell what this was. A sub-committee laid the evidence, which the Senate was not to be allowed to see, before the President and his cabinet, and "left it pretty much to them," in Mr. Wade's words. The resolution was supported by Mr. Sumner, and was passed against the opposition of the committee. Nine days later the President declined to lay the evidence before the Senate in a message, which, as Mr. Blaine points out, bears marks of having been written in the War Office; but the fact that the information withheld consisted of the evidence taken by its own committee was not revealed to the Senate.

Mr. Stanton's order for Stone's arrest was issued on the 28th of January. It was not executed until the morning of the 9th of February. What happened in the interval has never been told. It is soon done. General McClellan asked that General Stone might be heard in his defense. The committee assented, and General Stone was examined on the 31st. Meantime, the

[1] Adjutant-General Schouler ("Massachusetts in the War") says, "Mr. Sumner took no notice" of Stone's letter. General Schouler was evidently not aware that Mr. Sumner took the letter at once to Mr. Lincoln, with the above result.—R. B. I.

execution of the order was informally suspended in deference to General McClellan's express statement to the Secretary, that he did not see how any charges could be framed on the testimony. ☆

In a few days the missing link was supplied by a surprising occurrence. A refugee came into General W. W. Burns's lines from Leesburg, with a vague and utterly groundless story of mysterious flags of truce and of how much the Confederates thought of their friend Stone. ⚓ General McClellan was now placed in a cruel dilemma. He had either to show the refugee's story to the Secretary, or withhold it. The course he chose was that which seemed to him his duty. Mr. Stanton instantly renewed the order, and Stone's ruin was accomplished.

Not only were no charges ever preferred, but no acknowledgment of error was ever made, unless Stone's retention in the service and his restoration to duty, long subsequently, and under secret surveillance, be so considered. General McClellan in vain applied for him. General Hooker's first act on taking command was to ask for him as chief-of-staff. At last, in May, 1863, upon the earnest request of General Banks, commanding the Department of the Gulf, Stone was ordered to report to him. He arrived during the siege of Port Hudson, and rendered valuable service, though without assignment. Immediately afterward, General Banks appointed him chief-of-staff, in which capacity he served until April 16th, 1864, when, coincidently with the disaster on the Red River, but under orders previously issued at Washington, he was deprived of his commission as brigadier-general, and ordered to "report by letter" as colonel of the 14th infantry. In the following August, Lieutenant-General Grant assigned him to the command of a brigade in the Fifth Army Corps. A month later, worn out at last by the strain of the unmerited suffering he had so long endured in silence, he resigned.

And thus it was that this most gallant, accomplished, and faithful soldier was, upon no charges, without a hearing, upon "evidence" on which no humane or fair-minded man would punish a pet terrier, condemned not merely to long and rigorous imprisonment, but to a punishment so much worse than death that in all ages men have sought death because they have lacked the courage to endure it.

☆ The Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, appointed in December, 1861, during the second session of the 37th Congress, consisted of Senators Benjamin F. Wade, of Ohio; Zachariah Chandler, of Michigan, and Andrew Johnson, of Tennessee; and Representatives D. W. Gooch, of Massachusetts; John Covode, of Pennsylvania; George W. Julian, of Indiana, and M. F. Odell, of New York. On the appointment of Andrew Johnson as Military Governor of Tennessee, March 4th, 1862, his place on the committee was filled, temporarily, by Joseph A. Wright, of Indiana. Only six names appear in the report, submitted April 6th, 1863, with respect to the First Bull Run, Ball's Bluff, the Western Department of Missouri, and other subjects.— EDITORS.

⚓ General McClellan informed General Stone that he had last seen the written statement at the War Office on the 8th of February, 1862. I saw it at his headquarters in Washington in September, 1862, in a wardrobe full of papers turned over to me when I, as Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, was detached "to prevent the tail of the army from being again cut off," and it was among a double handful which I delivered back to General Seth Williams after Antietam. I suggest that the name of this refugee, and all the facts regarding him, and all the statements made by him, will probably turn up in the archives of the "Secret Service." I know the man was turned over to "Colonel E. J. Allen" (Allen Pinkerton) and examined by him.— R. B. I.

CAPTAIN WILKES'S SEIZURE OF MASON AND SLIDELL.

BY D. MACNEILL FAIRFAX, REAR-ADMIRAL, U. S. N., EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE "SAN JACINTO."

IN October, 1861, the United States screw-sloop *San Jacinto*, of which Captain Charles Wilkes was commander and the writer was executive officer, on her return from the west coast of Africa, touched at the island of St. Thomas to coal ship. Here for the first time we learned of the presence in those waters of the Confederate cruiser *Sumter* (Captain Raphael Semmes).[1] Captain Wilkes immediately determined to search for the enemy. At Cienfuegos, on the south coast of Cuba, he learned from the United States consul-general at Havana that Messrs. Mason and Slidell, Confederate commissioners to Europe, and their secretaries and families had recently reached that port from Charleston en route to England. He immediately put to sea, October 26th, with the purpose of intercepting the blockade runner which had brought them out. The commissioners were to have left Charleston by the cruiser *Nashville*, but their plans had been changed, and the steamer *Gordon*, otherwise known as the *Theodora* (Captain Lockwood), had been substituted. They had run the Union blockade successfully during a storm on the night of October 11th, and had arrived at Nassau on the 13th, and at Havana on the 17th. There we ascertained that their plan was to leave on the 7th of November in the English steamer *Trent* for St. Thomas on their way to England, and readily calculated when and where in the Bahama Channel we might intercept them. Meanwhile, on the 2d of November, Captain Wilkes continued his cruise after the *Sumter* along the north coast of Cuba, also running over to Key West in the hope of finding the *Powhatan* or some other steamer to accompany him to the Bahama Channel to guard against the possibility of the escape of the commissioners. But the *Powhatan* had left the day before, and the *San Jacinto* therefore returned alone to the channel to await the *Trent*. Here, 240 miles from Havana, and 90 miles from Sagua la Grande, where the channel contracts to the width of 15 miles, at noon on the 8th of November the *Trent* was sighted.

On our way from St. Thomas to Havana we had stopped at the Caymans, an English possession, to procure fresh provisions for the crew. The natives had not many days before received a visit from the *Sumter*, and were loud

[1] The *Sumter*, one of the first, if not the very first, of the regularly commissioned vessels of the Confederate navy, left New Orleans on the 18th of June, 1861 (see cut, p. 14), and, running the blockade, almost immediately began privateering operations. She was a screw steamer of 500 tons, and was armed with 5 guns — an 8-inch pivot, and 4 24-pound howitzers. She cruised for two months in the Caribbean Sea and along the coast of South America, receiving friendly treatment and coaling without hindrance in the neutral ports. During the succeeding two months she cruised in the Atlantic. On the night of the 23d of November, she ran out of the port of St. Pierre, Island of Martinique, eluding the *Iroquois* (Captain Palmer), which had been sent to search for her. At Gibraltar, having been effectually blockaded by the *Tuscarora*, she was sold, afterward becoming a blockade runner. Among the vessels sent in search of her were the *Niagara*, *Powhatan*, *Keystone State*, *Richmond*, and *San Jacinto*.

In his volume, "The Blockade and the Cruisers" (Charles Scribner's Sons), Professor J. R. Soley sums up her career thus:

"During her cruise she had made 17 prizes, of which 2 were ransomed, 7 were released in Cuban ports by order of the Captain-General, and 2 were recaptured. Apart from the delays caused by interrupted voyages, the total injury inflicted by the *Sumter* upon American commerce consisted in the burning of six vessels with their cargoes." EDITORS.



JAMES M. MASON, CONFEDERATE COMMISSIONER TO GREAT BRITAIN. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

in praise of the Confederate cruiser. They had in times past shown great pleasure in selling turtle and fresh beef and vegetables to the United States war vessels, but now their sympathy for the Southern cause was uppermost, and they really showed indifference to selling us provisions. This feeling had displayed itself wherever we had stopped either at St. Thomas or on the southern coast of Cuba, and when we reached Havana it was still more apparent. It was evident, even at that early day, that the South had the sympathy of nearly all Europe — particularly of England and France. When Captain Wilkes first took me into his confidence, and told me what he purposed to do, I earnestly reminded him of the great risk of a war with these two Governments, supported as they were by powerful navies; and when we reached Key West I suggested that he consult with Judge Marvin, one of the ablest maritime lawyers. I soon saw, however, that he had made up his mind to intercept and capture the *Trent* as well as to take possession of the commissioners, and I therefore ceased to discuss the affair. As the next in rank to Captain Wilkes, I claimed the right to board the mail-packet. Captain Wilkes fully expected that I would tender my services for this "delicate duty," and rather left to me the plan of carrying out his instructions. ⚓ I was impressed with the gravity of my position, and I made up my mind not to do anything unnecessary in the arrest of these gentlemen, or anything that would irritate the captain of the *Trent*, or any of his passengers, particularly the commissioners — lest it might occur to them to throw the steamer on my hands, which would necessitate my taking her as a prize.

⚓ Following is the text of Captain Wilkes's instructions, which, as will be seen from the narrative, were not literally observed by Lieutenant Fairfax:

"U. S. STEAMER *San Jacinto*. At sea, Nov. 8th, 1861.

SIR: You will have the second and third cutters of this ship fully manned and armed, and be in all respects prepared to board the steamer *Trent*, now hove to under our guns.

"On boarding her you will demand the papers of the steamer, her clearance from Havana, with the list of passengers and crew.

"Should Mr. Mason, Mr. Slidell, Mr. Eustis, and Mr. McFarland be on board, you will make them prisoners and send them on board this ship immediately, and take possession of her as a prize.

"I do not deem it will be necessary to use force, that the prisoners will have the good sense to avoid any necessity for using it; but if they should they must be made to understand that it is their own fault.

"*They must be brought on board.*

"All trunks, cases, packages, and bags belonging to them you will take possession of, and send on board this ship; any dispatches found on the persons of the prisoners, or in possession of those on board the steamer.

As the *Trent* approached she hoisted English colors; whereupon our ensign was hoisted and a shot was fired across her bow. As she maintained her speed and showed no disposition to heave to, a shell was fired across her bow which brought her to. Captain Wilkes hailed that he intended to send a boat on board, and I then left with the second cutter.

The manner of heaving the *Trent* to evidently was galling to Captain Moir. When he did stop his steamer, he showed how provoked he was by impatiently singing out through his trumpet, "What do you mean by heaving my vessel to in this manner?" I felt that I must in every way conciliate him when I should get on board. Two boats had been equipped ready to lower and the officers and crews detailed to jump into them. These were not employed until later. The boat I took was a third one, and as the sea was smooth, but a few minutes elapsed before we reached the *Trent*. I instructed the boat's crew to remain alongside for orders, and, boarding the vessel, I was escorted by one of her officers to the upper or promenade deck and was introduced to Captain Moir, who, though very gentlemanly in his way of receiving me, was also very dignified and manifested no little indignation as he spoke of the unusual treatment received at our hands. I immediately asked if I might see his passenger-list, saying that I had information that Messrs. Mason and Slidell were on board. The mention of Mr. Slidell's name caused that gentleman to come up and say, "I am Mr. Slidell; do you want to see me?" Mr. Mason, whom I knew very well, also came up at the same time, thus relieving me from Captain Moir's refusal, which was very polite but very



JOHN SLIDELL, CONFEDERATE COMMISSIONER TO FRANCE. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

will be taken possession of, examined, and retained if necessary.

"I have understood that the families of these gentlemen may be with them; if so, I beg you will offer some of them in my name a passage in this ship to the United States, and that all the attention and comforts we can command are tendered them and will be placed in their service.

"In the event of their acceptance, should there be anything which the captain of the steamer can spare to increase the comforts in the way of necessaries or stores, of which a war vessel is deficient, you will please to procure them; the amount will be paid for by the paymaster.

"Lieutenant James A. Greer will take charge of the third cutter which accompanies you, and assist you in these duties. I trust that all those under your command in executing this important and delicate duty will conduct themselves with all the delicacy and kindness which become the character of our Naval Service.

"I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, CHARLES WILKES, Captain.

"To Lieutenant D. M. FAIRFAX, U. S. N., Executive Officer, *San Jacinto*."

positive, that I could not under such circumstances be shown any list of passengers. I asked where their secretaries, Mr. McFarland and Mr. Eustis, were, for I wanted to see them also, and Mr. Mason pointed them out to me standing near. In the briefest time I had the four gentlemen before me, and then I informed Captain Moir that I had been sent by my commander to arrest Mr. Mason and Mr. Slidell and their secretaries, and send them prisoners on board the United States war vessel near by.

As may readily be understood, when it was known why I had boarded the *Trent*, there was an outburst of rage and indignation from the passengers, who numbered nearly one hundred, many of them Southerners. The captain and the four gentlemen bore themselves with great composure, but the irresponsible lookers-on sang out, "Throw the d —— fellow overboard!" I called on Captain Moir to preserve order, but, for the benefit of the excited passengers, I reminded them that our every move was closely observed from the *San Jacinto* by spy-glasses (she was within hailing distance), that a heavy battery was bearing upon them, and that any indignity to any of her officers or crew then on board might lead to dreadful consequences. This, together with Captain Moir's excellent commanding manner, had a quieting effect. During this uproar among the passengers, the officer in charge of the *San Jacinto's* boat, not knowing what it meant, and fearing some ill-treatment of me, hurried up with six or eight of the crew. Captain Moir was the first to see this body of armed men, and remonstrated with me at their appearance on the promenade-deck among his passengers, there being many ladies and children among them. I immediately directed the officer to return to his boat and await my orders. I assured him, amidst the noise of his passengers, that the men had come contrary to my instructions. I was really pleased to find the captain so tenacious of his command, for my mind was possessed with the idea that Mr. Mason or Mr. Slidell, or both, would urge Captain Moir to relinquish his command, making it necessary for me to assume it, as in such event my instructions left no opening for me to decline it. After order had been restored, we discussed the affair more generally, Captain Moir, however, scarcely joining in the conversation—always dignified and punctilious. The mail-agent, Commander Williams, an officer of the Royal Navy, on the retired list, was more officious, for he scarcely left me, and more than once reminded me that he represented Her Majesty's Service, and that I must refer things to him. Of course, I knew what was due to him, but I also knew that Captain Moir was the only person with whom I could have any official relations. I carefully avoided giving offense, and confined myself strictly to the duty which had taken me on board. I was anxious that Mr. Slidell and Mr. Mason should not leave any of their luggage behind. Mrs. Slidell having asked me who commanded the *San Jacinto*, I replied, "Your old acquaintance, Captain Wilkes"; whereupon she expressed surprise that he should do the very thing the Confederates were hoping for—something to arouse England; and she also spoke of our having run down a French brig, a short time before, saying that two French men-of-war were at Havana when the brig came in with jury-masts, almost a wreck, as the captain of the brig reported to

them, and adding that their commanders had expressed great indignation, and would make the most of our treatment of one of their merchantmen. "Really," she added, "Captain Wilkes is playing into our hands!" Mr. Mason here suggested that it would be just as well not to discuss these matters at such a time. Captain Wilkes's offer of his cabin was conveyed by me to Mrs. Slidell and Mrs. Eustis, and declined by both ladies.

After the first uproar had subsided, I sent the boat to Captain Wilkes to say that these gentlemen were all on board, and had objected to being sent to the *San Jacinto*, and that I must use force to accomplish my orders; I asked for a boat to carry them comfortably on board, another for their baggage, and a third to carry stores, which the paymaster's clerk, at Captain Wilkes's order, had already purchased from the steward of the *Trent*, to add to the comfort of the new guests.

REAR-ADMIRAL CHARLES WILKES. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

When all was ready and the boats were in waiting, I notified both Mr. Mason and Mr. Slidell that the time had come to send them to the *San Jacinto*. They came quietly down to the main-deck, and there repeated that they would not go unless force was used—whereupon two officers, previously instructed, escorted each commissioner to the side, and assisted them into the comfortable cutter sent especially for them. The two secretaries followed them into the boat without making opposition. At this stage of the proceedings another outcry was raised by the passengers—noise enough to cause Lieutenant Greer, who was waiting for these gentlemen to accompany them on board, to send a corporal's guard inside of the main-deck cabin. This produced considerable consternation among the ladies near by, but it was soon allayed by Captain Moir, and the marines were sent back outside. They had been sent in one of the boats by Captain Wilkes's order, under the impression that they might be required. Some machinists also came, in the event of the *Trent* being taken as a prize; they were not needed, and were sent back to their ship a little while before I returned to make my report. Commander Williams was reported as saying when he went to England that I had caused marines to charge upon defenseless women and children with fixed bayonets. The men, of course, had their muskets at "carry" or "shoulder," and moved into the cabin with quick step—but there was no other foundation for the statement. Again he represented, and it was pictured in one of the London illustrated papers, that Miss Slidell, for some cause or other, had struck me in the face. This

was based on the fact that she accidentally touched my shoulder while I was talking to Mrs. Slidell at the door of Mr. Slidell's state-room. While I was standing there, Miss Slidell, then a girl of 15 or 17 years, was protesting against my taking her father from her, when a little roll of the steamer caused her to lose her balance, and thus she touched me slightly. Mrs. Slidell, writing afterward from Paris to her near relative, and a friend of mine, expressed her mortification that such a story should have been circulated. But Commander Williams bade me good-bye pleasantly when I left the *Trent*, saying that he was very much pleased at my moderate and gentlemanly manner throughout this very embarrassing and perplexing duty, and that he would report the same to his Government, for which I thanked him, mentioning his language afterward to Captain Wilkes. The truth is that much was made of Williams in England, and he evidently lost his head.

Once while the transfer of luggage and stores delayed us, Captain Moir, seeing his vessel drifting out of channel and in sight of shoal water, said to me, "If you do not hurry and get out of my vessel, I will not be responsible for her safety." I immediately hailed the *San Jacinto* and requested that she be kept more to windward and in mid-channel, and then said to Captain Moir, "Now you can move up nearer to the *San Jacinto*," which he did. I speak of this to show how watchful I was to keep him in an amiable frame of mind, and so to lessen the chance of his throwing the *Trent* on my hands. When all was finished I went on board the *San Jacinto* and reported to Captain Wilkes that I had not taken the *Trent* as a prize, as he had instructed me to do, giving certain reasons, which satisfied him; for he replied, "inasmuch as you have not taken her, you will let her go" or "proceed on her voyage." To make clear one of these reasons, I should before have mentioned that Captain Wilkes, while at Havana, had learned more definitely of the character of Du Pont's fleet, from which he inferred its destination, for of the Southern ports the larger vessels could enter only Port Royal. He directed me "to refit our battery and get the *San Jacinto* ready in all respects for battle," adding that he would "join Du Pont in time to coöperate with him." (As it was, Port Royal fell the day before we boarded the *Trent*, as we learned on our arrival off Charleston.) The reasons I assigned to Captain Wilkes for my action were: First, that the capture of the *Trent* would make it necessary to put a large prize crew (officers and men) on board, and thus materially weaken our battery for use at Port Royal; secondly, that as there were a large number of women and children and mails and specie bound to various ports, the capture would seriously inconvenience innocent persons and merchants; so that I had determined, before taking her, to lay these matters before him for more serious consideration.†

I returned immediately to the *Trent* and informed Captain Moir that Cap-

† I gave my real reasons some weeks afterward to Secretary Chase, whom I met by chance at the Treasury Department, he having asked me to explain why I had not literally obeyed Captain Wilkes's instructions. I told him that it was because I was impressed with England's sympathy for the South, and felt that she would be glad to have so good a ground to declare war against the United States. Mr. Chase seemed surprised, and exclaimed, "You have certainly relieved the Government from great embarrassment, to say the least."—D. M. F.

WILLIAM H. SEWARD, SECRETARY OF STATE. FROM A DAGUERREOTYPE TAKEN ABOUT 1851.

tain Wilkes would not longer detain him, and he might proceed on his voyage. The steamers soon separated, and thus ended one of the most critical events of our civil war. We went up the coast from St. Augustine to the blockading fleet off Charleston, and thence to Fort Monroe, from which point we were ordered first to New York and afterward to Boston, with the prisoners. When we reached the outer roads of Boston I escorted the four gentlemen to Fort Warren, and parted from them with expressions of the most pleasant character; for everything had been done by Captain Wilkes and his officers to make them feel at home while on board the vessel. Mr. Eustis and myself had several conversations as to the probable reception of the news in England and on the Continent. He maintained from the first, that England would

immediately demand their release, and that our Government would be obliged to accede to this demand. When Mr. Slidell was leaving the side of the *Trent*, he said to his wife, "Good-bye, my dear, we shall meet in Paris in 60 days." If I remember aright, he was but 20 days longer in rejoining her.

After the war I had a conversation with Captain Moir, in the presence of an English chaplain, at St. Thomas. Captain Moir was there in command of a large steamer running between Liverpool and Aspinwall, and I was in command of the *Susquehanna*. Captain Moir invited the chaplain and myself to lunch, and after we were relieved from the presence of the waiters, only we three in the cabin, he then reverted to an interview he had with the British Admiralty on his return to England, whither he had been called from St. Thomas. They were very much disappointed and displeased with him for not having thrown the *Trent* on our hands, to which he replied (so he said to me) that it never had occurred to him; that, in fact, the officer who boarded the *Trent* was so civil, and had so closely occupied him in conversation about foreign matters, that he had failed to see what afterward was very plain. He recounted the excitement on 'Change over the affair, and expressed the conviction that all England would have demanded speedy redress, had I taken the *Trent*. He had seen the reports in print in our newspapers, and had read my orders to take possession and wondered that I had not.

Although Captain Wilkes and I viewed the seizure of the commissioners from different points of view, I cannot close this narrative without saying that Wilkes was one of our very best officers, a man of strong will-power, brave and intelligent, and I always entertained the highest respect for his abilities and worth.

After parting from the *Trent*, the *San Jacinto* proceeded to the Florida coast, and thence, by way of the blockading fleet off Charleston, to Fort Monroe. Here report of the seizure was made, and the vessel was ordered to New York, and thence, by order of Secretary Seward, to Fort Warren, Boston harbor, where the prisoners were confined during the diplomatic correspondence which followed. The commissioners expressed their satisfaction at the considerate treatment which they received, both from Captain Wilkes during the voyage and from Colonel Justin Dimick, the commander at Fort Warren.

On the 30th of November, Earl Russell, the British minister for foreign affairs, having received the news of the seizure through a letter from Commander Williams (mentioned above), wrote to Lord Lyons, the British minister at Washington, reciting the circumstances and saying in part:

"Her Majesty's Government, therefore, trust that when this matter shall have been brought under the consideration of the Government of the United States, that Government will, of its own accord, offer to the British Government such redress as alone could satisfy the British nation, namely, the liberation of the four gentlemen and their delivery to your lordship, in order that they may again be placed under British protection, and a suitable apology for the aggression which has been committed."

On the 3d of December, the French Government also made an informal protest, through its minister at Washington, M. Mercier.

On the 26th of December, Mr. Seward wrote at length to Lord Lyons, reviewing the case, and saying that the commissioners would be "cheerfully liberated." In the course of the letter Mr. Seward said:

"If I decide this case in favor of my own Government, I must disavow its most cherished principles, and reverse and forever abandon its essential policy. The country cannot afford the sacrifice. If I maintain those principles, and adhere to that policy, I must surrender the case itself. It will be seen, therefore, that this Government could not deny the justice of the claim presented to us in this respect upon its merits. We are asked to do the British nation just what we have always insisted all nations ought to do to us."

Accordingly, on the 1st of January, 1862, the commissioners and their secretaries were placed on board the English vessel *Rinaldo*, at Provincetown, Mass., which had been designated by Lord Lyons to receive them. After a voyage of unusual rigor, during which they were compelled by storms to alter the first plan of going by way of Halifax and to run to Bermuda, the commissioners arrived at Southampton, England, on the 29th of January. — EDITORS.

EARLY OPERATIONS ON THE POTOMAC RIVER.

BY PROFESSOR J. RUSSELL SOLEY, U. S. N.

THE first active naval operations of the war were those on the Potomac River, in May and June, 1861. At this time the larger vessels of the navy were engaged in setting on foot the blockade of the coast, in pursuance of the President's proclamations of April 19th and 27th. The *Niagara*, *Minnesota*, *Roanoke*, and *Susquehanna* on the Atlantic coast, under Flag-Officer Silas H. Stringham, and the *Colorado*, *Mississippi*, *Powhatan*, and *Brooklyn* in the Gulf, under Flag-Officer William Mervine, took the initial steps to render the blockade effective. Smaller vessels were sent to the blockading stations as rapidly as they could be prepared.

The Potomac River, although officially within the limits of the Atlantic Squadron, became early in the war a nearly independent command, owing to its distance from the flag-ship, and its nearness to Washington. In May the Potomac flotilla was organized, under Commander James H. Ward. It was originally composed of the small side-wheel steamer *Thomas Freeborn*, purchased, May 7th, at New York, and the tugs *Anacostia* and *Resolute*, but was considerably enlarged in the course of the year. Its organization was closely connected with the service of the Washington Navy Yard, and other vessels attached to the yard occasionally cooperated with it. Its movements were under the direct supervision of the department.

In the early part of May, 1861, the Navy of the State of Virginia began the erection of batteries on the Potomac, in order to close the navigation of the river to Federal vessels proceeding to and from Washington. Works were thrown up under the direction of Captain William F. Lynch, Commander Frederick Chatard, and other officers at Aquia Creek, the terminus of the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad, at Mathias Point, and later at Quantico. A small steamer, the *George Page*, coöperated with the forces on shore. The batteries were manned chiefly by infantry acting as artillerists. The first duty of the Potomac flotilla was to clear the Virginia banks of these obstructions to navigation and open the river. With this object in view, the *Freeborn*, under Commander Ward, on the 31st of May, attacked the works at Aquia Creek. The attack, which may be called the first naval engagement of the war, was ineffectual, the light guns of the *Freeborn* producing little impression. On the other hand, the necessity of economizing ammunition led the Confederates to reserve their fire. On the next day, June 1st, the attack was repeated by the *Freeborn*, which had meantime been joined by the *Pawnee*, under Commander S. C. Rowan. The bombardment was continued for five hours, but no casualties occurred on either side. The railroad pier and its buildings were set on fire and blown up by the Confederate forces, and both the batteries and the vessels received several shot, but no material injury was inflicted.

On the 27th of June, the *Freeborn* made an attack upon Mathias Point, where a considerable force of Confederates was posted, although no batteries had as yet been erected. In this attack Commander Ward was assisted by two boats from the *Pawnee*, under Lieutenant Chaplin. A landing was effected by the party, led by Commander Ward in person, and after some skirmishing the Confederate pickets were driven in; but upon the approach of the main body of the enemy a retreat was ordered to the boats. Commander Ward returned to the *Freeborn*, and directed her fire at the advancing force, enabling Chaplin to make a second landing. Breastworks were rapidly thrown up, but they were no sooner completed than the landing party was ordered to return, Commander Ward having received a fatal gunshot wound while sighting his bow-gun. Late in the afternoon, Lieutenant Chaplin, with great skill and coolness, embarked his men under a galling musketry fire. The only casualties in this somewhat rash undertaking were one killed and four wounded. Immediately after, the Confederates erected formidable works at the Point.

Two days after Ward's death, on the 29th of June, the steamer *St. Nicholas*, a passenger vessel still making regular trips between Baltimore and Georgetown, was captured by a stratagem of the Confederates. A party of armed men, more or less disguised, under Colonel Thomas, went on board as passengers at Baltimore, and were joined by Captain George N. Hollins and others at Point Lookout. As the *St. Nicholas* was on her way up the Potomac, the Confederates threw off their disguise, and, overpowering the crew and passengers, took possession of the vessel. She subsequently made several prizes, and was burnt at Fredericksburg in 1862.

Commander Thomas T. Craven succeeded Commander Ward in the command of the Potomac flotilla. The force was increased by the addition of eight or ten vessels, but it was unable to dislodge the Confederates from their positions, and although the navigation of the river was not actually closed to armed vessels, a virtual blockade of Washington, as far as the Potomac was concerned, was maintained until March, 1862, when the Confederate forces retired to the line of the Rappahannock River. The guns were then removed from the batteries, and the *George Page* was burnt.

During the remainder of the war, the Potomac flotilla, commanded successively by Commodore A. A. Harwood and Commanders R. H. Wyman and Foxhall A. Parker, was chiefly occupied in patrolling the river and the adjacent waters to insure the safety of water communication from Washington, and to prevent contraband trade between the frontiers. It seconded the operations of the army at various points, and occasionally its vessels had smart brushes with the enemy, but its principal occupation was that of a water-police, and its efforts were mainly directed against illicit trade and guerrilla warfare.



FORT MONROE — AND THE OLD HYGEIA HOTEL, SINCE TORN DOWN. FROM A LITHOGRAPH.

OPERATIONS OF 1861 ABOUT FORT MONROE.

BY JOSEPH B. CARR, BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. V.

ON the 24th of May, 1861, I arrived at Fort Monroe, with my regiment, the 2d New York Volunteers. Two days before Major-General B. F. Butler had arrived and assumed command of the department. Previous to our arrival the fort contained, besides the regular garrison of four companies of artillery, the 4th Massachusetts Volunteers, a regiment of "three-months" men. We went into camp just over the border of Mill Creek, a stream dividing the fort from Virginia, and pitched our tents on a plowed field near a mansion known as the Segar House. This camp was first called Camp Troy, and, later, Camp Hamilton. Pickets were placed immediately on our arrival, and at once began operations by the capture of nine Confederate officers — one of them a surgeon. The prisoners were brought before General Butler, confessed to being in arms under the Confederacy, and stated that, when captured, they were on their way to join their regiments after a day spent in looking after their homes, located in our neighborhood. General Butler saw fit to release them unconditionally.

Within a few days of our arrival in camp we were ordered to proceed to Hampton Village, where we expected to encounter Confederates and acquire our first knowledge of warfare. In this we were disappointed; the Confederates had departed, having burned the bridge at Hampton. Save for the evident approach of war, that portion of the peninsula occupied by Union troops in 1861 seemed a paradise. Great fields of corn and wheat grew on the sunny plain, and the neighboring farms teemed with stock of all kinds. But the villas and mansions of the inhabitants were deserted and uncared for; families were scattered, industries stopped, and sources of income abandoned or destroyed. The lower portion of the peninsula, to within a few miles of the Bethels, was occupied by General Butler's troops. Within the limits of his command General Butler sought to maintain strict discipline, and to that end issued various orders relating to the rights and duties of his command,

but particularly the rights of property-owners in our vicinity. Foraging and depredations of all kinds were forbidden, and as a rule the orders were obeyed, yet cases of disobedience constantly came to light, for it was only by stern experience that officers and men were taught the peculiar duties of a soldier. Food was at times irregularly issued to the men, and again was unwholesome and repellent, thus rendering the soldier doubly liable to fall under the temptations of generous foraging.

Some of the clothing issued to the men during the early days of the civil war was made of the vilest "shoddy" and literally fell from their bodies. In Fort Monroe men in the 2d New York Volunteers appeared on parade with blankets wrapped about them to conceal a lack of proper garments, and sometimes stood sentinel with naked feet and almost naked bodies. The only reason for this hard- ship was the dishonesty of contrac- tors, and the lack of experience and celerity in the sub- ordinates of the Quarter- master-General's department at Washington.



Among the liveliest soldiers encamped on any field were our neigh- bors, Duryée's Zouaves. The Confederates had dubbed this regiment, from their baggy red trousers and reckless bear- ing, "the red-legged devils," and had invested them with the characteristics of the Bashi-Bazouks. A private letter from a Confederate, read in camp, said: "We have no fear of your New York, Troy, Vermont, or Massachu- setts men, but I own that we do not want to meet those red-legged devils around our houses or hen-coops." It was a well-known fact that the Zouaves' rations included chicken, roast pig, ham, corn, and other first- class food. By the verdict of numer- ous squads in all the regiments, many articles of food near at hand were declared "contraband of war,"





1.—LIGHT-HOUSE, FORT MONROE. 2.—CHESAPEAKE HOSPITAL, HAMPTON, VA. 3.—SALLY-PORT, FORT MONROE. FROM WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPHS.

ARRIVAL OF THE ORIGINAL "CONTRABAND." FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

on the ground that if left on farms or in gardens "aid and comfort" to the enemy might ensue. There were few cases of real lawlessness, consequently the "Beauty and Booty" proclamation ☆ of General Beauregard was uncalled for, and even in the vague and uncertain light of that day was absurd.

The negroes in Virginia, learning of our presence, began to arrive at our camp in large numbers. While other commanders were hesitating and quibbling over the question, General Butler promptly declared slaves of Confederates "contraband of war," inasmuch as they gave, or had given, aid and comfort to the enemy. Contrabands at this date were not anxious to serve as soldiers, and no commander had the temerity to employ them as such. Commanding officers were seriously in error as to the value of men in the early days of the war. In my regiment, 118 men were discharged for disability, who enlisted later in other regiments, making first-class soldiers.

During the time in which General Butler was in command at Fort Monroe, he developed remarkable ability in civil organization, and showed courage and determination in any project in which he was interested. While just and even generous in dealing with the men in his department his manner was decidedly autocratic. He rarely tolerated conduct savoring of insubordination, and yet under peculiar circumstances he overlooked it. ⸸

☆ This proclamation by General Beauregard was dated "Department of Alexandria, Camp Pickens, June 5th, 1861," and was addressed "To the Good People of the Counties of Loudoun, Fairfax, and Prince William," in which, referring to the Union forces, he says: "All rules of civilized warfare are abandoned, and they proclaim by their acts, if not on their banners, that their war-cry is 'Beauty and Booty.'"—EDITORS.

⸸ On one occasion, when residents were complaining of acts of vandalism, Butler was informed that a certain regiment was guilty. Lieutenant Butler, the general's nephew, then quite young, was sent to summon the colonel of the regiment. Entering the colonel's tent, he said, "Colonel, Uncle Ben wants you, and is going to give you hell!" "Who is Uncle Ben?" inquired the colonel. "Why, General Butler!" "Very well, I will attend, but not to 'get hell,' young man, I did not come here for that purpose." "That's right," said the lieutenant, "I like to see men who are not afraid of Uncle Ben."—J. B. C.

Among other prominent soldiers at Fort Monroe, at this time, was General J. W. Phelps, then colonel of a Vermont regiment. Brave, cool, and capable, he was thoroughly liked by his men and by his superior officers. He spoke with a long, drawling "Yankee" accent, and his piquant sayings were very entertaining. Hating display and egotism, he invariably showed his displeasure when in the presence of men who were guilty of either. A dapper young lieutenant attached to one of the regiments at Newport News had shown great fondness for his dress uniform, supplemented by a scarlet-lined cloak, and dislike for ranking his personality below the chief-officer. Strutting into General Phelps's tent on one occasion, he said, without salute or preface, "I am going down to the fort, sir." "Are you?" said General Phelps, as he took in at a glance the gorgeous uniform scarlet-lined cloak and superabundant self-esteem of the young man. "Are you? Neow, I guess not, young man. Go to your colonel, get his permission, and then, if you can get *mine*, you may go down to the fort. Not otherwise. Go, now." On another occasion when the camp was all commotion and excitement owing to firing in the direction of our pickets, General Phelps, not excited in the least degree, walked into the writer's tent, and said, "Carr, that's not picket shooting. It is your men shooting p-e-e-g-s." His surmise proved correct.

Entering General Butler's quarters the colonel saluted, and said, "You sent for me, General?" "Sit down, sir," roared the exasperated chief; then, wheeling in his chair, the general recited the crimes charged, and, concluding, said, "I'll send your whole regiment to the Rip-Raps; what have you to say, sir, in your defense?" The colonel, now as angry as his chief, rose, and said, "I have this to say: Any man who says that my men are guilty of the crimes you enumerate, lies, sir!" "Do you dare tell *me* that I lie?" roared the general. "I tell you or any man uttering the charges, that he lies," was the reply. General Butler stared at the colonel for a few seconds, then, taking a cigar from his pocket, tendered it to the colonel, saying, "Smoke, Colonel, we will talk of this matter later." General Butler showed no further resentment, but thereafter favored the colonel. Events proved that the regiment was innocent of the crimes charged.—J. B. C.

CAMP OF DURYÉE'S ZOUAVES, NEAR FORT MONROE. FROM A SKETCH MADE IN JULY, 1861.

On the 10th of June, 1861, occurred the disastrous fight at Big Bethel,—battle we scarce may term it. Up to this time but few soldiers had been under fire, and the confidence which must exist between men and officers to make an army effective was lacking. To the want of that experience and confidence a great measure of the failure at Big Bethel may be attributed.

At noon of Sunday, the 9th of June, General Ebenezer W. Peirce received an order to go at once to headquarters at Fort Monroe. Arriving at General Butler's quarters, he was shown a plan of attack on both Little and Big Bethel. Minute directions for conducting the attack were given, and Peirce was assigned to command the expedition. The march was begun about midnight, June 9th. Peirce was to lead one column from Camp Hamilton to a point near Little Bethel, where the column advancing from Newport News was to meet him, and together they were to surprise and attack both Bethels. The troops taking part in the action on the following day were 5 New York regiments, the 1st, 2d, 3d, 5th, and 7th, detachments from the 4th Massachusetts and 1st Vermont, and a detachment of United States Regular Artillery (11 men), with 2 field-pieces, under command of Lieutenant Greble. Reports credit us with 2500 men engaged; I believe we had not less than 3500 men. General Butler had taken precautions against errors when our men should meet, having given the watchword "Boston" to be shouted when unrecognized troops should approach. Colonel Bendix, of the 7th New York regiment, did not receive information on this point. The several detachments were approaching the point designated as a place for meeting, and some troops had already departed for the rear of Little Bethel, when Townsend's (3d New York) and Bendix's troops approached each other, a dense wood having intervened for part of the march. Bendix, seeing troops in gray uniforms approaching,—the uniform of early regiments were in many cases gray in color,—and supposing them to be the enemy, opened fire on them with musketry and one piece of artillery. The watchword was shouted, but Bendix, being ignorant of its significance, continued firing. Townsend retreated a short distance, and the error was then discovered. Duryée (5th New York) and Washburn (1st Vermont), who were in advance, hearing the firing, concluded that the Confederates had reached their rear, and immediately retraced their march. The possibility of surprising the enemy was now past. The shots of Bendix's and Townsend's men had aroused the Confederates, and preparation for defense was made by

UNIFORM OF DURYÉE'S ZOUAVES.

THE OPPOSING FORCES AT BIG BETHEL, VA.—JUNE 10TH, 1861.

Union Forces: Brigadier-General Ebenezer W. Peirce. 4th Mass. (5 co's), Maj. Horace O. Whittemore; 1st N. Y., Col. William H. Allen; 2d N. Y., Col. Joseph B. Carr; 3d N. Y., Col. Frederick Townsend; 5th N. Y., Col. Abram Duryée; 7th N. Y., Col. John E. Bendix; 1st Vt. (5 co's), Lieut.-Col. Peter T. Washburn; Regular artillery (4 guns), Lieut. John T. Greble (k).

Total Union loss: 18 killed, 53 wounded, and 5 missing = 76.

Confederate Forces: Col. J. Bankhead Magruder. 1st N. C., Col. Daniel H. Hill; 3d Va. (detachment), Lieut.-Col. William D. Stuart; Va. Cavalry Battalion, Maj. E. B. Montagne; Va. Howitzer Battalion, Maj. Geo. W. Randolph.

Total Confederate loss: 1 killed and 7 wounded = 8.

them. About this time Peirce sent for reënforcements, and the 1st and 2d New York regiments, under Colonels Allen and Carr, were hurried forward. The latter was ordered to wait orders at New Market Bridge. Advancing through Little Bethel, which they found evacuated, to a position near Big Bethel, the troops under General Peirce found the Confederates occupying a strong position, well intrenched, with earth-works covering the bridge, which crossed a stream running in front of the Confederate position. Colonel J. B. Magruder, formerly an officer in the United States Army, was in command, having, it was said, about 1800 men under him, but having actually only 300 or 400 men and about 5 guns.

Duryea's Zouaves moved up the road on the left of the woods, and the fight opened by the discharge of a Parrott gun in the Confederate works. Greble, with his battery, consisting of 2 6-pounder guns, took position on the road with Bendix's regiment and 3 companies of Massachusetts troops. Duryea went through the orchard and cornfield, Townsend on his right and rear. The Confederate firing was inaccurate for a time, but soon the range was found, and our troops were soon seeking the shelter of the woods, after a vain attempt to drive the enemy from his works. A short time after the troops had gone to the shelter of the woods, or about 11 o'clock, A. M., I arrived on the ground with my regiment. Orders to go forward had been received at 7 o'clock, and we marched as rapidly as possible; yet the delay incident to dragging a gun, by hand, for ten miles, and the time used in getting the gun over the burned bridge at Hampton, with the hot and wearying roads, made an earlier arrival impossible. On approaching, we were surprised and puzzled at the condition of the troops. For at least one mile from the scene of action the men and officers were scattered singly and in groups, without form or



THE 4TH MASSACHUSETTS REGIMENT FORTIFYING CAMP BUTLER AT NEWPORT NEWS. FROM A SKETCH MADE IN 1861.



CONFEDERATE EARTH-WORKS AT BIG BETHEL. FROM A SKETCH MADE APRIL 4, 1862.

organization, looking far more like men enjoying a huge picnic than soldiers awaiting battle. I reported my regiment to General Peirce, who consented to give me support for a charge on the Confederate works. Colonel Townsend promptly volunteered to support me with his regiment, and departed to make the necessary preparations. Having placed the 2d New York on the right and left of the road, I was preparing for the charge, when a message reached me from General Peirce, stating that, after consultation with the colonel, he found that troops could not be formed to make the charge effective, and that during the consultation an order had been received from General Butler ordering a retreat; therefore, I was commanded to cover the retreat about to commence. The pursuit made by the Confederates was easily checked by the 2d New York, and the men reached their camps without further mishap. The only firing occurring after 12 o'clock on that day was from the gun brought up by my regiment, and in command of Lieutenant Greble. About one dozen shots had been fired when Greble was killed. The gun was abandoned on the field and Greble's body was left beside it. I called for volunteers to rescue the gun, and Captain Wilson, with his company of the 2d New York, responded, and in the face of the enemy gallantly rescued the gun, bringing it in with Greble's body lying on it. Major Winthrop's death during the early part of this engagement was a notable event. ⚓ Although unattached to any regiment, he had volunteered for the expedition, and was killed

⚓ J. B. Moore, of Richmond, writes as follows:

"Major Winthrop headed a force, intending to turn our left flank. On our left was a slight earth-work. About 75 yards in front of this was a rail fence. Our attention was called by cheering to his advance. Looking up, we saw the major and two privates on the fence. His sword was drawn, and he was calling on his troops to follow him. Our first volley killed these three; those following, being protected by the peculiar formation of the ground, were not injured, but upon the fall of their leader they beat a precipitate retreat. I was among the first to reach these men. All were dead, having been instantly killed. Major Winthrop was shot in the breast, and the others in the head. About ten days afterward, a flag of truce came up asking for Major Winthrop's body. Having assisted in burying him, I was sent with the party to find the body, which was given to his friends. Among the incidents of this skirmish, none is more indelibly impressed on my mind than the gallant bearing of this unfortunate young man, when I first saw him, calling his men to follow, and confident that he had accomplished his object."

EDITORS.

while far in advance of the troops, and within one hundred yards of the enemy's works. General Butler arrived at Hampton Creek in time to meet the men coming in, but saw no part of the engagement. Among the first officers met by Butler were a major and lieutenant-colonel from one of the regiments engaged. Both were seated in a carriage driving leisurely home. Butler noticed the odd style of retreat, and also that there was crockery in the bottom of the carriage. The effects of this battle have been variously stated. Save as an encouragement to the Confederates, it had no important result.

MAJOR THEODORE WINTHROP. FROM A PORTRAIT.

After the battle of Big Bethel and up to the arrival of General McClellan the events of the war in and around Fort Monroe were, with few exceptions, of minor importance. On July 1st, 1861, Brigadier-General Peirce, under orders from General Butler, occupied Hampton, and at once proceeded to intrench. In this work the volunteers were assisted by former slaves. When General Magruder sent some cavalry to Hampton with orders to burn the village, a stampede of the Union soldiers occurred. Our forces on the east side of the bridge were greatly surprised when the disorganized troops and the contrabands came dashing over. The Confederate cavalrymen sent to burn the beautiful village remained, and at night we saw flames issuing from several buildings. We could readily discern the incendiaries going about the streets setting fire to the houses. In August, 1861, General John E. Wool was appointed to succeed General Butler in command at Fort Monroe.

Early in the fall of 1861 I was ordered, with my regiment, the 2d New York, to report to General Stone for duty in operations about Ball's Bluff, but Colonel E. D. Baker, with his regiment, was sent in my place. It appeared, later, that Colonel Baker had desired that he should be substituted, and when objections were made he succeeded in overruling them [see p. 123].

After the battle between the *Monitor* and *Merrimac* [see Vol. I., p. 692], General Wool, seeing the advantage of opening the blockade of the James River, prepared for an attempt to recapture Norfolk.

President Lincoln, with Secretaries Stanton and Chase, came to Fort Monroe, and on May 8th, 1862, the order was given and a movement made. Rear-Admiral Goldsborough, who had been ordered to assist, attacked the Confederate batteries at Sewell's Point, but, the *Merrimac* coming out, he retired, and for the hour, at least, the expedition was abandoned. News came to headquarters later in the day that General Huger was preparing to retire, and General Wool, after a trip to Willoughby's Point, decided to land his troops at Ocean View, thus taking in reverse the Confederate works. The landing of our troops was easily effected, and had more energy been displayed it is doubtful whether the enemy would have had time and opportunity to commit to the flames so much valuable material of war. While the movement was progressing, a delay



RUINS OF HAMPTON, VA. FROM A SKETCH MADE IN APRIL, 1862.

was caused by a dispute between two general officers as to rank. Our troops finally entered the intrenchments of the enemy unopposed. The mayor of Norfolk met General Wool and formally surrendered the city. While our troops were absent on this expedition, General Mansfield and myself were summoned to Fort Monroe by President Lincoln. Arriving there, Lincoln said: "Colonel Carr, where is your command?" "At Camp Hamilton, sir." (My command was the 2d, 7th, and 10th New York, and 29th Massachusetts.) "Why are you not on the other side at Norfolk?" "I am awaiting orders." Turning to Mansfield, Lincoln said, "Why are you here? Why not on the other side?" "I am ordered to the fort by General Wool," replied Mansfield. President Lincoln with vehement action threw his tall hat on the floor, and, uttering strongly his disapproval and disappointment, he said finally: "Send me some one who can write." Colonel LeGrand B. Cannon, of Wool's staff, responded, and Lincoln dictated an order to General Wool requiring that troops at Camp Hamilton be at once ordered to Norfolk, and that the troops already there be pushed rapidly forward. The order was issued, and I reported to General Viele at Norfolk and was assigned to the command of the exterior lines of defense at Portsmouth. The delays occurring in forwarding and pushing the troops allowed the Confederates time to burn the Navy Yard at Portsmouth, and to destroy the shipping. These troops remained at Norfolk until about June 1st, when we received orders to report to McClellan at Fair Oaks. General Wool was relieved of his command soon after the affair at Norfolk, and General John A. Dix was appointed in his stead.



INSPECTION. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

CAMPAIGNING TO NO PURPOSE.

RECOLLECTIONS OF A PRIVATE.—II. BY WARREN LEE GOSS.

WHILE we were in camp at Washington in February, 1862, we were drilled to an extent which to the raw "thinking soldier" seemed unnecessary. Our colonel was a strict disciplinarian. His efforts to drill out of us the methods of action and thought common to citizens, and to substitute in place thereof blind, unquestioning obedience to military rules, were not always appreciated at their true value. In my company there was an old drill-sergeant (let us call him Sergeant Hackett) who was in sympathetic accord with the colonel. He had occasion to reprove me often, and, finally, to inflict a blast of profanity at which my self-respect rebelled. Knowing that swearing was a breach of discipline, I waited confidently upon the colonel, with the manner of one gentleman calling upon another. After the usual salute, I opened complaint by saying: "Colonel, Mr. Hackett has——" The colonel interrupted me angrily, and, with fire in his eye, exclaimed: "*Mister?* There *are* no misters in the army." "I thought, sir——" I began apologetically. "Think? think?" he cried. "What right have *you* to think? *I* do the thinking for this regiment! Go to your quarters!"

I did not tarry. There seemed to be no common ground on which he and I could argue questions of personal etiquette. But I should do injustice to his character as a commander if I failed to illustrate another manner of reproof which he sometimes applied.

One day, noticing a corporal in soiled gloves, he said: "Corporal, you set a bad example to the men with your soiled gloves. Why do you?"

"I've had no pay, sir, since entering the service, and can't afford to hire washing."

The colonel drew from his pocket a pair of gloves spotlessly white, and, handing them to the corporal, said: "Put on those; I washed them myself!" This was an unforgotten lesson to the whole regiment that it was a soldier's duty to attend himself to his personal neatness.

In a camp of soldiers, rumor, with her thousand tongues, is always speaking. The rank and file and under-officers of the line are not taken into the confidence of their superiors. Hence the private soldier is usually in ignorance as to his destination. What he lacks in information is usually made up in surmise and conjecture; every hint is caught at and worked out in possible and impossible combinations. He plans and fights imaginary battles. He manœuvres for position, with pencil and chalk, on fanciful fields, at the same time knowing no more of the part he is actually performing in some great or little plan than the knapsack he bears. He makes some shrewd guesses (the Yankee's birthright), but he knows absolutely nothing. It is this which makes the good-will and confidence of the rank and file in the commander so important a factor in the *morale* of an army.

How we received the report or whence it came I know not, but it was rumored one morning that we were about to move. The order in reality came at last, to the distress and dismay of the sutlers and the little German woman who kept the grocery round the corner. We left her disconsolate over the cakes, pies, and goodies which had been liberally purchased, but which were yet unpaid for when we fell into two ranks, were counted off, and marched to conquer the prejudices of other sutlers.

We took the cars on February 25th and were hurried through a number of little sleepy-looking villages of Maryland [see map, p. 124]. The next morning found us at Sandy Hook, about half a mile from Harper's Ferry; thence, after about three hours' delay, we marched to a place opposite the promon-



A SUTLER'S TENT. BASED UPON A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.



HARPER'S FERRY IN 1862, FROM THE NORTH. BASED UPON A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.

tory on and around which is situated the picturesque village of Harper's Ferry, at the confluence of the Potomac and Shenandoah rivers. It was cold at our camping-place, between the canal and the river. There were no rations awaiting our arrival, and we were suffering from the hunger so common to soldiers. Who ever saw one off duty who was not in pursuit of something to eat? We couldn't get anything for love or money. We had at last reached a place where the people showed some of the distress incident to war, and a strong disinclination to feed or believe in us. We were grieved, but it couldn't be helped.

The bridge from the Maryland to the Virginia or Harper's Ferry shore had been destroyed by fire, leaving only the granite abutments (which were afterward built upon again), and we were soon set at work conveying some flat-bottomed scows from Sandy Hook to Harper's Ferry. As early as 9 o'clock about one hundred men came down opposite the ferry, just above the old bridge, and broke into little groups, in military precision. Four or five with spades and other implements improvised a wooden abutment on the shore; another party rowed against the stream, moored a scow, and let it drift down until it was opposite the wooden abutment; then a party of ten advanced, each two men carrying a claw-balk, or timbers fitted with a claw, one of which held the gunwale of the boat, the other the shore abutment. Twenty men now came down on the left with planks, one inch thick, six inches wide, and fifteen feet long, narrowed at each end; these they laid across the five joists or balks, and returned on the right. Another party meanwhile moored another boat, which dropped down-stream opposite the one already bridged; five joists, each twenty feet long, were laid upon the gunwale by five men; these were fastened by those in the boat, by means of ropes, to cleats or hooks pro-

CONFEDERATE PRISONERS. BASED UPON A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.

vided for the purpose on the side of the scows, which were shoved off from the shore until the shore end of the balk rested upon the shore boat. These were covered with planks in the same manner as before; side-rails of joists were lashed down with ropes to secure the whole. So one after another of the boats was dropped into position until a bridge several hundred feet long reached from the Maryland to the Virginia shore, for the passage of artillery and every description of munitions for an army. Owing to the force of the current, a large rope-cable was stretched from shore to shore fifty feet above the bridge, and the upper end of each boat was stayed to the cable by a smaller rope. The rushing bent the bridge into a half-moon curve. The clock-like precision with which these men worked showed them to be the drilled engineers and pontoniers of the regular army. After the bridge was built, a slight, short man, with sandy hair, in military dress, came out upon it and congratulated the engineers on their success. This unassuming man was George B. McClellan, commander of the Army of the Potomac.

It was on this boat-bridge that the army of General Banks crossed to the Virginia shore in 1862. Officers were not allowed to trot their horses; troops in crossing were given the order, "Route step," as the oscillation of the cadence step or trotting horse is dangerous to the stability of a bridge of any kind.

I crossed the bridge soon after it was laid, visited Jefferson Rock, the ruins of the burned armory, and the town in general. The occasional crack of a musket among the hills on the other side of the Shenandoah told that the enemy's scouts were still there. Colonel Geary's men were engaged in driving them from the hills, preparatory to the advance of General Banks. During the day fifteen or twenty were captured and marched through the town, presenting a generally shabby and unmilitary appearance. They did not impress me, as they did afterward when charging on our lines, with their unmusical yell and dauntless front.

The ruins of the burned armory of the United States were noticeable from the Maryland shore; also the masses of men moving in ceaseless tramp over the long and almost crescent-like bridge. The murmur of many voices, the mellow, abrupt call of the negro drivers to their mules, the glistening arms of the infantry reflected in the sunlight, the dull rumble of artillery wheels and baggage-wagons, live in memory to-day as one of the pictures of "war's wrinkled front," framed in the routine of more ordinary scenes.

The next day we were sent by rail back to Washington, and into camp upon our old grounds. A few mornings afterward an inspection was ordered. It came with the usual hurry and parade. Knapsacks and equipments were in shining order; every musket, bayonet, and button, boot and belt, as bright as rubbing and fear of censure or police duty could make them. Inspection over, the last jingle of ramrod in resounding musket was heard, and we were dismissed, with an intimation that on the morrow we were to go on a march.

The sun rose through the mists of the morning,—one of those quiet mornings when every sound is heard with distinctness. The waters of the Potomac were like a sheet of glass as we took up our line of march across the Long Bridge, making the old structure shake with our cadence step. Our moods varied: some laughed and joked; some, in suppressed tones, talked with their comrades as to their destination. Not much was said about fighting, but I, for one, did a great deal of thinking on that tender subject.

A CAMP OVEN. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

After we passed the fort, which commanded the bridge on the Virginia side, we encountered one of the most powerful allies of the enemy, particularly during the winter and spring campaigns in Virginia,—MUD. No country equals a Virginia road for mud. We struck it thick, and sometimes knee-deep. It was verily "heavy marching." The foot sank insidiously into the mud, and came out again reluctantly; it had to be coaxed, and while you were persuading your left, the willing right was sinking as deep. The noise of walking was like that of a suction-pump when the water is exhausted.

The order was given, "Route step"; we climbed the banks of the road in search of firm earth, but it couldn't be found, so we went on pumping away, making about one foot in depth to two in advance. Our feet seemingly weighed twenty pounds each. We carried a number six into the unknown

depths of mud, but it came out a number twelve, elongated, yellow, and nasty. Occasionally a boot or shoe would be left in the mud, and it would take an exploring expedition to find it. Wad Rider declared that though Virginia was once in the Union, she was now in the mud. The boys called their shoes "pontons," "mud-hooks," "soil-excavators," and other names not quite so polite.

The mud was in constant league with the enemy; an efficient ally in defensive warfare; equivalent to reënforcements of twenty thousand infantry. To realize the situation, spread tar a foot deep all over your back-yard, and then try to walk through it; particularly is this experiment recommended to those citizens who were constantly crying, "Why doesn't the army move?"

Mud took the military valor all out of a man. Any one would think, from reading the Northern newspapers, that we soldiers had macadamized roads over which to charge at the enemy. It would have pleased us much to have seen those "On to Richmond" people put over a 5-mile course in the Virginia mud, loaded with a 40-pound knapsack, 60 rounds of cartridges, and haversacks filled with 4 days' rations.

Without exaggeration, the mud has never had full credit for the immense help it afforded the enemy, as it prevented us from advancing upon them. The ever-present foe, winter and spring, in Old Virginia, was Mud. Summer and fall it was Dust, which was preferable; though marching without water, and with dust filling one's nostrils and throat, was not pleasant.

That first night out we went into camp near a small brook, where we washed off enough of the mud to recognize our feet. We had hard-tack and coffee for supper. And didn't it "go good!" What sauce ever equaled that of hunger? Truly the feast is in the palate. How we slept! Feet wet, boots for a pillow, the mud oozing up around our rubber blankets, but making a soft bed withal, and we sleeping the dreamless sleep of tired men. I would be willing, occasionally, to make another such march, through the same mud, for such a sleep.

At early daylight we fell in for rations of hot coffee and hard-tack. Immediately after, we took up our line of march, or, as Wad Rider expressed it, "began to pull mud." With intervals of rest, we "pulled mud" until about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, when we halted near Manassas Junction. Who has not heard of the "Quaker guns" at Manassas? We met the logs mounted on wheels, around the fortifications of Manassas, and can assure you they were not so formidable as the mud.

After thoroughly inspecting our enemies,—the logs,—we re-formed our ranks and took the back track for Washington. The rain soon began to fall, coming down literally in sheets; it ran down our backs in rivulets, and we should have run had we met the enemy about that time—that is, if the mud had permitted; for there is nothing which will so take the courage out of a soldier as to wet the seat of his trousers. On we went pumping and churning up and down in the mud, till about 10 o'clock, when we pitched camp near the roadside, as wet and bedraggled a set of men as ever panted for

military glory, or pursued the bubble reputation at the wooden cannon's mouth. We arrived at our old camp near Washington the following evening.

Virginia mud has never been fully comprehended. To fully understand it you must march in it, sleep in it, be encompassed round about by it. Great is mud—Virginia mud.

In the early spring of 1862, when the Army of the Potomac was getting ready to move from Washington, the constant drill and discipline, the brightening of arms and polishing of buttons, and the exasperating fussiness on the part of company and regimental officers during inspections, conveyed to us a hint, as one of our comrades expressed it, that "some one higher in command was punching them to punch us." There was unusual activity upon the Potomac in front of our camp. Numerous steam-tugs were pulling huge sailing vessels here and there, and large transports, loaded with soldiers, horses, bales of hay, and munitions for an army, swept majestically down the broad river. Every description of water conveyance, from a canal-boat to a huge three-decked steamboat, seemed to have been pressed into the service. At last, when drills and inspections had made us almost frantic with neatness and cleanliness, our marching orders came. We formed in two ranks and boarded a little steamer lying at the wharf near by. All heavy baggage was left behind. I had clung to the contents of my knapsack with dogged tenacity; but, notwithstanding my most earnest protest, I was required to leave about one-half of them, including a pair of heavy boots and a choice brick from the Harper's Ferry engine-house. To my mind I was now entirely destitute of comforts.

The general opinion among us was that at last we were on our way to make an end of the Confederacy. We gathered in little knots on the deck: here and there a party were playing "penny ante"; others slept or dozed, but the majority smoked and discussed the probabilities of our destination, about which we really knew nothing, except that we were sailing down the Potomac.



TRANSPORTS ON THE POTOMAC. BASED UPON A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.

FORT MONROE — PARADE OF THE 30 PENNSYLVANIA ARTILLERY. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.

BY GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. A.

IN the following pages I purpose to give a brief sketch of the Peninsular campaign of 1862. As it is impossible, within the limits available, to describe even the most important battles, I shall confine myself to strategical considerations. But even this requires a rapid review of the circumstances under which, from a small assemblage of unorganized citizens, utterly ignorant of war and almost of the use of arms, was evolved that mighty Army of the Potomac, which, unshaken alike in victory and defeat, during a long series of arduous campaigns against an army most ably commanded and the equal in heroism of any that ever met the shock of battle, proved itself worthy to bear on its bayonets the honor and fate of the nation.

In July, 1861, after having secured solidly for the Union that part of western Virginia north of the Kanawha and west of the mountains, I was suddenly called to Washington on the day succeeding the first battle of Bull Run. Reaching the capital on the 26th, I found myself assigned to the command of that city and of the troops gathered around it.

MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN E. WOOL [SEE P. 168]. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

All was chaos and despondency; the city was filled with intoxicated stragglers, and an attack was expected. The troops numbered less than fifty thousand, many of whom were so demoralized and undisciplined that they could not be relied upon even for defensive purposes. Moreover, the term of service of a large part had already expired, or was on the point of doing so. On the Maryland side of the Potomac no troops were posted on the roads leading into the city, nor were there any intrenchments. On the Virginia side the condition of affairs was better in these respects, but far from satisfactory. Sufficient and fit material of war did not exist. The situation was difficult and fraught with danger.

The first and most pressing demand was the immediate safety of the capital and the Government. This was secured by enforcing the most rigid discipline, by organizing permanent brigades under regular officers, and by placing the troops in good defensive positions, far enough to the front to afford room for manœuvring and to enable the brigades to support each other.

The contingency of the enemy's crossing the Potomac above the city was foreseen and promptly provided for. Had he attempted this "about three months after the battle of Manassas," he would, upon reaching "the rear of Washington," have found it covered by respectable works, amply garrisoned, with a sufficient disposable force to move upon his rear and force him to "a decisive engagement."¦ It would have been the greatest possible good fortune for us if he had made this movement at the time in question, or even some weeks earlier. It was only for a very few days after the battle of Bull Run that the movement was practicable, and every day added to its difficulty.

Two things were at once clear: first, that a large and thoroughly organized army was necessary to bring the war to a successful conclusion; second, that Washington must be so strongly fortified as to set at rest any reasonable apprehensions of its being carried by a sudden attack, in order that the active army might be free to move with the maximum strength and on any line of operations without regard to the safety of the capital.

These two herculean tasks were entered upon without delay or hesitation. They were carried to a successful conclusion, without regard to that impatient and unceasing clamor — inevitable among a people unaccustomed to war — which finally forced the hand of the general charged with their execution. He regarded their completion as essential to the salvation of his country, and determined to accomplish them, even if sacrificed in the endeavor. Nor has he, even at this distant day, and after much bitter experience, any regret that he persisted in his determination. Washington was surrounded by a line of strong detached works, armed with garrison artillery, and secure against assault. Intermediate points were occupied by smaller works, battery epaulements, infantry intrenchments, etc. The result was a line of defenses which could easily be held by a comparatively small garrison against any assault, and could be reduced only by the slow operations of a regular siege, requiring much time and material, and affording full opportunity to bring all the resources of the country to its relief. At no time during the war was the enemy able to undertake the siege of Washington, nor, if respectably garrisoned, could it ever have been in danger from an assault. The maximum garrison necessary to hold the place against a siege from any and every quarter was 34,000 troops, with 40 field-guns; this included the requisite reserves.

With regard to the formation of the Army of the Potomac, it must suffice to say that everything was to be created from the very foundation. Raw men and officers were to be disciplined and instructed. The regular army was too small to furnish more than a portion of the general officers, and a very small portion of the staff, so that the staff-departments and staff-officers were to be fashioned mainly out of the intelligent and enthusiastic, but per-

¦ The words quoted are General Beauregard's. (See Vol. I., p. 221).— EDITORS.



VIEW OF ALEXANDRIA FROM THE CAMP OF THE 40TH NEW YORK VOLUNTEERS.
FROM A SKETCH MADE IN NOVEMBER, 1861.

fectly raw, material furnished. Artillery, small-arms, and ammunition were to be fabricated, or purchased from abroad; wagons, ambulances, bridge trains, camp equipage, hospital stores, and all the vast *impedimenta* and material indispensable for an army in the field, were to be manufactured. So great was the difficulty of procuring small-arms that the armament of the infantry was not satisfactorily completed until the winter, and a large part of the field-batteries were not ready for service until the spring of 1862. As soon as possible divisions were organized, the formation being essentially completed in November.

On the 1st of November, upon the retirement of General Winfield Scott, I succeeded to the command of all the armies, except the Department of Virginia, which comprised the country within sixty miles of Fort Monroe. Upon assuming the general command, I found that the West was far behind the East in its state of preparation, and much of my time and large quantities of material were consumed in pushing the organization of the Western armies. Meanwhile the various coast expeditions were employed in seizing important points of the enemy's sea-board, to facilitate the prevention of blockade-running, and to cut or threaten the lines of communication near the coast, with reference to subsequent operations.

The plan of campaign which I adopted for the spring of 1862 was to push forward the armies of Generals Halleck and Buell to occupy Memphis, Nashville, and Knoxville, and the line of the Memphis and Danville Railroad, so as to deprive the enemy of that important line, and force him to adopt the circuitous routes by Augusta, Branchville, and Charleston. It was also

intended to seize Washington, North Carolina, at the earliest practicable moment, and to open the Mississippi by effecting a junction between Generals Halleck and Butler. This movement of the Western armies was to be followed by that of the Army of the Potomac from Urbana, on the lower Rappahannock [see map, next page], to West Point and Richmond, intending, if we failed to gain Richmond by a rapid march, to cross the James and attack the city in rear, with the James as a line of supply.

So long as Mr. Cameron was Secretary of War I received the cordial support of that department; but when he resigned, the whole state of affairs changed. I had never met Mr. Stanton before reaching Washington, in 1861. He at once sought me and professed the utmost personal affection, the expression of which was exceeded only by the bitterness of his denunciation of the Government and its policy. I was unaware of his appointment as Secretary of War until after it had been made, whereupon he called to ascertain whether I desired him to accept, saying that to do so would involve a total sacrifice of his personal interests, and that the only inducement would be the desire to assist me in my work. Having no reason to doubt his sincerity, I desired him to accept, whereupon he consented, and with great effusion exclaimed: "Now we two will save the country."

On the next day the President came to my house to explain why he had appointed Mr. Stanton without consulting me; his reason being that he supposed Stanton to be a great friend of mine, and that the appointment would naturally be satisfactory, and that he feared that if I had known it beforehand it would be said that I had dragooned him into it.

The more serious difficulties of my position began with Mr. Stanton's accession to the War Office. It at once became very difficult to approach



HEADQUARTERS OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN SEDGWICK, ON THE LEESBURG TURNPIKE, NEAR WASHINGTON. FROM A SKETCH MADE IN JANUARY, 1862.



MAP OF THE VIRGINIA CAMPAIGNS.

him, even for the transaction of ordinary current business, and our personal relations at once ceased. The impatience of the Executive immediately became extreme, and I can attribute it only to the influence of the new Secretary, who did many things to break up the free and confidential intercourse that had heretofore existed between the President and myself. The Government soon manifested great impatience in regard to the opening of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the destruction of the Confederate batteries on the Potomac. The first object could be permanently attained only by occupying the Shenandoah Valley with a force strong enough to resist any attack by the Confederate army then at Manassas; the second only by



QUARTERMASTER'S DOCK, FORT MONROE. FROM A SKETCH MADE IN 1862.

a general advance of the Army of the Potomac, driving the enemy back of the Rapidan. My own view was that the movement of the Army of the Potomac from Urbana would accomplish both of these objects, by forcing the enemy to abandon all his positions and fall back on Richmond. I was therefore unwilling to interfere with this plan by a premature advance, the effect of which must be either to commit us to the overland route, or to minimize the advantages of the Urbana movement. I wished to hold the enemy at Manassas to the last moment—if possible until the advance from Urbana had actually commenced, for neither the reopening of the railroad nor the destruction of the batteries was worth the danger involved.

The positive order of the President, probably issued under the pressure of the Secretary of War, forced me to undertake the opening of the railway. For this purpose I went to Harper's Ferry in February, intending to throw over a force sufficient to occupy Winchester. To do this it was necessary to have a reliable bridge across the Potomac — to insure supplies and prompt reënforcements. The pontoon-bridge, thrown as a preliminary, could not be absolutely trusted on a river so liable to heavy freshets; therefore it was determined to construct a canal-boat bridge. It was discovered, however, when the attempt was made, that the lift-lock from the canal to the river was too narrow for the boats by some four or five inches, and I therefore decided to rebuild the railroad bridge, and content myself with occupying Charlestown until its completion, postponing to the same time the advance to Winchester. I had fully explained my intentions to the President and Secretary before leaving Washington, providing for precisely such a contingency. While at Harper's Ferry I learned that the President was dissatisfied with my action, and on reaching Washington I laid a full explanation before the Secretary, with which he expressed himself entirely satisfied, and told me that the President was already so, and that it was unnecessary for me to communicate with him on the subject. I then proceeded with the preparations necessary to force the evacuation of the Potomac batteries. On the very day appointed for the division commanders to come to headquarters to receive their final orders, the President sent for me. I then learned that he had received

no explanation of the Harper's Ferry affair, and that the Secretary was not authorized to make the statement already referred to; but after my repetition of it the President became fully satisfied with my course. He then, however, said that there was another "very ugly matter" which he desired to talk about, and that was the movement by the lower Chesapeake. He said that it had been suggested that I proposed this movement with the "traitorous" purpose of leaving Washington uncovered and exposed to attack. I very promptly objected to the coupling of any such adjective with my purposes, whereon he disclaimed any intention of conveying the idea that he expressed his own opinion, as he merely repeated the suggestions of others. I then explained the purpose and effect of fortifying Washington, and, as I thought, removed his apprehensions, but informed him that the division commanders were to be at headquarters that morning, and suggested that my plans should be laid before them that they might give their opinion as to whether the capital would be endangered; I also said that in order to leave them perfectly untrammeled I would not attend the meeting. Accordingly they met on the 8th of March and approved my plans.

On the same day was issued, without my knowledge, the order forming army corps and assigning the senior general officers to their command. ⁂ My own views were that, as the command of army corps involved great responsibility and demanded ability of a high order, it was safer to postpone their formation until trial in the field had shown which general officers could best perform those vital functions. An incompetent division commander could not often jeopardize the safety of an army; while an unfit corps commander could easily lose a battle and frustrate the best-conceived plan of campaign. Of the four corps commanders, one only had commanded so much as a regiment in the field prior to the Bull Run campaign. On the next day intelligence arrived that the enemy was abandoning his positions. I crossed to the Virginia side to receive information more promptly and decide upon what should be done. During the night I determined to advance the whole army, to take advantage of any opportunity to strike the enemy, to break up the permanent camps, give the troops a little experience on the march and in bivouac, get rid of extra baggage, and test the working of the staff-departments. If this were done at all, it must be done promptly, and by moving the troops by divisions, without waiting to form the army corps. Accordingly, I telegraphed to the Secretary, explaining the state of the case and asking authority to postpone the army corps formation until the completion of the movement. The reply was an abrupt and unreasonable refusal. I again telegraphed, explaining the situation and throwing the responsibility upon the Secretary, whereupon he gave way.

Meanwhile, as far back as the 27th of February, orders had been given for collecting the transportation necessary to carry out the Urbana movement.

⁂ First Corps, McDowell — Divisions: Franklin, McCall, and King; Second Corps, Sumner — Divisions: Richardson, Blenker, and Sedgwick; Third Corps, Heintzelman — Divisions: Porter, Hooker, and Hamilton; Fourth Corps, Keyes — Divisions: Couch, Smith, and Casey. The reserve artillery (Henry J. Hunt), the regular infantry (George Sykes), and regular cavalry (Philip St. George Cooke) and engineer troops were attached to headquarters.—EDITORS.

This conclusion had been reached after full discussion. On the 27th of January had been issued the President's General War Order No. 1, directing a general movement of the land and naval forces against the enemy on the 22d of February. On the 31st of January was issued the President's Special War Order No. 1, directing the Army of the Potomac to advance to the attack of Manassas on the 22d of February. The President, however, permitted me to state my objections to this order, which I did, at length, in a letter of February 3d, to the Secretary of War. As the President's order was not insisted upon, although never formally revoked, it is to be assumed that my letter produced, for a time at least, the desired effect. When Manassas had been abandoned by the enemy and he had withdrawn behind the Rapidan, the Urbana movement lost much of its promise, as the enemy was now in position to reach Richmond before we could do so. The alternative remained of making Fort Monroe and its vicinity the base of operations.



MAP OF THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.

The plan first adopted was to commence the movement with the First Corps as a unit, to land north of Gloucester and move thence on West Point; or, should circumstances render it advisable, to land a little below Yorktown to turn the defenses between that place and Fort Monroe. The Navy Department were confident that we could rely upon their vessels to neutralize the *Merrimac* and aid materially in reducing the batteries on the York River,

either by joining in the attack or by running by them and gaining their rear. As transports arrived very slowly, especially those for horses, and the great impatience of the Government grew apace, it became necessary to embark divisions as fast as vessels arrived, and I decided to land them at Fort Monroe, holding the First Corps to the last, still intending to move it in mass to turn Gloucester. On the 17th of March the leading division embarked at Alexandria. The campaign was undertaken with the intention of taking some 145,000 troops, to be increased by a division of 10,000 drawn from the troops in the vicinity of Fort Monroe, giving a total of 155,000. Strenuous efforts were made to induce the President to take away Blenker's German division of 10,000 men. Of his own volition he at first declined, but the day before I left Washington he yielded to the non-military pressure and reluctantly gave the order, thus reducing the expected force to 145,000.

While at Fairfax Court House, on the 12th of March, I learned that there had appeared in the daily papers the order relieving me from the general command of all the armies and confining my authority to the Department of the Potomac. I had received no previous intimation of the intention of the Government in this respect. Thus, when I embarked for Fort Monroe on the 1st of April, my command extended from Philadelphia to Richmond, from the Alleghanies, including the Shenandoah, to the Atlantic; for an order had been issued a few days previous placing Fort Monroe and the Department of Virginia under my command, and authorizing me to withdraw from the troops therein ten thousand, to form a division to be added to the First Corps.

The fortifications of Washington were at this time completed and armed. I had already given instructions for the refortification of Manassas, the reopening of the Manassas Gap Railroad, the protection of its bridges by blockhouses, the intrenchment of a position for a brigade at or near the railroad crossing of the Shenandoah, and an intrenched post at Chester Gap. I left about 42,000 troops for the immediate defense of Washington, and more than 35,000 for the Shenandoah Valley — an abundance to insure the safety of Washington and to check any attempt to recover the lower Shenandoah and threaten Maryland. Beyond this force, the reserves of the Northern States were all available.

On my arrival at Fort Monroe on the 2d of April, I found five divisions of infantry, Sykes's brigade of regulars, two regiments of cavalry, and a portion of the reserve artillery disembarked. Another cavalry regiment and a part of a fourth had arrived, but were still on shipboard; comparatively few wagons had come. On the same day came a telegram stating that the Department of Virginia was withdrawn from my control, and forbidding me to form the division of ten thousand men without General Wool's sanction. I was thus deprived of the command of the base of operations, and the ultimate strength of the army was reduced to 135,000 — another serious departure from the plan of campaign. Of the troops disembarked, only four divisions, the regulars, the majority of the reserve artillery, and a part of the cavalry, could be moved, in consequence of the lack of transportation. Casey's division was



HEADQUARTERS OF GENERAL HEINTZELMAN, COMMANDING THE THIRD ARMY CORPS AT HOWE'S SAW-MILL, BEFORE YORKTOWN [SEE MAP, P. 188]. FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

unable to leave Newport News until the 16th, from the impossibility of supplying it with wagons.

The best information obtainable represented the Confederate troops around Yorktown as numbering at least fifteen thousand, with about an equal force at Norfolk; and it was clear that the army lately at Manassas, now mostly near Gordonsville, was in position to be thrown promptly to the Peninsula. It was represented that Yorktown was surrounded by strong earth-works, and that the Warwick River, instead of stretching across the Peninsula to Yorktown,— as proved to be the case,— came down to Lee's Mills from the North, running parallel with and not crossing the road from Newport News to Williamsburg. It was also known that there were intrenched positions of more or less strength at Young's Mills, on the Newport News road, and at Big Bethel, Howard's Bridge, and Ship's Point, on or near the Hampton and Yorktown road, and at Williamsburg [see map, p. 188].

On my arrival at Fort Monroe, I learned, in an interview with Flag-Officer Goldsborough, that he could not protect the James as a line of supply, and that he could furnish no vessels to take an active part in the reduction of the batteries at York and Gloucester or to run by and gain their rear. He could only aid in the final attack after our land batteries had essentially silenced their fire.

I thus found myself with 53,000 men in condition to move, faced by the conditions of the problem just stated. Information was received that Yorktown was already being reënforced from Norfolk, and it was apprehended that the main Confederate army would promptly follow the same course. I therefore determined to move at once with the force in hand, and endeavor to seize a point — near the Halfway House — between Yorktown

and Williamsburg, where the Peninsula is reduced to a narrow neck, and thus cut off the retreat of the Yorktown garrison and prevent the arrival of reënforcements. The advance commenced on the morning of the 4th of April, and was arranged to turn successively the intrenchments on the two roads; the result being that, on the afternoon of the 5th, the Third Corps was engaged with the enemy's outposts in front of Yorktown and under the artillery fire of the place. The Fourth Corps came upon Lee's Mills and found it covered by the unfordable line of the Warwick, and reported the position so strong as to render it impossible to execute its orders to assault [see map, p. 188]. Thus, all things were brought to a stand-still, and the intended movement on the Halfway House could not be carried out. Just at this moment came a telegram, dated the 4th, informing me that the First Corps was withdrawn from my command. Thus, when too deeply committed to recede, I found that another reduction of about 43,000, including several cavalry regiments withheld from me, diminished my paper force to 92,000, instead of the 155,000 on which the plans of the campaign had been founded, and with which it was intended to operate. The number of men left behind, sick and from other causes incident to such a movement, reduced the total for duty to some 85,000, from which must be deducted all camp, depot, and train guards, escorts, and non-combatants, such as cooks, servants, orderlies, and extra-duty men in the various staff-departments, which reduced the numbers actually available for battle to some 67,000 or 68,000.

The order withdrawing the First Corps also broke up the Department of the Potomac, forming out of it the Department of the Shenandoah, under General Banks, and the Department of the Rappahannock, under General McDowell, the latter including Washington. I thus lost all control of the depots at Washington, as I had already been deprived of the control of the base at Fort Monroe and of the ground subsequently occupied by the depot at White House. The only territory remaining under my command was the paltry triangle between the departments of the Rappahannock and Virginia; even that was yet to be won from the enemy. I was thus relieved from the duty of providing for the safety of Washington, and deprived of all control over the troops in that vicinity. Instead of one directing head controlling operations which should have been inseparable, the region from the Alleghanies to the sea was parceled out among four independent commanders.

On the 3d of April, at the very moment of all others when it was most necessary to push recruiting most vigorously, to make good the inevitable losses in battle and by disease, an order was issued from the War Department discontinuing all recruiting for the volunteers and breaking up all their recruiting stations. Instead of a regular and permanent system of recruiting, whether by voluntary enlistment or by draft, a spasmodic system of large drafts was thereafter resorted to, and, to a great extent, the system of forming new regiments. The results were wasteful and pernicious. There were enough, or nearly enough, organizations in the field, and these should have been constantly maintained at the full strength by a regular and constant influx of recruits, who, by association with their veteran comrades, would soon



VIEW FROM UNION MORTAR BATTERY NO. 4, LOOKING TOWARD YORKTOWN.—GLOUCESTER POINT ON THE RIGHT. FROM A SKETCH MADE APRIL 16, 1862.

have become efficient. The new regiments required much time to become useful, and endured very heavy and unnecessary losses from disease and in battle owing to the inexperience of the officers and men. A course more in accordance with the best-established military principles and the uniform experience of war would have saved the country millions of treasure and thousands of valuable lives.

Then, on the 5th of April, I found myself with 53,000 men in hand, giving less than 42,000 for battle, after deducting extra-duty men and other non-combatants. In our front was an intrenched line, apparently too strong for assault, and which I had now no means of turning, either by land or water. I now learned that 85,000 would be the maximum force at my disposal, giving only some 67,000 for battle. Of the three divisions yet to join, Casey's reached the front only on the 17th, Richardson's on the 16th, and Hooker's commenced arriving at Ship Point on the 10th. Whatever may have been said afterward, no one at the time — so far as my knowledge extended — thought an assault practicable without certain preliminary siege operations. At all events, my personal experience in this kind of work was greater than that of any officer under my command; and after personal reconnoissances more appropriate to a lieutenant of engineers than to the commanding general, I could neither discover nor hear of any point where an assault promised any chance of success. We were thus obliged to resort to siege operations in order to silence the enemy's artillery fire, and open the way to an assault. All the batteries would have been ready to open fire on the 5th, or, at latest, on the morning of the 6th of May, and it was determined to assault at various points the moment the heavy batteries had performed their allotted task; the navy was prepared to participate in the attack as soon as the main batteries were

silenced; the *Galena*, under that most gallant and able officer, John Rodgers, was to take part in the attack, and would undoubtedly have run the batteries at the earliest possible moment; but during the night of the 3d and 4th of May the enemy evacuated his positions, regarding them as untenable under the impending storm of heavy projectiles.

Meanwhile, on the 22d of April, Franklin's division of McDowell's corps had joined me by water, in consequence of my urgent calls for reënforcements.

The moment the evacuation of Yorktown was known, the order was given for the advance of all the disposable cavalry and horse batteries, supported by infantry divisions, and every possible effort was made to expedite the movement of a column by water upon West Point, to force the evacuation of the lines at Williamsburg, and, if possible, cut off a portion of the enemy's force and trains.

The heavy storms which had prevailed recommenced on the afternoon of the 4th, and not only impeded the advance of troops by land, but delayed the movement by water so much that it was not until the morning of the 7th that the leading division — Franklin's — disembarked near West Point and took up a suitable position to hold its own and cover the landing of reënforcements. This division was attacked not long after it landed, but easily repulsed the enemy.

Meanwhile the enemy's rear-guard held the Williamsburg lines against our advance, except where Hancock broke through, until the night of the 5th, when they retired [see map, p. 188].

The army was now divided: a part at the mouth of the Pamunkey, a part at Williamsburg, and a part at Yorktown prepared to ascend the York River. The problem was to reunite them without giving the enemy the opportunity of striking either fraction with his whole force. This was accomplished on the 10th, when all the divisions were in communication, and the movement of concentration continued as rapidly as circumstances permitted, so that on the 15th the headquarters and the divisions of Franklin, Porter, Sykes, and Smith reached Cumberland Landing; Couch and Casey being near New Kent Court



CLARK'S HOUSE, NEAR HOWE'S SAW-MILL, YORKTOWN, GENERAL HOSPITAL OF THE THIRD CORPS. FROM A SKETCH MADE APRIL 11, 1862.



VIEW OF MAIN STREET, YORKTOWN, THE UNION TROOPS MARCHING IN. FROM A SKETCH MADE MAY 4, 1862.

House, Hooker and Kearny near Roper's Church, and Richardson and Sedgwick near Eltham. On the 15th and 16th, in the face of dreadful weather and terrible roads, the divisions of Franklin, Porter, and Smith were advanced to White House, and a depot established. On the 18th the Fifth and Sixth Corps were formed, so that the organization of the Army of the Potomac was now as follows: Second Corps, Sumner — Divisions, Sedgwick and Richardson; Third Corps, Heintzelman — Divisions, Kearny and Hooker; Fourth Corps, Keyes — Divisions, Couch and Casey; Fifth Corps, F. J. Porter — Divisions, Morell and Sykes and the Reserve Artillery; Sixth Corps, Franklin — Divisions, Smith and Slocum.

The cavalry organization remained unchanged, and we were sadly deficient in that important arm, as many of the regiments belonging to the Army of the Potomac were among those which had been retained near Washington.

The question now arose as to the line of operations to be followed: that of the James on the one hand, and, on the other, the line from White House as a base, crossing the upper Chickahominy.

The army was admirably placed for adopting either, and my decision was to take that of the James, operating on either bank as might prove advisable, but always preferring the southern. I had urgently asked for reënforcements to come by water, as they would thus be equally available for either line of operations. The destruction of the *Merrimac* on the 11th of May had opened the James River to us, and it was only after that date that it became available. My plan, however, was changed by orders from Washington. A telegram of the 18th from the Secretary of War informed me that McDowell would advance from Fredericksburg, and directed me to extend the right of the Army of the Potomac to the north of Richmond, in order to establish communication with him. The same order required me to supply his troops from our depots at White House. Herein lay the failure of the campaign, as it necessitated the division of the army by the Chickahominy, and caused great delay in constructing practicable bridges across that stream; while if I had

been able to cross to the James, reënforcements would have reached me by water rapidly and safely, the army would have been united and in no danger of having its flank turned, or its line of supply interrupted, and the attack could have been much more rapidly pushed.

I now proceeded to do all in my power to insure success on the new line of operations thus imposed upon me. On the 20th of May our light troops reached the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge, which they found destroyed. I at once ordered Casey's division to ford the stream and occupy



1.—UNION WATER-BATTERY IN FRONT OF YORKTOWN.

2.—EXPLODED GUN, CONFEDERATE FORTIFICATIONS AT YORKTOWN.

3.—CONFEDERATE WATER-BATTERY, CALLED BATTERY MAGRUDER, YORKTOWN.

4.—AN ANGLE OF THE CONFEDERATE FORTIFICATIONS AT YORKTOWN.

FROM PHOTOGRAPHS.

the heights beyond, thus securing a lodgment on the right bank. Heintzelman was moved up in support of Keyes. By the 24th, Mechanicsville was carried, so that the enemy was now all together on the other side of the river. Sumner was near the railroad, on the left bank of the stream; Porter and Franklin were on the same bank near Mechanicsville.

It is now time to give a brief description of the Chickahominy. This river rises some fifteen miles north-westward of Richmond, and unites with the James about forty miles below that city. Our operations were on the part between Meadow and Bottom's bridges, covering the approaches to Richmond from the east. Here the river at its ordinary stage is some forty feet wide,

fringed with a dense growth of heavy forest-trees, and bordered by low marshy lands, varying from half a mile to a mile in width. Within the limits above mentioned the firm ground, above high-water mark, seldom approaches the river on either bank, and in no place did the high ground come near the stream on both banks. It was subject to frequent, sudden, and great variations in the volume of water, and a single violent storm of brief duration sufficed to cause an overflow of the bottom-lands for many days, rendering the river absolutely impassable without long and strong bridges. When we reached the river it was found that all the bridges, except that at Mechanicsville, had been destroyed. The right bank, opposite New, Mechanicsville, and Meadow bridges, was bordered by high bluffs, affording the enemy commanding positions for his batteries, enfilading the approaches, and preventing the rebuilding of important bridges. We were thus obliged to select other less exposed points for our crossings. Should McDowell effect the promised junction, we could turn the head-waters of the Chickahominy, and attack Richmond from the north and north-west, still preserving our line of supply from White House. But with the force actually available such an attempt would expose the army to the loss of its communications and to destruction in detail; for we had an able and savage antagonist, prompt to take advantage of any error on our part. The country furnished no supplies, so that we could not afford a separation from our depots. All the information obtained showed that Richmond was intrenched, that the enemy occupied in force all the approaches from the east, that he intended to dispute every step of our advance, and that his army was numerically superior. Early on the 24th of May I received a telegram from the President, informing me that McDowell would certainly march on the 26th, suggesting that I should detach a force to the right to cut off the retreat of the Confederate force in front of Fredericksburg, and desiring me to march cautiously and safely. On the same day another dispatch came, informing me that, in consequence of Stonewall Jackson's advance down the Shenandoah, the movement of McDowell was suspended. Next day the President again telegraphed that the movement against General Banks seemed so general and connected as to show that the enemy could not intend a very desperate defense of Richmond; that he thought the time was near when I "must either attack Richmond or give up the job, and come back to the defense of Washington." I replied that all my information agreed that the mass of the enemy was still in the immediate vicinity of Richmond, ready to defend it, and that the object of Jackson's movement was probably to prevent reënforcements being sent to me. On the 26th General Stoneman, with my advanced guard, cut the Virginia Central Railroad in three places. On the same day I learned that a very considerable force of the enemy was in the vicinity of Hanover Court House, to our right and rear, threatening our communications, and in position to reënforce Jackson or oppose McDowell, whose advance was then eight miles south of Fredericksburg. I ordered General F. J. Porter to move next morning to dislodge them. He took with him his own old division, Warren's provisional brigade and Emory's cavalry brigade. His operations

in the vicinity of Hanover Court House were entirely successful, and resulted in completely clearing our flank, cutting the railroads in several places, destroying bridges, inflicting a severe loss upon the enemy, and fully opening the way for the advance of McDowell's corps. As there was no indication of its immediate approach, and the position at Hanover Court House was too much exposed to be permanently held, General Porter's command was withdrawn on the evening of the 29th, and returned to its old position with the main army. The campaign had taken its present position in consequence of the assurance that I should be joined by McDowell's corps. As it was now clear that I could not count with certainty upon that force, I had to do the best I could with the means at hand.

ST. PETER'S CHURCH, NEAR NEW KENT COURT HOUSE.



The first necessity was to establish secure communications between the two parts of the army, necessarily separated



HOTEL. FACTORY. RECORD OFFICE — COURT HOUSE. RUINS OF JAIL.

NEW KENT COURT HOUSE. FROM A SKETCH MADE MAY 19, 1862.

by the Chickahominy. Richmond could be attacked only by troops on the right bank. As the expectation of the advance of McDowell was still held out, and that only by the land route, I could not yet transfer the base to the James, but was obliged to retain it on the Pamunkey, and therefore to keep on the left bank a force sufficient to protect our communications and cover the junction of McDowell. It was still permissible to believe that sufficient attention would be paid to the simplest principle of war to push McDowell rapidly on Jackson's heels, when he made his inevitable return march to join the main Confederate army and attack our right flank. The failure of McDowell to reach me at or before the critical moment was due to the orders he received from Washington. The bridges over the Chickahominy first built were swept away by the floods, and it became necessary to construct others



SECTION OF THE ENCAMPMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC NEAR WHITE HOUSE, VA. PROCESS REPRODUCTION OF A PHOTOGRAPH.

"We were now [middle of May] encamped on the old Custis place, at present owned by General Fitzhugh Lee [Gen. W. H. F. Lee] of the Rebel cavalry service. On every side of us were immense fields of wheat, which, but for the presence of armies, promised an abundant harvest. . . . It was marvelous that such quiet could exist where a hundred thousand men were crowded together, yet almost absolute stillness reigned throughout the vast camp during the whole of this pleasant Sabbath."— From George T. Stevens's "Three Years in the Sixth Corps." The picture represents the space occupied by about one brigade.— EDITORS.

more solid and with long log approaches, a slow and difficult task, generally carried on by men working in the water and under fire. The work was pushed as rapidly as possible, and on the 30th of May the corps of Heintzelman and Keyes were on the right bank of the Chickahominy, the most advanced positions being somewhat strengthened by intrenchments; Sumner's corps was on the left bank, some six miles above Bottom's Bridge; Porter's and Franklin's corps were on the left bank opposite the enemy's left. During the day and night of the 30th torrents of rain fell, inundating the whole country and threatening the destruction of our bridges.

Well aware of our difficulties, our active enemy, on the 31st of May, made a violent attack upon Casey's division, followed by an equally formidable one on Couch, thus commencing the battle of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines. Heintzelman came up in support, and during the afternoon Sumner crossed the river with great difficulty, and rendered such efficient service that the enemy was checked. In the morning his renewed attacks were easily repulsed, and the ground occupied at the beginning of the battle was more than recovered; he had failed in the purpose of the attack. The ground was now so thoroughly soaked by the rain, and the bridges were so much injured, that it was impracticable to pursue the enemy or to move either Porter or Franklin to the support of the other corps on the south bank. Our efforts were at once concentrated upon the restoration of the old and the building of new bridges.

On the 1st of June the Department of Virginia, including Fort Monroe, was placed under my command. On the 2d the Secretary telegraphed that as soon as Jackson was disposed of in the Shenandoah, another large body of troops would be at my service; on the 5th, that he intended sending a part of General McDowell's force as soon as it could return from Front Royal (in the Shenandoah Valley, near Manassas Gap, and about one hundred and fifteen miles north-west of Richmond), probably as many as I wanted; on the 11th, that McCall's force had embarked to join me on the day preceding, and that it was intended to send the residue of General McDowell's force to join me as speedily as possible, and that it was clear that a strong force was operating with Jackson for the purpose of preventing the forces there from joining me.

On the 26th the Secretary telegraphed that the forces of McDowell, Banks, and Frémont would be consolidated as the Army of Virginia, and would operate promptly in my aid by land.

Fortunately for the Army of the Potomac, however, I entertained serious doubts of the aid promised by the land route, so that, on the 18th, I ordered a number of transports, with supplies of all kinds, to be sent up the James, under convoy of the gun-boats, so that I might be free to cut loose from the Pamunkey and move over to the James, should circumstances enable me or render it desirable to do so.

The battle of Fair Oaks was followed by storms of great severity, continuing until the 20th of June, and adding vastly to the difficulties of our position, greatly retarding the construction of the bridges and of the defensive works regarded as necessary to cover us in the event of a repulse, and making the ground too difficult for the free movements of troops.

WHITE HOUSE, THE HOME OF GENERAL W. H. F. LEE, McCLELLAN'S BASE OF SUPPLIES ON THE PAMUNKEY. FROM SKETCHES MADE AT THE TIME.



RUINS OF THE WHITE HOUSE, WHICH WAS BURNED JUNE 28, DURING THE "CHANGE OF BASE."

On the 19th Franklin's corps was transferred to the south side of the Chickahominy, Porter's corps, reënforced by McCall's division (which, with a few additional regiments, had arrived on the 12th and 13th), being left alone on the north side.

This dangerous distribution was necessary in order to concentrate sufficient force on the south side to attack Richmond with any hope of success; and, as I was still told that McDowell would arrive by the overland route, I could not yet change the base to the James.

It was not until the 25th that the condition of the ground and the completion of the bridges and intrenchments left me free to attack. On that day the first step was taken, in throwing forward the left of our picket-line, in face of a strong opposition, to gain ground enough to enable Sumner and Heintzelman to support the attack to be made next day by Franklin on the rear of Old Tavern. The successful issue of this attack would, it was supposed, drive the enemy from his positions on the heights overlooking Mechanicsville, and probably enable us to force him back into his main line of works. We would then be in position to reconnoiter the lines carefully, determine the points of attack, and take up a new base and line of supply if expedient.

During the night of the 24th information arrived confirming the anticipation that Jackson was moving to attack our right and rear, but I persisted in the operation intended for the 25th, partly to develop the strength of the

enemy opposite our left and center, and with the design of attacking Old Tavern on the 26th, if Jackson's advance was so much delayed that Porter's corps would not be endangered.

Late in the afternoon of the 25th, Jackson's advance was confirmed, and it was rendered probable that he would attack next day. All hope of the advance of McDowell's corps in season to be of any service had disappeared; the dangerous position of the army had been faithfully held to the last moment. After deducting the garrisons in rear, the railroad guards, non-combatants, and extra-duty men, there were not more than 75,000 men for battle. The enemy, with a force larger than this, the strong defenses of Richmond close at hand in his rear, was free to strike on either flank. I decided then to carry into effect the long-considered plan of abandoning the Pamunkey and taking up the line of the James.

The necessary orders were given for the defense of the depots at the White House to the last moment and its final destruction and abandonment; it was also ordered that all possible stores should be pushed to the front while communications were open.

The ground to the James had already been reconnoitered with reference to this movement.

During the night of the 26th Porter's siege-guns and wagon-trains were brought over to the south side of the Chickahominy. During the afternoon of that day his corps had been attacked in its position on Beaver Dam Creek, near Mechanicsville, and the enemy repulsed with heavy losses on their part. It was now clear that Jackson's corps had taken little or no part in this attack, and that his blow would fall farther to the rear. I therefore ordered the Fifth Corps to fall back and take position nearer the bridges, where the flanks would be more secure. This was skillfully effected early on the 27th, and it was decided that this corps should hold its position until night. All the corps commanders on the south side were on the 26th directed to be prepared to send as many troops as they could spare in support of Porter on the next day. All of them thought the enemy so strong in their respective fronts as to require all their force to hold their positions. ☆

☆ Soon after the appearance of General McClellan's article the following letter was received from the daughter of General Heintzelman:

"In 'The Century' for May, 1885, General McClellan has an article, 'The Peninsular Campaign,' in which there are one or two misstatements in regards to the Third Corps, commanded by General Heintzelman. Fortunately my father's papers, which are in my possession, contain replies to both allegations,—one in the handwriting of General Heintzelman's adjutant-general, and the other the rough draft of a letter addressed to General Lorenzo Thomas, then Adjutant-General of the army. General McClellan says [see above]:

"'All the corps commanders on the south side were on the 26th directed to be prepared to send as many troops as they could spare in support of Porter on the next day. All of them thought the enemy so strong in their respective fronts as to require all their force to hold their positions.'

"Upon the demand for troops General Heintzelman replied as follows:

"'HEADQUARTERS THIRD CORPS, 4 P. M., June 26, 1862. GENERAL MARCY, Chief of Staff: I think I can hold the intrenchments with four brigades for twenty-four hours; that would leave two (2) brigades available for service on the other side of the river, but the men are so tired and worn out that I fear they would not be in a condition to fight after making a march of any distance. . . . S. P. HEINTZELMAN, Brigadier-General.'

"This is far from being a statement that all his forces were required to hold his own lines.

"General McClellan says [see p. 183]:

"'Meanwhile, through a misunderstanding of his orders, and being convinced that the troops of Sumner and Franklin at Savage's Station were ample for the purpose in view, Heintzelman withdrew his troops during the afternoon, crossed the swamp at Brackett's Ford, and reached the Charles City road with the rear of his column at 10 P. M.'

"When the same statement was first made in

Shortly after noon on the 27th the attack commenced upon Porter's corps, in its new position near Gaines's Mill, and the contest continued all day with great vigor.

The movements of the enemy were so threatening at many points on our center and left as to indicate the presence of large numbers of troops, and for a long time created great uncertainty as to the real point of his main attack. General Porter's first call for reënforcement and a supply of axes failed to reach me; but, upon receiving a second call, I ordered Slocum's division to cross to his support. The head of the division reached the field at 3:30 and immediately went into action. At about 5 P. M. General Porter reported his position as critical, and the brigades of French and Meagher—of Richardson's division—were ordered to reënforce him, although the fearless commander of the Second Corps, General Sumner, thought it hazardous to remove them from his own threatened front. I then ordered the reserve of Heintzelman to move in support of Sumner, and a brigade of Keyes's corps to headquarters for such use as might be required. Smith's division, left alone when Slocum crossed to the aid of Porter, was so seriously threatened that I called on Sumner's corps to send a brigade to its support.

French and Meagher reached the field before dusk, just after Porter's corps

1863, General Heintzelman wrote the following letter:

"'HEADQUARTERS DEFENSES OF WASHINGTON, April 11th, 1863. GENERAL L. THOMAS, ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. A., WASHINGTON. GENERAL: I find in the "New York Tribune" of the 8th of April a "Preliminary Report of the Operations of the Army of the Potomac, since June 25th, 1862," made by General G. B. McClellan . . .

"'In a paragraph commencing "On the 28th Porter's corps was also moved across the White Oak Swamp," etc., is the following:

"They were ordered to hold this position until dark, then to fall back across the swamp and rejoin the rest of the army. This order was not fully carried out, nor was the exact position I designated occupied by the different divisions concerned."

"'I was furnished with a map marked in red with the positions we should occupy.

"'As I had the fortified lines thrown up some time before by the troops in my command, I had no difficulty in knowing where to go, and I did occupy these lines. General Sumner's were more indefinite, and he occupied a position in advance of the one designated. This left a space of half a mile unoccupied, between his right and Franklin's left. In the morning I was informed that some rebels were already at or near Dr. Trent's house, where General McClellan's headquarters had been; I sent and found this to be the case. General Franklin had also called at my headquarters and told me that the enemy were repairing the bridges of the Chickahominy, and would soon cross in force. About 1 P. M. I saw some of our troops filing into the fields between Dr. Trent's house and Savage's Station, and a few moments later Generals Franklin and W. F. Smith came to me and reported the enemy approaching, and urged me to ride to General Sumner and get him to fall back and close this gap. I rode briskly to the front, and on the Williamsburg road, where it passed between my two divisions, met General Sumner's troops falling back. He wished me to turn back with him to arrange for ulterior operations, but as my right flank was entirely uncovered by these movements, I declined until after I had seen my division commanders and given them orders how to fall back. On my return there was some difficulty in finding General Sumner, and when found he informed me he had made his arrangements. I returned to my command, and on the way found the ground filled with troops, more than could be used to any advantage, and if the enemy planted a few batteries of artillery on the opposite side of the railroad, they would have been cut in pieces.

"'An aide to General McClellan having reported to me the day before to point out to me a road across the White Oak Swamp, opening from the left flank of my position of the fortified lines, I did not hesitate to retreat by that road, and left at 3 P. M. General Smith, of Franklin's corps, having sent to the rear all his batteries earlier in the day, I, at his request, let him have two of mine (Osborn's and Bramhall's), and they did good service that afternoon in checking and defeating the rebel attack.

"'My remaining would have been no aid to General Sumner, as he already had more troops than he could defile through the narrow road in his rear, and the road I took covered his left flank.

"'Before dark the advance of my corps was across the swamp, and by 10 P. M. the rear was over, with but little molestation from the enemy. I immediately sought General McClellan, and reported to him what I had done, and this is the first intimation I have had that my conduct was not entirely satisfactory.

"'To hold my position till dark, by which time I was to receive orders, would have been impossible. After Generals Franklin and Sumner had fallen back, my right flank and rear were uncovered, and by a road which passed entirely in my rear; and beyond my right flank my only line of retreat would have been cut off, and I would have lost my entire corps. I did not know where General McClellan was, and it was, therefore, impossible to report to him for orders.

"'When General Birney reached Fisher's Ford, the enemy were there, but not in force; they soon arrived in force, and he had to take another road more to our left. Had we been a little later they would have been in possession, and our retreat by this road cut off.

S. P. HEINTZELMAN.'

"I trust that you will be able to find space for these letters.—MARY L. HEINTZELMAN."

EDITORS.

had been forced by superior numbers to fall back to an interior position nearer the bridges, and, by their steady attitude, checked all further progress of the enemy and completed the attainment of the purpose in view, which was to hold the left bank of the river until dark, so that the movement to the James might be safely commenced. The siege-guns, material, and trains on the left bank were all safe, and the right wing was in close connection with the rest of the army. The losses were heavy, but the object justified them, or rather made them necessary. At about 6 o'clock next morning the rear-guard of regulars crossed to the south side and the bridges were destroyed.

I now bent all my energies to the transfer of the army to the James, fully realizing the very delicate nature of a flank march, with heavy trains, by a single road, in face of an active enemy, but confident that I had the army well in hand and that it would not fail me in the emergency. I thought that the enemy would not anticipate that movement, but would assume that all my efforts would be directed to cover and regain the old depots; and the event proved the correctness of this supposition. It seemed certain that I could gain one or two days for the movement of the trains, while he remained uncertain as to my intentions; and that was all I required with such troops as those of the Army of the Potomac.

During the night of the 27th I assembled the corps commanders at headquarters, informed them of my intentions, and gave them their orders. Keyes's corps was ordered to move at once, with its trains, across White Oak Swamp, and occupy positions on the farther side, to cover the passage of the remainder of the army. By noon of the 28th this first step was accomplished. During the 28th Sumner, Heintzelman, and Franklin held essentially their old positions; the trains converged steadily to the White Oak Swamp and crossed as rapidly as possible, and during this day and the succeeding night Porter followed the movement of Keyes's corps and took position to support it.

Early on the 28th, when Franklin's corps was drawing in its right to take a more concentrated position, the enemy opened a sharp artillery fire and made at one point a spirited attack with two Georgia regiments, which were repulsed by the two regiments on picket.

Sumner's and Heintzelman's corps and Smith's division of Franklin's were now ordered to abandon their intrenchments, so as to occupy, on the morning of the 29th, a new position in rear, shorter than the old and covering the crossing of the swamp. This new line could easily be held during the day, and these troops were ordered to remain there until dark, to cover the withdrawal of the rest of the trains, and then cross the swamp and occupy the positions about to be abandoned by Keyes's and Porter's corps. Meanwhile Slocum's division had been ordered to Savage's Station in reserve, and, during the morning, was ordered across the swamp to relieve Keyes's corps. This was a critical day; for the crossing of the swamp by the trains must be accomplished before its close, and their protection against attack from Richmond must be assured, as well as communication with the gun-boats.

A sharp cavalry skirmish on the Quaker road indicated that the enemy was alive to our movement, and might at any moment strike in force to

intercept the march to the James. The difficulty was not at all with the movement of the troops, but with the immense trains that were to be moved virtually by a single road, and required the whole army for their protection. With the exception of the cavalry affair on the Quaker road, we were not troubled during this day south of the swamp, but there was severe fighting north of it. Sumner's corps evacuated their works at daylight and fell back to Allen's farm, nearly two miles west of Savage's Station, Heintzelman being on their left. Here Sumner was furiously attacked three times, but each time drove the enemy back with much loss.

Soon afterward Franklin, having only one division with him, ascertained that the enemy had repaired some of the Chickahominy bridges and was advancing on Savage's Station, whereupon he posted his division at that point and informed Sumner, who moved his corps to the same place, arriving a little after noon. About 4 P. M. Sumner and Franklin — three divisions in all — were sharply attacked, mainly by the Williamsburg road; the fighting continued until between 8 and 9 P. M., the enemy being at all times thoroughly repulsed, and finally driven from the field.

Meanwhile, through a misunderstanding of his orders, and being convinced that the troops of Sumner and Franklin at Savage's Station were ample for the purpose in view, Heintzelman withdrew his troops during the afternoon, crossed the swamp at Brackett's Ford, and reached the Charles City road with the rear of his column at 10 P. M.

Slocum reached the position of Keyes's corps early in the afternoon, and, as soon as the latter was thus relieved, it was ordered forward to the James, near Malvern Hill, which it reached, with all its artillery and trains, early on the 30th. Porter was ordered to follow this movement and prolong the line of Keyes's corps to our right. The trains were pushed on in rear of these corps and massed under cover of the gun-boats as fast as they reached the James, at Haxall's plantation. As soon as the fighting ceased with the final repulse of the enemy, Sumner and Franklin were ordered to cross the swamp; this was effected during the night, the rear-guard crossing and destroying the bridge at 5 A. M. on the 30th. All the troops and trains were now between the swamp and the James, and the first critical episode of the movement was successfully accomplished.

The various corps were next pushed forward to establish connection with Keyes and Porter, and hold the different roads by which the enemy could advance from Richmond and strike our line of march. I determined to hold the positions now taken until the trains had all reached a place of safety, and then concentrate the army near the James, where it could enjoy a brief rest after the fatiguing battles and marches through which it was passing, and then renew the advance on Richmond.

General Franklin, with Smith's division of his own corps, Richardson's of the Second, and Naglee's brigade were charged with the defense of the White Oak Swamp crossing. Slocum held the ground thence to the Charles City road; Kearny from that road to the Long Bridge road; McCall on his left; Hooker thence to the Quaker road; Sedgwick at Nelson's farm, in rear

CAPTAIN LE CLERC. DUC DE CHARTRES. COMTE DE PARIS. PRINCE DE JOINVILLE. CAPTAIN MOHAIN.

THE ORLÉANS PRINCES AND SUITE AT DINNER. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

of McCall and Kearny. The Fifth Corps was at Malvern Hill, the Fourth at Turkey Bridge. The trains moved on during this day, and at 4 P. M. the last reached Malvern Hill and kept on to Haxall's, so that the most difficult part

General McClellan contributed an article to "The Century" magazine for February, 1884, on "The Princes of the House of Orléans," in which he spoke as follows of the services of the Comte de Paris and his brother, the Duc de Chartres:

"In August, 1861, the two brothers, accompanied by the Prince de Joinville, sailed for New York. Toward the close of September they arrived in Washington, and the young Princes at once received authority from the President to enter the army as aides-de-camp, being permitted to serve without taking the oath of allegiance, and without pay; it was also understood that they should be permitted to leave the service should family or political exigencies require it. They were borne on the army register as Louis Philippe d'Orléans and Robert d'Orléans, additional aides-de-camp in the regular army, with the rank of captain, and were assigned to the staff of the major-general commanding the Army of the Potomac. The Prince de Joinville accepted no rank, and simply accompanied headquarters, on the invitation of the general commanding, as an amateur and friend. The position held by these "young gentlemen"—as the Prince de Joinville always designated them—was not free from difficulties. Princes who might at any time be called upon to assume their places in the government of a great nation, yet serving in the army of a republic whose cause was not regarded with very friendly eyes by the existing government of their own country, they had many contradictions to reconcile, many embarrassments to overcome. Connected by family ties with so

of the task was accomplished, and it only remained for the troops to hold their ground until nightfall, and then continue the march to the positions selected near Malvern Hill.

The fighting on this day (June 30th) was very severe, and extended along the whole line. It first broke out between 12 and 1, on General Franklin's command, in the shape of a fierce artillery fire, which was kept up through the day and inflicted serious losses. The enemy's infantry made several attempts to cross near the old bridge and below, but was in every case thrown back. Franklin held his position until after dark, and during the night fell back to Malvern. At half-past 2 Slocum's left was attacked in vain on the Charles City road. At about 3 McCall was attacked, and, after 5 o'clock, under the pressure of heavy masses, he was forced back; but Hooker came up from the left, and Sedgwick from the rear, and the two together not only stopped the enemy, but drove him off the field.

At about 4 P. M. heavy attacks commenced on Kearny's left, and three ineffectual assaults were made. The firing continued until after dark. About midnight Sumner's and Heintzelman's corps and McCall's division withdrew from the positions they had so gallantly held, and commenced their march to Malvern, which they reached unmolested soon after daybreak. Just after the rear of the trains reached Malvern, about 4 P. M., the enemy attacked Porter's corps, but were promptly shaken off.

Thus, on the morning of July 1st, the army was concentrated at Malvern, with the trains at Haxall's, in rear. The supplies which had been sent from White House on the 18th were at hand in the James.

After consultation with Commodore Rodgers, I decided that Harrison's Landing was a better position for the resting-place of the army, because the channel passed so close to City Point as to enable the enemy to prevent the passage of transports if we remained at Malvern. It was, however, necessary to accept battle where we were, in order to give ample time for the trains to reach Harrison's, as well as to give the enemy a blow that would check his farther pursuit.

many of the royal families of Europe, always received by them as of royal rank, the elder regarded by so many in France as the rightful heir to the throne, they could never lose sight of the dignity of their position, while it was at the same time necessary for them to perform their duties in a subordinate grade, and to win the confidence and friendship of their new comrades, who were sure to weigh men by their personal qualities and abilities, not by their social position across the Atlantic. Their task was accomplished with complete success, for they gained the full confidence, respect, and regard of their commander and their comrades. From the moment they entered the service, they were called upon to perform precisely the same duties and in precisely the same manner as their companions on the personal staff of their commander. . . .

"Their conduct was characterized by an innate love for a soldier's life, by an intense desire to perfect themselves in the profession of arms by actual experience of war on a large scale, and by unswerving devotion to duty. Not only this, their heads and hearts were with us in our hour of trial, and I believe that, next to their own France, they most loved this country, for which they so freely and so often exposed their lives on the field of battle.

"Soon after the beginning of the peninsular campaign, the Princes were strongly urged by their friends at home to return at once to England, partly to receive the large numbers of their adherents expected to attend the Exhibition of 1862, and partly because the French expedition to Mexico had greatly strained the relations between this country and France. They persisted in remaining with the army until the close of the Seven Days, and left only when assured that the immediate resumption of the attack on Richmond was improbable. Had the prompt receipt of reënforcements rendered a new advance practicable, it is certain that no considerations would have withdrawn them from the field until the completion of the operations against Richmond. Although warmly attached to them and very unwilling to lose their services, their commander fully recognized the imperative nature of the reasons for their departure, and entirely acquiesced in the propriety of their prompt return to Europe."

Soon after the termination of the war, the Comte de Paris began his extensive "History of the Civil War in America," the first volume of the American edition being issued in 1875.—EDITORS.

Accordingly, the army was carefully posted on the admirable position of Malvern Hill, with the right thrown back below Haxall's. The left was the natural point of attack, and there the troops were massed and the reserve artillery placed, while full preparations were made to frustrate any attempt to turn our right. Early in the forenoon the army was concentrated and ready for battle, in a position of unusual strength — one which, with such troops as held it, could justly be regarded as impregnable. It was, then, with perfect confidence that I awaited the impending battle.

The enemy began feeling the position between 9 and 10 A. M., and at 3 P. M. made a sharp attack upon Couch's division, which remained lying on the ground until the enemy were within close range, when they rose and delivered a volley which shattered and drove back their assailants in disorder. At 4 P. M. the firing ceased for a while, and the lull was availed of to rectify the position and make every preparation for the approaching renewal of the attack. It came at 6 P. M., opened by the fire of all their artillery and followed by desperate charges of infantry advancing at a run. They were always repulsed with the infliction of fearful loss, and in several instances our infantry awaited their approach within a few yards, poured in a single volley, and then dashed forward with the bayonet. At 7 P. M. the enemy was accumulating fresh troops, and the brigades of Meagher and Sickles were sent from Sumner's and Heintzelman's corps to reënforce Porter and Couch; fresh batteries were moved forward from the reserve artillery and the ammunition was replenished.

The enemy then repeated his attacks in the most desperate style until dark, but the battle ended with his complete repulse, with very heavy losses, and without his even for one moment gaining a foothold in our position. His frightful losses were in vain. I doubt whether, in the annals of war, there was ever a more persistent and gallant attack, or a more cool and effective resistance.

Although the result of this bloody battle was a complete victory on our part, it was necessary, for the reasons already given, to continue the movement to Harrison's, whither the trains had been pushed during the night of the 30th of June and the day of the 1st of July. Immediately after the final repulse the orders were given for the withdrawal of the army. The movement was covered by Keyes's corps. So complete was the enemy's discomfiture, and so excellent the conduct of the rear-guard, that the last of the trains reached Harrison's after dark on the 3d, without loss and unmolested by the enemy.

This movement was now successfully accomplished, and the Army of the Potomac was at last in a position on its true line of operations, with its trains intact, no guns lost save those taken in battle, when the artillerists had proved their heroism and devotion by standing to their guns until the enemy's infantry were in the midst of them.

During the "Seven Days" the Army of the Potomac consisted of 143 regiments of infantry, 55 batteries, and less than 8 regiments of cavalry, all told. The opposing Confederate army consisted of 187 regiments of infantry, 79

batteries, and 14 regiments of cavalry. The losses of the two armies from June 25th to July 2d were: ☆

	Killed.	*Wounded.*	*Missing.*	*Total.*
Confederate Army	2,823	13,703	3,223	19,749
Army of the Potomac	1,734	8,062	6,053	15,849

The Confederate losses in killed and wounded alone were greater than the total losses of the Army of the Potomac in killed, wounded, and missing.

No praise can be too great for the officers and men who passed through these seven days of battle, enduring fatigue without a murmur, successfully meeting and repelling every attack made upon them, always in the right place at the right time, and emerging from the fiery ordeal a compact army of veterans, equal to any task that brave and disciplined men can be called upon to undertake. They needed now only a few days of well-earned repose, a renewal of ammunition and supplies, and reënforcements to fill the gaps made in their ranks by so many desperate encounters, to be prepared to advance again, with entire confidence, to meet their worthy antagonists in other battles. It was, however, decided by the authorities at Washington, against my earnest remonstrances, to abandon the position on the James, and the campaign. The Army of the Potomac was accordingly withdrawn, and it was not until two years later that it again found itself under its last commander at substantially the same point on the bank of the James. It was as evident in 1862 as in 1865 that there was the true defense of Washington, and that it was on the banks of the James that the fate of the Union was to be decided.

☆ Tables (to follow) of the "Opposing Forces" of the "Seven Days," made from the fullest revised data of the War Records office, will show that the Army of the Potomac consisted of 150 regiments of infantry; 2 regiments and 1 battalion of engineers; 1 regiment of heavy or siege artillery; 58 batteries; and 10 regiments of cavalry. The Confederate forces consisted of 173 regiments and 12 battalions of infantry; 71 batteries; and 12 regiments of cavalry. General McClellan correctly estimates the Union loss, but the Confederate loss, according to the revised returns, was: killed, 3286; wounded, 15,909; missing, 940. Total, 20,135.—EDITORS.



CONFEDERATE BATTERY AT MATHIAS POINT, OR BUDD'S FERRY, ON THE POTOMAC [SEE ARTICLE, P. 143, AND MAP, P. 164]. FROM A SKETCH MADE IN FEBRUARY, 1862.



MAP OF THE FIGHT AT BIG BETHEL, JUNE 10, 1861 [SEE P. 148]—OF THE SIEGE OF YORKTOWN, APRIL 5 TO MAY 4, 1862 [SEE P. 171]—AND OF THE BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG, MAY 5, 1862 [SEE PP. 172 AND 193].

YORKTOWN AND WILLIAMSBURG.

RECOLLECTIONS OF A PRIVATE.—III. BY WARREN LEE GOSS.



IT was with open-eyed wonder that, as part of McClellan's army, we arrived at Old Point Comfort and gazed upon Fort Monroe, huge and frowning. Negroes were everywhere, and went about their work with an air of importance born of their new-found freedom. These were the "contrabands" for whom General Butler had recently invented that sobriquet. We pitched our tents amid the charred and blackened ruins of what had been the beautiful and aristocratic village of Hampton. The first thing I noticed about the ruins, unaccustomed as I was to Southern architecture, was the absence of cellars. The only building left standing of all the village was the massive old Episcopal church. Here Washington had worshiped, and its broad aisles had echoed to the footsteps of armed men during the Revolution. In the church-yard the tombs had been broken open. Many tombstones were broken and overthrown, and at the corner of the church a big hole showed that some one with a greater desire for possessing curiosities than reverence for ancient landmarks had been digging for the corner-stone and its buried mementos.

Along the shore which looks toward Fort Monroe were landed artillery, baggage-wagons, pontoon trains and boats, and the level land back of this was crowded with the tents of the soldiers. Here and there were groups frying hard-tack and bacon. Near at hand was the irrepressible army mule, hitched to and eating out of pontoon boats; those who had eaten their ration of grain and hay were trying their teeth, with promise of success, in eating the boats. An army mule was hungrier than a soldier, and would eat anything, especially a pontoon boat or rubber blanket. The scene was a busy one. The red cap, white leggins, and baggy trousers of the Zouaves mingled with the blue uniforms and dark trimmings of the regular infantry-men, the short jackets and yellow trimmings of the cavalry, the red stripes of the artillery, and the dark blue with orange trimmings of the engineers; together with the ragged, many-colored costumes of the black laborers and teamsters, all busy at something.

One morning we broke camp and went marching up the Peninsula. The roads were very poor and muddy with recent rains, and were crowded with the indescribable material of the vast army which was slowly creeping through the mud over the flat, wooded country. It was a bright day in April — a perfect Virginia day; the grass was green beneath our feet, the buds of the trees were just unrolling into leaves under the warming sun of spring, and in the woods the birds were singing. The march was at first orderly, but



MRS. T——'S EXODUS.

under the unaccustomed burden of heavy equipments and knapsacks, and the warmth of the weather, the men straggled along the roads, mingling with the baggage-wagons, ambulances, and pontoon trains, in seeming confusion.

During our second day's march it rained, and the muddy roads, cut up and kneaded, as it were, by the teams preceding us, left them in a state of semi-liquid filth hardly possible to describe or imagine. When we arrived at Big Bethel the rain was coming down in sheets. A dozen houses of very ordinary character, scattered over an area of a third of a mile, constituted what was called the village. Just outside and west of the town was an insignificant building from which the place takes its name. It did not seem large enough or of sufficient consequence to give name to a hamlet as small as Big Bethel. Before our arrival it had evidently been occupied as officers' barracks for the enemy, and looked very little like a church.

I visited one of the dwelling-houses just outside the fortifications (if the insignificant rifle-pits could be called such) for the purpose of obtaining something more palatable than hard-tack, salt beef, or pork, which, with coffee, comprised the marching rations. The woman of the house was communicative, and expressed her surprise at the great number of Yanks who had "come down to invade our soil." She said she had a son in the Confederate army, or, as she expressed it, "in our army," and then tearfully said she should tremble for her boy every time she heard of a battle. I expressed the opinion that we should go into Richmond without much fighting. "No!" said she, with the emphasis of conviction, "you all will drink hot blood before you all get thar!"

While wandering about, I came to the house of a Mrs. T——, whose husband was said to be a captain in the Confederate service and a "fire-eating" secessionist. Here some of our men were put on guard for a short time, until relieved by guards from other parts of the army as they came up, whereupon we went on. A large, good-looking woman, about forty years old, who, I learned, was Mrs. T——, was crying profusely, and I could not induce her to tell me why. One of the soldiers said her grief was caused by the fact that some of our men had helped themselves to the contents of cupboard and cellar. She was superintending the loading of an old farm-wagon, into which she was putting a large family of colored people, with numerous bundles. The only white person on the load as it started away was

the mistress, who sat amid her dark chattels in desolation and tears. Returning to the house, after this exodus, I found letters, papers, and odds and ends of various kinds littering the floor; whether overturned in the haste of the mistress or by the visiting soldiers, I could only guess. No other building at Big Bethel was so devastated, and I did not see another building so treated on our whole route. The men detailed to guard it declined to protect the property of one who was in arms fighting against us.

After leaving Big Bethel we began to feel the weight of our knapsacks. Castaway overcoats, blankets, parade-coats, and shoes were scattered along the route in reckless profusion, being dropped by the overloaded soldiers, as if after plowing the roads with heavy teams they were sowing them for a harvest. I lightened my knapsack without much regret, for I could not see the wisdom of carrying a blanket or overcoat when I could pick one up almost anywhere along the march. Very likely the same philosophy actuated those who preceded me or came after. The colored people along our route occupied themselves in picking up this scattered property. They had on their faces a distrustful look, as if uncertain of the tenure of their harvest. The march up the peninsula seemed very slow, yet it was impossible to increase our speed, owing to the bad condition of the roads. I learned in time that marching on paper and the actual march made two very different impressions. I can easily understand and excuse our fireside heroes, who fought their or our battles at home over comfortable breakfast-tables, without impediments of any kind to circumscribe their fancied operations; it is so much easier to manœuvre and fight large armies around the corner grocery, than to fight, march, and manœuvre in mud and rain, in the face of a brave and vigilant enemy.



CONFEDERATE BATTERY ON THE TERRACED MAGAZINE COMMANDING THE LAND APPROACH TO THE GOSPORT NAVY-YARD. [SEE PAGE 152.]
FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

The baggage-trains were a notable spectacle. To each baggage-wagon were attached four or six mules, driven usually by a colored man, with only one rein, or line, and that line attached to the bit of the near leading mule, while the driver rode in a saddle upon the near wheel mule. Each train was accompanied by a guard, and while the guard urged

the drivers the drivers urged the mules. The drivers were usually expert, and understood well the wayward, sportive natures of the creatures over whose destinies they presided. On our way to Yorktown our pontoon and baggage trains were sometimes blocked for miles, and the heaviest trains were often unloaded by the guard to facilitate their removal from the mud. It did seem at times as if there were needless delays with the trains, partly due, no doubt, to fear of danger ahead. While I was guarding our pontoon train, after leaving Big Bethel, the teams stopped all along the line. Hurrying to the front, I found one of the leading teams badly mired, but not enough to justify the stopping of the whole train. The lazy colored driver was comfortably asleep in the saddle. "Get that team out of the mud!" I yelled, bringing him to his senses. He flourished his long whip, shouted his mule lingo at the team, and the mules pulled frantically, but not together. "Can't you make your mules pull together?" I inquired. "Dem mules pull right smart!" said the driver. Cocking and capping my unloaded musket, I brought it to the shoulder and again commanded the driver, "Get that team out of the mud!" The negro rolled his eyes wildly and woke up all over. He first patted his saddle mule, spoke to each one, and then, flourishing his long whip with a crack like a pistol, shouted, "Go 'long dar! what I feed yo' fo'!" and the mule team left the slough in a very expeditious manner.

When procuring luxuries of eggs or milk, we paid the people at first in silver, and they gave us local scrip in change; but we found on attempting to pay it out again that they were rather reluctant to receive it, even at that early stage in Confederate finance, and much preferred Yankee silver or notes.

On the afternoon of April 5th, 1862, the advance of our column was brought



"GET THAT TEAM OUT OF THE MUD!"



SKIRMISH AT LEE'S MILLS BEFORE YORKTOWN, APRIL 16, 1862. [SEE MAP, P. 188.]
FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

to a standstill, with the right in front of Yorktown, and the left by the enemy's works at Lee's mills [see p. 188]. We pitched our camp on Wormley Creek, near the Moore house, on the York River, in sight of the enemy's water-battery and their defensive works at Gloucester Point. One of the impediments to an immediate attack on Yorktown was the difficulty of using light artillery in the muddy fields in our front, and at that time the topography of the country ahead was but little understood, and had to be learned by reconnoissance in force. We had settled down to the siege of Yorktown; began bridging the streams between us and the enemy, constructing and improving the roads for the rapid transit of supplies, and for the advance. The first parallel was opened about a mile from the enemy's fortifications, extending along the entire front of their works, which reached from the York River on the left to Warwick Creek on the right, along a line about four miles in length. Fourteen batteries and three redoubts were planted, heavily armed with ordnance.

We were near Battery No. 1, not far from the York River. On it were mounted several 200-pounder guns, which commanded the enemy's water-batteries. One day I was in a redoubt on the left, and saw General McClellan with the Prince de Joinville, examining the enemy's works through their field-glasses. They very soon drew the fire of the observant enemy, who opened with one of their heavy guns on the group, sending the first shot howling and hissing over and very close to their heads; another, quickly following it, struck in the parapet of the redoubt. The French prince, seemingly quite startled, jumped and glanced nervously around, while McClellan quietly knocked the ashes from his cigar.

Several of our war-vessels made their appearance in the York River, and occasionally threw a shot at the enemy's works; but most of them were kept busy at Hampton Roads, watching for the iron-clad *Merrimac*, which was still afloat. The firing from the enemy's lines was of little consequence, not

amounting to over ten or twelve shots each day, a number of these being directed at the huge balloon which went up daily on a tour of inspection, from near General Fitz John Porter's headquarters. One day the balloon broke from its mooring of ropes and sailed majestically over the enemy's works; but fortunately for its occupants it soon met a counter-current of air which returned it safe to our lines. The month of April was a dreary one, much of the time rainy and uncomfortable. It was a common expectation among us that we were about to end the rebellion. One of my comrades wrote home to his father that we should probably finish up the war in season for him to be at home to teach the village school the following winter; in fact, I believe he partly engaged to teach it. Another wrote to his mother: "We have got them hemmed in on every side, and the only reason they don't run is because they can't." We had at last corduroyed every road and bridged every creek; our guns and mortars were in position; Battery No. 1 had actually opened on the enemy's works, Saturday, May 3d, 1862, and it was expected that our whole line would open on them in the morning. About 2 o'clock of Saturday night, or rather of Sunday morning, while on guard duty, I observed a bright illumination, as if a fire had broken out within the enemy's lines. Several guns were fired from their works during the early morning hours, but soon after daylight of May 4th it was reported that they had abandoned their works in our front, and we very quickly found the report to be true. As soon as I was relieved from guard duty, I went over on "French leave" to view our enemy's fortifications. They were prodigiously strong. A few tumble-down tents and houses and seventy pieces of heavy ordnance had been abandoned as the price of the enemy's safe retreat.



UNION MORTAR-BATTERY BEFORE YORKTOWN. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

As soon as it was known that the Confederates had abandoned the works at Yorktown, the commanding general sent the cavalry and horse artillery under Stoneman in pursuit to harass the retreating column. The infantry divisions of Smith (Fourth Corps) and Hooker (Third Corps) were sent forward by two roads to support the light column. General Sumner (the officer second in rank in the Army of the Potomac) was directed to proceed to the front and assume command until McClellan's arrival. Stoneman overtook Johnston's rear-guard about noon, six miles from Williamsburg, and skirmished with the cavalry of Stuart, following sharply until 4 o'clock, when he was confronted by a line of redoubts before Williamsburg. The works consisted of a large fort (Magruder) at the junction of two roads running from Yorktown to Williamsburg, and small redoubts on each side of this, making an irregular chain of fortifications extending, with the creeks upon which they rested on either flank, across the peninsula. The Confederate brigades of

THE 61ST NEW YORK REGIMENT IN CAMP AT SHIP POINT, BELOW YORKTOWN.
[SEE MAP, P. 188.] FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

Kershaw and Semmes, of Magruder's command, occupied the works when Stoneman came in front of them, and, on finding his advance stubbornly opposed, Stoneman sent his cavalry upon reconnoissances over the field, and waited for the infantry under Hooker and Smith to come to his support. These divisions marched from Yorktown on parallel roads until Smith's column was halted by a burning bridge, and compelled to turn into the road by which Hooker was advancing. Sumner accompanied Smith's column, and, immediately on the arrival before Williamsburg, formed the brigades of Hancock and Brooks for an advance through a piece of woods which screened the Confederate rifle-pits. The result is given in Sumner's official report as follows:

"After entering the woods I found the underbrush much thicker than I expected, and the lines became entangled, and shortly afterward it became so dark it was impossible to advance, and I ordered the troops to halt and lie on their arms."

General Hooker was delayed on the road so long that he did not reach the field until early on the morning of May 5th, when he found himself on the left of Smith's division, and in front of Fort Magruder. The position of the Union troops then was: Smith on the right, and Hooker on the left, confronting the enemy's works, the latter having the heaviest obstacle before him, and the divisions of Kearny, Casey, and Couch struggling on toward the front, over crowded, muddy roads. General Sumner says in his report:

"I had a careful reconnoissance made on the left of the enemy's works, on the morning of the 5th, and found two of their forts unoccupied. I immediately ordered General Hancock to advance with a brigade and ten pieces of artillery, and hold those works, it being my intention to force their left."

This was about 11 A. M. Meantime, at 7:30 A. M., General Hooker, on his own responsibility, had advanced his lines. In his official report he says:

"Being in pursuit of a retreating army, I deemed it my duty to lose no time in making the disposition to attack, regardless of their number and position, except to accomplish the result with the least possible sacrifice of life."

Hooker sent forward Grover's brigade, and Bramhall's and Webber's batteries, and very soon all opposition on his front was silenced for a time.

Longstreet, however, ordered up reënforcements, and soon had a section of Pelham's battery, and the three fresh brigades of Wilcox, Pickett, and A. P. Hill on the ground, driving Hooker back, with the loss of all his cannon, and heavy casualties. During his desperate engagement, Hooker reported his situation to Sumner, and Kearny was promptly ordered up with his division, while Heintzelman, the proper commander of the Third Corps, was sent to the spot to take charge. [See "Opposing Forces," p. 200.]

A comrade in Hooker's division gave me an account of his experiences about as follows: "Marching over the muddy road late in the afternoon, we found our farther advance prevented by a force which had preceded us, and we halted in the mud by the roadside just as it began to rain. About 5 o'clock we resumed our march by crossing over to the Hampton road, and did not halt till 11 in the evening, when we lay down in our blankets, bedraggled, wet, and tired, chewing hard-tack and the cud of reflection, the tenor of which was, 'Why did we come for a soldier?' Before daylight we were on the march, plodding in the rain through the mire. By daybreak we came out on the edge of the dense woods in front of Fort Magruder. The main fort was a strong earth-work with a bastioned front and a wide ditch. In front of this muddy-looking heap of dirt was a level plain, sprinkled plentifully with smaller earth-works; while between us and the level plain the dense forest, for a distance of a quarter of a mile, had been felled, thus forming a labyrinth of tangled abatis difficult to penetrate. A mile away lay the village of Williamsburg.

A TEMPTING BREASTWORK.

"We were soon sent out as skirmishers, with orders to advance as near the enemy's rifle-pits as possible. They immediately opened fire upon us with heavy guns from the fort, while from their rifle-pits came a hum of bullets and crackle of musketry. Their heavy shot came crashing among the tangled abatis of fallen timber, and plowed up the dirt in our front, rebounding and tearing through the branches of the woods in our rear. The constant hissing of the bullets, with their sharp *ping* or *bizz* whispering around and sometimes into us, gave me a sickening feeling and a cold perspiration. I felt weak around my knees — a sort of faintness and lack of strength in the joints of my legs, as if they would sink from under me. These symptoms did not decrease when several of my comrades were hit. The little rifle-pits in our front fairly blazed with musketry, and the continuous *snap*, *snap*, *crack*, *crack* was murderous. Seeing I was not killed at once, in spite of all the noise, my knees recovered from their unpleasant limpness, and my mind gradually regained its balance and composure. I never afterward felt these disturbing influences to the same degree.

"We slowly retired from stump to stump and from log to log, finally regaining the edge of the wood, and took our position near Webber's and Bramhall's batteries, which had just got into position on the right of the road, not over seven hundred yards from the hostile fort. While getting into position several of the battery men were killed, as they immediately drew the artillery fire of the enemy, which opened with a noise and violence that astonished me. Our two batteries were admirably handled, throwing a number of shot and shell into the enemy's works, speedily silencing them, and by 9 o'clock the field in our front, including the rifle-pits, was completely 'cleaned out' of artillery and infantry. Shortly afterward we advanced along the edge of the wood to the left of Fort Magruder, and about 11 o'clock we saw emerging from the little ravine to the left of the fort a swarm of Confederates, who opened on us with a terrible and deadly fire. Then they charged upon us with their peculiar yell. We took all the advantage possible of the stumps and trees as we were pushed back, until we reached the edge of the wood again, where we halted and fired upon the enemy from behind all the cover the situation afforded. We were none of us too proud, not even those who had the dignity of shoulder-straps to support, to dodge behind a tree or stump. I called out to a comrade, 'Why don't you get behind a tree?' 'Confound it,' said he, 'there ain't enough for the officers.' I don't mean to accuse officers of cowardice, but we had suddenly found out that they showed the same general inclination not to get shot as privates did, and were anxious to avail themselves of the privilege of their rank by getting in our rear. I have always thought that pride was a good substitute for courage, if well backed by a conscientious sense of duty; and most of our men, officers as well as privates, were too proud to show the fear which I have no doubt they felt in common with myself. Occasionally a soldier would show symptoms which pride could not overcome. One of our men, Spinney, ran into the woods and was not seen until after the engagement. Some time afterward, when he had proved a good soldier, I asked him why he ran, and he replied that every bullet which went by his head said 'Spinney,' and he thought they were calling for him. In all the pictures of battles I had seen before I ever saw a battle, the officers were at the front on prancing steeds, or with uplifted swords were leading their followers to the charge. Of course, I was surprised to find that in a real battle the officer gets in the rear of his men, as is his right and duty,—that is, if his ideas of duty do not carry him so far to the rear as to make his sword useless.

"The 'rebs' forced us back by their charge, and our central lines were almost broken. The forces withdrawn from our right had taken the infantry support from our batteries, one of which, consisting of four guns, was captured. We were tired, wet, and exhausted when supports came up, and we were allowed to fall back from under the enemy's fire, but still in easy reach of the battle. I asked one of my comrades how he felt, and his reply was characteristic of the prevailing sentiment: 'I should feel like a hero if I wasn't so blank wet.' The bullets had cut queer antics among our men. A private, who had a canteen of whisky when he went into the engagement, on

CAMP OF THE UNION ARMY NEAR WHITE HOUSE ON THE PAMUNKEY RIVER, McCLELLAN'S BASE OF OPERATIONS AGAINST RICHMOND. FROM PHOTOGRAPHS.

endeavoring to take a drink found the canteen quite empty, a bullet having tapped it for him. Another had a part of his thumb-nail taken off. Another had a bullet pass into the toe of his boot, down between two toes, and out along the sole of his foot, without much injury. Another had a scalp-wound from a bullet, which took off a strip of hair about three inches in length from the top of his head. Two of my regiment were killed outright and fourteen badly wounded, besides quite a number slightly injured. Thus I have chronicled my first day's fight, and I don't believe any of my regiment were ambitious to 'chase the enemy' any farther just at present. Refreshed with hot coffee and hard-tack, we rested from the fight, well satisfied that we had done our duty."

On the Confederate side, according to Longstreet's account, the march of the rear column northward in retreat from the town was being delayed all day on the 5th by impassable roads, and he ordered fresh troops from time to time to countermarch to the field at Williamsburg, relieving those whose ammunition was exhausted in this unexpected engagement. After Hooker had been forced back from Fort Magruder, the threatening position of Hancock on the Confederate left was noted by the enemy, and D. H. Hill went forward with Early's brigade, Early and Hill in person leading, toward the crest where Hancock's infantry was posted.

The Confederates were met by a severe musketry fire, and at length by a counter charge, led by Hancock, in which the bayonet was used in open field. Generals Sumner, Keyes, and Smith all mentioned Hancock's victory, which was brilliant and decisive. General Smith said in his report, "The brilliancy of the plan of battle, the

coolness of its execution, the seizing of the proper instant for changing from the defensive to the offensive, the steadiness of the troops engaged, and the completeness of the victory, are subjects to which I earnestly call the attention of the General-in-Chief for just praise." General Keyes wrote, "If Hancock had failed, the enemy would not have retreated."¦

The division of Kearny, that was coming to Hooker's aid, was delayed by crowded roads, and reached the field by brigades between 2:30 and 4 o'clock, and, taking position on Hooker's field, became engaged in a somewhat irregular fight to the extent of five regiments of the brigades of Berry and Birney. Berry's brigade made a desperate charge, recovering some of the ground yielded by Hooker earlier in the day. The heavy losses at Williamsburg fell upon Hooker and Kearny, the division of the former sustaining nearly three-fourths of the total Union loss.

After the engagement I went over the field in front of the enemy's fort. Advancing through the tangled mass of logs and stumps, I saw one of our men aiming over the branch of a fallen tree, which lay among the tangled abatis. I called to him, but he did not turn or move. Advancing nearer, I put my hand on his shoulder, looked in his face, and started back. He was dead! — shot through the brain; and so suddenly had the end come that his rigid hand grasped his musket, and he still preserved the attitude of watchfulness, literally occupying his post after death. At another place we came upon one of our men who had evidently died from wounds. Near one of his hands was a Testament, and on his breast lay an ambrotype picture of a group of children and another of a young woman.

The 6th of May was a beautiful morning, with birds singing among the thickets in which lay the dead. The next morning we marched through quaint, old-fashioned Williamsburg. The most substantial buildings of the town were those of William and Mary College, which were of brick. We kindled fires from that almost inexhaustible source of supply, the Virginia fences, cooked our coffee, sang, and smoked, thoughtless of the morrow.

¦ It was of this action that McClellan telegraphed to his wife, "Hancock was superb."— EDITORS.



UNION CAMP AT CUMBERLAND LANDING BELOW WHITE HOUSE. [SEE MAP, P. 167.]

THE OPPOSING FORCES AT WILLIAMSBURG, VA.

The composition, losses, and strength of each army as here stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the Official Records. K stands for killed; w for wounded; m w for mortally wounded; m for captured or missing; c for captured.

THE UNION FORCES.

Major-General George B. McClellan. Brigadier-General Edwin V. Sumner, second in command.

THIRD ARMY CORPS, Brigadier-General Samuel P. Heintzelman.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Joseph Hooker.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Cuvier Grover: 1st Mass., Col. Robert Cowdin; 11th Mass., Col. William Blaisdell; 2d N. H., Col. Gilman Marston; 26th Pa., Col. William F. Small (w), Major Casper M. Berry. Brigade loss: k, 33; w, 186; m, 34 = 253. *Second Brigade*, Col. Nelson Taylor: 70th N. Y., Col. William Dwight, Jr. (w c), Major Thomas Holt; 72d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Israel Moses; 73d N. Y., Col. William R. Brewster; 74th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Charles H. Burtis. Brigade loss: k, 191; w, 349; m, 232 = 772. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Francis E. Patterson: 5th N. J., Col. Samuel H. Starr; 6th N. J., Lieut.-Col. John P. Van Leer (k), Maj. George C. Burling; 7th N. J., Lieut.-Col. Ezra A. Carman (w), Maj. Francis Price, Jr.; 8th N. J., Col. Adolphus J. Johnson (w), Maj. Peter H. Ryerson (k). Brigade loss: k, 109; w, 353; m, 64 = 526. *Artillery*, Maj. Charles S. Wainwright: D, 1st N. Y., Capt. Thomas W. Osborn; 4th N. Y., Capt. James E. Smith; 6th N. Y., Capt. Walter M. Bramhall; H, 1st U. S., Capt. Charles H. Webber. Artillery loss: k, 4; w, 20 = 24.

THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Philip Kearny. Staff loss: k, 2.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Charles D. Jameson: 87th N. Y., Col. Stephen A. Dodge; 57th Pa., Col. Charles T. Campbell; 63d Pa., Col. Alexander Hays; 105th Pa., Col. Amor A. McKnight. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. David B. Birney: 3d Me., Col. Henry G. Staples; 4th Me., Col. Elijah Walker; 38th N. Y., Col. J. H. Hobart Ward; 40th N. Y., Col. Edward J. Riley. Brigade loss: k, 16; w, 92; m, 10 = 118. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Hiram G. Berry: 2d Mich., Col. Orlando M. Poe; 3d Mich., Col. Stephen G. Champlin; 5th Mich., Col. Henry D. Terry; 37th N. Y., Col. Samuel B. Hayman. Brigade loss: k, 69; w, 223; m, 7 = 299. *Artillery*, Capt. James Thompson: B, 1st N. J., Capt. John E. Beam; E, 1st R. I., Capt. George E. Randolph; G, 2d U. S., Capt. James Thompson.

FOURTH ARMY CORPS, Brigadier-General Erasmus D. Keyes.

Cavalry: 5th U. S., Major Joseph H. Whittlesey.

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Darius N. Couch.

First Brigade, Col. Julius W. Adams: 65th N. Y. (1st U. S. Chasseurs), Lieut.-Col. Alexander Shaler; 67th N. Y. (1st Long Island), Lieut.-Col. Nelson Cross; 23d Pa., Col. Thomas H. Neill; 31st Pa., Col. David H. Williams; 61st Pa., Col. Oliver H. Rippey. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. John J. Peck: 55th N. Y., Col. P. Regis de Trobriand; 62d N. Y., Col. John L. Riker; 93d Pa., Col. James M. McCarter; 98th Pa., Col. John F. Ballier; 102d Pa., Col. Thomas A. Rowley. Brigade loss: k, 18; w, 82; m, 24 = 124. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Charles Devens, Jr.: 7th Mass., Col. David A. Russell; 10th Mass., Col. Henry S. Briggs; 2d R. I., Col. Frank Wheaton. Brigade loss (7th Mass.): k, 1; w, 2 = 3. *Artillery*, Maj. Robert M. West: C, 1st Pa., Capt. Jeremiah McCarthy; D, 1st Pa., Capt. Edward H. Flood: E, 1st Pa., Capt. Theodore Miller; H, 1st Pa., Capt. James Brady.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. William F. Smith.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Winfield S. Hancock (also in temporary command of Davidson's Third Brigade): 6th Me., Col. Hiram Burnham; 43d N. Y., Col. Francis L. Vinton; 49th Pa., Col. William H. Irwin; 5th Wis., Col. Amasa Cobb. Brigade loss: k, 8; w, 76; m, 1 = 85. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. W. T. H. Brooks: 2d Vt., Col. Henry Whiting; 3d Vt., Col. Breed N. Hyde; 4th Vt., Col. Edwin H. Stoughton; 5th Vt., Lieut.-Col. Lewis A. Grant; 6th Vt., Col. Nathan Lord. Brigade loss: w, 2. *Third Brigade* (temporarily under Hancock's command): 7th Me., Col. Edwin C. Mason; 33d N. Y., Col. Robert F. Taylor; 49th N. Y., Col. Daniel D. Bidwell; 76th N. Y., Col. James B. McKean. Brigade loss (33d N. Y.): w, 10. *Artillery*, Capt. Romeyn B. Ayres: 1st N. Y., Lieut. Andrew Cowan; 3d N. Y., Capt. Thaddeus P. Mott; E, 1st N. Y., Capt. Charles C. Wheeler; F, 5th U. S., Capt. Romeyn B. Ayres.

THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Silas Casey.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry M. Naglee: 11th Me., Col. John C. Caldwell; 56th N. Y., Col. Charles H. Van Wyck; 100th N. Y., Col. James M. Brown; 52d Pa., Col. John C. Dodge, Jr.; 104th Pa., Col. W. W. H. Davis. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. William H. Keim: 96th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Charles O. Gray; 85th Pa., Col. Joshua B. Howell; 101st Pa., Col. Joseph H. Wilson; 103d Pa., Maj. Audley W. Gazzam. Brigade loss (103d Pa.): w, 2. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Innis N. Palmer: 81st N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Jacob J. De Forest; 85th N. Y., Col. Jonathan S. Belknap; 92d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Hiram Anderson, Jr.; 93d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Benjamin C. Butler; 98th N. Y., Col. William Dutton. *Artillery*, Col. Guilford D. Bailey: 7th N. Y., Capt. Peter C. Regan; 8th N. Y., Capt. Butler Fitch; A, 1st N. Y., Capt. Thomas H. Bates; H, 1st N. Y., Capt. Joseph Spratt.

ADVANCE-GUARD, Brig.-Gen. George Stoneman. Brig.-Gen. P. St. George Cooke and William H. Emory, brigade commanders.

Cavalry: 8th Ill., Col. John F. Farnsworth; McClellan (Ill.) Dragoons, Maj. Charles W. Barker; 3d Pa., Col. William W. Averell; 1st U. S., Lieut.-Col. William N. Grier; 6th U. S., Maj. Lawrence Williams. *Artillery*, Lieut.-Col. William Hays: B and L, 2d U. S., Capt. James M. Robertson; M, 2d U. S., Capt. Henry Benson; C, 3d U. S., Capt. Horatio G. Gibson; K, 3d U. S., Capt. John C. Tidball. Advance-guard loss (mostly on May 4th): k, 15; w, 33; m, 1 = 49.

The total loss of the Union army (May 4th and 5th) was 468 killed, 1442 wounded, and 373 captured or missing = 2283.

THE CONFEDERATE FORCES.

General Joseph E. Johnston. Major-General James Longstreet in immediate command on the field.

SECOND DIVISION (Longstreet's).

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Ambrose P. Hill: 1st Va., Col. Louis B. Williams (w), Maj. William H. Palmer (w); 7th Va., Col. James L. Kemper; 11th Va., Col. Samuel Garland (w); 17th Va., Col. M. D. Corse. Brigade loss: k, 67; w, 245; m, 14 = 326. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Richard H. Anderson (in command on the right), Col. Micah Jenkins: 4th S. C. (Battalion), Maj. C. S. Mattison; 5th S. C., Col. John R. R. Giles; 6th S. C., Col. John Bratton; Palmetto (S. C.) Sharp-shooters, Col. Micah Jenkins, Lieut.-Col. Joseph Walker; La. Foot Rifles, Capt. McG. Goodwyn; Fauquier (Va.) Artillery, Capt. Robert M. Stribling; Williamsburg (Va.) Artillery, (2 guns), Capt. William R. Garrett; Richmond (Va.), Howitzers (2 guns), Capt. Edward S. McCarthy. Brigade loss: k, 10; w, 75; m, 6 = 91. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. George E. Pickett: 8th Va., Lieut.-Col. Norbourne Berkeley; 18th Va., Lieut.-Col. Henry A. Carrington; 19th Va., Col. John B. Strange; 28th Va., Col. Robert C. Allen; Va. Battery, Capt. James Dearing. Brigade loss: k, 26; w, 138; m, 26 = 190. *Fourth Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox: 9th Ala., Col. Samuel

Henry; 10th Ala., Col. John J. Woodward; 19th Miss., Col. Christopher H. Mott (k), Lieut.-Col. L. Q. C. Lamar. Brigade loss: k and w, 231. *Fifth Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Roger A. Pryor: 8th Ala., Lieut.-Col. Thomas E. Irby (k); 14th Ala., Maj. O. K. McLemore; 14th La., Col. R. W. Jones; 32d Va. (detachment); Richmond (Va.) Fayette Artillery, Lieut. W. I. Clopton. Brigade loss: k, w, and m, 214. *Colston's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. R. E. Colston: 13th N. C., Col. Alfred M. Scales; 14th N. C., Col. P. W. Roberts; 3d Va., Col. Joseph Mayo. Brigade loss not separately reported. Donaldsonville (La.) Battery (3 guns), Lieut. Lestang Fortier.

FOURTH DIVISION, Major-Gen. Daniel H. Hill (in command on the left).

Early's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Jubal A. Early (w), Col. D. K. McRae: 5th N. C., Col. D. K. McRae; 23d N. C., Col. John F. Hoke, Maj. Daniel H. Christie; 24th Va., Col. William R. Terry (w), Major Richard L. Maury; 38th Va., Lieut.-Col. Powhatan B. Whittle. Brigade loss (except 5th N. C., not reported): k, 30; w, 106; m, 70=206. *Rodes's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. R. E. Rodes: 5th Ala., Col. C. C. Pegues; 6th Ala., Col. John B. Gordon; 12th Ala., Col. R. T. Jones; 12th Miss., Col. W. H. Taylor. *Rains's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. G. J. Rains: 13th Ala., Col. B. D. Fry; 26th Ala., Col. E. A. O'Neal; 6th Ga., Col. A. H. Colquitt; 23d Ga., Col. Thos. Hutcherson. *Featherston's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. W. S. Featherston: 27th Ga., Col. Levi B. Smith; 28th Ga., Col. T. J. Warthen; 4th N. C., Col. George B. Anderson; 49th Va., Col. William Smith. *Unattached:* 2d Fla., Col. George T. Ward (k); 2d Miss. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. John G. Taylor. Unattached loss: k, 9; w, 61; m, 11=81.

CAVALRY BRIGADE, Brig.-Gen. J. E. B. Stuart: 3d Va., Col. Thomas F. Goode; 4th Va., Maj. William H. Payne (w), Capt. R. E. Utterback; Jeff Davis Legion, Lieut.-Col. William T. Martin; Wise Legion, Col. J. Lucius Davis; Stuart Horse Artillery, Captain John Pelham. Brigade loss: k, 1; w, 3=4.

The total loss of the Confederate Army was 288 killed, 975 wounded, and 297 captured or missing = 1560.

CONFEDERATE USE OF SUBTERRANEAN SHELLS ON THE PENINSULA.

SEVERAL Union officers have written to the editors, stating that they witnessed the explosion of concealed shells or torpedoes at Yorktown — among them Fred T. Locke, assistant adjutant-general to Fitz John Porter, director of the siege, and Colonel Edward C. James, of the engineer corps. General Locke wrote in May, 1885:

"On the morning of May 4th, 1862, our pickets sent in a prisoner who said he was a Union man, had been impressed into the rebel service, and was one of a party detailed to bury some shells in the road and fields near the works. . . . A cavalry detachment passing along the road leading to Yorktown had some of its men and horses killed and wounded by these shells. Our telegraph operator was sent into Yorktown soon after our troops had got possession of the place. He trod upon one of the buried shells, which burst and terribly mangled both of his legs, from which he died soon after in great agony. . . . In the casemates and covered ways about the fortifications I saw a number of large shells, placed so that they could easily be fired by persons unaware of their presence."

The "Official Records" show that General Fitz John Porter referred to the buried shells in his report of the siege, and General William F. Barry, Inspector of Artillery, made a statement in detail, in a communication to army headquarters, August 25th, 1863. Porter's statement is that when the advance detachments entered Yorktown the command

"on the left was fired upon from the Red Fort. Those on the right experienced some losses from shells planted in the ground, which exploded when trod upon. Many of these shells were concealed in the streets and houses of the town, and arranged to explode by treading on the caps or pulling a wire attached to the doors."

General W. F. Barry wrote that buried shells were encountered when they were about to enter the abandoned Confederate lines:

"Before reaching the glacis of the main work, and at the distance of more than one hundred yards from it, several of our men were injured by the explosion of what was ascertained to be loaded shells buried in the ground. These shells were the ordinary eight or ten inch mortar or Columbiad shells, filled with powder, buried a few inches below the surface of the ground, and so arranged with some fulminate, or with the ordinary artillery friction primer, that they exploded by being trod upon or otherwise disturbed. . . . These shells were not thus placed on the glacis at the bottom of the ditch, etc., which, in view of an anticipated assault, might possibly be considered a legitimate use of them, but they were planted by an enemy who was secretly abandoning his post, on common roads, at springs of water, in the shade of trees, at the foot of telegraph poles, and, lastly, quite within the defenses of the place — in the very streets."

On the march from Williamsburg toward Richmond General Longstreet wrote to General G. J. Rains, whose brigade was on duty as rear-guard:

"It is the desire of the major-general commanding [Longstreet] that you put no shells or torpedoes behind you, as he does not recognize it as a proper or effective method of war."

In an indorsement on the above, General Rains advocated the use of buried shells in retreat and for the defense of works. He forwarded Longstreet's letter and his own comments to General D. H. Hill. The latter approvingly indorsed Rains's suggestion. This correspondence went to the Secretary of War, G. W. Randolph, whose decision, favorable to Longstreet's views, was as follows:

"It is not admissible in civilized warfare to take life with no other object than the destruction of life. . . . It is admissible to plant shells in a parapet to repel an assault, or in a wood to check pursuit, because the object is to save the work in one case and the army in the other."

A copy of the "New York Herald," containing General McClellan's report on buried torpedoes at Yorktown, reached General Johnston, who, in a letter dated May 12th, requested General D. H. Hill to ascertain if there was any truth in it. General Hill referred the matter to Rains, who on May 14th reported in part as follows:

"I commanded at Yorktown for the last seven months, and when General McClellan approached with his army of 100,000 men and opened his cannons upon us, I had but 2500 in garrison, and our whole Army of the Peninsula, under Major-General Magruder, amounted to but 9300 effective men; then at a salient angle, an accessible point of our works, as part of the defenses thereof, I had the land mined with the weapons alluded to, to destroy assailants and prevent *escalade*. Subsequently, with a similar view, they were placed at spots I never saw. . . . And again when, at Williamsburg, we were ordered to turn upon our assailants and combat them, . . . some 6 or 7 miles this side of Williamsburg, my command forming the rear-guard of the army, . . . some 4 small shells, found abandoned by our artillery, were hastily prepared by my efforts, and put in the road near a tree felled across, mainly to have a moral effect in checking the advance of the enemy (for they were too small to do more). . . ." [Compare p. 205.] EDITORS.

MANASSAS TO SEVEN PINES.

BY JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON, GENERAL, C. S. A.

CONFEDERATE SHARP-SHOOTER.

ALREADY in this work [Vol. I., p. 240] I have discussed Mr. Davis's statements in his "Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government," so far as they bore upon the responsibilities of the First Bull Run. I will now consider his remarks upon the operations following the withdrawal from Manassas and including the battle of Seven Pines.

As to the question of the forces on the Peninsula Mr. Davis says: "Early in April General McClellan had landed about 100,000 men at or near Fortress Monroe" ["Rise and Fall," II., 84]. According to John Tucker, Assistant Secretary of War, 121,000 Federal troops landed before the 5th of April. Mr. Davis further says: "At this time General Magruder occupied the lower Peninsula with his force of seven or eight thousand men" [II., 84]. General Magruder reported that he had eleven thousand men. Mr. Davis also says:

"After the first advance of the enemy, General Magruder was reënforced by some troops from the south side of James River, and General Wilcox's brigade, which had been previously detached from the army under General Johnston."

These reënforcements, together, made about five thousand men [II, p. 85]. He says, on the same page:

"On the 9th of April, General Magruder's command, thus reënforced, amounted to about 12,000. On that day General Early joined with his division from the Army of Northern Virginia. . . . . This division had about 8000 officers and men for duty. General Magruder's force was thus increased to about 20,000."

The same order detached Early's, D. R. Jones's, and D. H. Hill's divisions from the Army of Northern Virginia, and they were transported as fast as the railroad trains could carry them. The two latter divisions had together about 10,000 men, so that Magruder's army was raised to about 33,000 men, instead of 20,000, as Mr. Davis said.

Coming to the plan of withdrawal Mr. Davis says:

"As soon as it was definitely ascertained that General McClellan, with his main army, was on the Peninsula, General J. E. Johnston was assigned † to the command of the Department of the Peninsula and Norfolk, and directed to proceed thither to examine the condition of affairs there.

† That assignment was made after the conference at Richmond mentioned on page 207.— EDITORS.

After spending a day on General Magruder's defensive line, he returned to Richmond and recommended the abandonment of the Peninsula, and that we should take up a defensive position nearer to Richmond" [II., 86].

The President has forgotten my recommendation, or misunderstood it at the time. I represented to him that General McClellan's design was, almost certainly, to demolish our batteries with his greatly superior artillery, and turn us by the river, either landing in our rear or moving directly to Richmond; so that our attempting to hold Yorktown could only delay the enemy two or three weeks. Instead of that, I proposed that all our available forces should be united near Richmond, Magruder's troops to be among the last to arrive; the great army thus formed about Richmond not to be in a defensive position, as Mr. Davis supposes, but to fall with its whole force upon McClellan when the Federal army was expecting to besiege only the troops it had followed from Yorktown. If the Federal army should be defeated a hundred miles away from its place of refuge, Fort Monroe, it could not escape destruction. This was undoubtedly our best hope [see maps, pp. 167 and 188].

In the conference that followed the President took no part. But the Secretary of War, G. W. Randolph, once a naval officer, opposed the abandonment of the valuable property in the Norfolk Navy Yard; and General Lee opposed the plan proposed, because it would expose Charleston and Savannah to capture. I maintained that if those places should be captured, the defeat of the principal Federal army would enable us to recover them; and that, unless that army should be defeated, we should lose those sea-ports in spite of their garrisons. Mr. Davis says:

"After hearing fully the views of the several officers named, I decided to resist the enemy on the Peninsula. . . . Though General J. E. Johnston did not agree with this decision, he did not ask to be relieved. . . ." [II., 87].

Not being in command, I could not be relieved. My assignment was included in the order to oppose McClellan at Yorktown; that order added to my then command the departments of Norfolk and the Peninsula. It is not easy to reconcile this increase of my command by the President, with his very numerous disparaging notices of me.

General Keyes, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, confirmed my opinion in saying that "Gloucester must have fallen upon our [McClellan's] getting possession of Yorktown, and the York River would then have been open."

Mr. Davis expresses the opinion that "General McClellan certainly might have sent a detachment from his army, which, after crossing York River, could have turned the position at Gloucester Point" [II., 90]. That would have been needless; the driving us from Yorktown would have compelled us to abandon Gloucester Point. Then [Vol. II., p. 91] he says:

"Whether General McClellan . . . would have made an early assault . . . or have waited to batter our earth-works in breach . . . is questionable" [II., 91].

We did not apprehend "battering in breach," but believed that the heavy sea-coast rifles to be mounted in the batteries, about completed, would

demolish our water-batteries, drive us from the intrenchments at Yorktown, and enable the enemy to turn us by the river. Mr. Davis quotes from one of his dispatches to me:

"Your announcement to-day [May 1st] that you would withdraw to-morrow night takes us by surprise, and must involve enormous losses, including unfinished gun-boats. Will the safety of your army allow more time?" [II., 92].

My own announcement was made April 27th, not May 1st, and reached Richmond in ten hours; so the President had abundant time to prevent the withdrawal. The appearance of the enemy's works indicated that fire from them might open upon us the next morning. The withdrawal just then was to avoid waste of life. With regard to the property abandoned he says:

"The loss of public property, as was anticipated, was great, the steamboats expected for its transportation not having arrived before the evacuation was made. From a narrative by General Early I make the following extract: 'A very valuable part of the property so lost . . . consisted of a very large number of picks and spades. . . . All of our heavy guns, including some recently arrived and not mounted, together with a good deal of ammunition piled upon the wharf, had to be left behind'" [II., 94].

The steamboats he mentions were controlled in Richmond. As to the loss of very valuable picks and spades, Colonel Henry T. Douglas, chief engineer at Yorktown, wrote to me, May 12th, 1883:

REGION BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND RICHMOND.

"I was at Yorktown the evening before the evacuation commenced. I did not see any quantity of picks and shovels there, and cannot understand how they could have accumulated there when they were needed so much from Redoubt Number Five to Lee's Mills—that is, on the extreme right of our line."

General D. H. Hill, who commanded in and near Yorktown, said, in his official report: "We lost very little by the retreat, save some medical stores which Surgeon Coffin deserted in his flight, May 1st. The heavy guns were all of the old navy pattern." We had very little ammunition on hand at the time. The heavy guns could have been saved only by holding the place, which was impossible.

Mr. Davis says that General Magruder's "absence at this moment was the more to be regretted, as it appears that the positions of the redoubts he had constructed [before Williamsburg] were not all known to the commanding general"

[II., 94]. The positions of the redoubts were "all known." But to a body of troops serving merely as a rear-guard, it was necessary to occupy only those nearest the road. A rear-guard distributed in all the redoubts intended for an army could have held none of them. The event showed that the proper redoubts were occupied. It is singular that Mr. Davis's only notice of the conflict at Williamsburg, in which our troops behaved admirably, relates to a detached affair, unimportant, because it had, and could have, no influence upon the real event. Mr. Davis says of General Early's account of his attack upon Hancock at Williamsburg:

"He [Early] confidently expresses the opinion that had his attack been supported promptly and vigorously, the enemy's force there engaged must have been captured" [II., 96].

General Early sent an officer to report that there was a battery in front of him which he could take, and asked authority to do so. The message was delivered to General Longstreet, who referred the messenger to me, we being together. I authorized the attempt, but desired the general to look carefully first. Under the circumstances he could not have expected support, for he moved out of reach of it.

Mr. Davis speaks of the employment of sub-terra shells to check a marching column, and quotes from General Rains as follows:

"Fortunately we found in a mud-hole a broken ammunition wagon containing five loaded shells. Four of these, armed with a sensitive fuse-primer, were planted in our rear, near some trees cut down as obstructions to the road. A body of the enemy's cavalry came upon these sub-terra shells, and they exploded with terrific effect" [II., 97].

This event was not mentioned in General D. H. Hill's report, although General Rains belonged to his division, nor was it mentioned by our cavalry which followed Hill's division. Such an occurrence would have been known to the whole army, but it was not; so it must have been a dream of the writer. [But see p. 201.—EDITORS.]

Mr. Davis says: "The next morning after the battle of the 5th, at Williamsburg, Longstreet's and D. H. Hill's divisions being those there engaged" [II., 98]. But one regiment of Hill's division was engaged.

In the Federal reports of this action, it is treated as a battle in which the whole Confederate army was engaged. It was an affair with our rear-guard, the object of which was to secure our baggage trains. For that it was necessary to detain the Federal army a day, which was accomplished by the rear-guard. In those Federal reports a victory is claimed.⚓ The proofs

⚓ General McClellan's statement was as follows:

"Notwithstanding the report I received from General Heintzelman during the night [of the 5th], that General Hooker's division had suffered so much that it could not be relied upon next day, and that Kearny's could not do more than hold its own without reënforcements, being satisfied that the result of Hancock's engagement was to give us possession of the decisive point of the battle-field, during the night I countermanded the order for the advance of the divisions of Sedgwick and Richardson and directed them to return to Yorktown. . . . On the next morning we found the enemy's position abandoned, and occupied Fort Magruder and the town of Williamsburg, which was filled with the enemy's wounded. . . . Colonel Averell was sent forward at once with a strong cavalry force to endeavor to overtake the enemy's rear-guard. He found several guns abandoned and picked up a large number of stragglers, but the condition of the roads and the state of his supplies forced him to return after advancing a few miles. . . . The supply trains had been forced out of the roads on the 4th and 5th to allow troops and artillery to pass to the front, and the roads were now in such a state, after thirty-six hours' continuous rain, that it was almost impossible to pass even empty wagons over them. General Hooker's division had suffered so severely that it was in no condition to follow the enemy, even if the roads had been good. Under these circumstances an immediate pursuit was impossible." EDITORS.

are: (1) That what deserves to be called fighting ceased at least two hours before dark, yet the Confederates held the ground until the next morning, having slept on the field, and then resumed their march; (2) that they fought only to protect their trains, and accomplished the object; (3) that although they marched but twelve miles the day after the affair, they saw no indications of pursuit, unless the seeing a scouting party once can so be called; (4) that they inflicted a loss much greater than that they suffered; (5) and that in the ten days following the fight they marched but thirty-seven miles. They left four hundred wounded in Williamsburg, because they had no means of transporting them. But they captured five cannon and destroyed the carriages of five more, and took four hundred prisoners and several colors.

Mr. Davis says:

"In the meantime, Franklin's division had gone up the York River and landed a short distance below West Point, on the south side of York River, and moved into a thick wood in the direction of the New Kent road, thus threatening the flank of our line of march. [McClellan wrote that the divisions of Franklin, Sedgwick, Porter, and Richardson were sent from Yorktown by water to the right bank of the Pamunkey, near West Point.—J. E. J.] Two brigades of General G. W. Smith's division, Hampton's and Hood's, were detached under the command of General Whiting to dislodge the enemy, which they did after a short conflict, driving him through the wood to the protection of his gun-boats in York River" [II., 98].

The Federal force engaged was very much less than a division.

Mr. Davis says, lower down: "The loss of the enemy [in the battle of Williamsburg] greatly exceeded our own, which was about 1200." He means exclusive of General Early's loss. According to General McClellan's report his loss was 2228. General Hooker stated under oath that his was 1700.† But Kearny's, Couch's, and two-thirds of Smith's division, and Peck's brigade were engaged also; a loss of 528 is very small among so many.‡

Mr. Davis says:

"Soon after General Johnston took position on the north of the Chickahominy, accompanied by General Lee, I rode out to his headquarters. . . . A long conversation followed, which was so inconclusive that it lasted until late in the night, so late that we remained until the next morning. As we rode back to Richmond, . . . General Lee confessed himself, as I was unable to draw from it any more definite purpose than that the policy was to . . . improve his [Johnston's] position as far as practicable, and wait for the enemy to leave his gun-boats, so that an opportunity might be offered to meet him on land" [II., 101].

I explained that I had fallen back that far to clear my left flank of the navigable water, and so avoid having it turned; that as we were too weak to assume the offensive, and as the position I then held was an excellent one, I intended to await the Federal attack there. These explanations covered the whole ground, so that the President had no cause to complain, especially as he suggested nothing better. And he was satisfied then; for, three days later, he wrote to me by Colonel G. W. C. Lee: " . . . If the enemy proceed as heretofore indicated, your position and policy, as you stated it in

† The total Union loss was 2283, and Hooker's loss, 1575. See tables, p. 200.—EDITORS.

‡ Peck's brigade (five regiments) belonged to Couch's division and was the only brigade of that division which took part in the battle. Five regiments of Kearny's division (2 of Birney's brigade and 3 of Berry's) and 6 of Smith's division (4 of Hancock's and 2 of Davidson's) were engaged, so the loss (exclusive of Hooker's) of 528 belonged, in fact, to only 16 regiments.—EDITORS.



FORT MAGRUDER AND OTHER CONFEDERATE EARTH-WORKS IN FRONT OF WILLIAMSBURG. FROM SKETCHES MADE MAY 6, 1862.



WILLIAM AND MARY COLLEGE, WILLIAMSBURG, USED AS A UNION HOSPITAL.

our last interview, seems to me to require no modification." This is the interview called "inconclusive." Mr. Davis says:

"After the repulse of the enemy's gunboats at Drewry's Bluff [May 15th, 1862], I wrote to General Johnston a letter to be handed to him by my aide, Colonel G. W. C. Lee. . . . I soon thereafter rode out to visit General Johnston at his headquarters, and was surprised, in the suburbs of Richmond, . . . to meet a portion of the light artillery, and to learn that the whole army had crossed the Chickahominy" [II., 103].

The army crossed the Chickahominy immediately after the affair of Drewry's Bluff. So that if Colonel Lee delivered a letter to me then, he of course reported to the President that I had crossed the river. And as the army's nearest approach to Richmond was on the 17th, his meeting with the light artillery must have occurred that day. So one cannot understand his surprise.

He says on the same page:

"General Johnston's explanation of this (to me) unexpected movement was, that he thought the water of the Chickahominy unhealthy. . . . He also adverted to the advantage of having the river in front rather than in the rear of him."

The army crossed the Chickahominy because the possession of James River by the enemy suggested the probability of a change of base to that river. And it was necessary that we should be so placed as to be able to meet the United States army approaching either from York River or along the James. Water was not considered, for we did not use that of the Chicka-

hominy; nor the position of the little stream behind us, for we had four bridges over it. The position of Seven Pines was chosen for the center, the right somewhat thrown back. But the scarcity of water induced me to draw nearer to Richmond, which was done on the 17th.

Mr. Davis makes statements [II., 106] regarding the strength of the Army of Northern Virginia, on the 21st and 31st of May; but as he treats the subject more minutely farther on, we will examine what he says [p. 153]:

"In the Archives Offices of the War Department in Washington, there are on file some of the field and monthly returns of the Army of Northern Virginia. . . . The following statements have been taken from those papers by Major Walter H. Taylor, of the staff of General Lee. . . .

"A statement of the strength of the troops under General Johnston shows that on May 21st, 1862, he had present for duty, as follows: Smith's division, . . . 10,592; Longstreet's division, . . . 13,816; Magruder's division, . . . 15,680 [240 too little.—J. E. J.]; D. H. Hill's division, . . . 11,151; cavalry brigade, 1289; reserve artillery, 1160; \ total effective men, 53,688."

The above is from Major Taylor's memorandum given the President, made from estimates of brigades, not from returns. Without being accurate, it is not far from the truth; corrected as above, Magruder should be given 15,920 men. Mr. Davis continues:

"Major Taylor in his work ('Four Years with General Lee') states: 'In addition to the troops above enumerated, . . . there were two brigades subject to his orders, then stationed in the vicinity of Hanover Junction, one under the command of General J. R. Anderson, and the other under the command of General Branch. They were subsequently incorporated into the division of General A. P. Hill.' [Mr. Davis continues]: . . . He estimates the strength of the two at 4000 effective.

" . . . Previous to the battle of Seven Pines, General Johnston was reënforced by General Huger's division of three brigades. The total strength of these three brigades, according to the 'Reports of the Operations of the Army of Northern Virginia,' was 5008 effectives. Taylor says: 'If the strength of these five be added to the return of May 21st, we shall have 62,696 as the effective strength of the army under General Johnston on May 31st, 1862.'"

But according to General Huger's report to me, there were 7000 men (instead of 5008) in his three brigades, which does not exceed the ordinary strength of brigades then (that is to say, three average brigades would have had not less than 7000 men); and what Mr. Davis calls two brigades of "4000 effective" were, in fact, Anderson's division sent to observe McDowell's corps at Fredericksburg, and so large that General Lee called it the army of the North, and estimated it as 10,000 men; ☆ and the second, Branch's brigade, greatly strengthened to protect the railroad at Gordonsville, and estimated by General Lee as 5000 men. ⌋ When these troops were united on the Chickahominy, General Anderson's estimate of their numbers was, of the first, 9000, and of the other, 4000; 20,000 then, and not 9008, is the number to be added

\ According to General Johnston's memorandum of May 21st, 1862, "Official Records," Vol. XI., Part III., p. 531, the reserve artillery numbered 920.—Editors.

☆ "I advised you, April 23d, of certain troops ordered to report to General Field, viz.: two regiments from Richmond, two light batteries, a brigade from South Carolina, and one from North Carolina (Anderson's), in all 8000, in addition to those [2500.—J. E. J.] previously there."—General Lee's letter, May 8th.—"Official Records," Vol. XI., Part III., pp 500–1.—J. E. J.

⌋ "Two brigades, one from North Carolina (Branch's) and one from Norfolk, have been ordered to Gordonsville to reënforce that line."—General Lee's letter, as above.—J. E. J.

to the return of May 21st, 1862, to show the effective strength of that army May 31st, viz., 73,928, including the correction of the number in Magruder's division.

Referring to our withdrawal from the north side of the Chickahominy to the vicinity of Richmond, Mr. Davis says:

"Remembering a remark of General Johnston's that the Spaniards were the only people who now undertook to hold fortified towns, I had written to him that he knew the defense of Richmond must be made at a distance from it" [II., 120].

Mr. Davis is mistaken. No such letter was sent to me then. We communicated with each other only orally, excepting a note he sent me to point out that I had been absent from a skirmish the day before. He knew that the fact that the enemy was then able to approach Richmond either from York River or by the James compelled me to prepare for either event, by placing the army near the city. A short time before, he wrote: "To you it is needless to say that the defense must be made outside of the city." His next sentence, approving the course I was pursuing, has been quoted in connection with what the President said of an "inconclusive" conversation with me.

MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN B. MAGRUDER, C. S. A. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

Mr. Davis continues, a little farther down [II., 120]:

"It had not occurred to me that he [Johnston] meditated a retreat which would uncover the capital, nor was it ever suspected, until, in reading General Hood's book, published in 1880, the evidence was found that General Johnston, when retreating from Yorktown, told his volunteer aide, Mr. McFarland, that 'he [Johnston] expected or intended to give up Richmond.'"

This story of Mr. McFarland is incredible. He, a very rich, fat old man, could not have been an aide-de-camp. As I did not know him at all until four years later, and then barely, he could not have been my aide-de-camp. And lastly, I had no volunteer aide. Besides, the Confederate President had abundant evidence that I had no such expectation, in the fact that, so far from giving up Richmond, I stood between it and the Federal army for three weeks, until I was disabled by desperate wounds received in its defense. Under such circumstances his accusation is, to say the least, very discreditable. E. J. Harvie, late Colonel and Assistant Inspector-General, C. S. A., now in the "War Records" Office, Washington, in answer to my question, "Had I ever a volunteer aide-de-camp named McFarland, or any volunteer aide-de-camp after leaving Manassas, while serving in Virginia?" wrote me, under date of January 28th, 1885, as follows: "To my knowledge, you certainly had not.

My position as your staff-officer justifies me in saying that Mr. McFarland was not with you in any capacity."

Surgeon A. M. Fauntleroy, in answer to my question, "Had I a volunteer aide-de-camp in May, 1862, especially when the army was moving from Yorktown toward Richmond; or did you ever in that time see an old gentleman of Richmond, named McFarland, about my headquarters?" writes:

"I never did. I cannot well see how such a person could have escaped my observation, if he was there at any time."

And J. B. Washington, president of the Baltimore and Philadelphia Railway, writes me as follows:

"You had not on your staff after leaving Manassas a volunteer aide-de-camp, especially during May, 1862, when the army was between Yorktown and Richmond. I was personally acquainted with Mr. McFarland of Richmond, but never saw him at our headquarters, nor heard of his ever having been there. Having served as aide-de-camp on your staff from May, 1861, to February, 1864, I was in the position to know of the circumstances of which I have written."

Mr. Davis says:

"Seeing no preparation to keep the enemy at a distance . . . I sent for General Lee . . . and told him why and how I was dissatisfied with the condition of affairs. He asked me what I thought it was proper to do. . . . I answered that McClellan should be attacked on the other side of the Chickahominy, before he matured his preparations for a siege of Richmond. To this he promptly assented. . . . He then said: 'General Johnston should, of course, advise you of what he expects or proposes to do. Let me go and see him.' . . . When General Lee came back, he told me that General Johnston proposed, on the next Thursday, to move against the enemy, as follows: 'General A. P. Hill was to move down on the right flank and rear of the enemy. General G. W. Smith, as soon as Hill's guns opened, was to cross the Chickahominy at the Meadow Bridge, attack the enemy in flank, and, by the conjunction of the two, it was expected to double him up. Then Longstreet was to cross on the Mechanicsville bridge and attack him in front. From this plan the best results were hoped by both of us" [II., 120].

It is certain that General Lee could have had no such hopes from this plan, nor have been a party to it; for it would not only have sent our army where there was no enemy, but left open the way to Richmond. For the Meadow Bridge is 2½ miles from Mechanicsville, and that place about 6 miles above the Federal right. So, after two-thirds of our troops had crossed the Chickahominy, the Federal army could have marched straight to Richmond, opposed by not more than one-fifth of its number in Magruder's and D. H. Hill's divisions. This plan is probably the wildest on record.

As to what is described [II., 121], G. W. Smith's division was never in the place indicated, and General Longstreet's was never on the Mechanicsville road near the bridge, before General Lee crossed the Chickahominy to fight at Gaines's Mills.

A glance at the map will show how singularly incorrect is Mr. Davis's description [II., 122–3] of the vicinity of Seven Pines and of the disposition of the Federal troops.

On the 23d of May, Keyes's Federal corps crossed to the south side of the Chickahominy, and a detachment attacked Hatton's Confederate brigade, which was in observation near Savage's Station. The detachment was driven

back, and Hatton's object having been accomplished (to learn whether the enemy had crossed the stream), he was recalled. I was advised to hold that position with the army, but preferred to let the enemy advance, which would increase the interval between his left and the right, which was beyond the Chickahominy. McDowell's corps of 40,000 men‡ was then at Fredericksburg, observed by a division under Brigadier-General J. R. Anderson; and a large Confederate brigade, under Brigadier-General Branch, was at Gordonsville.

On the 24th our cavalry was driven across the Chickahominy, principally at Mechanicsville. This extension of the right wing of the enemy to the west made me apprehend that the two detachments (Anderson and Branch) above mentioned might be cut off. They were therefore ordered to fall back to the Chickahominy. Near Hanover Court House the brigade was attacked by Porter's corps and driven off, escaping with a loss of 66 killed, and 177 wounded, as General Branch reported.† A division was formed of Anderson's and Branch's troops, to the command of which Major-General A. P. Hill was assigned.

That evening General Anderson sent word that his scouts left near Fredericksburg reported that McDowell's troops were marching southward. As the object of this march was evidently the junction of this corps with the main army, I determined to attack McClellan before McDowell could join him; and the major-generals were desired to hold their troops ready to move. But at night, when those officers were with me to receive instructions for the expected battle, General J. E. B. Stuart, who also had a detachment of cavalry observing McDowell's corps, reported that it had returned to Fredericksburg. As my object was to bring on the inevitable battle before McClellan should receive an addition of 40,000 men to his forces, this intelligence made me return to my first design — that of attacking McClellan's left wing on the Williamsburg road as soon as, by advancing, it had sufficiently increased its distance from his right, north of the Chickahominy.

The morning of the 30th, armed reconnoissances were made under General D. H. Hill's direction — on the Charles City road by Brigadier-General Rodes, and on the Williamsburg road by Brigadier-General Garland. The latter found Federal outposts five miles from Richmond — or two miles west of Seven Pines — in such strength as indicated that a corps was near. On receiving this information from General Hill, I informed him that he would lead an attack on the enemy next morning. Orders were given for the concentration of twenty-two of our twenty-eight brigades against McClellan's left wing, about two-fifths of his army. Our six other brigades were guarding the river from New Bridge to Meadow Bridge, on our extreme left. Longstreet and Huger were directed to conduct their divisions to D. H. Hill's position on the Williamsburg road, and G. W. Smith to march with his to the junction

‡ McDowell says, May 22d, 1862, "Official Records," Vol. XII., Part III., p. 214, that he would require subsistence for 38,000 men. This included both effectives and non-effectives. A fair deduction would leave McDowell about 35,000 combatants, to compute by the basis on which the Confederate generals always estimated their strength. — EDITORS.

† Exclusive of the loss of the 28th North Carolina, of Lane's command, which as far as reported was 7 killed and 15 wounded. — EDITORS.



MAJOR-GENERAL BENJAMIN HUGER, C. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

of the Nine-mile road with the New Bridge road, where Magruder was with four brigades.

Longstreet, as ranking officer of the troops on the Williamsburg road, was instructed verbally to form D. H. Hill's division as first line, and his own as second, across the road at right angles, and to advance in that order to attack the enemy; while Huger's division should march by the right flank along the Charles City road, to fall upon the enemy's flank when our troops were engaged with him in front. Federal earth-works and abatis that might be found were to be turned. G. W. Smith was to protect the troops under Longstreet from attack by those of the Federal right wing across the Chickahominy; and, if such transfer should not be threatened, he was to fall upon the enemy on the Williamsburg road. Those troops were formed in four lines, each being a division. Casey's was a mile west of Seven Pines, with a line of skirmishers a half mile in advance; Couch's was at Seven Pines and Fair Oaks — the two forming Keyes's corps. Kearny's division was near Savage's Station, and Hooker's two miles west of Bottom's Bridge — the two forming Heintzelman's corps.

Longstreet's command of the right was to end when the troops approached Seven Pines and I should be present to direct the movements, after which each major-general would command his own division. The rain began to fall violently in the afternoon of the 30th, and continued all night. In the morning the little streams near our camps were so much swollen as to make it probable that the Chickahominy was overflowing its banks and cutting the communication between the wings of the Federal army. Being confident that Longstreet and D. H. Hill, with their forces united, would be successful in the earlier part of the action against adversaries formed in several lines, with wide intervals between them, I left the immediate control on the Williamsburg road to them, under general instructions, and placed myself on the left, where I could soonest learn of the approach of Federal reënforcements from their right. For this scouts were sent forward to discover all movements that might be made by the enemy.‖

The condition of the ground and little streams delayed the troops in marching; yet those of Smith, Longstreet, and Hill were in position quite early enough. But the soldiers from Norfolk, who had seen garrison service only,

‖ The map of Seven Pines, printed with this paper in "The Century Magazine" for May, 1885, was prepared by the editors, and has been canceled because of incorrectness as to the positions of the opposing forces on the night of May 31st, as well as on the morning of June 1st.— EDITORS.

were unnecessarily stopped in their march by a swollen rivulet. This unexpected delay led to interchange of messages for several hours between General Longstreet and myself, I urging Longstreet to begin the fight, he replying. But, near 2 o'clock, that officer was requested to go forward to the attack; the hands of my watch marked 3 o'clock at the report of the first field-piece.[1] The Federal advanced line—a long line of skirmishers, supported by several regiments—was encountered at 3 o'clock. The greatly superior numbers of the Confederates soon drove them back to the main position of Casey's division. It occupied a line of rifle-pits, strengthened by a redoubt and abatis. Here the resistance was very obstinate; for the Federals, commanded by an officer of skill and tried courage, fought as soldiers generally do under good leaders; and time and vigorous efforts of superior numbers were required to drive them from their ground. But the resolution of Garland's and G. B. Anderson's brigades, that pressed forward on our left through an open field, under a destructive fire, the admirable service of Carter's and Bondurant's batteries, and a skillfully combined attack upon the Federal left, under General Hill's direction, by Rodes's brigade in front and that of Rains in flank, were at last successful, and the enemy abandoned their intrenchments. Just then reënforcements from Couch's division came up, and an effort was made to recover the position. But it was to no purpose; for two regiments of R. H. Anderson's brigade reënforced Hill's troops, and the Federals were driven back to Seven Pines.

Keyes's corps (Casey's and Couch's divisions) was united at Seven Pines and reënforced by Kearny's division, coming from Savage's Station. But the three divisions were so vigorously attacked by Hill that they were broken and driven from their intrenchments, the greater part along the Williamsburg road to the intrenched line west of Savage's Station. Two brigades of their left, however, fled to White Oak Swamp.

General Hill pursued the enemy a mile; then, night being near, he re-formed his troops, facing toward the Federals. Longstreet's and Huger's divisions, coming up, were formed between Hill's line and Fair Oaks.

For some cause the disposition on the Charles City road was modified. Two of General Huger's brigades were ordered to advance along that road, with three of Longstreet's under Brigadier-General Wilcox. After following that road some miles, General Wilcox received orders to conduct his troops to the Williamsburg road. On entering it, he was ordered to the front, and two of his regiments joined Hill's troops near and approaching Seven Pines.

When the action just described began, the musketry was not heard at my position on the Nine-mile road, from the unfavorable condition of the air; and I supposed for some time that we were hearing only an artillery duel. But a staff-officer was sent to ascertain the facts. He returned at 4 o'clock with intelligence that our infantry as well as artillery had been engaged an hour, and all were pressing on vigorously. As no approach of troops from beyond the Chickahominy had been discovered, I hoped that the enemy's

[1] General D. H. Hill, who directed the onset, says in his report: "At 1 o'clock the signal guns were fired, and my division moved off in fine style." In their reports, the Union commanders name 12:30 and 1 o'clock as the time of the Confederate attack.—EDITORS.

bridges were impassible, and therefore desired General Smith to move toward Seven Pines, to be ready to coöperate with our right. He moved promptly along the Nine-mile road, and his leading regiment soon became engaged with the Federal skirmishers and their reserves, and in a few minutes drove them off.

On my way to Longstreet's left, to combine the action of the two bodies of troops, I passed the head of General Smith's column near Fair Oaks, and saw the camps of about a brigade in the angle between the Nine-mile road and the York River Railroad, and the rear of a column of infantry moving in quick time from that point toward the Chickahominy by the road to the Grapevine ford. A few minutes after this, a battery near the point where this infantry had disappeared commenced firing upon the head of the Confederate column. A regiment sent against it was received with a volley of musketry, as well as canister, and recoiled. The leading brigade, commanded by Colonel Law, then advanced, and so much strength was developed by the enemy that General Smith brought his other brigades into action on the left of Law's. An obstinate contest began, and was maintained on equal terms, although we engaged superior numbers on ground of their own choosing.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL DANIEL H. HILL, C. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

I had passed the railroad a few hundred yards with Hood's brigade when the firing commenced, and stopped to see it terminated. But being confident that the enemy opposing us were those whose camp I had just seen, and therefore only a brigade, I did not doubt that General Smith was more than strong enough to cope with them. Therefore, General Hood was directed to go on in such a direction as to connect his right with Longstreet's left and take his antagonists in flank. The direction of that firing was then nearly south-west from Fair Oaks. It was then about 5 o'clock.

In that position my intercourse with Longstreet was maintained through staff-officers, who were assisted by General Stuart of the cavalry, which was then unemployed; their reports were all of steady progress.

At Fair Oaks, however, no advantage was gained on either side, and the contest was continued with unflagging courage. It was near half-past 6 o'clock before I admitted to myself that Smith was engaged, not with a brigade, as I had obstinately thought, but with more than a division; but I thought that it would be injudicious to engage Magruder's division, our only reserve, so late in the day.

The firing was then violent at Seven Pines, and within a half hour the three Federal divisions were broken and driven from their position in con-

fusion. It was then evident, however, from the obstinacy of our adversaries at Fair Oaks, that the battle would not be decided that day. I said so to the staff-officers near me, and told them that each regiment must sleep where it might be standing when the firing ceased for the night, to be ready to renew it at dawn next morning.

About half-past 7 o'clock I received a musket-shot in the shoulder, and was unhorsed soon after by a heavy fragment of shell which struck my breast. I was borne from the field — first to a house on the roadside, thence to Richmond. The firing ceased before I had been carried a mile from it. The conflict at Fair Oaks was terminated by darkness only.

Mr. Davis's account of what he saw and did at Fair Oaks (II., 123) indicates singular ignorance of the topography of the vicinity, as well as of what was occurring. He says that the enemy's line was on the bank of the river. It was at right angles to and some three miles from it. He says that soon after his arrival I was brought from the right wounded. This proves that his "arrival" was near sunset. He also describes the moving of reënforcements from the left to the right. This was not being done. The right was abundantly strong. He says that he made a reconnoissance — then sent three couriers one after the other, with an order to Magruder "to send a force" by the wooded path under the bluff, to attack the enemy in flank and reverse. If the first courier had been dispatched before the reconnoissance, and delivered the order to Magruder promptly, his "force," marching little more than a mile by the straight Nine-mile road, could scarcely have come up before dark. The route described would have been (if found) five or six miles long.

The only thing he ought to have done, or had time to do, was postponed almost twenty hours — the putting General Lee, who was near, in command of the army.

The operations of the Confederate troops in this battle were very much retarded by the broad ponds of rain-water, — in many places more than knee-deep, — by the deep mud, and by the dense woods and thickets that covered the ground.

Brigadier-General Hatton was among the killed, and Brigadier-Generals Pettigrew and Hampton were severely wounded. The latter kept his saddle, and served to the end of the action. Among the killed on the Williamsburg road were Colonels Moore, of Alabama, Jones, and Lomax. In the two days' battle, the Confederate loss, so far as the reports indicate, was 6134 (including the loss in G. W. Smith's division, which was 1283); and the Federal loss, according to the revised returns, was 5031.

Prisoners to the number of 350, 10 pieces of artillery, 6700 muskets and rifles in excellent condition, a garrison flag and 4 regimental colors, medical, commissary, quartermaster and ordnance stores, tents and sutler's property, were captured and secured.

The troops on the ground at nightfall were: on the Confederate side, 22 brigades, more than half of which had not been in action; and on the Federal side 6 divisions in 3 corps, two-thirds of which had fought, and half of which

BURYING THE DEAD, AND BURNING HORSES, AT THE TWIN HOUSES NEAR CASEY'S REDOUBT, AFTER THE SECOND DAY'S FIGHT.
FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

had been totally defeated. Two Federal divisions were at Fair Oaks, and three and a half at Savage's, three miles off, and half a one two miles nearer Bottom's Bridge. The Southern troops were united, and in a position to overwhelm either fraction of the Northern army, while holding the other in check.



MAJOR-GENERAL GUSTAVUS W. SMITH, C. S. A.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

Officers of the Federal army have claimed a victory at Seven Pines. The Confederates had such evidences of victory as cannon, captured intrenchments, and not only sleeping on the field, but passing the following day there, so little disturbed by the Federal troops as to gather, in woods, thickets, mud, and water, 6700 muskets and rifles.☆ Besides, the Federal army had been advancing steadily until the day of this battle; after it they made not another step forward, but employed themselves industriously in intrenching.

In a publication of mine ["Johnston's Narrative"] made in 1874, I attempted to show that General Lee did not attack the enemy until June 26th, because he was engaged from June 1st until then in forming a great army, bringing to that which I had commanded 15,000 men from North Carolina under General Holmes, 22,000 from South Carolina and Georgia, and above 16,000 in the divisions of Jackson and Ewell. My authority for the 15,000 was General Holmes's statement, May 31st, that he had that number waiting the President's order to join me. When their arrival was announced, I supposed the number was as stated.

General Ripley, their best-informed and senior officer, was my authority for the 22,000 from South Carolina and Georgia. I thought, as a matter of course, that all of these troops had been brought up for the great crisis. Mr. Davis is eager to prove that but 2 of the 4 bodies of them came to Richmond in time. One who, like me, had opportunity to observe that Mr. Davis was almost invariably too late in reënforcing threatened from unthreatened points, has no apology for the assumption that this was an exception. General Ripley reported officially that he brought 5000 from Charleston, and explained in writing that, arriving before them, he was assigned to the command of

☆ The Union position at Fair Oaks was, in general, maintained on both days of the battle. Part of the field east of Seven Pines (but not Casey's camp, which was west) was regained on the second day by General Heintzelman, who reported that "our troops pushed as far forward as the battle-field of the previous day, where they found many of our wounded and those of the enemy." General Daniel E. Sickles, who advanced to Casey's camp on June 2d, the Confederates having withdrawn in the night, states in his report that "the fields were strewn with Enfield rifles, marked 'Tower, 1862,' and muskets, marked 'Virginia,' thrown away by the enemy in his hurried retreat. In the camp occupied by General Casey and General Couch on Saturday before the battle of Seven Pines, we found rebel caissons filled with ammunition, a large number of small-arms and several baggage wagons."— EDITORS.

the brigade of 2366, his 5000 being distributed as they arrived in detachments. General Lawton stated in writing that he brought about 6000 men from Georgia to the Valley; but as they had never marched before, they were incapable of moving at Jackson's rate, and he estimated that 2500 had been unable to keep their places when they arrived at Gaines's Mill, where, as he states, he had 3500. But the laggards rejoined him in two or three days.

I estimated Jackson's and Ewell's forces at 16,000, because Ewell told me that his was 8000, and Jackson's had been usually about twenty-five per cent. larger. Mr. Davis puts the joint force at 8000. His authority has stated it also at 12,000 (see "Personal Reminiscences of General Lee," p. 6), and this is far below the fact. My object in this is to show that I consulted respectable authorities. Mr. Davis proves that his forces were not well employed.

OPPOSING FORCES AT SEVEN PINES, MAY 31–JUNE 1, 1862.

The composition, losses, and strength of each army as here stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the Official Records. K stands for killed; w for wounded; m w for mortally wounded; m for captured or missing; c for captured.

THE UNION ARMY.

Major-General George B. McClellan.

SECOND ARMY CORPS, Brig.-Gen. Edwin V. Sumner.
FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Israel B. Richardson.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Oliver O. Howard (w), Col. Thomas J. Parker: 5th N. H., Col. E. E. Cross (w), Lieut.-Col. Samuel G. Langley; 61st N. Y., Col. Francis C. Barlow; 64th N. Y., Col. T. J. Parker, Capt. Rufus Washburn; 81st Pa., Col. James Miller (k), Lieut.-Col. Charles F. Johnson. Brigade loss: k, 95; w, 398; m, 64 = 557. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Thomas F. Meagher: 63d N. Y., Col. John Burke; 69th N. Y., Col. Robert Nugent; 88th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Patrick Kelly. Brigade loss: k, 7; w, 31; m, 1 = 39. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. William H. French: 52d N. Y., Col. Paul Frank; 57th N. Y., Col. Samuel K. Zook; 66th N. Y., Col. Joseph C. Pinckney; 53d Pa., Col. John R. Brooke. Brigade loss: k, 32; w, 188; m, 22 = 242. *Artillery*, Capt. G. W. Hazzard: B, 1st N. Y., Capt. Rufus D. Pettit; G, 1st N. Y., Capt. John D. Frank; A and C, 4th U. S., Capt. G. W. Hazzard.
SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. John Sedgwick.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Willis A. Gorman: 15th Mass., Lieut.-Col. John W. Kimball; 1st Minn., Col. Alfred Sully; 34th N. Y., Col. James A. Suiter; 82d N. Y., (2d Militia), Lieut.-Col. Henry W. Hudson; 1st Co. Mass. Sharp-shooters, Capt. John Saunders; 2d Co. Minn. Sharp-shooters, Capt. William F. Russell. Brigade loss: k, 40; w, 153; m, 3 = 196. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. William W. Burns: 69th Pa., Col. Joshua T. Owen; 71st Pa., Maj. Charles W. Smith; 72d Pa., Col. De Witt C. Baxter; 106th Pa., Col. Turner G. Morehead. Brigade loss: k, 5; w, 30 = 35. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. N. J. T. Dana: 19th Mass., Col. Edward W. Hinks; 20th Mass., Col. W. Raymond Lee; 7th Mich., Col. Ira R. Grosvenor, Maj. John H. Richardson; 42d N. Y., Col. E. C. Charles. Brigade loss: k, 16; w, 95 = 111. *Artillery*, Col. Charles H. Tompkins: A, 1st R. I., Capt. John A. Tompkins; B, 1st R. I., Capt. Walter O. Bartlett; G, 1st R. I., Capt. Charles D. Owen; I, 1st U. S., Lieut. Edmund Kirby. Artillery loss: k, 1; w, 4 = 5. *Cavalry:* K, 6th N. Y., Capt. Riley Johnson.

THIRD ARMY CORPS, Brig.-Gen. S. P. Heintzelman (commanded the Third and Fourth Corps, combined).
SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Jos. Hooker. Staff loss: w, 1.

Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Daniel E. Sickles: 70th N. Y. (1st Excelsior), Maj. Thomas Holt; 71st N. Y. (2d Excelsior), Col. George B. Hall; 72d N. Y. (3d Excelsior), Col. Nelson Taylor; 73d N. Y. (4th Excelsior), Maj. John D. Moriarty, Capt. Charles B. Elliott; 74th N. Y. (5th Excelsior), Col. Charles K. Graham. Brigade loss: k, 7; w, 61; m, 6 = 74. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Francis E. Patterson, Col. Samuel H. Starr: 5th N. J., Col. Samuel H. Starr; Maj. John Ramsey; 6th N. J., Col. Gershom Mott. Brigade loss: k, 9; w, 67; m, 3 = 79. *Artillery*, Maj. Charles S. Wainwright: D, 1st N. Y., Capt. Thos. W. Osborn; 6th N. Y., Capt. Walter M. Bramhall.
THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Phil. Kearny. Staff loss: w, 1.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Charles D. Jameson: 87th N. Y., Col. Stephen A. Dodge (w), Lieut.-Col. Richard A. Bachia; 57th Pa., Col. Charles T. Campbell (w), Lieut-Col. E. W. Woods; 63d Pa., Col. Alexander Hays; 105th Pa., Col. Amor A. McKnight (w). Brigade loss: k, 86; w, 297; m, 36 = 419. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. David B. Birney, Col. J. H. H. Ward: 3d Me., Col. Henry G. Staples; 4th Me., Col. Elijah Walker; 38th N. Y., Col. J. H. H. Ward, Maj. William H. Baird; 40th N.Y., Lieut.-Col. Thomas W. Egan. Brigade loss: k, 23; w, 174; m, 10 = 207.

Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Hiram G. Berry: 2d Mich., Col. Orlando M. Poe; 3d Mich., Col. S. G. Champlin (w), Lieut.-Col. A. A. Stevens; 5th Mich., Col. Henry D. Terry; 37th N. Y., Lieut-Col. Gilbert Riordan (temporarily), Col. Samuel B. Hayman. Brigade loss: k, 84; w, 344; m, 36 = 464.

FOURTH ARMY CORPS, Brig.-Gen. E. D. Keyes.

Cavalry, 8th Pa., Col. D. McM. Gregg. Loss: w, 2; m, 2 = 4.
FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. D. N. Couch. Staff loss: w, 1.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John J. Peck: 55th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Louis Thourot; 62d N. Y., Col. J. Lafayette Riker (k), Lieut.-Col. David J. Nevin; 93d N. Y., Col. J. M. McCarter (w), Capt. John E. Arthur; 102d Pa., Col. Thomas A. Rowley (w), Lieut.-Col. J. M. Kinkead. Brigade loss: k, 47; w, 236; m, 64 = 347. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. John J. Abercrombie: 65th N. Y. (1st U. S. Chasseurs), Col. John Cochrane; 67th N. Y. (1st Long Island), Col. Julius W. Adams; 23d Pa., Col. Thomas H. Neill; 31st Pa., Col. David H. Williams; 61st Pa., Col. Oliver H. Rippey (k), Capt. Robert L. Orr. Brigade loss: k, 124; w, 433; m, 67 = 624.

Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Charles Devens, Jr. (w), Col. Charles H. Innes: 7th Mass., Col. David A. Russell; 10th Mass., Col. Henry S. Briggs (w), Capt. Ozro Miller; 36th N. Y., Col. Charles H. Innes, Lieut.-Col. D. E. Huntgerford. Brigade loss: k, 34; w, 136; m, 8 = 178. *Artillery*, Maj. Robert M. West: C, 1st Pa., Capt. Jeremiah McCarthy; D, 1st Pa., Capt. Edward H. Flood; E, 1st Pa., Capt. Theodore Miller; H, 1st Pa., Capt. James Brady. Artillery loss: k, 2; w, 12 = 14.
SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Silas Casey.

Provost Guard: w, 1; m, 2 = 3.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry M. Naglee: 11th Me., Col. Harris M. Plaisted; 56th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. James

Jourdan; 100th N. Y., Col. James M. Brown (k); 52d Pa., Col. John C. Dodge, Jr.; 104th Pa., Col. W. W. H. Davis (w), Capt. Edward L. Rogers. Brigade loss: k, 89; w, 383; m, 167 = 639. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Henry W. Wessells: 96th N. Y., Col. James Fairman; 85th Pa., Col. Joshua B. Howell; 101st Pa., Lieut.-Col. David B. Morris (w), Capt. Charles W. May; 103d Pa., Maj. A. W. Gazzam. Brigade loss: k, 35; w, 264; m, 59 = 358. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Innis N. Palmer: 81st N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Jacob J. De Forest (w), Capt. W. C. Raulston; 85th N. Y., Col. J. S. Belknap; 92d N. Y., Col. Lewis C. Hunt (w), Lieut.-Col. Hiram Anderson, Jr.; 98th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Charles Durkee. Brigade loss: k, 46; w, 251; m, 95 = 392. *Artillery*, Col. Guilford D. Bailey (k), Maj. D. H. Van Valkenburgh (k), Capt. Peter C. Regan: A, 1st N. Y., Lieut. George P. Hart; H, 1st N. Y., Capt. Joseph Spratt (w), Lieut. Charles E. Mink; 7th N. Y., Capt. Peter C. Regan; 8th N. Y., Capt. Butler Fitch. Artillery loss: k, 7; w, 28; m, 2 = 37. *Unattached:* E, 1st U. S. Artillery, Lieut. Alanson M. Randol. Loss: k, 1; w, 3 = 4.

The total Union loss (Revised Official Returns) was 790 killed, 3594 wounded, and 647 captured or missing = 5031.

THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.

General Joseph E. Johnston (w); Major-General Gustavus W. Smith; General Robert E. Lee.

RIGHT WING, Major-General James Longstreet.

LONGSTREET'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Richard H. Anderson (temporarily).

Kemper's Brigade, Col. James L. Kemper: 1st Va.; 7th Va.; 11th Va.; 17th Va., Col. M. D. Corse. *Anderson's (R. H.) Brigade*, Col. Micah Jenkins: 5th S. C., Col. J. R. R. Giles (k), Lieut.-Col. A. Jackson; 6th S. C., Col. John Bratton (w and c), Lieut.-Col. J. M. Steedman; Palmetto (S. C.) Sharp-shooters, Maj. William Anderson; Va. Battery, Capt. Robert M. Stribling. *Pickett's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. George E. Pickett: 8th Va., Lieut.-Col. N. Berkeley; 18th Va., Col. R. E. Withers; 19th Va., Col. John B. Strange; 28th Va., Col. William Watts; Va. Battery, Capt. James Dearing. Brigade loss: k and w, 350. *Wilcox's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox: 9th Ala., Lieut.-Col. Stephen F. Hale; 10th Ala., Maj. J. J. Woodward; 11th Ala., Col. Sydenham Moore (m w); 19th Miss., Maj. John Mullins. Brigade loss: k and w, 110. *Colston's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. R. E. Colston: 13th N. C.; 14th N. C.; 3d Va. *Pryor's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Roger A. Pryor: 8th Ala.; 14th Ala.; 14th La.

HILL'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Daniel H. Hill.

Garland's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Samuel Garland, Jr.: 2d Fla., Col. E. A. Perry; 2d Miss. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. John G. Taylor; 5th N. C., Col. D. K. McRae, Maj. P. J. Sinclair; 23d N. C., Col. Daniel H. Christie, Lieut.-Col. R. D. Johnston (w); 24th Va., Maj. Richard L. Maury (w); 38th Va., Col. E. C. Edmonds; Ala. Battery, Capt. J. W. Bondurant. Brigade loss: k, 98; w, 600; m, 42 = 740. *Rodes's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. R. E. Rodes (w), Col. John B. Gordon: 5th Ala., Col. C. C. Pegues; 6th Ala., Col. John B. Gordon; 12th Ala., Col. R. T. Jones (k), Lieut.-Col. B. B. Gayle; 12th Miss., Col. W. H. Taylor; 4th Va. Battalion, Capt. C. C. Otey (k), Capt. John R. Bagby; Va. Battery, Capt. Thomas H. Carter. Brigade loss: k, 241; w, 853; m, 5 = 1099. *Rains's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Gabriel J. Rains: 13th Ala., Col. D. B. Fry (w); 26th Ala., Col. E. A. O'Neal (w); 6th Ga.; 23d Ga. *Featherston's Brigade*, Col. George B. Anderson: 27th Ga., Col. Levi B. Smith (w), Lieut.-Col. Charles T. Zachry; 28th Ga., Capt. John N. Wilcox; 4th N. C., Maj. Bryan Grimes; 49th Va., Col. William Smith (w). Brigade loss: k, 149; w, 680; m, 37 = 866.

HUGER'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Benjamin Huger.

Armistead's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Lewis A. Armistead: 5th Va. Battalion; 9th Va., Col. D. J. Godwin (w); 14th Va.; 53d Va., Col. H. B. Tomlin. *Mahone's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. William Mahone: 3d Ala., Col. Tennent Lomax (k); 12th Va.; 41st Va. *Blanchard's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. A. G. Blanchard: 3d Ga.; 4th Ga.; 22d Ga.; 1st La.

ARTILLERY (not previously mentioned): La. Battery, Capt. Victor Maurin; Va. Battery, Capt. David Watson.

Total loss of the Right Wing, as reported by Gen. Longstreet: 816 killed, 3739 wounded, and 296 missing = 4851.

LEFT WING, Major-General Gustavus W. Smith. *Couriers:* Capt. R. W. Carter's Co. 1st Va. Cav.

SMITH'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. W. H. C. Whiting (temporarily).

Whiting's Brigade, Col. E. McIver Law: 4th Ala.; 2d Miss.; 11th Miss.; 6th N. C. Brigade loss: k, 28; w, 286; m, 42 = 346. *Hood's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. John B. Hood: 18th Ga., Col. W. T. Wofford, or Lieut.-Col. S. Z. Ruff; 1st Tex., Col. A. T. Rainey; 4th Tex., Col. John Marshall; 5th Tex., Col. James J. Archer. Brigade loss: w, 13. *Hampton's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Wade Hampton, (w): 14th Ga.; 19th Ga.; 16th N. C.; Hampton (S. C.) Legion, Lieut.-Col. M. W. Gary. Brigade loss: k, 45; w, 284 = 329. *Hatton's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Robert Hatton (k): 1st Tenn.; 7th Tenn.; 14th Tenn. Brigade loss: k, 44; w, 187; m, 13 = 244. *Pettigrew's Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. J. J. Pettigrew (w and c): Arkansas Battalion; 35th Ga.; 22d N. C.; 47th Va. Brigade loss: k, 47; w, 240; m, 54 = 341.

The "Official Records" indicate that Semmes's and Griffith's brigades were in position for action, but were not actually engaged. The total loss of the Left Wing, as reported by General Smith, was 164 killed, 1010 wounded, and 109 missing = 1283. The aggregate Confederate loss on May 31st and June 1st was 980 killed, 4749 wounded, and 405 missing = 6134.

RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE OPPOSING FORCES.

The following synopsis, from the "Records" and other data, is by General Gustavus W. Smith:

The Union Army numbered 98,008, of which about 5000 were on detached service: "Present for duty," Sumner's Corps, 17,412; Heintzelman's Corps, 16,999; Keyes's Corps, 17,132; Porter's Corps, 17,546; Franklin's Corps, 19,580; Engineers, Cavalry and Provost Guard, 4767. Each corps was composed of two divisions of nearly equal strength.

The aggregate present for duty in the three Union Corps that were engaged was 51,543. The number "in close action" on the Williamsburg road, May 31st, was about 11,853, with full complement of artillery; these included 4253 in Casey's division, about 4000 in Couch's division, and about 3600 in Kearny's division. Near Fair Oaks, there were engaged about 9000, with 10 pieces of artillery: these included Sedgwick's division, about 7000, and 4 regiments of Couch's division, about 2000.

The Union troops engaged, June 1st, numbered about 14,000: Richardson's division, about 7000, with 4 batteries; 1 brigade of Kearny's division, about 1500; and 1 brigade and 2 regiments of Hooker's division, about 3500; there was no artillery with Kearny and Hooker.

General Johnston estimates the strength of his army at 73,928. Other authorities place it at 62,696. The "Official Records" show that, on the 21st of May, Johnston's army was 53,688: Smith's division, 10,532; Longstreet's division, 13,816; Magruder's division (including D. R. Jones's division), 15,920; D. H. Hill's division, 11,151; cavalry and reserve artillery, 2209. Before May 31st, this force was increased by the arrival of A. P. Hill's division (estimated), 4000, and Huger's division (estimated), 5008. One of the five brigades of D. H. Hill's division was detached before May 31st.

The aggregate of the 4 Confederate divisions engaged was about 39,000. The number "in close action" on the Williamsburg road, May 31st, was about 9520, with 2 batteries—including 7580 in D. H. Hill's division, and 1950 of Longstreet's division. Near Fair Oaks, 4 brigades of G. W. Smith's division (under Whiting), 8670; no artillery.

The number of Confederates engaged, June 1, was about 8300: in Huger's division about 3300; in Longstreet's division, about 5000. No artillery was advanced into action.

TWO DAYS OF BATTLE AT SEVEN PINES } (FAIR OAKS).

BY GUSTAVUS W. SMITH, MAJOR-GENERAL, C. S. A.



THE SEVEN PINES, LOOKING EAST.
AFTER A ROUGH SKETCH MADE DURING THE WAR.

here the Williamsburg "old stage" road is intersected by the Nine-mile road, at a point seven miles east of Richmond, was fought the first great contest between the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia and the Federal Army of the Potomac. The junction of these two roads is called Seven Pines. About one mile from Seven Pines, where the Nine-mile road crosses the Richmond and the York River Railroad, there is a station called Fair Oaks. Before the action ended there was a good deal of fighting near the latter place. The Federals called the action of May 31st and June 1st the battle of Fair Oaks.

Before describing this contest, a sketch will be given of the movements of the two armies from the time the Confederates withdrew from Williamsburg. It is well, however, to say here that, in preparing an account of the battle, I have felt constrained to refer to some important matters in more detail than would have been considered essential, if there was not such direct conflict of "high authorities" in regard to them. For instance, nearly all the descriptions of this action heretofore published give as the intention of the Confederate commander that Longstreet's division was to move to the Williamsburg road and support D. H. Hill's division on that road. In "asserting" that this is an error, I have felt that, under the circumstances, it is incumbent on me to prove what I say on that subject.

It is broadly stated by many authorities that General Johnston intended Huger's division should attack the Federal left flank and rear, Huger's attack to be followed by D. H. Hill's division falling on the Federal front; and it is claimed by many that the slowness of Huger's division caused the failure of complete Confederate success the first day. In refutation of these statements and claims, I have felt constrained to give proofs, and not leave these questions to be decided by mere "assertion."

The position of the Confederate troops at dark, May 31st, has been erroneously stated by General Johnston, and in such particularity of detail as at the time to satisfy me that, in the main, he was correct. But the "Official Records," recently published, show beyond question that General Johnston is in error on this point. It has, therefore, been considered necessary in this article to give definite proof in regard to the position of the Confederate

} In the Confederate attack, in the irregular and desperate fighting, and in the duration and changing success of this first great battle in the East, there are striking resemblances to (as well as wide divergences from) the two days' battle at Shiloh, the first great clash of arms in the West.— EDITORS.

forces when the command of the army devolved upon me, by reason of General Johnston's being wounded. His statement of the reasons for my not having ordered the attack to be renewed the next morning (June 1st) calls for specific proof that I did order the attack to be renewed, and for a detailed exhibit of General Longstreet's battle-field notes to me on that day.

Without specifying further, at this time, in regard to the "misunderstanding," misapprehension, and other causes that have led to erroneous published accounts of important events in this battle,—to some extent on the Federal, but more on the Confederate, side,—it may be added that the recent publication of the "Official Records," when carefully studied, throws a great deal of light upon these events, the accounts of which have heretofore been nearly as dark and confusing as were the dense, tangled wood and swamps in which most of the close and desperate fighting took place. The Federal accounts, as now officially published, are full; they embrace the reports of nearly every regimental, brigade, division, and corps commander engaged; but many of the Confederate reports are missing, those in D. H. Hill's division being the only ones that are complete in regard even to brigade commanders. There are, however, enough others, when taken in connection with the full Federal reports, to give quite a clear understanding of the main facts on both sides.

THE affair at Williamsburg, May 5th, was an incident in the withdrawal of the Confederate army from its fortified lines, near Yorktown, to the open country between the Pamunkey and the Chickahominy rivers, where General Johnston intended to halt, near the Richmond and York River Railroad, and contest the farther advance of General McClellan's army. From Williamsburg, Longstreet's and Hill's divisions, both under General Longstreet, moved on the Charles City road, which crosses the Chickahominy at Long Bridge; the division of G. W. Smith and Magruder's forces — commanded by him before Johnston's army arrived at the Yorktown lines — moved on the road that passes through Barhamsville and New Kent Court House and crosses the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge. All the Confederate troops on the latter road were under my command, and they were followed by the Federal army. Excepting occasional collisions between our rear-guard and the Federal advance-guard, nothing of special interest occurred after we left Barhamsville, near which place, below West Point, the Federals landed quite a large force, and seemed disposed to move out against us. General Johnston ordered nearly the whole of his army to Barhamsville, and came there in person. The next day, May 7th, the Federal skirmishers advanced, but their main force gave us no opportunity to cut them off from their gun-boats. At this point there was a good deal of sharp fighting for several hours.⚓ From this time

⚓ Reference is had here to the York River expedition, under General W. B. Franklin, which McClellan dispatched from Yorktown on the 5th with instructions to seize and hold a landing near West Point, situated at the confluence of the York and Pamunkey rivers, and the terminus of the Richmond and York River Railroad. This movement on West Point, if successful, would secure the so-called Urbana route of communications, the advantages of which are explained in McClellan's letter to the War Department of March 19th, 1862.

Franklin moved up the York River on the 6th, his troops in transports and under convoy of a

the Confederates were more worried by the deep mud through which they were patiently trudging than they were by any movements of the Federals. In a letter to me from Palo Alto, on the Charles City road, dated Headquarters, Second Corps, May 8th, General Longstreet says:

"If your road can beat this for mud, I don't want to see it." "If you see the General [Johnston], say to him that we are as happy as larks over here, till we get 126 wagons [the total number] up to the hub at one time." "I don't fear McClellan or any one in Yankeedom."

When my command had passed the Baltimore Cross-roads, four and a half miles west of New Kent Court House, and had reached position about half-way between the Pamunkey and Chickahominy rivers, on good ground, they were halted. Longstreet's corps was again within easy supporting distance of mine, and General Johnston intended in that vicinity to contest the further advance of McClellan's army. We remained there about five days. The troops, having rested from the tiresome service in the trenches near Yorktown, and the fatiguing march, were now furnished with abundant supplies from Richmond, and were elated at the prospect of meeting the enemy on an open field of battle.

MAJOR-GENERAL SAMUEL P. HEINTZELMAN. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

General Johnston then supposed that something effective had been done by the Government for the local defense of Richmond, during the month that had elapsed since his army moved from there to the peninsula. On the 14th of May he learned, through his chief engineer, that little or nothing — either in the way of fortifications or of troops — had been provided; and that the enemy, on the James River, were above City Point, and threatening Drewry's Bluff, as well as the obstruction in the Appomattox, four and a half miles below Petersburg. This report closed with the remark: "The danger is on the south side of James River."

On the same day General Johnston received intelligence of the destruction of the Confederate iron-clad *Virginia* — called by the Federals the *Merrimac*.

number of gun-boats, and made a landing the same day. General Franklin, in a letter on this subject, dated November 25th, 1881, says:

"My instructions were to await orders after landing, and not to advance. . . . We were attacked on the 7th, the object of the enemy being to drive us into the river. We had not made any attempt to advance, as such an attempt would have been in conflict with my orders."

General John Newton, commander of the Federal brigade most heavily engaged, states:

"The enemy was not only repelled in his attempt upon our position, but at the end of the day we occupied with our troops a position in advance of that held at the commencement of the action."

General Gustavus W. Smith, who commanded the Confederate troops engaged, says:

"On the morning of the 7th, after becoming satisfied that the enemy did not intend to advance in force from under the protection of their gun-boats, I directed General Whiting to drive their skirmishers from the dense woods, and endeavor to get position in the open ground between the woods and the river, from which he could reach their place of landing and their transports with his artillery fire."

In this action the Union losses were 48 killed, 110 wounded, 28 missing; total, 186. The Confederate losses were 8 killed and 40 wounded; total, 48.— EDITORS.

The next day news was received of the attack on Drewry's Bluff [see p. 271], and of the confusion and fright in Richmond. In this state of affairs, General Johnston decided that it was expedient to cross the Chickahominy and take position nearer the city, rather than continue to wait, north of that stream, for the advance of McClellan from the Pamunkey. Accordingly, orders were issued that night for Longstreet's "corps" to cross the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, and for my command to cross at Bottom's Bridge. A regiment of riflemen was sent direct to aid in the defense of Drewry's Bluff. On the 17th, Longstreet's division was about five miles from Richmond, in the direction of the James River defenses; D. H. Hill's division, on Longstreet's left, guarded the Charles City road, and was about three miles from Richmond; G. W. Smith's division was on the Williamsburg road, and north of it, two or three miles from the city, with one brigade in observation at Bottom's Bridge; whilst Magruder's troops extended from Old Tavern, on the Nine-mile road, to New Bridge, thence along the crest of the Chickahominy Bluffs to the Mechanicsville road.

McClellan's army approached the Chickahominy slowly. On the 23d Keyes's corps crossed at Bottom's Bridge; on the 25th he reached the position known later as the "third line of defense," at which point, as well as at Bottom's Bridge, strong earth-works were constructed; on the 27th the leading division of Keyes's corps occupied and commenced to fortify a position across the Williamsburg road at Seven Pines. In the meantime Heintzelman's corps had crossed at Bottom's Bridge; one division remained near that place, and the other division was posted at White Oak Bridge. Three corps of McClellan's army were still on the north side of the Chickahominy, their left near the railroad, their right, thrown back in a naturally strong position, on the left bank of Beaver Dam Creek, with an intrenched outpost at Mechanicsville. All the bridges and fords along the Chickahominy in their front were in possession of the Federals; and they were rapidly constructing new bridges.

In the meantime there had been no material change in the position of the Confederate forces. General Johnston was closely watching the movements of the Federals approaching on the Williamsburg road; but, in his opinion, the proper time to strike McClellan's left wing had not come. On the morning of the 27th our pickets were closely pressed just east of Old Tavern. This was some indication that the enemy were probably coming nearer in large force, and would soon be within our effective reach, on the Williamsburg or Nine-mile road, or on both. Our attention was, however, almost immediately diverted to McClellan's right flank, on the opposite side of the Chickahominy.

At 1 P. M. that day I received a note from General Johnston, stating he had just been informed that McDowell was advancing from Fredericksburg in force. This put a new phase on Confederate affairs around Richmond. It was well understood by us that McDowell had an army of about 40,000 men; † McClellan's forces were known to be about 100,000, and we could not afford to wait until McDowell reached him.

† About 35,000 effectives. McDowell asked for subsistence for 38,000 men, including, of course, the non-effectives.— EDITORS.

General Johnston determined to attack the Federal right before McDowell could come up. I was ordered to move my division to the vicinity of Meadow Bridge, bring up A. P. Hill's division from the vicinity of Ashland, and make preparations, as soon as possible, to attack at Mechanicsville and Beaver Dam Creek. Longstreet's division was ordered to take position north and east of Richmond, and D. H. Hill's division was ordered to the ground vacated by mine on the Williamsburg road. Magruder's troops were not moved; but, at my request, I was relieved from longer commanding General Magruder, and he was ordered to report, in future, direct to General Johnston. At the same time D. R. Jones's division, two brigades, of Magruder's proper command, posted on our extreme left, remained temporarily under my control, for service in the proposed attack. Brigadier-General Whiting was regularly assigned, temporarily, to the command of my division.

About sunset, May 28th, I reported to General Johnston that A. P. Hill's division would be close in front of Mechanicsville, on the north side of the Chickahominy, before midnight, with orders to attack that place at dawn on the 29th. As soon as A. P. Hill's attack commenced, my division and D. R. Jones's division would cross the Meadow and Mechanicsville bridges, and the three divisions, constituting the new left wing of Johnston's army under my command, would make a prompt and combined attack on the right of the Federals, strongly posted at Beaver Dam Creek. I was satisfied that the three divisions could carry the works at that place by open assault, but it would be a bloody business—called for, however, by the necessity for prompt action before McDowell could join McClellan. I did not know, in any detail, what General Johnston intended to do with the rest of his forces during the contest I was ordered to initiate, but I was perfectly satisfied that he would use the whole strength of his army against McClellan, and, if possible, defeat him before McDowell could arrive.

On receiving my report General Johnston stated that his latest information showed McDowell's army had returned to Fredericksburg; and it was believed he was moving north from that place. In this state of affairs, there was no longer any necessity for crossing the Chickahominy, attacking the three Federal corps on the north side of that stream, and moving against the very strong position at Beaver Dam Creek; while there were but two Federal corps on our side, gradually coming within striking distance where the natural features of the ground were not against us. General Johnston ordered the contemplated attack on the Federal right to be suspended, and directed me to withdraw A. P. Hill's division, bring it to the south side of the Chickahominy, and place it on our extreme left.

General Longstreet, who was present, then proposed that an attack be made early next morning, the 29th, in the direction of Seven Pines. General Johnston said that it was not quite certain that McDowell had moved north; the disposition made of our troops whilst it was supposed McDowell was coming was too strong on the left to admit of immediate and advantageous attack being made in the direction of Seven Pines; that Huger's division from Norfolk was expected to join us very soon; and that the enemy, east of us, had

not yet approached near enough, in force worth crushing, to justify the engagement of the mass of our army in the swamps around Seven Pines, whilst the Federals were threatening the city on the north side. No orders were given to attack on the 29th, but it was distinctly understood that, in case McDowell did not promptly come on, General Johnston would revert to his former intention, and endeavor to strike a sudden and, if possible, crushing blow, in full force, against the Federals in the vicinity of Seven Pines, and destroy them before they could be reënforced either from the troops in their rear, now on our side of the Chickahominy, or by forces sent across from the opposite side. When I was assigned to the command of the left wing of the army, General Longstreet became the ranking officer on the right and was anxious to attack in that direction on the 29th. These matters are mentioned in General Johnston's letter of that date to General Whiting.

MAJOR-GENERAL ERASMUS D. KEYES.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

On the 30th my division, under Whiting, was drawn back to ground about midway between Meadow Bridge and Richmond; and A. P. Hill's division was brought nearer the bridges. The other commands were still in the positions to which they were assigned when it was first heard that McDowell was moving to join McClellan. In the meantime Huger's division had arrived and was encamped east of the city, north of the Williamsburg road, on Gilliss Creek.

About noon on the 30th General D. H. Hill reported to General Johnston that reconnoissances satisfied him that the enemy was not in force on the Charles City road, but was on the Williamsburg road and fortified about Seven Pines. General Johnston promptly determined to attack. His intention was that General Longstreet's division should move by the Nine-mile road, that of General D. H. Hill by the Williamsburg stage road, and General Huger's by the Charles City road. In his order for my division to move, a copy of which was sent by him direct to Whiting, General Johnston says:

"Please be ready to move by the Nine-mile road, coming as early as possible to the point at which the road to New Bridge turns off [at Old Tavern]. Should there be cause of haste, General McLaws, on your approach, will be ordered to leave his ground for you, that he may reënforce General Longstreet."

In written instructions, May 30th, to Huger, General Johnston says:

"I wish to concentrate the troops of your division on the Charles City road. . . . Be ready, if an action should be begun on your left, to fall upon the enemy's left flank."

On May 31st General Johnston wrote to General Huger:

"I fear that in my note of last evening, of which there is no copy, I was too positive on the subject of your attacking the enemy's left flank. . . . It will be necessary for your progress

to the front to conform at first to that of General Hill. If you find no strong body in your front, it will be well to aid General Hill; but then a strong reserve should be retained to cover our right."

There seem to have been no written instructions given either to General Longstreet or to General D. H. Hill; but, in his official report, General Johnston says the divisions of G. W. Smith, Longstreet, D. H. Hill, and Huger were ordered to move at daybreak. At sunrise General Johnston confidently expected that Keyes's corps would be crushed, or routed, before 8 A. M. At that season daybreak was at about 4 A. M. Magruder's command and A. P. Hill's division were not moved.

In order to form a proper conception of Johnston's plan it will be well to glance at the position of the Federal forces on the morning of May 31st. One division of Keyes's corps was across the Williamsburg road, a little more than half a mile west of Seven Pines; the other division was across that road at Seven Pines. Both lines were strengthened by rifle-pits extending a short distance on each side of the road, with abatis or felled timber in front. In the first line there was a small, unfinished pentangular redoubt; and the abatis of the second line extended in a curve to the rear, across the Nine-mile road. The left of the position was protected by the almost impracticable White Oak Swamp. But the ground on the right offered no strong features for defense, and was not fortified. About one thousand yards in front of the first line of rifle-pits, and nearly at right angles to the Williamsburg road, a skirmish-line extended from the White Oak Swamp to the Chickahominy River. Two regiments were detached to support the skirmish-line,—one near the railroad, the other farther to the right, on the Nine-mile road; whilst two regiments and a battery were detached and posted near Fair Oaks Station, to guard the depot of supplies at that place, where there were no artificial defenses. Keyes's lines were provided with ample artillery. On the morning of the 31st the two divisions were in camp just in rear of their earth-works; whilst strong working parties were engaged upon the unfinished trenches and other artificial defenses.

The "third line of defense," across the Williamsburg road, two miles in rear of the first line, was unoccupied. Heintzelman's corps was five miles in rear of Seven Pines; and Sumner's corps was three or four miles from Keyes, with the Chickahominy between them. The two other Federal corps on the north side of that stream were still farther off. In this part of its course the Chickahominy, at ordinary stages of water, is a sluggish stream, from thirty to sixty feet in width, from three to four feet deep, with low, muddy banks. It is bordered by flat bottom-lands for some distance, to the foot of rather abrupt bluffs about one hundred feet high. In times of freshet it rises rapidly, extends over the bottom-lands in depth of two or three feet to the bluffs; and at this stage the stream becomes a very serious military obstacle.

The ground upon which Keyes's corps fought that day is level, or very slightly undulating, and most of it, except the small open spaces at the earth-



MAP SHOWING POSITIONS PRELIMINARY TO THE BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES.

works, was densely wooded and swampy. The soil in all that region, when wet, is very soft and spongy, making passage over it difficult even for infantry. In the dense woods the thick undergrowth is matted with tangled vines, and the luxuriant foliage, in the full bloom of spring, rendered it in many places impossible to distinguish objects ten paces distant. A violent rain-storm set in about 5 P. M. on the 30th, a few hours after General Johnston had determined to attack next morning. The heavy rain continued all night, and the face of the country was literally flooded. At daylight on the 31st the Chickahominy was booming, passable only at the bridges, and continued to rise during the day, although it had ceased to rain.

General Keyes gives a still closer view of his condition at that time. On the morning of the 31st he reported to General McClellan's chief-of-staff:

"Everything on the part of the Confederates indicates an attack on my position, which is only tolerably strong, and my forces are too weak to defend it properly. Brigadier-General Sumner told me yesterday he should probably cross the Chickahominy last night. If he did so, and takes post nigh Old Tavern and this side, I should feel more secure than I do now."

Sumner did not cross at the time referred to, and there is no other indication that he had orders or authority to do so. But General Keyes's report, made that morning, develops the fact that there was a dangerous gap between these two corps, and shows that there was a strong probability

that it would soon be filled by Sumner's corps. In his "Fifty Years' Observations," General Keyes says:

"The left of my lines was all protected by the White Oak Swamp, but the right was on ground so favorable to the approach of the enemy, and so far from the Chickahominy, that if Johnston had attacked there an hour or two earlier than he did, I could have made but a feeble defense comparatively, and every man of us would have been killed, captured, or driven into the swamp or river before assistance could have reached us."

Isolated as Keyes's corps was, every effort should have been made to strongly fortify the ground it occupied. The defenses in front were weak and incomplete. The vulnerable and easily accessible right flank—the point at which attack ought to have been expected, because Confederate success at that place would have cut the Federal army in two, and would have exposed its left wing to destruction—ought to have been strongly fortified instead of being left entirely open. All this would have been practically illustrated if General Johnston's intentions had been carried into effect—that is, if Longstreet's division in full force had struck Keyes's right flank near Fair Oaks, when D. H. Hill's division moved against Keyes's front. But, through a "misunderstanding," General Longstreet transferred his own division to the Williamsburg road, instead of moving to the attack by the Nine-mile road, and he caused that division to take precedence of Huger's division at the crossing of Gilliss Creek, which at daylight was a raging torrent. General Huger, in a report, says: "Longstreet's division got the road at the crossing first"; and adds that his own troops "had to wait until they [Longstreet's division] had passed. The delay after that was the time necessary to cross." ☆

Captain B. Sloan, of Huger's staff, says in a letter dated August 17th, 1885:

"Longstreet's brigades as they successively reached the plain above the creek halted and remained for an hour or two resting on their arms. This plain (in front of General Huger's headquarters) was perhaps between three and four miles in rear of the battle-field. Here, at a farm-house, Huger met Longstreet and Hill, and a discussion was had as to the movements of the divisions, and as to the relative rank of the division commanders. Longstreet claimed (by instructions from General Johnston) to be in command of that portion of the army. After protest Huger acquiesced."

It was "then possibly 10 A. M. or 11 A. M." After that time "Huger's movements were directed by Longstreet."

Governor William E. Cameron, who was then adjutant of the 12th Virginia,

☆ On the 20th of September, 1862, General Huger wrote to General Johnston:

"I beg to refer you to my letter of the 20th ultimo. I have waited one month, and no reply has been received from General Longstreet. As you have indorsed his erroneous statements, to my injury, I must hold you responsible, and desire to know from you if you have any reason to believe an answer will be made by General Longstreet. You must perceive that by postponing an answer your published report is allowed to go down to history as true. I cannot conceive that you desire to perpetrate such an injustice, for, though it may ruin me, it cannot redound to your credit. . . . I send you herewith an abstract of such parts of your report as refer to my division, with my remarks annexed, to which I invite your attention."

In Huger's abstract of Johnston's report we find:

"Major-General Longstreet, unwilling to make a partial attack, . . . waited from hour to hour for General Huger's division. . . . Had Major-General Huger's division been in position and ready for action when those of Smith, Longstreet, and Hill moved, I am satisfied that Keyes's corps would have been destroyed instead of merely defeated. . . . Had it gone into action at 4 o'clock, the victory would have been much more complete."

In his remarks on these abstracts, Huger says:

"When General Longstreet's troops moved to support General Hill's attack, General Huger's division moved down the Charles City road at the same time with three brigades of Longstreet's division . . . to the last paragraph I have only to say that if it [Huger's division] did not go into action by 4 o'clock, it was because General Longstreet did not require it, as it was in position and awaiting his orders." G. W. S.

of Mahone's brigade, Huger's division, says:

"Longstreet [three brigades] moved that morning from Fairfield race-course, and arrived at the crossing of the [Gilliss] creek in front of the command. We waited till Longstreet cleared the way — crossed the creek about 10:30 A. M. — moved as far as the Tudor House — rested there until 1 P. M." [Mahone's brigade then moved out on the Charles City road]; "the men were fresh, eager, and in light marching-trim. The roads were bad, but there was no physical obstruction of any moment, and we met no enemy."

MAJOR-GENERAL W. H. C. WHITING. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

The following is from a letter by General R. E. Colston, commander of one of the three brigades of Longstreet's division that moved at 6:30 A. M., from a point three and a half miles out on the Nine-mile road:

"A little brook [Gilliss Creek] near Richmond was greatly swollen, and a long time was wasted crossing it on an improvised bridge made of planks, a wagon mid-stream serving as a trestle. Over this the division passed in single file, you may imagine with what delay. If the division commander had given orders for the men to sling their cartridge-boxes, haversacks, etc., on their muskets and wade without breaking formation, they could have crossed by fours at least, with water up to their waists, . . . and hours would have been saved. . . . When we got across we received orders to halt on the roadside until Huger's division passed us. There we waited for five or six hours."

These movements of Longstreet's division are in very marked contrast with General Johnston's intention that this division should start at daylight, move on the Nine-mile road, and attack the enemy on D. H. Hill's left, as early as possible that morning.

At 6:30 A. M. General D. H. Hill wrote to General Rodes: "I am ordered to attack the enemy this morning. . . . Have your men ready to start at a moment's notice." Rodes's brigade was in observation, three and a half miles out, on the Charles City road, and had to cross an almost impracticable swamp in order to reach the position on the Williamsburg road from which Hill's division was to advance to the attack. General Rodes says that the order to move reached him between 10 and 11 A. M., and adds:

"The progress of the brigade was considerably delayed by the washing away of a bridge near the head of White Oak Swamp. . . . At this point the character of the crossing was such that it was absolutely necessary to proceed with great caution, to prevent the loss of both ammunition and life."

When the signal for attack was given, only two regiments of Rodes's brigade had reached Hill's position on the Williamsburg road, about one thousand

yards in front of the Federal picket-line. But the other regiments of this brigade came up soon after. At 1 o'clock the signal-guns were fired, and Hill's division at once moved forward.

The foregoing details in reference to the movements of these three divisions could not well be omitted, because General Johnston "asserts" that the divisions of Hill and Longstreet were in position early enough "to be ready to commence operations by 8 A. M.," and that General Longstreet "waited from hour to hour for General Huger's division." Having thus seen D. H. Hill's division start out alone at 1 P. M. to attack the Federals, it will be well to glance at the preparations made to receive him.

Whilst Hill's troops were coming into position, their movements had been reported to General Silas Casey, who commanded the Federal first line of defense. He at once ordered one regiment to go forward about eight hundred yards on the Williamsburg road, and support the picket-line; the working parties were called in, batteries harnessed up, and the troops formed, ready to take their assigned places. In a short time the Confederate signal-guns were heard, and the division was ordered into position to resist attack. The camps of these troops were immediately in rear of the earth-works. Palmer's brigade on the left, Wessells's in the center, and Naglee's on the right. Two regiments of Naglee's brigade were detached, supporting the picket-line, as already stated. About one-half of this division was placed in the rifle-pits on the right and left of the redoubt; the others were put in front, with orders to contest the advance of the Confederates against the first abatis, and Spratt's battery was placed four hundred yards in advance of the earth-works, on the north side of the road, closely supported by three regiments of Naglee's brigade and one of Palmer's.

In moving to attack, Rodes's brigade was on the south side of the road, supported by Rains; Garland's brigade, on the north side of the road, was supported by G. B. Anderson. All were in the dense and marshy woods, wading through water occasionally from two to three feet deep, the whole way obstructed by undergrowth, which often prevented commanders from seeing more than one company of their men at a time. General Hill had taken the precaution to order every man to wear in action a white strip of cloth around his hat as a battle-badge. Garland moved a few minutes before Rodes was ready. His skirmishers soon struck the Federal picket-line, and the shock of Garland's brigade fell upon the small regiment of raw troops that had been ordered into the woods to support the Federal pickets. That regiment fell back to the abatis just in time to prevent being enveloped and destroyed. And it was soon driven through the abatis in great disorder. It had lost about one-fourth its numbers in a few minutes, and was broken to pieces in crossing the abatis under close and deadly fire. This regiment could not again be rallied. General Keyes says that it "retreated, joined by a great many sick. The numbers, as they passed down the road as stragglers, conveyed an exaggerated idea of surprise and defeat."

The field-hospitals of the division were in the camps at the front; there was a large number of sick; some men of the working parties did not resume

their arms and join their regiments; these, with the teamsters and army followers, suddenly finding themselves under the fire of a large Confederate force rapidly emerging from the dark woods, fled in wild disorder.

But Garland, who encountered Spratt's battery and its supports at the first abatis, says:

"We had now reached the edge of the wood where the abatis impeded our farther advance, and the troops were under heavy fire. . . . The regimental commanders, who had received my orders to move by the left flank, were unable to effect the movement in good order under the galling fire. The alternative was adopted — to push the regiments forward through the abatis."

General Garland soon found that his brigade unaided could not accomplish the work in hand. His losses were very heavy. But he adds: "G. B. Anderson's brigade arrived upon the field just at the proper time."

The latter officer, having put in three regiments to aid Garland, moved to the left with the 27th Georgia and endeavored to turn the right of the Federals. He encountered one of Naglee's detached regiments and drove it back; but the other detached regiment of Naglee's brigade came on the ground, and one regiment sent by General Keyes came up. G. B. Anderson then withdrew from the advanced position he had gained, but continued the fighting on the ground where it had been commenced on this part of the field.

In the meantime the contest around the battery at the abatis was close and desperate. Rodes's brigade was hotly engaged on the south side of the road, and General Hill had ordered Carter's battery to the front. The Federals stubbornly held their ground, and Hill now detached General Rains to make a wide flank movement through the woods to the right in order to turn the left of Casey's earth-works. From the edge of the wood, south of the Williamsburg road, Rains's brigade commenced firing on the flank and rear of the troops posted in Casey's rifle-pits. General Hill says:

"I now noticed commotion in the camps and redoubt and indications of evacuating the position. Rodes took skillful advantage of this commotion, and moved up his brigade in beautiful order and took possession of the redoubt and rifle-pits."

Pending this contest for Casey's earth-works, General Keyes had sent two regiments from the second line direct to Casey's assistance, and a short time before those works were carried he sent General Couch, with two regiments, to attack the Confederate left, and thus relieve the pressure on Casey's front. Before Couch could get into position Casey's line was carried, and General Keyes made immediate preparations for the defense of the line at Seven Pines, held by Couch's division. Peck's brigade was on the left, Devens in the center, and the regiments of Abercrombie's brigade, that had not been detached, were on the right. Casey's troops, in falling back from their earth-works, endeavored to make a stand at the abatis in front of Couch's line, and General Keyes sent forward one regiment of Devens's brigade to assist in checking the advance of the Confederates. Casey's men were driven through the abatis, and the regiment of Devens's brigade was hurled back in disorder, and could not be rallied until they had retreated beyond the earth-works from which they had advanced. A large proportion of the men of

Palmer's and Wessells's brigades having been thrown into great disorder whilst retiring through the second abatis, and finding the earth-works of the second line already crowded, continued to retreat; but some of them, with nearly the whole of Naglee's brigade, remained upon the field. The Confederates in the immediate front of Seven Pines were now pressing into the second abatis, and there seemed to be strong probability that they would soon break through it and carry the earth-works of Keyes's second line. Thus, after more than two hours' close and bloody fighting, Hill's division unaided had captured the Federal first line of defense, and was closely pressing upon their second line. Hill then sent to Longstreet for another brigade. In a few minutes "the magnificent brigade of R. H. Anderson" came to Hill's support. The latter says:

THE TWIN FARM-HOUSES BEHIND CASEY'S REDOUBT (SEEN INDISTINCTLY ON THE LEFT). FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

The upper picture looks toward Richmond; the grove stands between the Williamsburg stage road and the houses which front squarely on the road, perhaps 300 feet away. Four hundred dead of the battle of Seven Pines were buried in the foreground (behind the houses), where also stood a part of Casey's camp.

The foreground of lower picture shows either a corner of Casey's redoubt or the works between it and the Williamsburg road.

On the Official Map of the Campaign of 1864 the twin houses are named "Kuhn." In 1886 only one of them remained. A persimmon tree stood at that time on the site of Casey's redoubt, and there were slight traces of the old earth-works that for the most part were erected after the battle of Seven Pines.



THE TWIN FARM-HOUSES AS SEEN FROM CASEY'S REDOUBT. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

"A portion of this force, under Colonel Jenkins, consisting of the Palmetto Sharp-shooters and the 6th South Carolina, was sent on the extreme left to scour along the railroad and Nine-mile road, and thus get in rear of the enemy."

These two regiments were conducted by General (then Colonel) G. B. Anderson to the position in which he had left the 27th Georgia. The three regiments soon became engaged with the two regiments under General Couch, previously referred to. The latter says:

"I advanced with Neill's and Rippey's regiments through a close wood, moving by the flank. . . . . We at once came upon a large column of the enemy in reserve, but apparently mov-

ing toward Fair Oaks. . . . Immediately engaged. . . . Here Colonel Rippey and all his field-officers fell, and in twenty minutes the enemy had passed over the [Nine-mile] road leading to my center, cutting off the advance at Fair Oaks."

In reference to this affair General Keyes says:

"Both regiments were badly cut up. . . . Casualties in Rippey's amount to 263, and are heavier than in any other regiment in Couch's division."

He adds that, after Couch was thrown back, Neill's regiment "took part in the hard fighting which closed the day near the Seven Pines," but Rippey's regiment "withdrew in detachments, some of which came again into action near my headquarters."

So far, the fighting done by the Federal troops for the safety of their second line of defense was not so effective as the resistance made by Casey's division at the first line. After the three Confederate regiments had fought their way across the Nine-mile road, not far south of Fair Oaks Station, they changed direction and moved toward Seven Pines. Leaving them for the present, attention will be called to the state of affairs in the vicinity of the redoubt in Casey's captured line.

MAJOR-GENERAL SILAS CASEY.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

When General Hill ordered the two South Carolina regiments to join the 27th Georgia and "scour along the railroad and Nine-mile road, and thus get in rear of the enemy," he directed General R. H. Anderson, with the other portion of his brigade, to attack the Federals in a wood north, and within cannon-range of the redoubt. This wood was then occupied by two regiments and some companies of Naglee's brigade that had been, previous to the commencement of the action, supporting the picket-line. In reference to the fighting at this point, General Naglee says in his official report:

"The Confederates opened a most destructive cross-fire upon them from the pieces near the redoubt that had not been spiked, and this, with the [musketry] fire from their immediate front, was no longer to be endured, and they [his men] were withdrawn and marched down the Nine-mile road and placed in position in rear of this road, about three hundred yards from the Seven Pines."

Whilst these operations were in progress on Hill's left, the state of affairs at the second abatis, just in front of Seven Pines, and in the woods south and east of the redoubt had materially changed against the Confederates, who were first checked at the second abatis, and on the right were forced back to the redoubt. Previous to this the brigades of Rodes, Garland, and G. B. Anderson were engaged at the second abatis, and General Hill, having "resolved to drive" the Federals out of the woods on the south of the road,

where they now appeared in strong force, ordered General Rains, who was near them, "to move farther to the right," and adds:

"I regret that that gallant and meritorious officer did not advance farther in that direction. He would have taken the Yankees in flank, and the direct attack of Rodes in front would have been less bloody. The magnificent brigade of Rodes moved over the open ground to assault the Yankees, strongly posted in the woods. He met a most galling fire, and his advance was checked. A portion of his command met with a disastrous repulse. Kemper's brigade was now sent me by General Longstreet, and directed by me to move directly to the support of Rodes. This brigade, however, did not engage the Yankees, and Rodes's men were badly cut up."

General Rodes was severely wounded, but did not turn over the command of his brigade to the senior colonel, John B. Gordon, until the firing had ceased. The latter says:

"Notified that I was placed in command, I reported to Major-General Hill for orders. Under his direction I moved the brigade about half a mile to the rear, and ordered them to encamp on either side of the Williamsburg road."

General G. B. Anderson says: "After night we were ordered by the major-general commanding the division to take position in the woods, in rear of the clearing"—that is, in the edge of the wood on the Richmond side of Casey's line. General Garland says that his brigade bivouacked that night with G. B. Anderson's. General Rains says that his brigade "ultimately passed the night in line of battle, without fire or light, in another part of the woods, ready to receive and check the enemy, should he advance." He makes no mention of any fighting done by his brigade after Casey's camp was captured.

Attention will now be called to the Federal movements that caused the right of D. H. Hill's division to fall back from the second abatis.

At 12 M. Berry's brigade of Kearny's division, from Bottom's Bridge, arrived at the third line of defense; and about the same time Birney's brigade, of the same division, reached the same line, but was near the railroad. At 3 P. M. the latter brigade was ordered to move along the railroad and support Keyes's right; but, owing to subsequent conflicting orders, it did not go into action that day. About 3:30 P. M. Berry's brigade, now at the third line of defense, was ordered to Seven Pines to support Keyes; and, at the same time, General Kearny "sent written orders for Jameson's brigade, camped at the *tête-de-pont*, near Bottom's Bridge (three miles in rear), to come up without delay." It was about 4 P. M. when the advance of Berry's brigade reached Seven Pines. At that time one regiment of Devens's brigade had just been routed in the second abatis. General Kearny says: "On arriving at the field of battle, we found certain zigzag rifle-pits sheltering crowds of men, and the enemy firing from abatis and timber in their front." Berry's brigade was moved forward in the woods on the south side of the Williamsburg road. That officer says: "We steadily drove the enemy so far that I had serious fears of being flanked by the enemy, as they were driving our troops down the [Nine-mile] road." He evidently refers to the effect being produced by the advance of the three regiments under Colonel Jenkins. General Berry adds:

"We were at this time in the woods extending from the edge of the slashings up the woods and on the left [south] of the camping-ground of General Casey's division, completely commanding his old camp and the earth-works with our rifles."

In the meantime the head of Jameson's brigade had reached the field. Two regiments were sent in advance of Seven Pines, in the abatis and woods on the south side of the road, supporting Berry's brigade; one regiment was posted in the earth-works of the second line, and the other regiment of Jameson's brigade had not yet come up.

General Kearny says:

"It was perhaps near 6 o'clock, when our center and right [the forces in the earth-works at Seven Pines, and those that had been sent to resist the Confederates advancing in rear of the Nine-mile road], defended by troops of the other divisions, with all their willingness, could no longer resist the enemy's right central flank attacks, pushed on with determined discipline and with the impulsion of numerous concentrated masses. Once broken, our troops fled incontinently, and a dense body of the enemy, pursuing rapidly, yet in order, occupied the Williamsburg road, . . . and, penetrating deep into the woods on either side, soon interposed between my division and my line of retreat." He says that he "checked the enemy in his intent of cutting us off against the White Oak Swamp. This enabled the advanced regiments . . . to retire by a remaining wood path, known to our scouts (the Saw-mill road), until they once more arrived at and remanned the impregnable position [the third line of defense]."

BRIGADIER-GENERAL HENRY M. NAGLEE.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

Besides Kearny's troops on the south side of the Williamsburg road, a large portion of those in the earth-works at Seven Pines retreated by the Saw-mill road; but some of the regiments from the earth-works, and others that had been contesting Colonel Jenkins's advance along the Nine-mile road, fell back on the Williamsburg road. The latter were re-formed, and again contested Colonel Jenkins's advance. It does not appear that any of D. H. Hill's division, except the regiment that was with Colonel Jenkins, succeeded in getting beyond the second abatis; but it is very certain that the effective fire, across that abatis, from Hill's musketry and artillery, materially aided Colonel Jenkins in "bursting across the Williamsburg road."

Having given the Federal account of the manner in which the two South Carolina regiments and the 27th Georgia forced their way to and crossed the Nine-mile road a little south of Fair Oaks, it is now proposed to give extracts from Colonel Jenkins's report, showing the advance of these three regiments to and across the Williamsburg road, and then along the latter road to a point within about one mile of the Federal third line of defense. Colonel Jenkins says:

"I advanced my regiment through the abatis under a very heavy fire. . . . I instructed Colonel Bratton [6th South Carolina] to keep his left touching my right; and the enemy's

line, after a stubborn resistance, having given way to our attack, . . . I executed, under fire from the right front, a change of front obliquely forward. . . . We drove the enemy to the front and right, passing over their second camp. . . . The enemy, heavily reënforced, made a desperate stand, and our fighting was within seventy-five yards. . . . Our advance continued, . . . the enemy steadily giving back, . . . I halted the lines, dressed them, and then changed front obliquely forward. . . . Our steady advance was not to be resisted. . . . The enemy gave back to our left and right across the Williamsburg road, about a mile or more from General Casey's headquarters. Following the latter and heavier body, they were again reënforced and took position in a wood parallel [to] and about three hundred yards on the right [south] of the Williamsburg road."

In describing his progress thus far, Colonel Jenkins speaks repeatedly of the obstinate resistance he met with, the terrible slaughter of the enemy, and his own severe losses. Bearing in mind the movement of Kearny's troops in the meanwhile against D. H. Hill's right, and the effect of Kearny's fire on Rodes's brigade, the Federals have good cause to regret the conflicting orders that prevented Birney's brigade, on the railroad, from closely supporting Keyes's right. It should be also borne in mind that, whilst Colonel Jenkins was fighting his way to the Williamsburg road, there were four Federal regiments and a battery at Fair Oaks that had not been in action that day. Two of these regiments were the regular guards of the depot of supplies, and the other two had been ordered from Seven Pines to support Couch, but, missing their way, reached Fair Oaks just before the two regiments under Couch were cut up. It was very fortunate for the Confederates that Birney's brigade and the force at Fair Oaks Station were not thrown against the rear of Colonel Jenkins's three regiments, that were so gallantly fighting, and were so determinedly resisted in their brilliant movement to the Williamsburg road, in rear of the Federal second line of defense, and far in rear of Kearny's successful advance.

Resuming Colonel Jenkins's account, it appears that five companies of his regiment pushed after that portion of the Federals which fell back along the Williamsburg road. With the rest of his force Colonel Jenkins was preparing to move against the enemy in the woods south of that road, when it was reported to him that a heavy column of Federals was advancing upon the five companies. Learning just then that the 5th South Carolina was not far to the rear, Colonel Jenkins sent for it to come up as soon as possible; ordered the commander of the five companies to advance upon the approaching Federal column, and determined to break the enemy south of the road before the column advancing on the road could reach him. He says:

"Having to pass across an open field on this advance, I lost heavily, but succeeded in routing and dispersing the enemy in my front, driving them at least a quarter of a mile; then, gathering my men promptly, . . . I moved by the flank . . . and took up line of battle oblique to the [Williamsburg] road and to the left, so as to present front at once to the enemy's advance by the road and to any rallied party that might recover from my last attack. . . . We had evidence of the near approach of the enemy by hearing their words of command and their cheers. . . . I advanced my line toward them. . . . The enemy poured in a heavy fire. . . . The supporting regiment [27th Georgia], under a terrible fire, gave back. . . . The enemy, encouraged, redoubled his fire . . . and advanced, and I determined to meet him. In prompt obedience, the two regiments . . . resumed their old, steady advance, firing full

in the face of the foe. The two lines neared each other to 30 or 40 yards. . . . Losing heavily I pressed on, and the enemy sullenly and slowly gave way. . . . We had advanced some 200 or 300 yards. . . . By this time . , . the 5th South Carolina . . . came up at a double-quick. . . . The 27th Georgia . . . rallied and came forward. . . . Jackson [5th South Carolina] came up on their right, sweeping before him the rallied fragments, who had collected and resumed fire from the woods to the right, and thus, at 7:40 P. M., we closed our busy day."

Out of thirteen brigades composing the right wing of the Confederate army, but five were put in close action that day. General Pickett says:

"On the afternoon of May 31st, and just as the battle of Seven Pines was being opened by General Longstreet, I was directed by that officer to move with my brigade to the York River Railroad, cover the same, [and] repel any advance of the enemy up that road."

MAJOR-GENERAL DAVID B. BIRNEY.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

General Longstreet held Pickett's brigade back in that position until daybreak, June 1st. From this it would seem that Longstreet was not in need of help on that side from troops not under his command. Attention will now be called to the five brigades under Longstreet's control on the Charles City road.

General Wilcox, in his official report, says that the three brigades under his command were in camp near the "Mechanicsville" road. He tells me, however, that he had no map of the country, knew very little about the names of the roads, but distinctly remembers that the road his troops were on passed close to General Johnston's headquarters near the north-east suburb of Richmond and led to New Bridge,— that is, the Nine-mile road. Whatever may have been the name of the road on which his troops were in camp, he says they were three and a half miles from the city, and moved, at 6:30 A. M., "by by-paths across to the junction of the Charles City and Williamsburg roads, and remained at this point till 3:30 P. M. I was then ordered to move with three brigades — my own, Colston's, and Pryor's — on the Charles City road, in rear of a part of Huger's division (Blanchard's and Armistead's brigades), as a support to these troops."

The Charles City road is south of the White Oak Swamp; it bears rapidly away from the point where the battle had been raging for more than two hours; and there was no enemy on that road. General Wilcox adds:

"This order was soon modified, and my three brigades ordered to precede Huger's two. Having passed Huger's brigades, the march was continued but for a short time, when orders

were again received, and this time to countermarch to the Williamsburg road and follow on in rear of the troops then advancing. The brigades had retraced their steps near one mile, and orders were again given to face about and march down the Charles City road. . . . Again orders were received in writing to move across to the Williamsburg road, following country roads and paths through woods and fields . . . in many places covered with water, and at one point waist-deep. . . . It was about 5 P. M. when the head of the column reached the Williamsburg road."

The plain words of General Wilcox, written at the time and addressed to his immediate commander, are more significant of the real truth than any skillfully formed sentences, framed now, could possibly be. With Wilcox's report before him, General Longstreet says:

"I was obliged to send three of my small brigades on the Charles City road to support the one of Major-General Huger's which had been ordered to protect my right flank."

Three brigades of Huger's division were then on that road.

In order to form a proper conception of the folly exhibited by the marching and countermarching of five Confederate brigades up and down the Charles City road between 3 and 5 P. M., it is necessary to glance at the movements then being made by the Federals from the north side of the Chickahominy. At 1 P. M., when the firing of Hill's attack was first heard, General McClellan ordered General Sumner to form the two divisions of his corps, and be ready to move across the Chickahominy, at a moment's notice, to aid Keyes. Sumner at once put his two divisions under arms, marched them to their respective bridges, and, with the heads of the columns on the bridges, awaited further orders. General Sumner says: "At 2:30 o'clock P. M. I received the order to cross the river." And he adds: "The columns immediately moved over the river and marched rapidly to the field of battle by two roads." It is not proposed, just now, to describe the earnest haste with which Sumner's troops pressed forward, through the deep mud, to the assistance of their friends. The head of Sumner's leading column reached the immediate vicinity of Fair Oaks before the head of the column of five brigades of Longstreet's command, from the Charles City road, reached the Williamsburg road, far in rear of the fighting.

The leading brigade of Wilcox's command arrived at Casey's captured redoubt a little before the firing of Kearny's rear-guard in the wood, south of the Williamsburg road, ceased. Three companies of the leading regiment of Wilcox's troops were sent to dislodge a party of the enemy — Kearny's detached rear-guard — whose fire was still annoying the Confederates in the open between Casey's earth-works and the second abatis. In this contest these three companies lost 66 men in a few minutes. The five brigades with Wilcox went into bivouac between the first and the second abatis. Hill's division☆ was afterward withdrawn and bivouacked in the woods west of Casey's redoubt and rifle-pits.

☆ On the Confederate side the losses, May 31st, in D. H. Hill's division were 2915, being more than one-third of his effective strength. The losses in R. H. Anderson's brigade (of Longstreet's division) are not reported; but it is known that the 6th South Carolina Regiment lost 269 out of 521 in action. The losses in this brigade may fairly be estimated to have been more than 600, and the total losses in Longstreet's division that day may be placed at 700. These figures, whilst showing that the losses in the six brigades of Longstreet's division were not one-fourth as great as the losses

In his "Narrative," p. 132, General Johnston says:

"An hour or two later [than noon, May 30th] orders were given for the concentration of 23 of our 27 brigades against McClellan's left wing."

The result of that alleged "concentration" has been described. McClellan's left wing was attacked by five brigades; and General Johnston, who was wounded on another part of the field about sunset that day, says, in his official report:

"The skill, vigor, and decision with which these operations were conducted by General Longstreet are worthy of the highest praise."

Without discussing here General Johnston's opinion in regard to the manner in which General Longstreet conducted the operations of the three



ALLEN'S FARM-HOUSE NEAR THE WILLIAMSBURG ROAD, NOT FAR FROM THE "THIRD LINE OF DEFENSE." DESERTED IN 1885 WHEN THIS SKETCH WAS MADE.

divisions on the right, reference will now be made to the movements of the division on the Nine-mile road, directed by General Johnston in person.

In addition to the action already described, there was a sharp contest north of Fair Oaks Station late in the afternoon, May 31st, between reënforcements, under General Sumner, sent from the north side of the Chickahominy to aid Keyes at Seven Pines, and my division, under General Whiting. It will be borne in mind that when three Confederate regiments, under Colonel Jenkins, crossed the Nine-mile road just south of Fair Oaks, a little after 4 P. M., four regiments and a battery of Couch's division were cut off from the Federals

in the four brigades of D. H. Hill's division, indicate clearly enough that Hill's division did the greater part of the fighting; but all honor is due the brilliant, successful, and bloody work done that day by the two South Carolina regiments of Longstreet's division under Colonel Jenkins.

On the Federal side the losses in the operations described were: Kearny's division, less 1 brigade, 873; Couch's division, less 4 regiments, 1049; Casey's division, 1426. It is not amiss to give here the following from General Casey's official report. After stating that 8 of the 13 regiments that composed his division were raw troops, and had suffered from the inclemency of the weather, at times without tents or blankets, and poorly supplied with rations and medical stores, he adds: "Notwithstanding all these drawbacks, and the fact that there were not five thousand men in line of battle, they withstood for three hours the attack of an overwhelming force of the enemy. . . . It is true that the division, after being nearly surrounded by the enemy and losing one-third of the number actually engaged, retreated to the second line. They would all have been prisoners of war had they delayed their retreat a few minutes longer."—G. W. S.


BATTLE OF
SEVEN PINES OR FAIR OAKS
MAY 31st & JUNE 1st 1862.
SCALE
1 MILE
500
1000
1500 YARDS
Dispositions made by Union Troops to resist attack 1 o'clock May 31st
Positions of Confederate Troops going into Action
Positions of Union Troops at dark May 31st
" " Confederate " " " " "
" " Union Troops morning of June 1st
" " Confederate " " " " "
" " Union Troops in Action June 1st
" " Confederate " " " " "
RICHMOND & YORK RIVER R.R.
WILLIAMSBURG ROAD
NAGLEE'S CAMP
2 BRIGADES HUGER'S DIVISION
WESSEL'S CAMP
4 BRIGADES LONGSTREET
2 BRIGADES
PALMER'S CAMP
SEVEN PINES
FAIR OAKS
KEARNY AT 6 P.M.
RAINS
CARTER
RODES
GARLAND
G.B. ANDERSON
HOOD 3 P.M.
JENKINS
COLSTON
ARMISTEAD
PICKETT
R.H. ANDERSON'S BRIGADE
R.H. ANDERSONS BRIGADE
2 N.J. REGT.
PRYOR
SICKLES OF HOOKER
W. REGT. WILCOX
WILCOX
BERRY'S BRIGADE
BERRY & JAMESON'S BRIGADES OF KEARNY
3 REGTS
HOOKER'S DIVISION
SEDGWICK'S DIVISION AT 5 P.M.
GORMAN
BURNS
DANA
FRENCH'S BRIGADE
MEAGHER'S BRIGADE
HOWARD'S BRIGADE
GIBBONS'S BRIGADE
RICHARDSON'S DIVISION
SUMNER'S DIVISION
BIRNEY
BIRNEY'S BRIGADE
Allen
RICHMOND & YORK RIVER R.R.
RAIL ROAD
Dr Trent
HAYNES
NINE MILE ROAD
RIFLE PITS
HAMPTON
HATTON
COUCH
PETTIGREW
SMITH
GORMAN
DANA
BATT.
BATTERY
WILLIAMSBURG ROAD
SAVAGE'S STATION
WHITE OAK SWAMP
JWELLS

opposed to D. H. Hill. Immediately after being thus cut off, General Couch communicated with Birney's brigade on the railroad, a mile or more east of Fair Oaks, and endeavored to make arrangements by which the cut off forces could rejoin Keyes. Just then it was reported to General Couch that a large Confederate force on the Nine-mile road was rapidly advancing on Fair Oaks, and the four regiments and battery retreated in the direction of Sumner's bridges. On reaching a point about one thousand yards north of Fair Oaks, General Couch was informed that the leading troops of Sumner's corps were closely approaching. Couch halted his forces, formed line of battle, facing nearly south, placed two guns on each side of the road, and prepared to defend the position until Sumner's troops could come up.

LINE OF BATTLE OF GENERAL DEVENS'S BRIGADE, BETWEEN THE WILLIAMSBURG AND NINE-MILE ROADS — GENERAL DEVENS WOUNDED. FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

It is now proposed to give in some detail an account of the movements that day of my division under Whiting which prevented Sumner's forces from reaching Keyes at Seven Pines, and incidentally deprived Keyes and Heintzelman of the services of two brigades and a battery of their own troops.

In my official report (as originally submitted to General Johnston), it is stated that

"on arriving at the headquarters of General Johnston about sunrise [May 31st], I learned from him that his intention was that General Longstreet's division should move by the Nine-mile road, that of General D. H. Hill by the Williamsburg road, and General Huger's by the Charles City road. The enemy, it was understood, had already upon this side of the Chickahominy a force variously estimated at from 20,000 to 40,000 men. The recent rains had materially increased the difficulty of crossing that stream, and, notwithstanding the very bad condition of the roads over which we had to pass, and the boggy, swampy condition of the fields and woods through which our troops would have to operate, it was believed that an energetic attack early in the morning, properly supported and followed up, would result in defeat to that portion of the enemy already upon this side before the other portion of their army could cross the swollen river — either to reënforce their troops or to attack the city in our rear. . . . General Johnston's intentions, as then explained to me, were, that whilst General D. H. Hill's division was attacking the enemy's advanced position on the Williamsburg stage road in front, . . . General Longstreet's division would engage the enemy on Hill's left."

About 6 A. M. the head of the division under Whiting reached the vicinity of General Johnston's headquarters. There its way, to a point on the Nine-mile road near the suburb, was blocked by troops of Longstreet's division. General Whiting wrote to General Johnston asking that the route should be cleared. In reply, a staff-officer wrote: "General Johnston directs me to say, in answer to yours of this date, that Longstreet will precede you." This quieted Whiting for a time, but, as the delay continued, he became impatient, and having heard that I was at General Johnston's headquarters, he came there to see if I could not have his line of march cleared of Longstreet's troops. About 8 A. M. I sent my aide-de-camp, Captain Beckham, to

see General Longstreet in regard to this matter. Captain Beckham asked me where General Longstreet was to be found. I referred him to General Johnston who, with several others, was present. General Johnston said General Longstreet's division was on the Nine-mile road and he was probably with it; but, if not, he might be found on the Williamsburg road with that part of his command.

I now quote again from the suppressed portion of my official report:

"In about an hour I learned by note from Captain Beckham that neither General Longstreet nor any portion of his command was on the Nine-mile road. This note was immediately shown to General Johnston, who dispatched his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Washington, to General Longstreet with directions to turn his division into the Nine-mile road, provided it could be done without material loss of time. This message did not reach General Longstreet."

It was about 9 A. M. when I handed Captain Beckham's note to General Johnston, who was amazed at the information and for a time strongly inclined to discredit it, thinking that my aide had not gone far enough on the Nine-mile road to come up with Longstreet's troops. Johnston then sent one of his own aides, Lieutenant J. B. Washington, to Longstreet, with orders for the latter "to send three brigades by the Nine-mile road." Washington rode at full speed along the Nine-mile road, and soon found himself within the Federal picket-line—captured. ‖ As I first wrote in my report:

"An hour later Captain Beckham reported that he had found Longstreet's division on the Williamsburg road, halted, for the purpose of allowing General D. H. Hill's troops to file by."

In a letter to me dated February 7th, 1863, Captain Peckham says it was about 10 A. M. when he reached General Longstreet. He adds:

"Kemper's brigade, which formed a part of General Longstreet's division, was at a halt when I got to General Longstreet's headquarters, and, what surprised me most, was accompanied by wagons loaded with baggage and camp-equipage."

During these delays the firing of cannon across the Chickahominy, and reports from our troops guarding the river between New Bridge and Mechanicsville, indicated threatening movements of the Federals on that side. About 11 A. M. General Johnston directed me to take Hampton's and Hatton's brigades, proceed to the Chickahominy bluffs, and assume command of all the forces on that side, in case the Federals made any attempt to cross the river. At the same time, the other three brigades, after about five hours' delay near the suburbs of the city, accompanied by General Johnston, proceeded on the Nine-mile road, and halted near the point at which the road to New Bridge turns off. Finding nothing that required my presence on the banks of the river, I placed Hampton's and Hatton's brigades in position from which they could promptly resist the passage of the river at New Bridge or above, and could support the other three brigades when needed, and then joined Generals Johnston and Whiting, near Old Tavern. About 2:30 P. M., nothing having been heard from General Longstreet since my aide returned from the Williamsburg road, the chief of my staff, Major Whiting, requested to be

‖ General Casey says this incident helped to put him on his guard.— EDITORS.

allowed to go over to that road and find out the state of affairs there. I tendered his services in this matter to General Johnston.

In my official report it is stated:

"Between 4 and 5 o'clock a note was received [by General Johnston] from General Longstreet, stating that he had attacked and beaten the enemy after several hours' severe fighting; that he had been disappointed in not receiving assistance upon his left; and, although it was now nearly too late, that an attack, by the Nine-mile road, upon the right flank and rear of the enemy would probably enable him to drive them into the Chickahominy before night."

All of the foregoing quotations from my report were omitted from the copy that was put on file, in compliance with General Johnston's request, contained in his letter to me, June 28th, 1862, in which he said:

MAJOR-GENERAL DARIUS N. COUCH.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

"I inclose herewith the three first sheets of your report, to ask a modification — or omission, rather. They contain two subjects which I never intended to make generally known, and which I have mentioned to no one but yourself, and mentioned to you as I have been in the habit of doing everything of interest in the military way. I refer to the mention of the misunderstanding between Longstreet and myself in regard to the direction of his division, and that of his note to me, received about 4 o'clock, complaining of my slowness, which note I showed you. As it seems to me that both of these matters concern Longstreet and myself alone, I have no hesitation in asking you to strike them out of your report, as they in no manner concern your operations. I received information of L.'s misunderstanding (which may be my fault, as I told you at the time) while his troops were moving to the Williamsburg road, and sent to L. to send three brigades by the Nine-miles road, if they had not marched so far as to make the change involve a serious loss of time; this, after telling you of the misunderstanding. Your march from General Semmes's headquarters [he means the advance made by the division under Whiting, from the point where it was halted, near Old Tavern.— G. W. S.] was not in consequence of the letter from L. Whiting [Major] had gone at my request, with your permission, to ascertain the state of things with Longstreet. Just before 4 o'clock we heard musketry for the first time, and Whiting [General] was ordered to advance. Just then Major W. rode up and reported from L., and a moment after the note was brought me — which, after reading it, I showed to you."

In his official report General Johnston says that General Longstreet received verbal instructions, and that the division of General Longstreet was to support the attack made by D. H. Hill's division. General Longstreet, in his official report, makes no mention of the preliminary movements of his own division, except that he was obliged to send three of his small brigades on the Charles City road to support the brigade of Huger's division, which had been ordered to protect his (Longstreet's) right flank. Indefinite as these reports are in reference to the direction in which Longstreet's division was to move, it may, on the preceding evidence, be now considered

established that General Johnston intended Longstreet's division should move into action on the Nine-mile road, and support Hill by attacking Keyes's right flank. It is noticeable that General Johnston, in his official report, makes no mention of the information he received in regard to the transfer of Longstreet's division to the Williamsburg road, or of the attempt made to have at least three brigades sent back to the Nine-mile road. No allusion is made, in either of their official reports, to the note from Longstreet, received by Johnston about 4 P. M.

The anxiety felt by those near Old Tavern was extreme in the hours of suspense previous to 4 P. M., during which all were expecting to hear that the fighting on the Williamsburg road had commenced. In my official report it is stated that "as the day wore on and nothing decisive was heard from General Longstreet's attack, except occasional firing of cannon, and, for some two or three hours, but little musketry, it seemed that no real attack was likely to be made that day." Previous to 4 P. M. it was believed by all on the Nine-mile road that no attack had yet been made; the division on that road could not be advanced beyond McLaws's picket-line without bringing on the battle which General Johnston intended should be initiated by the divisions of Hill and Longstreet. The division under Whiting was there for the purpose of holding in check reënforcements from the north side of the river that would surely be sent to Keyes as soon as he was attacked in force; and Whiting was only to reënforce Longstreet "should there be cause of haste." The information finally received not only warned General Johnston that the battle had been raging for several hours, but the character of Longstreet's note conveyed the distinct impression that the delay from 8 A. M. to the afternoon had enabled the Federals to reënforce Keyes to such an extent that Longstreet had met with more opposition than the whole of his command could well overcome. In this state of affairs General Johnston ordered the division under Whiting to move forward as rapidly as possible, and himself urged and led the division against "the right flank of Longstreet's adversaries" without further regard to reënforcements from the north side of the Chickahominy. This advance was so rapid that no artillery was carried forward, on account of the almost impracticable condition of the ground. Very soon after this movement commenced, General Johnston directed Hood's brigade to bear strongly to the right, and go direct to the assistance of Longstreet, who was supposed to be in front of the enemy, near Seven Pines. But it has already been seen that Colonel Jenkins's command had then burst across the Nine-mile road a little south of Fair Oaks, and was "scouring" the rear of that road; and that 8 of the 13 brigades under Longstreet's control had not been put in action. Nothing of this, however, was then known to General Johnston. When the head of the column on the Nine-mile road, in the hurried movement to aid Longstreet, reached the vicinity of Fair Oaks Station, General Johnston censured General Whiting for hesitating to cross the railroad before disposing of a Federal force, north of that station, in position to threaten the left flank and rear of Whiting's command in case he moved farther. I was not present, but the following extracts from a letter to

me, written in 1868 by Colonel B. W. Frobel, of the Confederate States Engineer Corps, gives an account of what occurred on that occasion. Colonel Frobel was then a major on General Whiting's staff. He says:

"Generals Johnston and Whiting were following immediately after Whiting's brigade. As Whiting's brigade reached the road near the railroad crossing, I was sent to halt it. On returning after doing this, I joined Generals Whiting and Johnston, who were riding toward the crossing. General Whiting was expostulating with General Johnston about taking the division across the railroad — insisting that the enemy were in force on our left flank and rear. General Johnston replied: 'Oh! General Whiting, you are too cautious.' At this time we reached the crossing, and nearly at the same moment the enemy opened an artillery fire from the direction pointed out by General Whiting. We moved back up the road near the small white house. Whiting's brigade [a portion of it] was gone; it had been ordered forward to charge the batteries [two separated sections of one battery] which were firing on us. The brigade was repulsed, and in a few minutes came streaming back through the little skirt of woods to the left of the Nine-mile road near the crossing. There was only a part of the brigade in this charge. Pender [commanding regiment] soon rallied and re-formed those on the edge of the woods. General Whiting sent an order to him to reconnoiter the batteries, and if he thought they could be taken, to try it again. Before he could do so some one galloped up, shouting, 'Charge that battery!' The men moved forward at a double-quick, but were repulsed as before, and driven back to the woods."

Of the Federal resistance to this attack, General E. V. Sumner, in his official report, says:

"On arriving on the field, I found General Couch with four regiments and two companies of infantry and Brady's battery. These troops were drawn up in line near Adams's house, and there was a pause in the battle."

General Sedgwick, commander of Sumner's leading division, says: "Upon debouching into the open field near Adams's house, we found Abercrombie's brigade of Couch's division sustaining a severe attack and hard pushed by the enemy."

Kirby's six Napoleon guns were promptly placed in position facing south. The infantry of Sedgwick's division was put on the right and left, in Couch's defensive line. The Federal accounts show that repeated attempts were made by the Confederates to carry the position, but without success; that the contest continued until dark, at which time Kirby's battery faced west, without having otherwise changed position, and the infantry on the left of the battery was also facing west, with its left very near the railroad, a little east of Fair Oaks Station. On the immediate right of Kirby's battery the line of infantry still faced nearly south. There was no change in this part of the Federal lines; but on the extreme right the line was facing almost west, and had not been closely engaged.

In the meantime, before the action north of Fair Oaks commenced, when the head of Pettigrew's brigade reached the point in the large wood about three-fourths of a mile from the railroad crossing, I halted for the purpose of giving instructions to General Wade Hampton, whose brigade had reached the rear of Pettigrew's. Generals Johnston and Whiting had gone on with the two leading brigades, and I did not again see either of them until after dark. I directed General Hampton to lead his brigade to the left, on the wood road, a little more than a brigade length, and then resume his march in a direction

SUMNER'S CORPS CROSSING THE OVERFLOWED "GRAPEVINE" BRIDGE TO REËNFORCE COUCH AT FAIR OAKS. [SEE MAP, P. 226.] FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

parallel to the Nine-mile road, which would bring Hampton into line of battle on Pettigrew's left, in the attack General Johnston proposed to make. I remained at that point until Hampton's brigade had filed out of the Nine-mile road; then gave directions to Hatton's brigade to continue moving on the Nine-mile road, which would bring it into position as a reserve, to the line of battle formed by the brigades of Whiting, Pettigrew, and Hampton. In the meantime the action had commenced near Fair Oaks. On reaching the eastern edge of the wood I saw the leading troops moving north from Fair Oaks in direction almost exactly opposite to that in which I had given General Hampton to understand that General Johnston's movement would be made. In a short time I saw our leading troops retiring. This was the second repulse spoken of by Colonel Frobel. I notified General Whiting of Hampton's position, and soon learned from him that the previous attacks had been conducted without proper knowledge of the enemy's position; but that a reconnoissance had been made, and a combined attack by the three brigades would capture the battery in a few minutes. Before this attack was arranged, Kirby's battery of six pieces and the first brigade of Sedgwick's division reached Couch's line and the attack was repulsed. By this time Hatton's brigade had come up and was in the open field, close to the north side of the Nine-mile road. One regiment of Pettigrew's brigade, in reserve, was in the same field about two hundred yards north of the road. Soon after the repulse of the three brigades, the firing on the Federal side greatly increased. General Johnston, who was at the small grove north of Fair Oaks, sent word to me to have all the avail-

able troops brought up quickly. The only troops within reach, not already up, were a brigade and a half of Magruder's command stationed along the New Bridge road. I sent General Johnston's order direct to these brigade commanders; and seeing that Whiting's brigade was pressed back on the right, and learning that Hampton and Pettigrew were suffering great losses in the small wood, 600 or 800 yards north of Fair Oaks, it seemed to me that the Federal reënforcements from the north side of the river were likely to break through the division and reach Longstreet's left flank and rear. I therefore ordered Hatton's brigade and Pettigrew's reserve regiment to move into the woods and aid the troops closely engaged there. Believing that Whiting had, on the right, as much as he could well attend to, I went with Hatton's brigade to the extreme front line of Hampton and Pettigrew in the woods, and soon learned that General Pettigrew had been wounded, it was supposed mortally, and was a prisoner. General Hatton was killed at my side just as his brigade reached the front line of battle; and in a very few minutes General Hampton was severely wounded. In this state of affairs, I sent word to General Whiting that I would take executive control in that wood, which would relieve him, for the time, of care for the left of the division, and enable him to give his undivided attention to the right.

In the wood the opposing lines were close to each other, in some places not more than twenty-five or thirty yards apart. The contest continued until dark without material variation in the position of either line on that part of the field after I reached the extreme front, until the firing had ceased at dark, when I ordered the line to fall back to the edge of the field and re-form. In the meantime Whiting's brigade and the right of Pettigrew's had been forced back to the clump of trees just north of Fair Oaks Station, where the contest was kept up until night. [\]

On reaching the open field in rear of the line where Hampton's and Hatton's brigades had been engaged, I heard for the first time that General Johnston had been very seriously wounded and taken from the field an hour or more before. I was second in rank in his army, therefore the command, for the time being, devolved upon me.

In further illustration of views held at that time on the Confederate side in regard to the events of the first day at Seven Pines, the following extracts from a letter dated June 7th, 1862, from Longstreet to Johnston, are not irrelevant, however erroneous the opinions he expresses may be. He says:

"The failure of complete success on Saturday [May 31st] I attribute to the slow movements of General Huger's command. This threw perhaps the hardest part of the battle upon my own poor division. . . . Our ammunition was nearly exhausted when Whiting moved, and I could not, therefore, move on with the rush that we could had his movement been earlier. . . . I can't but help think that a display of his forces on the left flank of the enemy by General Huger would have completed the affair and given Whiting as easy and pretty a game as was ever had upon a battle-field."

It is not deemed necessary to make any comments on this letter. The facts already stated and proved are sufficient.

[\] In the action north of Fair Oaks the four Confederate brigades engaged lost 1061 killed and wounded.—G. W. S.

General Johnston says [see p. 214]:

"It was near half-past 6 o'clock before I admitted to myself that Smith was engaged, not with a brigade, as I had obstinately thought, but with more than a division."

It may not be amiss to mention here that Colonel Frobel, in the letter to me above referred to, says:

"General W. H. C. Whiting was at that time commanding your division, you being in command of the left wing of the army. . . . Whiting was directly under General Johnston, who was with the division the whole day until he was wounded, late in the afternoon."

Without dwelling now upon the persistency with which General Johnston insists that I was then in command of the division which bore my name, it may be stated here that General Whiting was clearly of opinion then and ever after, that but for General Johnston's determination to press on across the railroad to Longstreet's assistance, Couch would have been beaten and his battery captured before Sumner's leading troops reached the field.

MAJOR-GENERAL EDWIN V. SUMNER
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

Before describing what occurred on the second day, allusion will be made to some of the erroneous views which have been widely promulgated in regard to these operations. General Johnston, in his official report, says: "Major-General G. W. Smith succeeded to the command. He was prevented from renewing his attack on the enemy's position next morning by the discovery of strong intrenchments not seen on the previous evening." On page 141 of his published "Narrative," he says: "Sumner's corps at Fair Oaks [June 1st] was six miles from those of Heintzelman and Keyes, which were near Bottom's Bridge." In reference to the position of the Confederates at that time, he places D. H. Hill's division in line of battle across the Williamsburg road, at right angles to it, more than a mile east of Seven Pines, the left of Hill's line, near the railroad, facing north; Longstreet's and Huger's divisions on Hill's left, parallel to the railroad and extending a short distance west of Fair Oaks Station, uniting there with the division under Whiting; and says, "Magruder's division in reserve" "was under arms near."☆ On the map in his book he represents Sumner's corps in one line facing west, its left on the railroad a little west of Fair Oaks, with Longstreet's and Huger's divisions close on Sumner's left flank and rear. Having thus placed the contending forces, he adds: "Such advantage of position and superiority of numbers would have enabled the Confederates to defeat Sumner's corps, had the engagement been renewed Sunday morning [June 1st] before any aid could have come from Heintzelman, after which his troops could not have made

☆ "Narrative of Military Operations," by Joseph E. Johnston, pp. 137, 119.— G. W. S.

SUMNER'S MARCH TO REËNFORCE COUCH AT FAIR OAKS STATION.

Lieutenant Edmund Kirby, Battery I, First U. S. Artillery, says in his official report: "The roads were almost impassable for artillery, and I experienced great difficulty in getting my guns along. I was obliged at times to unlimber and use the prolonge, the cannoneers being up to their waists in water. About 4:30 P. M. I was within three-quarters of a mile of Fair Oaks Station, with three pieces [twelve-pounder Napoleons] and one caisson, the remainder of the battery being in the rear, and coming up as fast as circumstances would permit."

effectual resistance." He claims that the battle was "unfinished in consequence of the disabling of their commander [Johnston]," and states that after he was disabled, the *only thing* President Davis "ought to have done, or had time to do, was postponed almost twenty hours—the putting General Lee, who was near, in command of the army."

General Johnston also states that three Federal corps on the Richmond side "were completely separated from the two corps of their right beyond the Chickahominy by the swollen stream, which had swept away their bridges." This, if true, was not known or believed on our side. Anxiety on account of Federal reënforcements from the north side of the Chickahominy was felt, on the 1st of June as well as on the 31st of May, by the Confederate commander. But General Longstreet seems to have ignored all consideration of that subject on both days.

In the official report of the chief engineer of McClellan's army it is stated:

"At 8:15 A. M. (June 1st) the pontoon-bridge at the site of New Bridge was complete and passable to infantry, cavalry, and artillery. About noon the upper trestle-bridge was practicable for infantry. It was not till night that a practicable bridge for infantry was obtained at the lower trestle-bridge."

The railroad-bridge had been made practicable for all arms, and was not affected by the freshet.

The specific details given by General Johnston in regard to the positions occupied by the divisions of D. H. Hill, Longstreet, and Huger on the morn-

ing of June 1st, accorded, in the main, with General Longstreet's report to me at the time; and I never questioned the accuracy of General Johnston's statement in regard to the general positions occupied by these three divisions until I saw the recently published "Official Records." But I knew there was a gap between Whiting's right and Longstreet's left, and I knew, too, that Magruder's troops were not concentrated at Old Tavern.

Only one of the many remarkable statements made by General Longstreet in regard to the operations of the second day will be mentioned here. In a letter written in 1874 to General George W. Mindil, Federal, for the avowed purpose of throwing light upon the Confederate side, General Longstreet says:

"I do not remember to have heard of any fighting on the second day, except a sharp skirmish reported by General Pickett as he was retiring, under the orders of General Lee, to resume our former position."

Without dwelling upon what might have happened if General Johnston had not been disabled, or discussing what President Davis "ought to have done, or had time to do," it is proposed to show that General Johnston is greatly in error in reference to the positions of the contending forces on the morning of June 1st, and to present evidence that will refresh General Longstreet's memory in regard to the fighting he "heard of" that day.

In reference to the positions occupied by the three divisions under General Longstreet, it has already been stated and proved that D. H. Hill's division was in bivouac in the woods west of Casey's earth-works; and that large portions of the divisions of Longstreet and Huger were around Casey's redoubt, in the open field west of the second abatis. Before midnight, May 31st, Colonel Jenkins's command was withdrawn to Seven Pines, and the brigades of Wilcox and Pryor moved forward from the redoubt and bivouacked on the sides of the Williamsburg road, in advance of Seven Pines, the head of their column being on the ground where Colonel Jenkins ceased fighting. Pickett's brigade was still far back on the railroad, where it was posted by Longstreet's order when the attack was commenced, May 31st, and Mahone's brigade was three and a half miles out on the Charles City road.

Two brigades of the division under Whiting were in line of battle, facing nearly east, the right being on the railroad about five hundred yards west of Fair Oaks, the left in the woods on the north of the Nine-mile road, and the other three brigades within close supporting distance. There were six brigades in Magruder's command. Two of them were guarding the Mechanicsville and Meadow Bridge roads. The positions of the other four brigades are given in a note, dated 11 P. M., May 31st, addressed to me by their immediate commander, General McLaws. He says:

"General Cobb, five regiments, [posted] from the Mechanicsville road to General Harvey's place; General Kershaw from General Harvey's to Baker's; Generals Griffith and Semmes from General Kershaw's right to New Bridge, and on the line down New Bridge road."

Magruder's six brigades were the only forces guarding the crossings of the Chickahominy from New Bridge to Meadow Bridge.

On the Federal side Keyes's corps, with abundant artillery, occupied that part of the Federal third line of defense which was on the south side of the

Williamsburg road, one and three-eighths miles east of Seven Pines. One brigade and two regiments of Hooker's division were close in rear of Keyes, and two brigades of Kearny's division were in the trenches of the third line of defense, on the north side of the Williamsburg road; whilst Birney's brigade of that division was about half a mile in advance, with three regiments in line of battle, facing nearly south-west, their right resting on the railroad, and in close connection with Sumner's corps. In fact, the lines of Sumner and Heintzelman overlapped here at the time the Confederate attack was made. Sumner's corps (instead of being drawn up in one line, facing nearly west, as represented by General Johnston)



HOUSES ON THE BATTLE-FIELD, USED AS UNION HOSPITALS.

FROM PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN SOON AFTER THE BATTLE.

was in two lines, nearly at right angles to each other. Sedgwick's division, with Couch's cutoff forces and five batteries, were in line, facing nearly west, the left being a little north of the railroad, a short distance east of Fair Oaks. Richardson's division was on Sedgwick's left, in three lines, nearly parallel to the railroad, with four batteries. In front of Richardson's position was a dense and tangled wood; on his right, and in front of Sedgwick, the ground was open for several hundred yards.

I find no reasonable cause to doubt the substantial accuracy of the Federal official reports in regard to the position of their forces, or in reference to their accounts of the actual fighting, a synopsis of which will presently be given. I am far from agreeing with General Johnston in the rose-colored view he takes of the situation, at the time he was wounded, when there were, practically, three Federal corps upon the field. But I gave orders for the renewal of the attack, with no expectation, however, of the easy, complete, and certain success he pictures for that day.

When I assumed command of the army, I could learn nothing from those around me in reference to what had occurred on the Williamsburg road later than the information contained in the note received from General Longstreet, at 4 P. M. Hood's brigade had been recalled before it reached D. H. Hill's lines, and returned after the action north of Fair Oaks was ended. I sent staff-officers with several different parties to communicate with General Longstreet and request him to meet me as soon as possible at the headquarters on the Nine-mile road, near Old Tavern. A few minutes later General J. E. B.

MAJOR-GENERAL OLIVER O. HOWARD. FAC-SIMILE REPRODUCTION OF A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN BEFORE THE BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES, ON THE SECOND DAY OF WHICH GENERAL HOWARD LOST HIS RIGHT ARM.

Stuart reported to me that the enemy had made no advance during the day on the Charles City road, and that our troops had captured the Federal works at Seven Pines some time before sunset and had advanced beyond that point—he did not know how far. He had good guides with him, and offered to go in person to General Longstreet and have him piloted to headquarters. A little after 11 P. M. I received a note from General Stuart, stating that at 10:30 he had failed to find General Longstreet.

In the meantime General McLaws, who was at New Bridge, reported large forces opposite that point, and that they were building a pontoon-bridge. He added: "If this position is forced, your command will be in great danger, as you are aware."

Guided by one of my staff, who had succeeded in finding him about midnight, General Longstreet reached headquarters after 1 A. M. He reported that D. H. Hill's division and a portion of his own, after prolonged fighting and heavy losses, had succeeded in driving the enemy from Seven Pines late in the afternoon, and had pursued them more than a mile, until dark. On learning from him that a portion of his own division had not been in action, and that Huger's division, recalled from the Charles City road, though now at the front, had not been engaged at all, I directed General Longstreet to send a brigade of Huger's division to the Nine-mile road. That brigade was to support McLaws at New Bridge, or Whiting at Fair Oaks, as might be required. General Longstreet was ordered to renew the attack with the rest of his command as soon after daybreak as practicable, and to fight north rather than attempt to force his way any farther toward Bottom's Bridge. He left me a little after 2 A. M., and returned to the Williamsburg road. I wrote to General Lee, who was stationed in Richmond, in general charge of military operations, informing him of the orders I had given. In reply, dated 5 A. M., June 1st, General Lee says: "Your movements are judicious, and determination to strike the enemy right." In my official report it is stated:

"General Longstreet was directed to push his successes of the previous day as far as practicable, pivoting his movement upon the position of General Whiting, on his left. The latter was directed to make a diversion in favor of General Longstreet's real attack."

Soon after daylight there was sharp firing for a few minutes between Hood's skirmishers, near the railroad, and the extreme right of Richardson's position. These skirmishers were promptly recalled, and Whiting was ordered to make no advance until the attack by the right wing was well developed, in full force. In this affair Hood lost thirteen wounded. No part of the division under Whiting was again engaged during the day; because, although there was a good deal of heavy firing in the right wing that morning, nothing was observed from the Nine-mile road that indicated to me a real and determined attack, in full force by the right wing, such as I intended Whiting should support.

At 6:30 A. M. firing in the wood commenced, a little south of the railroad, about half a mile or more east of Fair Oaks, and was sufficiently heavy to indicate that the movement Longstreet had been ordered to make had begun. This heavy firing continued for an hour or more, nearly at the same place, but did not develop into an attack in full force. It lulled for a while, and was presently renewed, but now at a point several hundred yards south of the railroad. Longstreet's troops were evidently losing ground without his having made an attack with more than a very small portion of the Right Wing.

In the meantime my chief of staff, who was on the Chickahominy bluffs, had, from time to time, reported movements of troops, pontoons, etc., on the north side of the river, showing preparations for sending over additional Federal reënforcements. The first information received from General Longstreet was contained in a note from him, dated 8 A. M., saying: "I have ordered a brigade of General Huger's, as agreed upon. Please send a guide for it." About 10:30 A. M. the following was received from General Longstreet: "The brigade cannot be spared. Every man except a brigade is in action." In a few minutes this came from him: "The entire army seems to be opposed to me. I trust that some diversion may be made in my favor during these successive attacks, else my troops cannot stand it. The ammunition gives out too readily." And directly after, a note, dated 10 A. M., was received, saying: "Can you reënforce me? The entire army seems to be opposed to me. . . . If I can't get help, I fear I must fall back."

His leading troops had fallen back some time before; this was evident from observations made on the Nine-mile road. In Longstreet's dire extremity, as shown in the three notes received almost at one time, there were two ways in which I could then, possibly, help him,— one was by ordering Whiting forward over the open ground, and in deep mud, against the strong lines and numerous batteries of Sedgwick and Richardson; the other was to strip the Chickahominy of its defenders above New Bridge, and send reënforcements direct to Longstreet on the Williamsburg road. I adopted the latter course, and requested General McLaws to go to General Longstreet, inform him that about five thousand men had been ordered to reënforce him, assure him that the whole Federal army was not in his front, tell him that he must not fall back any farther, but drive the enemy, and, if possible, regain the ground he had lost.

About 1 P. M. I received a note from General McLaws, stating: "Longstreet says he can hold his position with five thousand more men. He has now the same ground the enemy held yesterday." A little after 2 P. M. I received a letter from General Longstreet, dated 1:30 P. M., in which he says:

"The next attack will be from Sumner's division. I think that if we can whip it we shall be comparatively safe. . . . I sincerely hope that we may succeed against them in their next effort. Oh, that I had ten thousand men more!"

When I received that note from Longstreet there had been little or no firing for several hours, and there was none of any consequence after that time.



FARM-HOUSE NEAR FAIR OAKS, USED AS A UNION HOSPITAL. FROM SKETCHES MADE AT THE TIME.

On reading in the "Official Records" the detailed reports of subordinate fighting commanders on both sides, I asked General D. H. Hill what orders he received from General Longstreet that day. His reply, dated June 26th, 1885, authorizes me to state: "General Hill says that he got no orders from General Longstreet on Sunday [June 1st] whatever." This information was to me like lightning from a clear sky, and it cleared the murky atmosphere which had surrounded some of the recently published official reports on the Confederate side, and enabled me to comprehend things that appeared to be inexplicable before I knew that Longstreet had made no attempt to obey my order.



HYER'S HOUSE, NEAR FAIR OAKS, USED AS A UNION HOSPITAL. BURNED JUNE 29, 1862.

The Federal reports of regimental, brigade, and division commanders of troops closely engaged the second day are given in such detail in the "Official Records," that, by comparing them with the limited number of Confederate reports found there, a clear idea may be formed of what actually occurred. This comparison eliminates nearly all of those exaggerated elements in the accounts which relate to the wondrous results claimed to have been achieved by so-called "bayonet-charges" on the one side, and the bloody repulse of "ten times" their own numbers on the other.

It has already been shown that on May 31st the Confederates struck Keyes's corps, isolated at Seven Pines, with four brigades, and increased the attacking force to five brigades after Keyes had been reënforced by Heintzelman. June 1st, the Confederate attack was made against the left wing of French's brigade, which, with one regiment of Howard's brigade on its left, formed the front line of Richardson's division. On the left of that division was Birney's brigade of Kearny's division. In his official report, Richardson says:

"Near our left two roads crossed the railroad, and up these the enemy moved his columns of attack. At 6:30 A. M. . . . the enemy opened a heavy rolling fire of musketry within fifty yards. . . . It soon became the heaviest musketry-firing that I had ever experienced during an hour and a half. . . . I now ordered in General Howard to reënforce the first line with his brigade. . . . Soon after this the whole line of the enemy fell back for the first time, unable to stand our fire, and for half an hour the firing ceased on both sides."

In this attack the regiment of Howard's brigade on the extreme left of Richardson's front line was broken, fell back behind the second line, and was not again in action. The regiment next to it on the right was forced back a short distance. The left of Richardson's front line was so rudely shaken that all available means were used to strengthen it; a battery and Meagher's brigade were put in to cover the gap, and Burns's brigade, previously detached to cover the communications with the bridges, was recalled and hurriedly sent by General Sumner to Richardson's assistance.

It will be seen later that this staggering blow against the left of Richardson's line was from three regiments of Armistead's brigade and three regiments of Mahone's brigade, both of Huger's division. It will be seen, too, that these six regiments were the only Confederate forces that attacked the Federals during the second day.

It was about 8 A. M. when General Howard, with two regiments of his brigade, relieved the left wing of French's brigade and took up the fighting. Just at that time the three regiments of Birney's brigade south of the railroad, whose strong advanced guards had been slowly driven back, were rapidly thrown forward. The regiment next the railroad struck the flank of the Confederates just at the time Howard was advancing against their front; and under these two attacks the Confederates gave way in great disorder. The center regiment, of Birney's three, met with but little resistance until it struck a Confederate force in strong position on a wood road parallel to and three hundred to four hundred yards south of the railroad, in front of the left wing of French's brigade. The two regiments of Howard's brigade, in their forward movement, soon struck the same Confederates in the densely tangled wood. These three Federal regiments, after repeated efforts to dislodge the Confederates,— Pickett's brigade,— were repulsed with severe losses, and resumed position in the lines from which they had advanced.

General Howard was wounded just as his two regiments were coming to close quarters with Pickett's brigade. The command of Howard's brigade then devolved upon Colonel Cross, of the 5th New Hampshire, who says:

"Finding that the three other regiments of the brigade had been some time in action and severely handled, I directed that they should move out of the woods and re-form in the rear of

Meagher's brigade, while I advanced my regiment to occupy the ground. We moved forward in line of battle through a thick wood, and about three hundred yards from the railroad track encountered the rebel line of battle. . . . The fire was now very close and deadly, the opposing lines being several times not over thirty yards apart. When about ordering another [the third] charge I was struck by a rifle-ball. . . . Lieutenant-Colonel Langley then took command of the regiment, and, the rebels endeavoring to flank us, he brought off the regiment in excellent order, carrying most of our wounded."

It was now about 11 A. M., perhaps earlier. The fighting was practically ended when the 5th New Hampshire withdrew from in front of the position defended by Pickett's brigade. In the meantime, however, there had been some sharp firing, and for a short time a little close fighting, on the Williamsburg road, between the two Confederate brigades under General Wilcox and seven regiments of Hooker's division and the left regiment of Birney's three. The two regiments of the right wing of French's brigade also advanced into the wood a short time before the action was ended. [For losses, see p. 218.]

On the Confederate side, General D. H. Hill, in his official report, says that at daylight, June 1st, he "learned that heavy reënforcements had come up to the support of Keyes," and "that General G. W. Smith had been checked upon the Nine-mile road, and that no help could be expected in that direction." He adds: "I therefore resolved to concentrate my troops around the captured works." This resolution was formed in the absence of any instructions "whatever" from his chief, General Longstreet, and he certainly received none from me. It now appears that after Longstreet, about 10 A. M., May 31st, assumed control of Huger and Huger's division, all the brigades, when sent to the front, were ordered to report to General D. H. Hill. I did not know that General Longstreet had, for the time being, virtually given up to General Hill the command of the three divisions on the Williamsburg road; much less did I know, or even suspect, that General Longstreet made no attempt, June 1st, to carry into effect the order I gave him to renew the attack. The official reports show that D. H. Hill commanded the thirteen brigades in the right wing that day. It is now proposed to tell what he did with them. It will be seen that he ordered the brigades of Pickett and Mahone to attack, and, by inference, that Armistead's brigade was ordered to attack; that the brigades of Wilcox and Pryor were ordered to retire, and that the brigades of Mahone and Colston, just as the fighting ended, were ordered to assist Pickett in the defensive position he had taken up after Armistead's three regiments were repulsed.

General Pickett, in his official report, says that his brigade marched at daylight from its position back on the railroad, and, in compliance with General Longstreet's orders given the evening before, reported to General D. H. Hill at Casey's redoubt. He adds:

"My brigade had marched on some four hundred yards in advance of this point when it was there halted. General Hill directed me to ride over to the railroad and communicate with Brigadier-General Hood, whose right was resting on that road. I asked General Hill of the whereabouts of the enemy. He said they were some distance in advance — in fact, I had no definite idea where."

It is very clear that to the Confederates on the Williamsburg road the expression "in advance" meant toward the east. But Pickett's instructions

from Hill required him in person to go north in search of Hood. On his route, Pickett soon met a small "plundering party" of Confederates rushing past him. He says:



HOUSE NEAR FAIR OAKS, USED AFTER THE BATTLE AS QUARTERS FOR THE OFFICERS OF THE 1ST MINNESOTA. FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

"One fellow riding a mule with a halter I seized on and detained for explanation. He said the enemy was within a few yards of us, and entreated me to let him save himself. I immediately rode back with him at a gallop, and as briefly as possible informed General Hill of the circumstances. He ordered me to attack, and I supposed [the] same order was given to other brigade commanders."

It is well to call attention here to the fact that the three regiments of Birney's brigade [Federal] had strong outposts well to their front, stationed in the woods several hundred yards south of the railroad, for the purpose of holding any advance of the Confederates in check long enough to enable Kearny, with the rest of his division, to reach and support Birney if closely pressed. The Federal accounts show that these outposts did seriously delay the Confederates advancing east on the south side of the railroad.

General Pickett says that his brigade was "in line of battle nearly perpendicular to the railroad," and that Armistead was on his left. It will be noticed that, advancing in the line he describes, Pickett's brigade moved nearly parallel to the railroad, and that Armistead's brigade was between Pickett and the railroad. Pickett encountered the strong outposts of Birney's brigade. Continuing his account, he says his brigade

"struck the enemy within a short distance (who opened heavily upon us), drove him through an abatis over a cross-road leading to [the] railroad, and was advancing over a second abatis, when I had discovered Armistead's brigade had broken and were leaving the field pell-mell. At this moment I was on foot and half-way across the abatis, the men moving on beautifully and carrying everything before them."

He had certainly not yet struck Richardson's line, and never did reach it. He called on General Hill for reënforcements, and he says that he threw back the left of his brigade so as to oppose a front to the Federals on the side where Armistead's men had given way, and adds:

"As a matter of course, from having been the attacking party, I now had to act on the defensive. Fortunately the enemy seemed determined on attacking and carrying my front, and driving me out of the abatis, which our men succeeded in preventing, though with considerable loss."

The "Official Records" contain no report from any commander in that portion of Armistead's or of Mahone's brigades engaged in the attack on Richardson's line. But General Mahone, in a letter to Captain Benj. Huger, October 13th, 1862, says that his brigade moved early on the morning of June 1st from its position on the Charles City road, and reported to General Hill, at the redoubt, "at the same time that General Pickett's brigade reported upon the field," and that his own "brigade was in a few moments thereafter *thrown* into action, a report of which General Huger has." That report cannot be found; but General Mahone now says, in letters to me, December, 1885, and January, 1886:

"At the moment I was reporting to General Hill, some person rode up and excitedly stated to him that the enemy were in the wood on the north side of the [Williamsburg] road. . . . General Hill said: 'General Mahone, take your brigade in there,' referring to the wood in which the enemy were supposed to be." "I am quite certain that Armistead's brigade was on my immediate right, and I suppose it went into the fight about the time my brigade went in. There was no fighting which would indicate an attack by either side before my leading regiments went in, . . . and none on my left during the engagement that followed. Armistead's brigade and mine must have struck the enemy about the same time." "The impetus of the charge of the 3d Alabama, a splendid regiment, I am satisfied must have severely shocked and disordered Richardson's line, and if there had been any intelligent understanding of the position of the enemy, and instructions as to what we were to do, it can be seen *now* how easy a destructive blow might have been given."

From different but authentic sources, I learn that the losses in Mahone's brigade were 339, of which 175 were in the 3d Alabama, 112 in the 41st Virginia, and 52 in the 12th Virginia. The other two regiments were detached.

I have not succeeded in getting specific information from any one engaged in either of the regiments of Armistead's brigade that attacked the extreme left of Richardson's line. The effect produced by that attack shows it was of a very determined character, and from the nature of the Federal counter-attack on Armistead, the losses of the latter must have been very heavy. That Armistead's three regiments did not, then, retire from the wood is shown by the published official report of Colonel H. B. Tomlin, of the 53d Virginia, which had been kept back during the night, May 31st, at General Longstreet's headquarters, and did not get to the front before the other three regiments had been repulsed. On reaching the redoubt, this regiment was ordered to join the other three in the woods. In the tangled undergrowth it became engaged by mistake with one of Mahone's regiments; and, whilst they were firing into each other, one of the regiments of French's Federal brigade came up, and Armistead's regiment, in confusion, fell back to the redoubt, "apprehending more danger from friends than the enemy." In this fiasco that regiment lost one killed and eighteen wounded, and the regiment of French's brigade lost one killed and five wounded. These incidents have been referred to because of the exaggerated importance attached by the Federals to the "bayonet-charge" made by the right of French's brigade.

General Wilcox, commanding his own brigade and Pryor's, says that on the morning of June 1st, having no orders, he formed his brigade in line of battle across and at right angles to the Williamsburg road about half

a mile east of Seven Pines, and Pryor's brigade on the left, but facing nearly north. The Federals moved against Wilcox about 8 A. M. In his official report he says that after the firing had continued for some time, the engagement became serious on his entire front, and the contest "was going on as well as could be desired," when "an order was sent to me to withdraw my command, which was instantly done." General Wilcox adds:

"The order given me to retire my command on the second morning was given in writing by D. H. Hill, and for the reason, as he stated in his note, that Mahone's men had acted badly."

After the withdrawal of these two brigades they were placed in position near the redoubt. In this affair the losses in Wilcox's brigade were 44; those in Pryor's brigade are not stated. The Federal accounts of operations on this part of the field show great misapprehension of the real state of affairs on the Confederate side. General Hooker says:

"Our advance on the rebels . . . was slow, . . . the fire brisk and unerring. After an interchange of musketry of this character for more than an hour, directions were given to advance with the bayonet, when the enemy were thrown into wild confusion, throwing away their arms, hats, and coats, and broke through the forest in the direction of Richmond."

A good deal of this "magnificence" vanishes before the plain statements made by General Wilcox; but, in fairness, it should be stated that "extravagances" are also found in the Confederate reports. General Hill says: "Pickett held his ground against the odds of ten to one for several hours."

Pickett's frantic appeals to Hill for help gave color of probability to General Hill's opinion; but the Federal reports, now published, show that Pickett's strong defensive position was attacked by four regiments only. Hill finally sent two brigades to Pickett's assistance, and on their appearance the 5th New Hampshire withdrew from Pickett's front; or, as he expresses it, "the enemy retreated to their bushy cover, and their fire immediately slackened." He adds: "No other attempt was made by them to advance, and about 1 P. M., I judge, by General Hill's order, I withdrew the whole of our front line." He evidently means his own brigade and the two brigades that had been sent to aid him. The losses in the 4 regiments of Pickett's brigade were 350.

General Hill had now succeeded in concentrating the right wing of the army "around the captured works." He says:

"The [remainder of the] day was spent in removing 6700 muskets and rifles in fine condition, ordnance, commissary and medical stores. Ten captured guns had been removed the night before. . . . General Longstreet sent me an order after dark to withdraw my whole command. The thirteen brigades were not got together until near midnight."

General Pickett says:

"General Hill sent for me about 1 o'clock at night, or, rather, morning of June 2d, and I went to the redoubt in search of him. . . . General Hill gave me orders to cover [the] withdrawal of the troops with my brigade. . . . The whole of our force filed past by half an hour after sunrise. I then leisurely moved off, not a Yankee in sight or even a puff of smoke."

The Federals resumed the positions they held that morning, with the exception of Sickles's brigade of Hooker's division, which occupied the ground where Colonel Jenkins's command ceased fighting the previous day. Some time after



SECOND LINE OF UNION WORKS AT THE "TWIN HOUSES" ON THE WILLIAMSBURG ROAD, LOOKING WEST.
FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

After the battle of Seven Pines this position was greatly strengthened, as may be seen by comparing the above picture with the sketches of the same position on page 216.

sunrise, June 2d, the Federal pickets discovered that the Confederates had retired from Casey's captured works. At 5 P. M. that day General Hooker reported the result of an armed reconnoissance from which he had just returned. He says that a short distance in front of Casey's camp "the enemy appeared to have a regiment of cavalry and three of infantry, but as the latter were most concealed in the forest, it was not prudent to determine their number." At 3 A. M. that day the chief of staff of McClellan's army wrote to General Sumner: "The general commanding says, in reply to your dispatch, that you must do the best you can to hold your own if attacked. General Heintzelman will support you." At 11:50 P. M., June 3d, General Sumner wrote to General Kearny:

"From information I have received, I have reason to expect a formidable attack to-morrow morning. Please advance with your division at 2 A. M. in order to attack the flank of the enemy if he assails me in large force. Everything may depend upon this movement of yours."

The *theory* that the "Confederates attacked in full force," were repulsed, retreated in "disorganization and dismay," "which sent them to Richmond in a panic on the night of June 1st," is not in accordance with the facts already established, nor with any that are likely to be brought to light hereafter.

The divisions of Longstreet and Hill leisurely returned to the positions they occupied when the order to attack was given; but Huger's division remained

well out on the Williamsburg road in advance of D. H. Hill's position. The latter fact is made clear by the following written statement of General Longstreet, dated June 3d, 1862. He says:

"The entire division of General Huger was left in advance upon retiring with the forces from the late battle-field. He was absent yesterday, but not coming to report after being sent for, I ordered General Stuart to take command of the division."

This in itself shows, beyond doubt, that General Longstreet was exercising control over Huger and Huger's division during these operations.

On the Nine-mile road the division under Whiting remained, for some days after the battle was ended, closely confronting Sumner's corps near Fair Oaks. In the letter already referred to, Colonel Frobel says:

"We remained in the position indicated until the afternoon, when the brigades were withdrawn a short distance to the shelter of heavy woods in our rear. I do not think after this that we changed our position for several days."

In his official report of what occurred the day after he was disabled and left the field, General Johnston says: "In the evening [June 1st] our troops quietly returned to their own camps."

The camps of the division under Whiting were on the Meadow Bridge road; this division remained on the Nine-mile road, a mile or more in advance of Magruder's line at Old Tavern. The camps of Huger's division were on the banks of Gilliss Creek, close to the suburbs of Richmond; this division remained on the Williamsburg road, more than a mile in advance of Hill's camps. The two divisions that did return to their camps left the field on the morning of June 2d—not "in the evening" of June 1st.

To complete this sketch of the battle of Seven Pines, it is essential to mention that, when I received General Longstreet's note, dated 1:30 P. M., June 1st, which ended with the exclamation, "Oh, that I had ten thousand men more," General Lee had just taken command of the army. He seemed very much impressed by the state of affairs on the Williamsburg road as depicted in General Longstreet's note. I assured him, however, that Longstreet was mistaken in supposing that the whole Federal army was opposed to him; that I had several hours before nearly stripped the Chickahominy, between New Bridge and Mechanicsville, in order to send him reënforcements; and that the danger to Richmond, if any, was not then on the Williamsburg road, if it ever had been.

General Lee gave me no orders that day. The fact that Longstreet's and D. H. Hill's divisions were sent back to their former camps induces me to believe that this was in compliance with orders given by General Lee to General Longstreet—perhaps for the reason that on May 31st we had not fully succeeded in crushing one Federal corps isolated at Seven Pines, and on June 1st had lost all the ground beyond Seven Pines that we had gained the day previous.

I was completely prostrated on the 2d of June by an attack of paralysis, no symptom of which was manifested within eighteen hours after Lee relieved me of the command of the army. But, for that misfortune, I would certainly



AFTER THE BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES — PETTIT'S BATTERY IN FORT RICHARDSON, IN FRONT OF FAIR OAKS STATION, BETWEEN THE NINE-MILE ROAD AND THE RAILROAD. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

have required all subordinates to report to me events that took place on the field in their respective commands whilst I was in control of the army.

The detailed reports of regimental and brigade commanders on both sides in this battle show many instances of close, persistent, and bloody fighting, such as have been seldom equaled by any troops on any field. Cases of temporary confusion and disorder occurred, but fair examination shows there was good reason for this. In reference to the general management, however, it may well be said that General McClellan committed a grave error in allowing Keyes's corps to remain isolated for several days within easy striking distance of General Johnston's army. The intention of the latter to throw Longstreet's division against Keyes's exposed and weak right flank was the best plan that could have been adopted. The first great blunder consisted in Longstreet's taking his division from the Nine-mile road to the Williamsburg road, and the next in placing six brigades on the Charles City road, where there was no enemy. Five of these brigades were marching and countermarching on the latter road, and struggling through the White Oak Swamp, in mud and water waist-deep, to reach the Williamsburg road miles in rear of the fighting, where General Longstreet then was, whilst Colonel Jenkins's three regiments were scouring the rear of the Nine-mile road from Fair Oaks to Seven Pines; thus not only saving the right of Hill's division from being driven out of Casey's captured works by Federal reënforcements under Kearny, but forcing Keyes and Heintzelman to their third line of defense. No one can fairly doubt what would have been the result, if at 3 P. M., when Hill's division alone had carried Casey's works, the five brigades that had been sent to the Charles City road had been within supporting distance of Hill, and had been promptly put in close action, and Pickett's brigade had



AFTER THE BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES — PUTTING THE WOUNDED ON CARS. FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

been thrown forward instead of being held far back on the railroad by Longstreet's order "to repel any advance of the enemy up that road." Instead of putting his own troops into the fight, even late in the afternoon, Longstreet called on General Johnston for help, and complained of the latter's "slowness."

It is not proposed to speculate here upon what might have happened on the second day, if General Longstreet had made any attempt to carry out the orders he received to renew the attack. But it may be well to emphasize the fact that if Longstreet's division had promptly moved, on the Nine-mile road, at daybreak, May 31st, and been put in close action on that side, whilst D. H. Hill's division attacked in front,— as Johnston certainly intended,— there would have been no occasion to make excuses for the failure of complete Confederate success in wiping out Keyes's corps, early in the morning of May 31st, before it could have been reënforced by either Heintzelman or Sumner. ⚓

⚓ On the 15th of May, the Union gun-boats opened fire on the forts at Drewry's Bluff, twelve miles below Richmond, and soon after Johnston's army retired, opening the way for McClellan's advance to within seven miles of Richmond, whose citizens believed at this time that the Confederate authorities would be compelled to evacuate the city. The archives were shipped to Columbia, S. C., the public treasure was kept on cars ready for transportation to a place of safety. Confidence was restored before the battle of Seven Pines. On May 25th and 26th, Lieutenant F. C. Davis, of the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, with eleven men rode from Bottom's Bridge, by way of White Oak Bridge and Charles City Court House, to the James River and communicated with the gun-boat fleet. After the battle of Seven Pines, General Lee determined to defend Richmond on the line then held by his army. This fact, in connection with the success of General Jackson in freeing the Shenandoah Valley of Union forces, restored the confidence of the people at Richmond. A large draft of soldiers from the ranks furnished a laboring force to build intrenchments, and slaves in the counties around Richmond were impressed for the work.

On the 18th of June, Brigadier-General Cuvier Grover's brigade, of Hooker's division, made a reconnoissance between the Williamsburg road and the railroad, and found the Confederates in force behind earth-works. The divisions of Hooker and Kearny advanced on the 25th to a point called Oak Grove, about four miles from Richmond, in front of Seven Pines. This was the nearest approach to Richmond during the investment by McClellan.

EDITORS.



ON THE GUN-DECK OF THE CONFEDERATE IRON-CLAD, "MERRIMAC."

THE NAVY IN THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.

BY PROFESSOR JAMES RUSSELL SOLEY, U. S. N.

AT the opening of the Peninsular campaign, April 1st, 1862, the North Atlantic Squadron, with its headquarters at Hampton Roads, was commanded by Flag-Officer Louis M. Goldsborough. The command included not only the operations in the Chesapeake and its tributary waters, but an entirely distinct series of operations in the sounds of North Carolina, and a third distinct and also very important service,—that of the Wilmington blockade. This concentration of command at a distance from the various fields of action was not without injurious results. The attention of the flag-officer could not be successfully directed at the same instant of time to such varied and complicated movements as were simultaneously in progress in the York River, the James River, Hampton Roads, Albemarle Sound, and the entrance to Wilmington.

Of the various plans for a direct movement upon Richmond considered by the civil and military authorities in the winter of 1861–62, that by way of Urbana on the Rappahannock River was finally adopted, but the withdrawal of General Johnston from Centreville led to a change of plan at the last moment; and on the 13th of March it was decided to advance from Fort Monroe as a base. The detailed plan of General McClellan comprehended an attack by the navy upon the batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester, on opposite sides of the York River. It was upon the navy that he chiefly relied to reduce these obstacles to his progress and to clear the way to his proposed base, the White House on the Pamunkey River. This fact was made known to the War Department, but apparently the Navy Department was not fully apprised of it. The question was asked of the Navy Department whether the *Merrimac*, at that time lying in the Elizabeth River, could be held in check,

and Assistant Secretary Fox replied that the *Monitor* would be sufficient for that purpose. Captain Fox said:

"It was determined that the army should go by way of Fort Monroe. The Navy Department never was consulted at all, to my knowledge, in regard to anything connected with the matter. No statement was ever made to us why they were going there beyond this."

General McClellan arrived at Old Point on the 2d of April, and immediately communicated with Flag-Officer Goldsborough. The advance of the army was to begin at once. Notwithstanding that he had previously considered it an essential part of his plan that Yorktown should be reduced by the navy, McClellan does not appear even at this time to have strenuously urged it, for Goldsborough afterward stated to the Committee on the Conduct of the War that he performed every service in connection with army operations which was requested of him by General McClellan. It may be that the naval attack on Yorktown and Gloucester was not pressed because McClellan learned in this interview that it was impracticable. On this point Fox said:



MAPS OF THE "MONITOR" AND "MERRIMAC" FIGHT [SEE ALSO VOL. I., P. 692], AND OF OPERATIONS IN THE YORK AND JAMES RIVERS.

On the 14th of March, Secretary Welles wrote to Secretary Stanton regarding McClellan's call for naval assistance:

"If a movement is to be made upon Norfolk, always a favorite measure of this Department, instant measures will be taken to advise and strengthen Flag-Officer Goldsborough; but unless such be the case, I should be extremely reluctant to take any measure that would even temporarily weaken the efficiency of the blockade."

On the 17th Gen. McDowell wrote to McClellan:

"In connection with General Barnard I have had a long conference with Assistant Secretary Fox, as to naval coöperation. He promises all the power of the Department shall be at our disposal." EDITORS.

IN THE TURRET OF THE "MONITOR."

"Wooden vessels could not have attacked the batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester with any degree of success. The forts at Yorktown were situated too high, were beyond the reach of naval guns, and *I understand that General McClellan never expected any attack to be made on them by the navy.*"

At McClellan's request Goldsborough sent 7 gun-boats under Commander William Smith into the York River, the *Marblehead* on the 4th of April, followed the next day by the *Wachusett*, *Penobscot*, and *Currituck*, and later by the *Sebago*, *Corwin*, and *Chocura*. The *Maratanza* afterward took the place of the *Penobscot*. The rest of the fleet, including the *Monitor*, remained to watch the *Merrimac*. On the 1st of May, during an attack made on the left flank of the army, the fleet shelled the enemy's artillery, posted on a hill to the left, and forced it to retire. On the 5th, the day following the evacuation of Yorktown, the fleet moved up to a position off the town, and a reconnoissance made by the *Chocura* and *Corwin* showed that the river was open as far as West Point. On the 6th, Commander Smith moved the gun-boats up to that place, escorting the transports carrying General Franklin's division. On the 7th, before the landing of the troops was completed, a sharp attack was made by the enemy and repulsed, the gun-boats rendering efficient assistance. On the 17th, the *Sebago* and *Currituck* passed up the Pamunkey, which resulted in the destruction of the enemy's store-vessels. When the *Wachusett* was withdrawn to the James, five boats remained to protect McClellan's base, under the command of Lieutenant Alexander Murray.

During the siege of Yorktown the presence of the *Merrimac* had, of course,

paralyzed the efforts of the navy in the waters adjoining Hampton Roads. It was necessary that she should be neutralized at all hazards, or her appearance either in the York or James River would become a serious obstacle to the success of the campaign. But for the negligence of the Navy Department in postponing the building of iron-clads until six months after the war had begun, and that of the War Department in omitting, during the six following months, when it had 150,000 men lying inactive around Washington, to send 50,000 of them to capture Norfolk, the *Merrimac* would never have become a serious factor in the situation. As, however, General McClellan had been satisfied to leave Norfolk to be turned by his advance on the Peninsula, and as the Navy Department had thus far succeeded in getting afloat only one iron-clad, the efforts of the force at Hampton Roads were necessarily concentrated on holding the enemy in check. This was the first consideration of the flag-officer from March 9th, when the engagement took place between the *Monitor* and *Merrimac* [see Vol. I., p. 692], until May 11th, when the latter was destroyed. During most of this time — that is, from April 5th to May 4th —the Army of the Potomac was conducting the siege of Yorktown.

After the battle of the 9th of March, Tattnall had taken command of the *Merrimac*, and on the 4th of April she came out of the dock thoroughly repaired, and, except for her engines, in good condition. On the morning of the 11th she steamed down Elizabeth River and came out into the Roads, advancing to a position between Sewell's Point and Newport News. Goldsborough, with the *Minnesota*, the *Monitor*, and other vessels of his squadron, was lying near Fort Monroe. The transports and store-ships at this time in the neighborhood had been warned of the danger of lying near Hampton, and most of them had withdrawn under the protection of the fort. Three vessels of the quartermaster's department still remained near Newport News. They had been run on shore. The Confederate gun-boats *Jamestown* and *Raleigh*, under Captain Barney and Captain Alexander, were sent to tow them off. This was handsomely done, in full view of the Union vessels, which offered no opposition, notwithstanding the challenge offered by the captors in hoisting the flags of their prizes Union down. This event, rendered all the more humiliating by the presence of a foreign ship-of-war, was suffered by Goldsborough because, in accordance with the wishes of the Department, it was his duty to hold in check the *Merrimac;* and he feared that a collision between the gun-boats might bring on a general engagement.



FORT DARLING. [SEE MAP, P. 272.] FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

During April the squadron was gradually increased by the addition of new vessels, including the new iron-clad *Galena*, and several fast steamers, the *Arago*, *Vanderbilt*, *Illinois*, and *Ericsson*, as rams. When it was apparent that the Confederates would shortly be compelled to abandon Norfolk, a squadron, consisting of the *Galena*, the gun-boat *Aroostook*, and the double-ender *Port Royal*, was sent up the James River on the 8th of May, by direction of the President. On the same day a demonstration made by the fleet against the battery at Sewell's Point led the *Merrimac* to come out again from the river. The *Monitor* had orders to fall back into fair channel-way, and only engage the *Merrimac* seriously in such a position as to enable the *Minnesota* and the other vessels to run her down if an opportunity offered. According to Flag-Officer Goldsborough, "the *Merrimac* came out, but was even more cautious than ever. The *Monitor* was kept well in advance, and so that the *Merrimac* could have engaged her without difficulty had she been so disposed; but she declined to do it, and soon returned and anchored under Sewell's Point." Commodore Tattnall said:

REAR-ADMIRAL JOHN RODGERS. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

"We passed the battery and stood directly for the enemy for the purpose of engaging him, and I thought an action certain, particularly as the *Minnesota* and *Vanderbilt*, which were anchored below Fortress Monroe, got under way and stood up to that point, apparently with the intention of joining their squadron in the Roads. Before, however, we got within gunshot, the enemy ceased firing and retired with all speed under the protection of the guns of the fortress, followed by the *Virginia*, until the shells from the Rip-Raps passed over her. The *Virginia* was then placed at her moorings near Sewell's Point."

This was the last exploit of the *Merrimac*. On the 10th, Norfolk was abandoned, and was immediately occupied by the Union forces under General Wool. Early the next morning Commodore Tattnall, being unable to carry out his plan of taking the *Merrimac* up the James River, destroyed her near Craney Island. Meantime, the *Galena* and her consorts under Commander John Rodgers had been working their way up the James River. On the first day two batteries were encountered. The first, at Rock Wharf, was silenced. The resistance of the second, at Hardin's Bluff, was more obstinate, but Rodgers, in the *Galena*, lay abreast of the enemy's guns and kept up a steady fire, disconcerting their aim while the wooden boats went by. During the next week Rodgers continued on his course up the James, meeting with no serious impediment until he arrived at Drewry's Bluff, eight miles below Richmond.

At this time, May 15th, the flotilla had been increased by the addition of



FORT DARLING, LOOKING DOWN THE JAMES. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

SUNKEN STEAMBOATS AND OTHER OBSTRUCTIONS IN THE JAMES RIVER, NEAR FORT DARLING, ON DREWRY'S BLUFF. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

the *Monitor* and the *Naugatuck*. Fort Darling (Commander E. Farrand, C. S. N.), at Drewry's Bluff, was a strong position, two hundred feet above the river, and mounting a number of heavy guns. At the foot of the bluff an obstruction had been placed in the river formed of sunken vessels secured by chains. The light armor of the *Galena* had not as yet been seriously tested, and Rodgers had no great confidence in her ability to stand a severe fire; nevertheless, he decided to make the test. In a private letter written shortly after, he said: "I was convinced as soon as I came on board that she would be riddled under fire, but the public thought differently, and I resolved to give the matter a fair trial." Accordingly, he ran the *Galena* up to a point opposite the battery, where the width of the stream was not more than double the ship's length. According to an officer in the fort, the *Galena* "steamed up to within seven or eight hundred yards of the bluff, let go her starboard anchor, ran out the chains, put her head inshore, backed astern, let go her stream-anchor from the starboard quarter, hove ahead, and made ready for action before firing a gun." Nothing could have been more beautiful than the neatness and preci-

sion of movement with which Rodgers placed the *Galena*, as if at target-practice, directly under the enemy's fire. In the words of the officer already quoted, "It was one of the most masterly pieces of seamanship of the whole war."

In this position the *Galena* remained for three hours and twenty minutes until she had expended all her ammunition. She came out of the action badly shattered, having been struck 28 times and perforated in 18 places. The *Monitor* passed for a short time above the *Galena*, but being unable to elevate her guns sufficiently to reach the bluff, she again dropped below. The wooden vessels coöperated as far as possible, but of course could not accomplish much. The attack made it clear that the obstructions could not be passed without first reducing the fort, and that the fort could not be reduced without the coöperation of the army. Notwithstanding the vital importance of such a movement, seeing that Fort Darling was the only obstacle to the direct passage up the river to Richmond, and that a small force would have sufficed to accomplish the work, nothing was done by General McClellan. According to Goldsborough's testimony, he went in person to the White House to see McClellan, and, showing him Rodgers's report of the fight, offered the coöperation of the squadron, if McClellan would make the attack with a land force. "General McClellan," he adds, "replied to me that he would prefer to defer his answer until he got his army on the other side of the Chickahominy." On the 17th of May, Flag-Officer Goldsborough, in the *Susquehanna*, with the *Wachusett*, *Dacotah*, and *Maratanza*, had destroyed the two abandoned batteries of the enemy at Rock Wharf and Hardin's Bluff. All this time, and during the campaign, James River was open to Fort Darling.

On the 18th of May, Commander William Smith arrived at City Point in the *Wachusett*, and relieved Rodgers of the command, being the senior officer. The force was gradually increased, and in June comprised, in addition to the vessels already mentioned, the *Mahaska*, *Jacob Bell*, *Southfield*, *Maratanza*, *Stepping Stones*, and *Delaware*. Commander Gillis shortly after relieved Smith. Occasional attacks were made upon passing gun-boats by field-batteries of the Confederates stationed along the river-banks. The difficulties of the channel and the unprotected character of the vessels rendered them liable to serious injury from such attacks, and the *Jacob Bell*, under Lieutenant McCrea, narrowly escaped severe loss at Watkin's Bluff on the 21st of June. On the 27th, a demonstration was made up the Appomattox, but nothing was accomplished, the channel proving to be too shoal for successful operations.

On the 29th, McClellan's retreating army opened communication with Rodgers, who now commanded the vessels in the James River. Little change had taken place in the composition of the force since the 1st of June, the *Wachusett* only having left the squadron, and the *Satellite* having joined it. The gun-boats rendered efficient assistance to the army, especially in the battle at Malvern Hill on the 1st of July. By the 4th of July, McClellan's position was comparatively secure.

On July 6th, the James River flotilla was organized as a separate command under Captain Charles Wilkes, and so remained, until disbanded, on August 31st, the withdrawal of the army rendering its presence no longer necessary.

STUART'S RIDE AROUND McCLELLAN.

BY W. T. ROBINS, COLONEL, C. S. A.

TROOPER OF THE VIRGINIA CAVALRY, 1861.

THE battle of "Seven Pines," or "Fair Oaks," had been fought with no result. The temporary success of the Confederates early in the engagement had been more than counterbalanced by the reverses they sustained on the second day, and the two armies lay passively watching each other in front of Richmond. At this time the cavalry of Lee's army was commanded by General J. E. B. Stuart, and this restless officer conceived the idea of flanking the right wing of the Federal army near Ashland, and moving around to the rear, to cross the Chickahominy River at a place called Sycamore Ford, in New Kent County, march over to the James River, and return to the Confederate lines near Deep Bottom, in Henrico County. In carrying out this plan, Stuart would completely encircle the army of General McClellan. At the time of this movement the writer was adjutant of the 9th Virginia cavalry. When the orders were issued from headquarters directing the several commands destined to form the expedition to prepare three days' rations, and the ordnance officers to issue sixty rounds of ammunition to each man, I remember the surmises and conjectures as to our destination. The officers and men were in high spirits in anticipation of a fight, and when the bugles rang out "Boots and Saddles," every man was ready. The men left behind in camp were bewailing their luck, and those forming the detail for the expedition were elated at the prospect of some excitement. "Good-bye, boys; we are going to help old Jack drive the Yanks into the Potomac,"☆ I heard one of them shout to those left behind.

On the afternoon of June 12th we went out to the Brooke turnpike, preparatory to the march. The cavalry column was the 9th Virginia, commanded by Colonel W. H. F. Lee, the 1st Virginia, led by Colonel Fitz Lee, and the Jeff Davis Legion, under Colonel Martin. A section of the Stuart Horse Artillery, commanded by Captain Pelham, accompanied the expedition. The whole numbered twelve hundred men. The first night was passed in bivouac in the vicinity of Ashland, and orders were issued enforcing strict silence and forbidding the use of fires, as the success of the expedition would depend upon secrecy and celerity. On the following morning, at the break of dawn, the troopers were mounted and the march was begun without a bugle blast, and the column headed direct for Hanover Court House, distant about two hours' ride. Here we had the first sight of the enemy. A scouting party of the 5th U. S. Cavalry was in the village, but speedily decamped when our troops were ascertained to be Confederates. One prisoner was taken after a hot chase across country. We now moved rapidly to Hawes's Shop, where a Federal picket was surprised and captured without firing a shot. Hardly had the prisoners been disarmed and turned over to the provost guard when the Confederate advance was driven in upon the main body by a squadron of Federal cavalry, sent out from Old Church to ascertain by reconnoissance whether the report of a Confederate advance was true or false. General Stuart at once ordered Colonel W. H. F. Lee, commanding the regiment leading the column, to throw forward a squadron to meet the enemy. Colonel Lee directed Captain Swann, chief of the leading squadron of his regiment, to charge with the saber. Swann moved off at a trot, and, turning a corner of the road, saw the enemy's squadron about two hundred yards in front of him. The order to charge was given, and the men dashed forward in fine style. The onset was so sudden that the Federal cavalry broke and scattered in confusion. The latter had a start of barely two hundred yards, but the Confederate yell that broke upon the air lent them wings, and only a few fell into our hands. The rest made their escape after a chase of a mile and a half. Now the road became very narrow, and the brush on either side was a place so favorable for an ambuscade that Captain Swann deemed it prudent to draw rein and sound the bugle to recall his men. Stuart, who had been marching steadily onward with the main body of the Confederate column, soon arrived at the front, and the advance-guard, which I had all along commanded, was directed to move forward again. I at once dismounted the men, and pushed forward up a hill

☆ Stuart's riders left camp ostensibly to go to Northern Virginia.—EDITORS.

in my front. Just beyond the hill, I ran into a force of Federal cavalry drawn up in column of fours, ready to charge. Just as my advance-guard was about to run into him, I heard their commanding officer give the order to charge. I fell back and immediately notified General Stuart of the presence of the enemy. Captain Latané, commanding a squadron of the 9th Virginia, was directed to move forward and clear the road. He moved up the hill at a trot, and when in sight of the enemy in the road gave the command to charge, and with a yell the men rushed forward. At the top of the hill, simultaneously with Latané's order to charge, a company of Federal cavalry, deployed as skirmishers in the woods on the right of the road, were stampeded, and rushed back into the woods to make good their retreat to their friends. The head of Latané's squadron, then just fairly up the hill, was in the line of their retreat and was separated from the rest of the squadron, cut off by the rush of the Federals, and borne along with them up the road toward the enemy. I was riding at the side of Latané, and just at the time when the Federal company rushed back into the road Captain Latané fell from his horse, shot dead. The rush of the Federals separated myself and six of the leading files of the squadron from our friends, and we were borne along by the flying Federals. Although the Federal cavalry both in front and rear were in full retreat, our situation was perilous in the extreme. Soon we were pushed by foes in our rear into the ranks of those in our front, and a series of hand-to-hand combats ensued. To shoot or to cut us down was the aim of every Federal as he neared us, but we did what we could to defend ourselves. Every one of my comrades was shot or cut down, and I alone escaped unhurt. After having been borne along by the retreating enemy for perhaps a quarter of a mile, I leaped my horse over the fence into the field and so got away.

Now came the rush of the Confederate column, sweeping the road clear, and capturing many prisoners. At this point my regiment was relieved by the 1st Virginia, and Colonel Lee continued the pursuit. The Federals did not attempt to make a stand until they reached Old Church. Here their officers called a halt, and made an attempt to rally to defend their camp. Fitz Lee soon swept them out, and burned their camp. They made no other attempt to stand, and we heard no more of them as an organized body, but many prisoners were taken as we passed along. We had surprised them, taken them in detail, and far outnumbered them at all points. The Federal forces, as we afterward learned, were commanded by General Philip St. George Cooke, father-in-law to General Stuart, to whom the latter sent a polite message. The casualties in this skirmish were slight—one man killed on each side, and about fifteen or twenty wounded on the Confederate side, mostly saber-cuts.

We halted for a short time at Old Church, and the people of the neighborhood, hearing of our arrival, came flocking out to greet us and wish us God-speed. They did not come empty-handed, but brought whatever they could snatch up on the spur of the moment, rightly supposing that anything to allay hunger or thirst would be acceptable to us. Some of the ladies brought bouquets, and presented them to the offi-



MAP OF STUART'S RIDE AROUND McCLELLAN.

cers as they marched along. One of these was given to General Stuart, who, always gallant, vowed to preserve it and take it into Richmond. He kept his promise.

We were soon far in rear of McClellan's army, which lay directly between us and Richmond. It was thought probable that the Federal cavalry was concentrating in *our* rear to cut off our retreat. We kept straight on, by Smith's store, through New Kent County to Tunstall's station, on the York River Railroad. I had been in charge of the Confederate advance-guard up to the time when Colonel Fitz Lee came to the front with the 1st Virginia, relieving the 9th of that duty. When well down in New Kent County, General Stuart sent for me again to the front. Hurrying on, I soon reached the head of the column, where I found the general, and was directed by him to take thirty men as an advance-guard, and to precede the column by about half a mile. Further, I was directed to halt at the road running from the mills to the White House long enough to cut the telegraph wire on that road; thence to proceed to Tunstall's station on the York River Railroad, at which place, the prisoners had informed the general, a company of Federal infantry was posted. At Tunstall's station I was directed to charge the infantry, disperse or capture them, cut the telegraph, and obstruct the railroad. Here was our point of danger. Once across the railroad, we were comparatively safe. But in possession of the railroad, with its rolling-stock the enemy could easily

throw troops along its line to any given point. However, no timely information had been furnished to the Federal general. We moved with such celerity that we carried with us the first news of our arrival. Pushing forward at a trot, and picking up straggling prisoners every few hundred yards, the advance-guard at length reached the telegraph road. At this point we overtook an ordnance wagon, heavily loaded with canteens and Colt's revolvers. The horses had stalled in a mud-hole, and the driver, cutting them out from the wagon, made his escape. The sergeant in charge stood his ground and was captured. Here was a prize indeed, as in those days we were poorly armed. In order to save time, a man furnished with an ax was sent to cut the telegraph wire, while the rest of the party was engaged in rifling the wagon. While these operations were in progress a body of Federal cavalry, suddenly turning a bend in the road, made their appearance. As soon as the Federal officer in command saw us he called a halt, and, standing still in the road, seemed at a loss to know what to do. His men drew their sabers, as if about to charge, but they did not come on. By this time the telegraph had been cut and the wagon disposed of. Our men were hastily mounted and formed into column of fours, with drawn sabers, ready for any emergency. There we stood, eying each other, about two hundred yards apart, until the head of the main Confederate column came in sight, when the Federals retreated down the road leading to the White House. One man of the Federal party was sent back along the road to Tunstall's station, now only about half a mile off. I supposed, of course, that this messenger was sent to warn the Federal troops at Tunstall's of our approach. I was, however, afterward informed that he galloped through Tunstall's but never stopped, and when some one called to him, "What's to pay?" he dashed along, calling out, at the top of his voice, "Hell's to pay!"

The road now being clear, we marched on briskly, and arriving near the station charged down upon it with a yell. We could see the enemy scattered about the building and lounging around before we charged them. The greater part scattered for cover, and were pursued by our people. I pushed straight for the station-house, where I found the captain of the company of infantry, with thirteen of his men, standing in front of the building, but with no arms in their hands. Only one of them seemed disposed to show fight. He ran to the platform where the muskets were stacked, and, seizing one of them, began to load. Before he could ram his cartridge home, a sweep of the saber, in close proximity to his head, made him throw down his gun, and, jumping into a ditch, he dodged under the bridge over the railroad and made his escape. I had no time to pursue him; but, turning to look after the others, met the captain, who, sword in hand, advanced and surrendered himself and his company as prisoners of war. I then proceeded to obstruct the railroad. To do this effectually, I caused a tree to be cut down which was standing on the side of the road. It fell across the railroad. In addition to this, I placed across the tracks an oak-sill about a foot square and fourteen feet long. I had barely time to do this before a train from the direction of Richmond came thundering down. At this time General Stuart, with the main body, arrived at the station. The engine driver of the coming train, probably seeing the obstructions on the track and a large force of cavalry there, suspected danger, and, being a plucky fellow, put on all steam, and came rushing down. The engine, striking the obstructions, knocked them out of the way and passed on without accident. General Stuart had dismounted a number of his men, and posted them on a high bank overlooking a cut in the road, just below the station, through which the train was about to pass. They threw in a close and effective fire upon the passing train, loaded with troops. Many of these were killed and wounded.

It was now the second night since leaving camp, and the well-filled haversacks with which we started from camp had long since been empty. The march had been so rapid that there was little opportunity of foraging for man or beast. Except a little bread and meat, brought out to the column by the country people as we passed along, we had had nothing since daybreak. The men were weary and hungry, and the horses almost exhausted by the long fast and severe exercise. As soon as a proper disposition had been made of the prisoners and of the captured horses and mules, the column moved on. Down through New Kent County, to a place called New Baltimore, we marched as rapidly as our condition would permit. I was still in the command of the advance-guard, marching some distance ahead of the column, and had orders to halt at this point, and await the coming up of the main body. Fortunately, an enterprising Yankee had established a store here, to catch the trade of all persons passing from McClellan's army to his base of supplies at the White House. He had crackers, cheese, canned fruits, sardines, and many other dainties dear to the cavalryman; and in the brief hour spent with him we of the advance were made new men. I fear little was left to cheer and to invigorate those in the rear. The main body arriving, "forward" was the order — straight down through New Kent to Sycamore Ford on the Chickahominy.

A beautiful full moon lighted our way and cast weird shadows across our path. Expecting each moment to meet the enemy, every bush in the distance looked like a sentinel, and every jagged tree bending over the road like a vidette. Marching all night, we arrived at the ford between daybreak and sunrise; and here our real troubles began. To our chagrin, we found the stream swollen by recent rains almost out of its banks, and running like a torrent. No man or horse could get over without swimming, and it happened that the entrance to the ford on our side was below the point at which we had to come out on the other side. Therefore, we had to swim against the current. Owing to the mud and mire, it was not practicable for any number of horses to approach the river at any point except by the road

DUEL BETWEEN A UNION CAVALRYMAN AND A CONFEDERATE TROOPER.

leading to the ford. We therefore tried it there for two long hours. The 9th Cavalry made the trial. After repeated efforts to swim the horses over we gave up, for we had crossed over only seventy-five men and horses in two hours. While we were trying to reach the opposite bank Stuart came up, and, finding crossing at this point impracticable, rode off to find another farther down the river.‡ At a point about one mile below, known as Forge Bridge, he succeeded in throwing across one branch of the river a bridge strong enough to bear the artillery, and upon which the men, having been dismounted, could walk. Here the approach on our side was higher up stream than the point at which we would come out on the other side. So the horses were formed into a column of fours, pushed into the water, and, swimming down stream, they easily landed on the other side. After a few horses had been crossed in this manner we found no difficulty, the others following on quite readily. The column was now upon an island formed by the two branches of the Chickahominy, and to reach the mainland it was necessary to cross the other branch of that river. This was, however, accomplished, but with some difficulty. The ford at this crossing was at that time very deep, and the river out of its banks and overflowing the flats to the depth of about two feet for at least a half-mile. At this place the limber to a caisson stuck fast in the mud, and we left it.

On leaving the river, General Stuart directed me to take charge of the rear-guard, and, when all had crossed, to burn the bridge. In accordance with these orders, I directed the men to collect piles of fence rails, heap them on the bridge, and set them afire. By my orders the horses had been led some distance back from the river into the brush, where they were concealed from view. The men were lounging about on the ground when the bridge fell in. I was seated under a tree on the bank of the river, and at the moment that the hissing of the burning timbers of the bridge let me know that it had fallen into the water, a rifle-shot rang out from the other side, and the whistling bullet cut off a small limb over my head, which fell into my lap. The shot was probably fired by some scout who had been following us,

‡ General Stuart says in his report: "The progress in crossing was very slow at the point chosen, just above Forge Bridge, and learning that at the bridge proper enough of the débris of the old bridge remained to facilitate the construction of another, material for which was afforded by a large warehouse adjacent, I moved to that point at once. . . . In three hours it was ready to bear artillery and cavalry. . . ."—EDITORS.

but who was afraid to fire until the bridge was gone. With a thankful heart for his bad aim, I at once withdrew the men, and pushed on after the column. When I came to the ford, I found it necessary to swim the horses a short distance, it having been deepened by the crossing of such a large body of horse. Soon the column was in sight, and the march across Charles City County to the James River was made as vigorously as the jaded horses were able to stand. The men, though weary and hungry, were in fine spirits, and jubilant over the successful crossing of the Chickahominy. About sunset we neared the James, at the plantation of Colonel Wilcox. Here we rested for about two hours, having marched into a field of clover, where the horses ate their fill. In the twilight, fires were lighted to cook the rations just brought in by our foragers.

We were now twenty-five miles from Richmond, on the "James River Road." Had the enemy been aware of our position, it would have been easy for him to throw a force between us and Richmond, and so cut us off. But the Federal general was not well served by his scouts, nor did his cavalry furnish him with accurate information of our movements. Relying upon the mistakes of the enemy, Stuart resolved to march straight on into Richmond by the River road on which we now lay. To accomplish this with the greater safety, it was necessary for him to march at once. Accordingly, I was ordered to take the advance guard and move out. As soon as the cravings of hunger were appeased, sleep took possession of us. Although in the saddle and in motion, and aware that the safety of the expedition depended on great vigilance in case the enemy should be encountered, it was hard to keep awake. I was constantly falling asleep, and awaking with a start when almost off my horse. This was the condition of every man in the column. Not one had closed his eyes in sleep for forty-eight hours.

The full moon lighted us on our way as we passed along the River road, and frequently the windings of the road brought us near to and in sight of the James River, where lay the enemy's fleet. In the gray twilight of the dawn of Sunday, we passed the "Double Gates," "Strawberry Plains," and "Tighlman's gate" in succession. At "Tighlman's" we could see the masts of the fleet, not far off. Happily for us, the banks were high, and I imagine they had no lookout in the rigging, and we passed by unobserved. The sight of the enemy's fleet had aroused us somewhat, when "Who goes there?" rang out on the stillness of the early morning. The challenger proved to be a vidette of the 10th Virginia Cavalry, commanded by Colonel J. Lucius Davis, who was picketing that road. Soon I was shaking hands with Colonel Davis and receiving his congratulations. Then we crossed the stream by the jug factory, up toward "New Market" heights, by the drill-house, and about a mile beyond we called halt for a little rest and food. From this point the several regiments were dismissed to their respective camps.

We lost one man killed and a few wounded, and no prisoners.☆ The most important result was the confidence the men had gained in themselves and in their leaders. The country rang out with praises of the men who had raided entirely around General McClellan's powerful army, bringing prisoners and plunder from under his very nose. The Southern papers were filled with accounts of the expedition, none accurate, and most of them marvelous.

ANECDOTES OF THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.

I.— GENERAL JOHNSTON TO THE RESCUE. BY F. Y. DABNEY.

IT was the morning of the day on which the battle of Williamsburg was fought that the following incident occurred. Late in the afternoon of the preceding day, general orders had been issued by General Joseph E. Johnston, informing us of the intended retrograde movement on the next morning. Among the instructions was one to the effect that any gun caisson, quartermaster, or commissary wagon which might become set in the mud so as to impede the line of march must be destroyed at once. In other words, the road must be kept clear. At that time the writer was a lieutenant in Snowden Andrews's battery of light artillery, and, as such, commanded one section of 2 guns, which, with their caissons, required 4 teams of 6 horses each. Of these 4 teams, 3 were in fair condition for service, but the fourth was notoriously weak. When the general's order was read, I became very anxious about this team, especially as nothing is considered more humiliating to a battery than to have to part with a portion of its equipment, no matter what the cause may be; so that when the retreat was commenced the next morning I endeavored to keep all the men of my section well in hand, and ready to assist at a moment's notice. For six miles north of Williamsburg the entire army was falling back over a single road, and as there had been frequent rains, this road was badly cut up, and the mud in many places was up to the axles of the guns. Finally my weak team balked with the gun — a 12-pounder Napoleon — in a deep hole. Every effort was made by the drivers to dislodge the gun, but without avail; and I found when I got to the wheels, with as many men as could be utilized, that the horses could not be made to work in concert. The whole line to the rear was at a dead stand-still, when I observed a party of mounted officers coming down the road from the front, and in a few moments more I recognized General Johnston

☆ General Stuart reported the capture of 165 prisoners, including teamsters and other non-combatants, 260 horses and mules, with more or less harness, and some small-arms.— EDITORS.

at their head. We all were covered with mud and straining every muscle to extricate the gun, when the general, resplendent in uniform, white gauntlets, and polished cavalry boots, rode up and halted by our side. I gave the military salute and stood like a criminal awaiting sentence. To my surprise he remarked in a very kindly tone: "Well, Lieutenant, you seem to be in trouble." "Yes, sir," I replied; "and I am afraid we shall have to abandon this gun." "Oh, no; I reckon not! Let me see what I can do." Whereupon he leaped from his horse, waded out in the mire, seized one of the wheel-spokes, covered as it was with mud, and called out, "Now, boys, altogether!" The effect was magical, and the next moment the gun jumped clear of the mud-hole. After that our battery used to swear by "Old Joe."

SANTA ROSA, CAL., August 10th, 1886.

II.—HOOD "FEELING THE ENEMY." BY J. H. L.

IMMEDIATELY after the battle of Williamsburg, as the Confederates under Johnston were moving back toward Richmond, neither by land nor water, but by a half-and-half mixture of both, General Johnston ordered me to go at once to General Hood. "Tell him," he said, "that a force of the enemy, estimated at from three to five thousand, have landed on York River, and are ravaging the country. His brigade must immediately check the advance of this force. He is to feel the enemy gently and fall back, avoiding an engagement and drawing them from under the protection of their gun-boats, as an ample force will be sent in their rear, and if he can draw them a few miles from the river, their capture is certain."

The order was given. General Hood repeated it to the colonel of his brigade; and the Texas boys, who were "sp'iling for a fight," charged upon the enemy, who outnumbered them greatly, drove them back to the shelter of their gun-boats, killing and capturing several hundred. Returning to headquarters, I had to report a result not at all in accordance with the orders or expectations of the general in command. General Johnston seemed greatly annoyed, and sternly ordered me to repeat the exact verbal orders given Hood. Just as I did so, General Hood rode up. He was asked by General Johnston to repeat the orders received from me. When he did so, "Old Joe," with the soldierly and game-cock air which characterized him, said: "General Hood, have you given an illustration of the Texas idea of feeling an enemy gently and falling back? What would your Texans have done, sir, if I had ordered them to charge and drive back the enemy?" Hood replied: "I suppose, General, they would have driven them into the river, and tried to swim out and capture the gun-boats." With a smile, General Johnston replied: "Teach your Texans that the first duty of a soldier is literally to obey orders."

III.—CHARACTERISTICS OF GENERAL WISE. BY J. H. L.

GOVERNOR HENRY A. WISE was one of the most gifted men it has been my fortune to know. His eloquence produced a greater effect upon a popular assembly than that of any one I ever heard; he would dazzle, surprise, and shock with electric touches of sentiment, wit, and pathos. Though brave, vigilant, and fertile in resource, his military career was by no means a success. Floyd and himself quarreled in West Virginia, and his relations had not been pleasant with any commanding officer. When General Wise was in command of the James River defenses opposite Drewry's Bluff, I visited him on official business. He received me most cordially, walked with me all the morning round his lines, explaining his views most eloquently, quoting from the great masters in the art of war,—with whom he seemed to be perfectly familiar,—interspersing these learned and scientific disquisitions with the most scathing criticisms on men and measures, denouncing the Confederate Executive and Congress and the narrow curriculum of West Point, but winding up always with a stream of fiery invective against the Yankees. General Wise was camped on the plantation of one of the richest and most influential citizens of Richmond. He annoyed Wise greatly with complaints of depredations committed by the Wise Legion on his property. Wise was greatly enraged when he presumed to charge some of his men with stealing, and after a fierce altercation ordered him out of his tent. As the gentleman was mounting his horse Wise came out, and, calling him by name, said: "Sir, before you leave, I think it due both to you and myself to make you an apology." "I'm glad, General Wise, that you show some sense of what is becoming to us both." "My apology," replied General Wise, "is that, having on my slippers, I could not possibly do you justice: I ought to have kicked you out of my tent, and will do so now if you will wait till I pull on my boots!" Then he poured a broadside upon his retreating enemy.

A few days after this Wise said: "General Lee came down to see me; fortunately, my wife and several other ladies were spending the day at my headquarters. We had a good dinner and a charming time. You know 'Marse Bob' was always very fond of ladies' society, and when he asked me to take a walk with him, I suspected what was coming. After telling me of the complaints made of my treatment of the Richmond man, and hearing my account of the affair, not omitting the apology and broadside, he laid his hand upon my arm, and, with that grace and cordiality which at such times tempered his usual stately dignity, said: 'Wise, you know, as well as I do, what the army regulations say about profanity; but, as an old friend, let me ask you if that dreadful habit cannot be broken—and remind you that we have both already passed the meridian of life,' etc. Seeing he was in for a

sermon, and one that I could not answer, I replied: 'General Lee, you certainly play Washington to perfection, and your whole life is a constant reproach to me. Now I am perfectly willing that Jackson and yourself shall do the praying for the whole army of Northern Virginia; but, in Heaven's name, let me do the *cussin'* for one small brigade.' Lee laughed and said, 'Wise, you are incorrigible,' and then rejoined the ladies."

Apropos of this a friend told me that, stopping at a farmer's in Appomattox after the surrender, he found the old man deriving comfort from but one thing, of which he frequently spoke: "Anyhow, Gineral Wise *cussed* the Yankees to the last."

IV.—ORIGIN OF THE LEE TOMATOES—BY W. ROY MASON, MAJOR, C. S. A.

ONE day in June, 1862, General Lee rode over to General Charles W. Field's headquarters at Meadow Bridge and asked for me. I would say here that on leaving home to enter the army I carried a family letter of introduction to General Lee; and on account of that, and also my relationship to Colonel Charles Marshall, an aide on his staff, my visits at army headquarters were exceptionally pleasant. When General Lee approached me on this occasion, he said: "Captain, can General Field spare you a little while?" I replied, "Certainly, General; what can I do for you?" "I have some property," he answered, "in the hands of the enemy, and General McClellan has informed me that he would deliver it to me at any time I asked for it." Then, putting aside his jesting manner, he told me that his wife and Miss Mary Lee, his daughter, had been caught within the Federal lines at the White House, the residence of General W. H. F. Lee, his son, and he desired me to take a courier and proceed with a flag of truce to Meadow Bridge and carry a sealed dispatch to General McClellan. At the Federal headquarters I would meet the ladies, and escort them to Mrs. Gooch's farm, inside our lines. I passed beyond the pickets to the second bridge, where I waved my flag of truce, and was asked by the Union officer of the guard to enter. When I reached the picket, the officer said he had been ordered not to permit any flag of truce to pass through his lines until he had communicated with the headquarters of General McClellan. I waited on the bridge, and when the courier returned he had orders to bring me before the general. The officer insisted on blindfolding me, and positively forbade my courier accompanying me. I was then led through the camps, where I could hear the voices of thousands laughing, talking, or hallooing. After riding an hour, a distance, as I supposed, of three or four miles, I reached headquarters and was relieved of my bandage. The general came out and gave me a hearty welcome; and when he heard that I had been blindfolded, he was so indignant that he placed the officer, my guide, under arrest. I had never seen him so excited. He asked me into the house, produced his liquors, and gave me a dinner of the best, after which we discussed the situation at length. He asked me no questions which it would compromise our cause to answer, but we calmly reviewed the position of things from our separate points of view, and he inquired anxiously after all his old friends. (General McClellan and my brother-in-law, General Dabney H. Maury, C. S. A., formerly captain, U. S. A., had been classmates and devoted friends, and the general had visited my father's house and my own at Fredericksburg.)

About 3 o'clock in the afternoon, looking down the road, we saw a carriage approaching. The curtains were cut off, and it was drawn by a mule and a dilapidated old horse, driven by a negro of about ten or twelve years, and followed by a cavalry escort. General McClellan, jumping up hastily, said: "There are Mrs. Lee and Miss Mary, now." As the carriage stopped before the door, General McClellan, greeting the ladies with marked cordiality, at once introduced me, and remarked to Mrs. Lee that the general (her husband) had chosen me as her escort through the lines, and that by a strange coincidence, he (McClellan) had found in me a personal friend. He offered to accompany us in person to the river, but this was declined by Mrs. Lee as entirely unnecessary.

When we reached Mrs. Gooch's farm and our own pickets, cheer after cheer went down the long line of soldiers. Near the house we were met by General Lee and a large number of officers assembled to honor the wife and daughter of their chief.

Before leaving for Richmond, Mrs. Lee handed me from a basket, under the carriage-seat, two fine tomatoes, the finest I had ever seen, remarking that she supposed such things were scarce in the Confederacy. The seeds of these tomatoes I preserved, and, some years after the war, General Lee ate some tomatoes at my table, and praised them; whereupon we told him, to his astonishment, that those were the Lee tomatoes, and that they had been distributed all over the State under that name, from the seed of those given me by his wife.

WEST VIRGINIA OPERATIONS UNDER FRÉMONT.†

BY JACOB D. COX, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. V.

THE campaign of the spring of 1862 was an interesting one in its details, but as it became subordinate to that against Jackson in the Shenandoah and was never completed as Frémont had planned, a very brief sketch of it must suffice. On the 29th of March Frémont assumed command of the "Mountain Department," including West Virginia, eastern Kentucky, and East Tennessee as far as Knoxville. There was a little too much sentiment and too little practical war in the construction of a department out of five hundred miles of mountain ranges, and the appointment of the "path-finder" to command it was consistent with the romantic character of the whole. The mountains formed an admirable barrier at which comparatively small bodies of troops could cover and protect the Ohio Valley behind them, but extensive military operations across and beyond the Alleghanies from west or east were impracticable, because a wilderness a hundred miles wide, crossed by few and most difficult roads, rendered it impossible to supply troops from depots on either side. The country was so wild that not even forage for mules could be found in it, and the teams could hardly haul their own provender for the double trip. Quick "raids" were therefore all that ever proved feasible.

Frémont had formed a plan of campaign which consisted in starting with Blenker's division (which had been taken from the Army of the Potomac and given to him) from Romney in the valley of the south branch of the Potomac, ascending this valley toward the south, picking up Schenck's and Milroy's brigades in turn, the latter joining the column at Monterey, on the great watershed, by way of the Cheat Mountain Pass. From Monterey Frémont intended to move upon Staunton and thence, following the south-western trend of the valleys, to the New River near Christiansburg. Here he would come into communication with me, whose task it would have been to advance from Gauley Bridge on two lines, the principal one by Fayette and Raleigh Court House over Flat-top Mountain to Princeton and the Narrows of New River, and a subordinate one on the turnpike to Lewisburg. The plan looked to continuing the march to the south-west with the whole column till Knoxville should be reached, the last additions to the force to be from the troops in the Big Sandy Valley of eastern Kentucky.

The plan would probably have failed, first, from the impossibility of supplying the army on the route, as it would have been without any reliable or safe base; and second, because the railroads east of the mountains ran on routes specially well adapted to enable the enemy quickly to concentrate any needed force at Staunton, at Lynchburg, at Christiansburg, or at Wytheville to overpower the column. The Union army would be committed to a whole season of marching in the mountains, while the Confederates could concentrate the needed force and quickly return it to Richmond when its work was done, making but a brief episode in a larger campaign. But the plan was not

† A continuation of "McClellan in West Virginia." See Vol. I., p. 126.— EDITORS.

destined to be thoroughly tried. Stonewall Jackson, after his defeat by Kimball at Kernstown, March 23d, had retired to the Upper Shenandoah Valley with his division, numbering about 10,000 men; Ewell was waiting to coöperate with him, with his division, at the gaps of the Blue Ridge on the east, and General Edward Johnson was near Staunton with a similar force facing Milroy. In April General Banks, commanding the National forces in the Shenandoah Valley, had


WEST VIRGINIA.
PENNSYLVANIA
MARYLAND
VIRGINIA
SCALE OF MILES
Camp Carlisle
Wheeling
Ohio River
New Martinsville
Morgantown
Cumberland
Fairmont
Marietta
Parkersburg
Weston
Buckhannon
Philippi
Grafton
Romney
Petersburg
Harrisonburg
Staunton
Lexington
Lynchburg
Charleston
Gauley Bridge
Fayette C.H.
Hawk's Nest
Lewisburg
Hinton
Beckley
Princeton
Wayne C.H.
Barboursville
Point Pleasant
Gallipolis
Pomeroy
Ravenswood
Spencer
Sutton
Braxton C.H.
Clarksburg
Bridgeport
Middlebourne
Martinsburg
Winchester
Strasburg
Front Royal
Warrenton
Culpeper C.H.
Orange C.H.
Charlottesville
Monterey
McDowell
Warm Springs
Huntersville
Millboro
Covington
White Sulphur Springs
Lewisburg
Kanawha R.
Gauley R.
New R.
Greenbrier R.
Potomac R.
Shenandoah R.
Rappahannock R.
Rapidan R.
James River
Blue Ridge
Alleghany Mts.
Cheat Mountain
Rich Mt.
Laurel Hill
Tygart's Valley R.
Monongahela R.
Little Kanawha R.
Hughes R.
Elk R.
Big Sandy R.
Guyandotte R.
Coal R.
Kanawha Falls
Buffalo
Windsor
Marshall
Elizabeth
Parkersburg
Ripley
Spencer
Sutton
Braxton C.H.
Weston
Buckhannon
Philippi
Grafton
Clarksburg
Fairmont
Morgantown
New Martinsville
Wheeling
Camp Carlisle
Romney
Moorefield
Woodstock
Mt. Jackson
New Market
Harrisonburg
Staunton
Lexington
Lynchburg
Charlottesville
Culpeper C.H.
Warrenton
Front Royal
Winchester
Martinsburg
Strasburg
Petersburg
Harrisonburg
Monterey
McDowell
Warm Springs
Huntersville
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Winchester
Strasburg
Front Royal
Warrenton
Culpeper C.H.
Orange C.H.
Charlottesville

on the 8th, and the latter calling upon Frémont for help, Schenck was sent forward to support him, who reached McDowell, having marched 34 miles in 24 hours. Jackson had not fully concentrated his forces, and the Union generals held their ground and delivered a sharp combat,† in which their casualties of all kinds numbered 256, while the Confederate loss was 498, General Johnson being among the wounded. Schenck as senior assumed the command, and on the 9th began his retreat to Franklin, abandoning the Cheat Mountain road. Franklin was reached on the 11th, but Jackson approached cautiously and did not reach there till the 12th, when, finding that Frémont had concentrated his forces, he did not attack, but returned to McDowell, whence he took the direct road to Harrisonburg, and marched to attack Banks at Strasburg, Ewell meeting and joining him in this movement.

Frémont resumed preparations for his original campaign, but Banks's defeat deranged all plans, and those of the Mountain Department were abandoned. A month passed in efforts to destroy Jackson by concentration of McDowell's, Banks's, and Frémont's troops; but it was too late to remedy the ill effects of the division of commands at the beginning of the campaign. On the 26th of June Pope was assigned to command all the troops in northern Virginia, Frémont was relieved by his own request, and the Mountain Department ceased to exist.

The operations on the Kanawha line had kept pace with those in the north during the month of April. Leaving a brigade to garrison the Lower Kanawha Valley, I sent forward another under Colonel Crook on the Lewisburg Turnpike, whilst I moved in person with the two remaining (Scammon's and Moor's) on the Princeton route. The brigades numbered about two thousand men each. Wagons were so few that tents were discarded, and the men bivouacked without shelter. On the 7th of May my advanced guard occupied Giles Court House (Parisburg) and the Narrows of New River, and on the 16th the rest of the two brigades on this line were at the East River, Crook's brigade occupying Lewisburg. We were thus prepared to join Frémont's column when it should approach Christiansburg. Instead of this we got news of Jackson's movements and of Schenck's and Milroy's retreat, and Frémont was obliged to telegraph that his plans were suspended, and that I must look out for myself.

The enemy had made strong efforts to concentrate a sufficient force to protect the railway, and the brigades of Generals Humphrey Marshall, Heth, and Williams were assigned to this duty, under the command of Marshall as senior. My own orders required me to converge toward Crook's line of movement as I advanced, and from Flat-top Mountain my line of supplies was exposed to a hostile movement on the right flank. On the 16th of May Marshall, leaving Heth to hold the passes of New River, marched by the Wytheville road on

† General Schenck in his report says:

"A little observation served to show at once that McDowell, as a defensive position, was entirely untenable, and especially against the largely outnumbering force that was ascertained to be advancing; and if it had been otherwise, there was no choice left on account of an entire destitution of forage. I determined, therefore, to obey, with as little delay as possible, your orders to fall back with the force of our two brigades to this place [Franklin]. Such a movement, however, could not with any safety or propriety be commenced before night, nor did it seem advisable to undertake it without first ascertaining or feeling the actual strength of the rebel force before us, and also, perhaps, taking some step that would serve to check or disable him from his full power or disposition to pursue. This was effectually done by our attack of his position on the mountain in the afternoon, and in the night following I was enabled to withdraw our whole little army along the road through the narrow gorge, which afforded the only egress from the valley in which McDowell is situated, in the direction of Franklin." EDITORS.

Princeton, driving out my small detachment there after a stubborn resistance. In the night I marched Moor's brigade back from East River and drove Marshall out in turn. I recalled Scammon's brigade also on the 17th, and offered battle in front of the town. Marshall took strong position on the hills south of the place, but did not attack, nor did Heth, who followed Scammon part of the way from the Narrows. Princeton could easily have been turned by roads on the west, and I determined while awaiting the resumption of the general plan of campaign to retire to Flat-top Mountain, a very strong position, directing Crook on the other side of New River to halt at Lewisburg, where we could support each other. On May 23d Heth with his brigade tried to dislodge Crook, but was beaten, with the loss of 38 killed and many wounded, of whom 66 fell into our hands. Crook also captured 4 cannon and 300 stand of small-arms. Crook's loss was 13 killed, 53 wounded, and 7 missing.

When General Pope assumed command he directed a defensive policy to be pursued in West Virginia, and made arrangements to transfer part of my command to his army in the field. About the middle of August I took two brigades by way of the Kanawha and Ohio Rivers to Parkersburg, and thence by rail to Washington. Gauley Bridge was made the advanced post in the Kanawha Valley, and no important movement was again made on that line.

It is an interesting fact, that, so confident was General Halleck that Pope would be joined by McClellan's army in time to keep Lee in the neighborhood of Richmond, my original orders were to march through the mountains by way of Staunton, and join Pope at Charlottesville. I had several detachments out pursuing guerrillas and scattered bands of Confederate troops operating in my rear toward the Kentucky line, and this necessarily caused a few days' delay in beginning the directed movement. I took advantage of the interval to lay before General Pope, by telegraph, the proof that the march ordered meant fifteen days of uninterrupted mountain travel, most of it through a wilderness destitute of supplies, and with the enemy upon the flank. Besides this, there was the very serious question whether the Army of Virginia would be at Charlottesville when I should approach that place. On the other hand, my calculation was that we could reach Washington in ten days or less by the way we came. On this evidence Pope, with Halleck's assent, gave permission to move as suggested. The march from Flat-top Mountain to the head of navigation on the Kanawha, ninety miles, was made in three days, and the Kanawha Division reached Washington within the time appointed. One train-load of two regiments joined Pope at Warrenton Junction when the railroad was cut at Manassas Junction by Stonewall Jackson. Two other regiments got as far as Bull Run bridge and had a lively affair with the enemy. Afterward I was ordered into the forts on Upton's and Munson's hills to cover the front of Washington toward Centreville. Here, with McClellan in person, we listened to the cannonade of the Second Bull Run, and through our lines Pope and McDowell retired within the defenses of Washington. It has often been a subject of interested speculation to inquire what would have been the fate of the Kanawha Division, had it been approaching Charlottesville at this time, in accordance with Halleck's original order.

STONEWALL JACKSON IN THE SHENANDOAH.

BY JOHN D. IMBODEN, BRIGADIER-GENERAL, C. S. A.

A CONFEDERATE OF 1862.

SOON after the battle of Bull Run Stonewall Jackson was promoted to major-general, and the Confederate Government having on the 21st of October, 1861, organized the Department of Northern Virginia, under command of General Joseph E. Johnston, it was divided into the Valley District, the Potomac District, and Aquia District, to be commanded respectively by Major-Generals Jackson, Beauregard, and Holmes. On October 28th General Johnston ordered Jackson to Winchester to assume command of his district, and on the 6th of November the War Department ordered his old "Stonewall" brigade and six thousand troops under command of Brigadier-General W. W. Loring to report to him. These, together with Turner Ashby's cavalry, gave him a force of about ten thousand men all told.

His only movement of note in the winter of 1861–62 was an expedition at the end of December to Bath and Romney, to destroy the Baltimore and Ohio railroad and a dam or two near Hancock on the Chesapeake and Ohio canal.[1] The weather set in to be very inclement about New Year's, with snow, rain, sleet, high winds, and intense cold. Many in Jackson's command were opposed to the expedition, and as it resulted in nothing of much military importance, but was attended with great suffering on the part of his troops, nothing but the confidence he had won by his previous services saved him from personal ruin. He and his second in command, General Loring, had a serious disagreement. He ordered Loring to take up his quarters, in January, in the exposed and cheerless village of Romney, on the south branch of the upper Potomac. Loring objected to this, but Jackson was inexorable. Loring and his principal officers united in a petition to Mr. Benjamin, Secretary of War, to order them to Winchester, or at least away from Romney. This document was sent direct to the War Office, and the Secretary, in utter disregard

[1] When Jackson took command in the Valley in November, 1861, the Union forces held Romney and occupied the north side of the Potomac in strong force. The Confederates had only a weak body of militia at Jackson's disposal, until reënforcements came from the east. After receiving the four brigades of R. B. Garnett, Wm. B. Taliaferro, William Gilham, and S. R. Anderson, Jackson moved against the Union communications along the Potomac, aiming to destroy the Chesapeake and Ohio canal. Under cover of demonstrations made against various places along the Potomac east of the objective point, a Confederate force was concentrated near Dam No. 5, December 17th, and after four days' labor a breach was made in the dam. On the 1st of January another force moved from Winchester, northward, the two columns uniting, and on the 4th instant the town of Bath was occupied, after being abandoned by a body of Union troops composed of cavalry, infantry, and artillery. Jackson followed the retreating Union troops to the river and promptly bombarded Hancock, Md., without, however, securing a surrender, and on the 7th he withdrew from the Potomac region toward Romney. On his approach the Union troops at that post evacuated without a struggle, yielding the town on January 10th. The Confederates now went into winter quarters along the south branch of the Potomac, at Romney and vicinity. EDITORS.

of "good order and discipline," granted the request without consulting Jackson. As soon as information reached Jackson of what had been done, he indignantly resigned his commission. Governor Letcher was astounded, and at once wrote Jackson a sympathetic letter, and then expostulated with Mr. Davis and his Secretary with such vigor that an apology was sent to Jackson for their obnoxious course. The orders were revoked and modified, and Jackson was induced to retain his command. This little episode gave the Confederate civil authorities an inkling of what manner of man "Stonewall" Jackson was.

In that terrible winter's march and exposure, Jackson endured all that any private was exposed to. One morning, near Bath, some of his men, having crawled out from under their snow-laden blankets, half-frozen, were cursing him as the cause of their sufferings. He lay close by under a tree, also snowed under, and heard all this; and, without noticing it, presently crawled out, too, and, shaking the snow off, made some jocular remark to the nearest men, who had no idea he had ridden up in the night and lain down amongst them. The incident ran through the little army in a few hours, and reconciled his followers to all the hardships of the expedition, and fully reëstablished his popularity.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN D. IMBODEN, C. S. A. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

In March Johnston withdrew from Manassas, and General McClellan collected his army of more than one hundred thousand men on the Peninsula. Johnston moved south to confront him. McClellan had planned and organized a masterly movement to capture, hold, and occupy the Valley and the Piedmont region; and if his subordinates had been equal to the task, and there had been no interference from Washington, it is probable the Confederate army would have been driven out of Virginia and Richmond captured by midsummer, 1862.

Jackson's little army in the Valley had been greatly reduced during the winter from various causes, so that at the beginning of March he did not have over 5000 men of all arms available for the defense of his district, which began to swarm with enemies all around its borders, aggregating more than ten times his own strength. Having retired up the Valley, he learned that the enemy had begun to withdraw and send troops to the east of the mountains to coöperate with McClellan. This he resolved to stop by an aggressive demonstration against Winchester, occupied by General Shields, of the Federal army, with a division of 8000 to 10,000 men.

A little after the middle of March, Jackson concentrated what troops he could, and on the 23d he occupied a ridge at the hamlet of Kernstown, four



MAP OF JACKSON'S CAMPAIGN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY.

The crossed line and arrows indicate Jackson's movements in the Valley. On May 6th he was at Staunton; he fought Milroy and Schenck near McDowell on May 8th; Banks at Front Royal, Newtown, and Winchester on May 23d, 24th, and 25th; Frémont at Cross Keys on June 8th; Tyler at Port Republic on June 9th.—EDITORS.

miles south of Winchester. Shields promptly attacked him, and a severe engagement of several hours ensued, ending in Jackson's repulse about dark, followed by an orderly retreat up the Valley to near Swift Run Gap in Rockingham county. The pursuit was not vigorous nor persistent.‡ Although

‡ General Jackson's first announcement of the battle to General Johnston, dated March 24th, contained the following:

"As the enemy had been sending off troops from the district, and from what I could learn were still doing so, and knowing your great desire to prevent it, and having a prospect of success, I engaged him yesterday about 3 P. M., near Winchester, and fought until dusk, but his forces were so superior to mine that he repulsed me with the loss of valuable officers and men killed and wounded; but from the obstinacy with which our troops fought and from their advantageous position I am of the opinion that his loss was greater than mine in troops, but I lost one piece of artillery and three caissons."

See also p. 302. EDITORS.

Jackson retired before superior numbers, he had given a taste of his fighting qualities that stopped the withdrawal of the enemy's troops from the Valley.

The result was so pleasing to the Richmond government and General Johnston that it was decided to reënforce Jackson by sending General Ewell's division to him at Swift Run Gap, which reached him about the 1st of May, thus giving Jackson an aggregate force of from 13,000 to 15,000 men to open his campaign with. At the beginning of May the situation was broadly about as follows: Milroy, with about 4087 men, was on the Staunton and Parkersburg road at McDowell, less than forty miles from Staunton, with Schenck's brigade of about 2500 near Franklin. The rest of Frémont's army in the mountain department was then about 30,000 men, of whom 20,000 were concentrating at Franklin, fifty miles north-west of Staunton, and within supporting distance of Milroy. Banks, who had fortified Strasburg, seventy miles north-east of Staunton by the great Valley turnpike, to fall back upon in an emergency, had pushed forward a force of 20,000 men to Harrisonburg, including Shields's division, 10,000 strong. General McDowell, with 34,000 men, exclusive of Shields's division, was at points east of the Blue Ridge, so as to be able to move either to Fredericksburg or to the Luray Valley and thence to Staunton. Not counting Colonel Miles's, later Saxton's, command, at Harper's Ferry, which was rapidly increased to 7000 men, sent from Washington and other points north of the Potomac, before the end of May, Jackson had about 80,000 men to take into account (including all Union forces north of the Rappahannock and east of the Ohio) and to keep from a junction with McClellan in front of Richmond. Not less than 65,000‡ of these enemies were in some part of the Valley under their various commanders in May and June [see p. 299].

Besides Ewell's division already mentioned, General Johnston could give no further assistance to Jackson, for McClellan was right in his front with superior numbers, and menacing the capital of the Confederacy with almost immediate and certain capture. Its only salvation depended upon Jackson's ability to hold back Frémont, Banks, and McDowell long enough to let Johnston try doubtful conclusions with McClellan. If he failed in this, these three commanders of an aggregate force then reputed to be, and I believe in fact, over one hundred thousand§ would converge and move down upon Richmond from the west as McClellan advanced from the east, and the city and its defenders would fall an easy prey to nearly, if not quite, a quarter of a million of the best-armed and best-equipped men ever put into the field by any government.

Early in May, Jackson was near Port Republic contemplating his surroundings and maturing his plans. What these latter were no one but himself knew.

Suddenly the appalling news spread through the Valley that he had fled to

‡ This seems to us an overestimate of the Union forces actually in the Valley during the operations of May and June. April 30th, Banks had 9178 "present for duty"; May 31st, Frémont had 14,672 (Cox and Kelley not in the Valley); McDowell's force that reached the Valley (including Shield's division, which on May 31st numbered 10,203), aggregated about 21,000. Total, 44,840. Saxton had about 7000 at Harper's Ferry, which were not engaged.— EDITORS.

§ We estimate that there were not above 80,000 Union troops in the three departments that could have been moved toward Richmond.— EDITORS.



MAP OF THE BATTLE OF McDOWELL. [SEE P. 298.]

By Major Jed. Hotchkiss, Topographical Engineer Valley District Army of Northern Virginia.

The Confederate commands (indicated by white bars) of Generals Edward Johnson and W. B. Taliaferro were posted on Setlington's Hill in the following order, beginning on the left: 52d, 10th, 58th, 31st, and 23d Virginia; 12th Georgia; 37th Virginia.

General Milroy's troops (indicated by black bars) moved from the valley of the Bull Pasture River against the Confederate position, and were engaged from right to left, as follows: 25th, 75th, 32d, and 82d Ohio, and 3d W. Virginia, with Johnson's 12th Ohio battery on Hall's Ridge, the extreme left.

The attack opened on the Union right and ended with a flank movement by the regiments on the left.

the east side of the Blue Ridge through Brown's and Swift Run Gaps. Only Ashby remained behind with about one thousand cavalry, scattered and moving day and night in the vicinity of McDowell, Franklin, Strasburg, Front Royal, and Luray, and reporting to Jackson every movement of the enemy. Despair was fast settling upon the minds of the people of the Valley. Jackson made no concealment of his flight, the news of which soon reached his enemies. Milroy advanced two regiments to the top of the Shenandoah Mountain, only twenty-two miles from Staunton, and was preparing to move his entire force to Staunton, to be followed by Frémont.

Jackson had collected, from Charlottesville and other stations on the Virginia Central Railroad, enough railway trains to transport all of his little army. That it was to be taken to Richmond when the troops were all embarked no one doubted. It was Sunday, and many of his sturdy soldiers were Valley men. With sad and gloomy hearts they boarded the trains at Mechum's River Station. When all were on, lo! they took a westward course, and a little after noon the first train rolled into Staunton.

News of Jackson's arrival spread like wild-fire, and crowds flocked to the station to see the soldiers and learn what it all meant. No one knew.

As soon as the troops could be put in motion they took the road leading toward McDowell, the general having sent forward cavalry to Buffalo Gap and beyond to arrest all persons going that way. General Edward Johnson, with one of Jackson's Valley brigades, was already at Buffalo Gap. The next morning, by a circuitous mountain-path, he tried to send a brigade of infantry to the rear of Milroy's two regiments on Shenandoah Mountain, but they were improperly guided and failed to reach the position in time, so that when attacked in front both regiments escaped. Jackson followed as rapidly as possible, and the following day, May 8th, on top of the Bull Pasture Mountain, three miles east of McDowell, encountered Milroy reënforced by Schenck, who commanded by virtue of seniority of commission. The conflict lasted four



UNION CAMP AT FRONT ROYAL. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

hours, and was severe and bloody. It was fought mainly with small-arms, the ground forbidding much use of artillery. Schenck and Milroy fled precipitately toward Franklin, to unite with Frémont. The route lay along a narrow valley hedged up by high mountains, perfectly protecting the flanks of the retreating army from Ashby's pursuing cavalry, led by Captain Sheetz. Jackson ordered him to pursue as vigorously as possible, and to guard completely all avenues of approach from the direction of McDowell or Staunton till relieved of this duty. Jackson buried the dead and rested his army, and then fell back to the Valley on the Warm Springs and Harrisonburg road.[\]

The morning after the battle of McDowell I called very early on Jackson at the residence of Colonel George W. Hull of that village, where he had his headquarters, to ask if I could be of any service to him, as I had to go to Staunton, forty miles distant, to look after some companies that were to join my command. He asked me to wait a few moments, as he wished to prepare a telegram to be sent to President Davis from Staunton, the nearest office to McDowell. He took a seat at a table and wrote nearly half a page of foolscap; he rose and stood before the fireplace pondering it some minutes; then he tore it in pieces and wrote again, but much less, and again destroyed what he had written, and paced the room several times. He suddenly stopped, seated himself, and dashed off two or three lines, folded the paper, and said, "Send that off as soon as you reach Staunton." As I bade him "good-bye," he remarked: "I may have other telegrams to-day or to-morrow, and will send them to you for transmission. I wish you to have two or three well-mounted couriers ready to bring me the replies promptly."

[\] See note by General Schenck, p. 298, and also p. 280.— EDITORS.

I read the message he had given me. It was dated "McDowell," and read about thus: "Providence blessed our arms with victory at McDowell yesterday." That was all. A few days after I got to Staunton a courier arrived with a message to be telegraphed to the Secretary of War. I read it, sent it off, and ordered a courier to be ready with his horse, while I waited at the telegraph office for the reply. The message was to this effect: "I think I ought to attack Banks, but under my orders I do not feel at liberty to do so." In less than an hour a reply came, but not from the Secretary of War. It was from General Joseph E. Johnston, to whom I supposed the Secretary had referred General Jackson's message. I have a distinct recollection of its substance, as follows: "If you think you can beat Banks, attack him. I only intended by my orders to caution you against attacking fortifications." Banks was understood to have fortified himself strongly at Strasburg and Cedar Creek, and he had fallen back there. I started the courier with this reply, as I supposed, to McDowell, but, lo! it met Jackson only twelve miles from Staunton, to which point on the Harrisonburg and Warm Springs turnpike he had marched his little army, except part of Ashby's cavalry, which, under an intrepid leader, Captain Sheetz, he had sent from McDowell to menace Frémont, who was concentrating at Franklin in Pendleton County, where he remained in blissful ignorance that Jackson had left McDowell, till he learned by telegraph some days later that Jackson had fallen upon Banks at Front Royal and driven him through Winchester and across the Potomac.

BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN R. KENLY.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

Two hours after receiving this telegram from General Johnston, Jackson was *en route* for Harrisonburg, where he came upon the great Valley turnpike. By forced marches he reached New Market in two days. Detachments of cavalry guarded every road beyond him, so that Banks remained in total ignorance of his approach. This Federal commander had the larger part of his force well fortified at and near Strasburg, but he kept a strong detachment at Front Royal, about eight miles distant and facing the Luray or Page Valley.☆

From New Market Jackson disappeared so suddenly that the people of the Valley were again mystified. He crossed the Massanutten Mountain, and,

☆ Banks's total force now numbered 9178 present for duty as against 16,000 to 17,000 of Jackson.—EDITORS.



VIEW FROM BANKS'S FORT, NEAR STRASBURG, ACROSS TO FISHER'S HILL.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1885.

passing Luray, hurried toward Front Royal. He sometimes made thirty miles in twenty-four hours with his entire army, thus gaining for his infantry the sobriquet of "Jackson's foot cavalry." Very early in the afternoon of May 23d he struck Front Royal. The surprise was complete and disastrous to the enemy, who were commanded by Colonel John R. Kenly. After a fruitless resistance they fled toward Winchester, twenty miles distant, with Jackson at their heels.¦ A large number were captured within four miles by a splendid cavalry dash of Colonel Flournoy and Lieutenant-Colonel Watts.

News of this disaster reached Banks at Strasburg, by which he learned that Jackson was rapidly gaining his rear toward Newtown. The works Banks had constructed had not been made for defense in that direction, so he abandoned them and set out with all haste for Winchester; but, *en route*, near Newtown (May 24th), Jackson struck his flank, inflicting heavy loss, and making large captures of property, consisting of wagons, teams, camp-equipage, provisions, ammunition, and over nine thousand stand of arms, all new and in perfect order, besides a large number of prisoners.⁂

Jackson now chased Banks's fleeing army to Winchester, where the latter made a stand, but after a sharp engagement with Ewell's division on the 25th he fled again, not halting till he had crossed the Potomac, congratulating himself and his Government in a dispatch that his army was at last safe in Maryland. General Saxton, with some 7000 men, held Harper's Ferry, 32

¦ Colonel Kenly, in his report, says that he was attacked about 2 P. M., and that he maintained his position in front of his camp until nearly 5 o'clock, when he found that he was flanked. Retiring, he made a stand at the river in his rear, and again at the cross-road leading to Middletown. At the last point his men were run down by overwhelming numbers and captured in detachments.— EDITORS.

⁂ Banks reports on April 30th, as present for duty, 9178; and on June 16th, 7113,—being a reduction of 2065. Jackson reports the capture in all of 3050 of Banks's men.— EDITORS.

ARRIVAL OF FRÉMONT'S VANGUARD ABOVE STRASBURG, IN VIEW OF JACKSON'S TRAINS MOVING TOWARD FISHER'S HILL. FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

miles from Winchester. Jackson paid his respects to this fortified post, by marching a large part of his forces close to it, threatening an assault, long enough to allow all the captured property at Winchester to be sent away toward Staunton, and then returned to Winchester. His problem now was to escape the clutches of Frémont, knowing that that officer would be promptly advised by wire of what had befallen Banks. He could go back the way he came, by the Luray Valley, but that would expose Staunton (the most important depot in the valley) to capture by Frémont, and he had made his plans to save it.

I had been left at Staunton organizing my recruits. On his way to attack Banks, Jackson sent me an order from New Market to throw as many men as I could arm, and as quickly as possible, into Brock's Gap, west of Harrisonburg, and into any other mountain-pass through which Frémont could reach the valley at or south of Harrisonburg. I knew that within four miles of Franklin, on the main road leading to Harrisonburg, there was a narrow defile hemmed in on both sides by nearly perpendicular cliffs, over five hundred feet high. I sent about fifty men, well armed with long-range guns, to occupy these cliffs, and defend the passage to the last extremity.

On the 25th of May, as soon as Frémont learned of Banks's defeat and retreat to the Potomac, he put his army of about 14,000 in motion from Franklin to cut off Jackson's retreat up the valley. Ashby's men were still in his front toward McDowell, with an unknown force; so Frémont did not attempt that route, but sent his cavalry to feel the way toward Brock's Gap, on the direct road to Harrisonburg. The men I had sent to the cliffs let the head of

the column get well into the defile or gorge, when, from a position of perfect safety to themselves, they poured a deadly volley into the close column. The attack being unexpected, and coming from a foe of unknown strength, the Federal column halted and hesitated to advance. Another volley and the "rebel yell" from the cliffs turned them back, never to appear again. Frémont took the road to Moorefield, and thence to Strasburg, though he had been peremptorily ordered on May 24th by President Lincoln to proceed direct to Harrisonburg. It shows how close had been Jackson's calculation of chances, to state that as his rear-guard marched up Fisher's Hill, two miles from Strasburg, Frémont's advance came in sight on the mountain-side on the road from Moorefield, and a sharp skirmish took place. Jackson continued to Harrisonburg, hotly pursued by Frémont, but avoiding a conflict.

The news of Banks's defeat created consternation at Washington, and Shields was ordered to return from east of the Blue Ridge to the Luray Valley in all haste to coöperate with Frémont. Jackson was advised of Shields's approach, and his aim was to prevent a junction of their forces till he reached a point where he could strike them in quick succession. He therefore sent cavalry detachments along the Shenandoah to burn the bridges as far as Port Republic, the river being at that time too full for fording. At Harrisonburg he took the road leading to Port Republic, and ordered me from Staunton, with a mixed battery and battalion of cavalry, to the bridge over North River near Mount Crawford, to prevent a cavalry force passing to his rear.

At Cross Keys, about six miles from Harrisonburg, he delivered battle to Frémont, on June 8th, and, after a long and bloody conflict, as night closed in he was master of the field. Leaving one division — Ewell's — on the ground, to resist Frémont if he should return next day, he that night marched the rest of his army to Port Republic, which lies in the forks of the river, and made his arrangements to attack the troops of Shields's command next morning on the Lewis farm, just below the town.

On the day of the conflict at Cross Keys I held the bridge across North River at Mount Crawford with a battalion of cavalry, four howitzers, and a Parrott gun, to prevent a cavalry flank movement on Jackson's trains at Port Republic. About 10 o'clock at night I received a note from Jackson, written in pencil on the blank margin of a newspaper, directing me to report with my command at Port Republic before daybreak. On the same slip, and as a postscript, he wrote, "Poor Ashby is dead. He fell gloriously.



By Major Jed. Hotchkiss, Top. Eng. Valley Dist. A. N. Va.



VIEW OF THE BATTLE OF CROSS KEYS, FROM THE UNION POSITION, LOOKING EAST. FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

. . . I know you will join with me in mourning the loss of our friend, one of the noblest men and soldiers in the Confederate army." I carried that slip of paper till it was literally worn to tatters.

It was early, Sunday, June 8th, when Jackson and his staff reached the bridge at Port Republic. General E. B. Tyler, who, with two brigades of Shields's division, was near by on the east side of the river, had sent two

General Ewell, the Confederate commander on the field, in his report says of the Union advance:

"The general features of the ground were a valley and a rivulet in my front, woods on both flanks, and a field of some hundreds of acres where the road crossed the center of my line, my side of the valley being more defined and commanding the other. . . . About 10 o'clock the enemy felt along my front with skirmishers, and shortly after posted his artillery, chiefly opposite mine. He advanced under cover on General Trimble, with a force, according to his own statement, of two brigades, which were repulsed with such signal loss that they did not make another determined effort. General Trimble had been reënforced by the 13th and 25th Virginia Regiments, Colonel J. A. Walker and Lieutenant-Colonel P. B. Duffy, of General Elzey's brigade. These regiments assisted in the repulse of the enemy. General Trimble in turn advanced and drove the enemy more than a mile, and remained on his flank ready to make the final attack. . . . The enemy's attack was decided by 4 P. M., it being principally directed against General Trimble, and, though from their own statement they outnumbered us on that flank two to one, it had signally failed. General Trimble's . . . brigade captured one of their colors."

General Frémont in his report describes the desperate fighting as follows:

"Urging vigorously forward his brigade, General Stahel encountered in the first belt of woods a strong line of skirmishers, which with hard fighting was driven out of the timber and pushed by the 8th and 45th New York over the open ground beyond the edge of the woods, where these regiments suddenly came upon the right of the enemy's main line. . . . Two of General Stahel's best regiments, the 27th Pennsylvania and the 41st New York, had been diverted to the right in the timber, and the shock of the entire force here was sustained by the 8th and 45th New York; and principally by the 8th, which was attacked in front and flank by four regiments. . . . The enemy now brought up additional artillery into the open ground on my extreme left, and General Taylor's reserve brigade [Confederate] entering the woods, the fighting continued with great severity continuously along the timber in front of our position. A Mississippi regiment, charging with yells upon Buell's battery, was gallantly met with a bayonet charge by the 27th Pennsylvania, under cover of which the battery was withdrawn. A Louisiana regiment of Taylor's brigade, undertaking a charge upon Diller's battery, was received with a fire of canister and grape, delivered with such precision and rapidity as nearly destroyed it. Every attempt of the enemy to emerge from the cover of the woods was repulsed by artillery and counter-attacks of infantry." . .

EDITORS.

guns and a few men under a green and inefficient officer to the bridge. They arrived about the same time as Jackson, but, his troops soon coming up, the Federal officer and his supports made great haste back to the Lewis farm, losing a gun at the bridge.

I reached Port Republic an hour before daybreak of June 9th, and sought the house occupied by Jackson; but not wishing to disturb him so early, I asked the sentinel what room was occupied by "Sandy" Pendleton, Jackson's adjutant-general. "Upstairs, first room on the right," he replied.

Supposing he meant our right as we faced the house, I went up, softly opened the door, and discovered General Jackson lying on his face across the bed, fully dressed, with sword, sash, and boots all on. The low-burnt tallow candle on the table shed a dim light, yet enough by which to recognize him. I endeavored to withdraw without waking him. He turned over, sat up on the bed, and called out, "Who is that?"

He checked my apology with "That is all right. It's time to be up. I am glad to see you. Were the men all up as you came through camp?"

"Yes, General, and cooking."

"That's right. We move at daybreak. Sit down. I want to talk to you."

I had learned never to ask him questions about his plans, for he would never answer such to any one. I therefore waited for him to speak first. He referred very feelingly to Ashby's death, and spoke of it as an irreparable loss. When he paused I said, "General, you made a glorious winding-up of your four weeks' work yesterday."

He replied, "Yes, God blessed our army again yesterday, and I hope with his protection and blessing we shall do still better to-day."

Then seating himself, for the first time in all my intercourse with him, he outlined the day's proposed operations. I remember perfectly his conversation. He said: "Charley Winder [Brigadier-General commanding his old 'Stonewall' brigade] will cross the river at daybreak and attack Shields on the Lewis farm [two miles below]. I shall support him with all the other troops as fast as they can be put in line. General 'Dick' Taylor will move through the woods on the side of the mountain with his Louisiana brigade, and rush upon their left flank by the time the action becomes general. By 10 o'clock we shall get them on the run, and I'll now tell you what I want with you. Send the big new rifle-gun you have [a 12-pounder Parrott] to Poague [commander of the Rockbridge artillery] and let your mounted men report to the cavalry. I want you in person to



By Major Jed. Hotchkiss,
Top. Eng. Valley Dist. A. N. Va.

PENNSYLVANIA "BUCKTAILS."

COLONEL JOHNSON, MOUNTED.

THE FIRST MARYLAND (CONFEDERATE) REGIMENT AT HARRISONBURG, JUNE 6, 1862, AND THE DEATH OF ASHBY.

In the affair of the rear-guard at Harrisonburg on the 6th of June, 1862, the 1st Maryland Regiment, Colonel (afterward General) Bradley T. Johnson, was ordered by General Ewell to charge through the woods to the left in support of the 58th Virginia, then closely engaged with the Pennsylvania 13th ("Bucktails"). They charged with a cheer, but soon began to suffer from a fire in the flank and rear. Colonel Johnson gave the command, "By the right flank, file right, march!" As soon as the colors came into line — "By the left flank, *charge!*" The right companies charged at double-quick, the left companies coming up on a run — thus changing front to the right under fire. At the same instant a volley from the enemy swept down the front files of the color company and color guard, killed the horses of General Turner Ashby and Colonel Johnson, and in a second after killed Ashby. Johnson, disentangling himself from his horse, led his regiment on, and, according to Ewell, "drove the enemy off with heavy loss," wounding and capturing their commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas L. Kane. General Frémont wrote that "a battalion of Colonel Kane's (Pennsylvania) regiment entered the woods under the direction of Brigadier-General [George D.] Bayard, and maintained for half an hour a vigorous attack, in which both sides suffered severely, driving the enemy." Ashby was directing when he fell not thirty yards from the enemy. Three Confederate color-sergeants were shot at one flag. As the regiment was moving into the battle of Cross Keys, June 8th, General Ewell directed Colonel Johnson to carry one of the bucktails captured from the enemy affixed to his colors as a trophy.— EDITORS.

take your mountain howitzers to the field, in some safe position in rear of the line, keeping everything packed on the mules, ready at any moment to take to the mountain-side. Three miles below Lewis's there is a defile on the Luray road. Shields may rally and make a stand there. If he does, I can't reach him with the field-batteries on account of the woods. You can carry your 12-pounder howitzers on the mules up the mountain-side, and at some good place unpack and shell the enemy out of the defile, and the cavalry will do the rest."

BRIGADIER-GENERAL TURNER ASHBY, C. S. A. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

This plan of battle was carried out to the letter. I took position in a ravine about two hundred yards in rear of Poague's battery in the center of the line. General Tyler, who had two brigades of Shields's division, made a very stubborn fight, and by 9 o'clock matters began to look very serious for us. Dick Taylor had not yet come down out of the woods on Tyler's left flank.

Meanwhile I was having a remarkable time with our mules in the ravine. Some of the shot aimed at Poague came bounding over our heads, and occasionally a shell would burst there. The mules became frantic. They kicked, plunged, and squealed. It was impossible to quiet them, and it took three or four men to hold one mule from breaking away. Each mule had about three hundred pounds weight on him, so securely fastened that the load could not be dislodged by any of his capers. Several of them lay down and tried to wallow their loads off. The men held these down, and that suggested the idea of throwing them all on the ground and holding them there. The ravine sheltered us so that we were in no danger from the shot or shell which passed over us.

Just about the time our mule "circus" was at its height, news came up the line from the left that Winder's brigade near the river was giving way. Jackson rode down in that direction to see what it meant. As he passed on the brink of our ravine, his eye caught the scene, and, reining up a moment, he accosted me with, "Colonel, you seem to have trouble down there." I made some reply which drew forth a hearty laugh, and he said, "Get your mules to the mountain as soon as you can, and be ready to move."

Then he dashed on. He found his old brigade had yielded slightly to overwhelming pressure.[1] Galloping up, he was received with a cheer; and, calling

[1] The first Confederate assault was made by Winder's (Stonewall) brigade, and was repulsed by the troops of Carroll's brigade. An incident of the counter-charge is thus described by Colonel Henry B. Kelly, C. S. A.:

"While victoriously driving back the line of the Confederate left, the advancing Federal infantry were themselves suddenly assailed in flank, on their left, by a charge of two regiments of Virginia infantry, the 44th and 58th, led by Colonel Scott."

The attack on the other flank by troops brought up from Cross Keys, by General Ewell, determined the result. Colonel Kelly says:

"At the word of command, the line moved forward,

out at the top of his voice, "The 'Stonewall' brigade never retreats; follow me!" led them back to their original line. Taylor soon made his appearance, and the flank attack settled the work of the day. A wild retreat began. The pursuit was vigorous. No stand was made in the defile. We pursued them eight miles. I rode back with Jackson, and at sunset we were on the battle-field at the Lewis mansion.

Jackson accosted a medical officer, and said, "Have you brought off all the wounded?" "Yes, all of ours, but not all of the enemy's." "Why not?" "Because we were shelled from across the river." "Had you your hospital flag on the field?" "Yes." "And they shelled that?" "Yes." "Well, take your men to their quarters; I would rather let them all die than have one of my men shot intentionally under the yellow flag when trying to save their wounded."[\]

Frémont, hearing the noise of the battle, had hurried out from near Harrisonburg to help Tyler; but Jackson had burnt the bridge at Port Republic, after Ewell had held Frémont in check some time on the west side of the river and escaped, so that when Frémont came in sight of Tyler's battle-field, the latter's troops had been routed and the river could not be crossed.

The next day I returned to Staunton, and found General W. H. C. Whiting, my old commander after the fall of General Bee at Bull Run, arriving with a division of troops to reënforce Jackson. Taking him and his staff to my house as guests, General Whiting left soon after breakfast with a guide to call on Jackson at Swift Run Gap, near Port Republic, where he was resting his troops. The distance from Staunton was about twenty miles, but Whiting returned after midnight. He was in a towering passion, and declared that Jackson had treated him outrageously. I asked, "How is that possible, General, for he is very polite to every one?"

"Oh! hang him, he was polite enough. But he didn't say one word about his plans. I finally asked him for orders, telling him what troops I had. He simply told me to go back to Staunton, and he would send me orders

soon coming into plain view of the batteries and of the infantry of the enemy beyond the ravine, which at once opened fire on the advancing brigade. With one volley in reply, and a Confederate yell heard far over the field, the Louisianians rushed down the rough declivity and across the ravine, and carried the batteries like a flash. . . . By the impetus of the charge over the rough ground all formation was lost, and officers and men were all thrown into one unorganized mass around the captured guns. While this exultant crowd were rejoicing and shouting over their victory, suddenly a scathing fire of canister was poured into them by a section of Clark's battery which had been rapidly brought over from the Federal right to within two hundred yards of the position of the captured guns. . . .

"At the outset of the attempt of the Federals to retake their batteries, Lieutenant-Colonel Peck, of the 9th Louisiana, called out to the men about the captured guns to shoot the horses, which was done. When, therefore, the Federals retook and held for a time, as they did, the ground where the guns were, they were unable, when again driven off, to take more than one gun with them for want of battery horses." EDITORS.

[\] The official references to this incident are comprised in the following.

General Jackson says in his report:

"While the forces of Shields were in full retreat, and our troops in pursuit, Frémont appeared on the opposite bank of the south fork of the Shenandoah with his army, and opened his artillery upon our ambulances and parties engaged in the humane labors of attending to our dead and wounded, and the dead and wounded of the enemy."

Frémont says in his report of his action at Port Republic:

"Parties (Confederate) gathering the dead and wounded, together with a line of prisoners, awaiting the movements of the rebel force near by, was all, in respect to troops on either side, now to be seen. A parting salvo of carefully aimed rifle-guns, duly charged with shell, hastened the departure of the rebels with the unlucky though most gallant convoy, and the whole were speedily out of sight."

It is hardly necessary to state that intentional shelling of an ambulance and relief parties is denied by Union officers. EDITORS.

to-morrow. I haven't the slightest idea what they will be. I believe he hasn't any more sense than my horse."

Seeing his frame of mind, and he being a guest in my house, I said little. Just after breakfast, next morning, a courier arrived with a terse order to embark his troops on the railroad trains and move to Gordonsville at once, where he would receive further orders. This brought on a new explosion of wrath. "Didn't I tell you he was a fool, and doesn't this prove it? Why, I just came through Gordonsville day before yesterday."

However, he obeyed the order; and when he reached Gordonsville he found Jackson there, and his little Valley army coming after him; a few days later McClellan was astounded to learn that Jackson was on his right flank on the Chickahominy. Shortly after the seven days' battle around Richmond, I met Whiting again, and he then said: "I didn't know Jackson when I was at your house. I have found out now what his plans were, and they were worthy of a Napoleon. But I still think he ought to have told me his plans; for if he had died McClellan would have captured Richmond. I wouldn't have known what he was driving at, and might have made a mess of it. But I take back all I said about his being a fool."

From the date of Jackson's arrival at Staunton till the battle of Port Republic was thirty-five days. He marched from Staunton to McDowell, 40 miles, from McDowell to Front Royal, about 110, from Front Royal to Winchester, 20 miles, Winchester to Port Republic, 75 miles, a total of 245 miles, fighting in the meantime 4 desperate battles, and winning them all.

On the 17th of June, leaving only his cavalry, under Brigadier-General B. H. Robertson, and Chew's battery, and the little force I was enlisting in the valley (which was now no longer threatened by the enemy), Jackson moved all his troops south-east, and on the 25th arrived at Ashland, seventeen miles from Richmond. This withdrawal from the valley was so skillfully managed that his absence from the scene of his late triumphs was unsuspected at Washington. On the contrary, something like a panic prevailed there, and the Government was afraid to permit McDowell to unite his forces with McClellan's lest it should uncover and expose the capital to Jackson's supposed movement on it.

Jackson's military operations were always unexpected and mysterious. In my personal intercourse with him in the early part of the war, before he had become famous, he often said there were two things never to be lost sight of by a military commander: "Always mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy, if possible; and when you strike and overcome him, never let up in the pursuit so long as your men have strength to follow; for an army routed, if hotly pursued, becomes panic-stricken, and can then be destroyed by half their number. The other rule is, never fight against heavy odds, if by any possible manœuvring you can hurl your own force on only a part, and that the weakest part, of your enemy and crush it. Such tactics will win every time, and a small army may thus destroy a large one in detail, and repeated victory will make it invincible."

His celerity of movement was a simple matter. He never broke down his

men by too-long-continued marching. He rested the whole column very often, but only for a few minutes at a time. I remember that he liked to see the men lie down flat on the ground to rest, and would say, "A man rests all over when he lies down."

NOTES ON THE BATTLE OF McDOWELL.

I.—BY ROBERT C. SCHENCK, MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. V.

ON the 7th of May I left Franklin with about 2000 men to join and support General Milroy, menaced with attack by Stonewall Jackson, near McDowell, about forty miles distant. During this forced march my troops made the remarkable time of 34 miles in 23 hours. When I arrived, on the morning of the 8th, I found Milroy, with his small force in the village at the foot of the mountain, defending himself against the enemy occupying the heights above, shut in, in fact, in a sort of amphitheater. The only easy escape from the position was down the narrow valley and small stream back by the road by which I had arrived. I, of course, assumed the command by right of seniority. The only question was how best to extricate ourselves from this disadvantageous position in the presence of a force of the enemy largely superior in numbers. My whole force, after my arrival at McDowell and junction with Milroy, was but about 4000 men.

General Milroy, always moved by undaunted and impetuous, though rather uncalculating, bravery, would have remained to challenge and await attack. But, after conference, it was agreed that the better plan would be to send, that evening, whatever portion of our united force was available for the attack up the side of the mountain to assault the enemy and deliver a blow, if we could, and then retire from his front before he had recovered from the surprise of such a movement. I gave the order accordingly. No officer could have carried it out more effectively than did General Milroy.

The movement was executed successfully. The attacking force was composed of a good part of Milroy's men and of those of my immediate command who were least fatigued. The whole number engaged was 2600; of these we had just ten per cent. killed and wounded. We remained at McDowell, at the foot of the mountain, the point from which our troops moved to the attack through that night, buried our dead, sent off the wounded and all stores, and withdrew in good order toward Franklin in the early morning. Our march back to Franklin, which occupied three days, was orderly and was not seriously molested by Ashby's cavalry or any force of the rebels in pursuit.

At Franklin we kept Jackson with his whole force at bay with our still much inferior numbers, until General Frémont arrived there on the 13th of May. With the troops I had left behind at Franklin, when I marched to the relief of Milroy, I had at no time before Frémont arrived to take command more than 6500 men. On the 8th of May, Frémont was at Petersburg on his march from Lost Creek to Franklin, and certainly nowhere within less than 50 or 60 miles of McDowell. That was poor "supporting distance."

II.—EXTRACTS FROM THE REPORT OF GENERAL R. H. MILROY.

"MAY 7th I was first advised by my scouts and spies that a junction had been effected between the armies of Generals [Stonewall] Jackson and [Edward] Johnson, and that they were advancing to attack me at McDowell. Having the day previous sent out a large portion of the 3d West Virginia and 32d and 75th Ohio Regiments to Shaw's Ridge and upon Shenandoah Mountain for the purpose of protecting my foraging and reconnoitering parties, I immediately ordered my whole command to concentrate at McDowell, and, expecting reënforcements, prepared for defense there. . . . Upon the next morning (the 8th instant) the enemy was seen upon the Bull Pasture Mountain, about one and three-fourths miles distant from McDowell, on my right and front. I commenced shelling them and sent out parties of skirmishers to endeavor to ascertain their numbers. At about 10 A. M. your brigade arrived. Desultory firing of a section of Hyman's battery and occasional skirmishing engaged the attention of the enemy during the morning. . . . In the afternoon, at about 3 o'clock, being informed by Captain George R. Latham, of the 2d West Virginia Volunteer Infantry, who, with his company, was engaged in skirmishing, that the rebels were endeavoring to plant a battery upon the mountain, which would command our whole encampment, with your permission I made a reconnoissance for the purpose of obtaining accurate information of their strength and position. . . . Under my order the 25th Ohio and 75th Ohio Regiments (the former under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel W. P. Richardson, and the latter under the command of Colonel N. C. McLean and Major Robert Reily) advanced in the most gallant manner up the face of the hill and attacked the enemy in their front. Numbering less than one thousand men, unprotected by any natural or artificial shelter, they advanced up a precipitous mountain-side upon an adversary protected by intrenchments and the natural formation of the mountain, and unsupported drove them (being at least twice their numerical strength) over the crest of the mountain, and for one and a half hours maintained unaided, while exposed to a deadly fire, the position from which they had so bravely driven the foe."

THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE VALLEY CAMPAIGNS.

March 23d–June 10th, 1862.

The composition, losses, and strength of each army as here stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the Official Records. K stands for killed: w for wounded; m w for mortally wounded; m for captured or missing; c for captured.

THE UNION ARMY.

FORCES AT KERNSTOWN, MARCH 23D, 1862.

Brigadier-General James Shields (w), Colonel Nathan Kimball. Staff loss: w, 1.

First Brigade, Col. Nathan Kimball (also commanded the division on the field of battle): 14th Ind., Lieut.-Col. William Harrow; 8th Ohio, Col. Samuel S. Carroll; 67th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Alvin C. Voris; 84th Pa., Col. William G. Murray (k). Brigade loss: k, 45; w, 200; m, 1=246.

Second Brigade, Col. Jeremiah C. Sullivan: 39th Ill., Col. Thomas O. Osborn; 13th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Robert S. Foster; 5th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. John H. Patrick; 62d Ohio, Col. Francis B. Pond. Brigade loss: k, 23; w, 69=92.

Third Brigade, Col. Erastus B. Tyler: 7th Ind., Lieut.-Col. John F. Cheek; 7th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. William R. Creighton; 29th Ohio, Col. Lewis P. Buckley; 110th Pa., Col. William D. Lewis, Jr.; 1st W. Va., Col. Joseph Thoburn. Brigade loss: k, 43; w, 171; m, 21=235.

Cavalry, Col. Thornton F. Brodhead: 1st Squadron Pa., Capt. John Keys; Indpt. Co's, Md., Captains Henry A. Cole, William Firey, and John Horner; 1st W. Va. (Battalion), Maj. B. F. Chamberlain; 1st Ohio (Co's A and C), Capt. Nathan D. Menken; 1st Mich. (Battalion), Lieut.-Col. Joseph T. Copeland. Cavalry loss: k, 3; w, 6=9.

Artillery, Lieut.-Col. Philip Daum: A, W. Va., Capt. John Jenks; B, W. Va.; H, 1st Ohio, Capt. James F. Huntington; L, 1st Ohio, Capt. Lucius N. Robinson; E, 4th U. S., Capt. Joseph C. Clark, Jr. Artillery loss: k, 4; w, 2=6.

Total loss (March 22d and 23d): killed, 118; wounded, 450; missing, 22=590.

General Shields reports ("Official Records," XII., Pt. I., p. 342): "Our force in infantry, cavalry, and artillery did not exceed 7000. . . . We had 6000 infantry, a cavalry force of 750, and 24 pieces of artillery."

FORCES AT McDOWELL, VA., MAY 8TH, 1862.

Brigadier-General Robert C. Schenck.

Milroy's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Robert H. Milroy: 25th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. W. P. Richardson; 32d Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Ebenezer H. Swinney; 73d Ohio, Col. Orland Smith; 75th Ohio, Col. Nathaniel C. McLean; 2d W. Va., Col. John W. Moss; 3d W. Va., Lieut.-Col. Francis W. Thompson; I, 1st Ohio Art'y, Capt. Henry F. Hyman; 12th Ohio Batt'y, Capt. Aaron C. Johnson; 1st W. Va. Cav. (3 co's), Maj. John S. Krepps. Brigade loss: k, 20; w, 177; m, 2=199.

Schenck's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. R. C. Schenck: 55th Ohio, Col. John C. Lee; 82d Ohio, Col. James Cantwell; 5th W. Va., Col. John L. Zeigler; 1st Battalion Conn. Cav., Maj. Judson M. Lyon; K, 1st Ohio Art'y, Capt. William L. De Beck. Brigade loss (82d Ohio): k, 6; w, 50; m, 1=57.

Total loss: killed, 26; wounded, 227; missing, 3=256.

General Schenck says ("Official Records," XII., Pt. I., pp. 462, 463), that he "brought into the field an aggregate of only 1300 infantry, besides De Beck's battery . . . and about 250 of the 1st Battalion Connecticut Cavalry." . . . "Adding to the 1768 of Milroy's brigade about 500 of the 82d Ohio, which was the number in action, the entire force we had engaged was 2268."

BANKS'S COMMAND, MAY 23D–25TH, 1862.

Major-General Nathaniel P. Banks.

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Alpheus S. Williams.

First Brigade, Col. Dudley Donnelly: 5th Conn., Lieut.-Col. George D. Chapman; 28th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Edwin F. Brown; 46th Pa., Col. Joseph F. Knipe; 1st Md., Col. John R. Kenly (w and c). Brigade loss: k, 17; w, 98; m, 735=850.

Third Brigade, Col. George H. Gordon: 2d Mass., Lieut.-Col. George L. Andrews; 29th Pa., Col. John K. Murphy (c), Capt. Samuel M. Zulich; 27th Ind., Col. Silas Colgrove; 3d Wis., Col. Thomas H. Ruger. Brigade loss: k, 22; w, 80; m, 507=609.

Cavalry: 1st Mich. (5 co's), Col. Thornton F. Brodhead, Maj. Angelo Paldi. Loss: k, 10; w, 9; m, 35=54.

Artillery, Capt. Robert B. Hampton: M, 1st N. Y., Lieut. James H. Peabody: F, Pa., Lieut. J. Presley Fleming; F, 4th U. S., Lieut. Franklin B. Crosby. Artillery loss: k, 2; w, 14; m, 12=28.

CAVALRY BRIGADE, Brig.-Gen. John P. Hatch: 1st Me. (5 co's), Lieut.-Col. Calvin S. Douty; 1st Vt., Col. Charles H. Tompkins; 5th N. Y., Col. Othneil De Forest; 1st Md. (5 co's), Lieut.-Col. Charles Wetschky. Brigade loss: k, 5; w, 25; m, 294=324.

UNATTACHED: 10th Me., Col. Geo. L. Beal; 8th N. Y. Cav. (5 co's, dismounted), Lieut.-Col. Charles R. Babbitt; Pa. Zouaves d'Afrique, Capt. Charles H. T. Collis; E, Pa. Art'y (section), Lieut. Charles A. Atwell. Unattached loss: k, 6; w, 17; m, 131=154.

The total loss of Banks's troops at Front Royal, Middletown, Newtown, Winchester, etc., from May 23d to 25th, is reported as 62 killed, 243 wounded, and 1714 captured or missing=2019. But Jackson claims ("Official Records," Vol. XII., Pt. I., p. 708) that the whole number of prisoners captured by his command was about 3050, including about 750 sick and wounded in the hospitals at Winchester and Strasburg. The effective strength of Banks's command was reported, April 30th, at 9178, and June 16th (after the battle) at 7113.

FORCES AT HARPER'S FERRY, MAY 26TH–30TH, 1862.

Brigadier-General Rufus Saxton.

Brigade Commanders: Brig.-Gens. James Cooper and John P. Slough, and Col. Dixon S. Miles.

Troops: Cole's Md. Cav., Capt. Henry A. Cole; 1st Md. Cav. (6 co's), Maj. James M. Deems; 5th N. Y. Cav. (4 co's), Maj. George H. Gardner; 8th N. Y. Cav. (4 co's, dismounted), Maj. William L. Markell; K, 1st N. Y. Art'y, Capt. Lorenzo Crounse; L, 1st N. Y. Art'y, Capt. John A. Reynolds; 60th N. Y., Col. William B. Goodrich: 78th N. Y., Col. Daniel Ullmann; 102d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. William B. Haywood; 109th Pa., Col. Henry J. Stainrook; 111th Pa., Col. Matthew Schlaudecker; 3d Del., Col. William O. Redden; 1st Md., P. H. B., Col. William P. Maulsby; Purnell Legion, Md., Col. William J. Leonard; 3d Md., Col. David P. De Witt; 1st D. C., Col. James A. Tait; 8th and 12th U. S. (battalion), Capt. Thomas G. Pitcher; Naval Battery, Lieut. C. H. Daniels.

The loss in Saxton's command was 1 killed, 6 wounded, and 8 captured or missing=15. The forces consisted "of not more than 7000 effective men." (See "Official Records," Vol. XII., Pt. I., p. 641.)

FRÉMONT'S COMMAND, JUNE 1ST–9TH, 1862.

Major-General John C. Frémont. Staff loss: k, 1.

BLENKER'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. L. Blenker. Staff loss: w, 2.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Julius Stahel: 8th N. Y., Col. Francis Wutschel (w); 39th N. Y.; 41st N. Y., Col. Leopold von Gilsa (w), Maj. Detleo von Einsiedel; 45th N. Y., Col. George von Amsberg; 27th Pa., Col. Adolphus Buschbeck; 2d N. Y. Battery, Capt. Louis Schirmer, Lieut. Hermann Jahn; C, W. Va. Art'y, Capt. Frank Buell. Brigade loss: k, 68; w, 240; m, 90 = 398.

Second Brigade, Col. John A. Koltes: 29th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Clemens Soest; 68th N. Y.; 73d Pa., Lieut.-Col. Gust. A. Muhleck; 13th N. Y. Battery, Capt. Julius Dieckmann. Brigade loss: w, 1; m, 8 = 9.

Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry Bohlen: 54th N. Y., Col. Eugene A. Kozlay; 58th N. Y., Col. Wladimir Krzyzanowski; 74th Pa., Lieut.-Col. John Hamm; 75th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Francis Mahler; I, 1st N. Y. Art'y, Capt. Michael Wiedrich. Brigade loss: k, 13; w, 52; m, 8 = 73.

Cavalry: 4th N. Y., Col. Christian F. Dickel.

UNATTACHED CAVALRY: 6th Ohio, Col. William R. Lloyd; 3d W. Va. (detachment), Capt. Everton J. Conger.

ADVANCE BRIGADE, Col. Gustave P. Cluseret: 60th Ohio, Col. William H. Trimble; 8th W. Va., Lieut.-Col. Lucien Loeser. Brigade loss: k, 4; w. 12; m, 3 = 19.

MILROY'S BRIGADE, Brig.-Gen. Robert H. Milroy: 2d W. Va., Maj. James D. Owens; 3d W. Va., Lieut.-Col. Francis W. Thompson; 5th W. Va., Col. John L. Zeigler; 25th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. William P. Richardson; 1st W. Va. Cav. (detachment), Maj. John S. Krepps; G, W. Va. Art'y, Captain Chatham T. Ewing; I, 1st Ohio Art'y, Capt. Henry F. Hyman; 12th Ohio Battery, Capt. Aaron C. Johnson. Brigade loss: k, 23; w, 122; m, 14 = 159.

SCHENCK'S BRIGADE, Brig.-Gen. Robert C. Schenck: 32d Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Ebenezer H. Swinney; 55th Ohio, Col. John C. Lee; 73d Ohio, Col. Orland Smith; 75th Ohio, Col. Nathaniel C. McLean; 82d Ohio, Col. James Cantwell; 1st Battalion Conn. Cav., Capt. Louis N. Middlebrook; K, 1st Ohio Art'y, Capt. William L. De Beck; Ind. Battery, Capt. Silas F. Rigby. Brigade loss: k, 4; w, 7; m, 4 = 15.

BAYARD'S BRIGADE (detached from McDowell's command), Brig.-Gen. George D. Bayard: 1st N. J. Cav., Col. Percy Wyndham (c), Lieut.-Col. Joseph Kargé; 1st Pa. Cav., Col. Owen Jones; 13th Pa. Reserves or 1st Rifles (battalion), Lieut.-Col. Thomas L. Kane (w and c), Capt. Hugh McDonald; 2d Me. Battery, Capt. James A. Hall. Brigade loss: k, 1; w, 7 = 8.

The total loss of Frémont's forces at Cross Keys (as above given in detail) was 114 killed, 443 wounded, and 127 captured or missing = 684. In the affairs at Mount Carmel, Strasburg, Woodstock, Mount Jackson, and Harrisonburg, etc., June 1st–7th, the loss aggregated 11 killed, 52 wounded, and 39 captured or missing = 102.

General Frémont reports ("Official Records," Vol. XII., Pt. I., p. 19) that "10,500 men is a liberal estimate of force in hand and for duty" with his command, June 8th.

SHIELDS'S DIVISION, JUNE 8TH–9TH, 1862.

Brigadier-General James Shields. Staff loss: w, 1.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Nathan Kimball: 14th Ind., Col. William Harrow; 4th Ohio, Col. John S. Mason; 8th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Franklin Sawyer; 7th W. Va., Col. James Evans.

Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Orris S. Ferry: 39th Ill., Col. Thomas O. Osborn; 13th Ind., Lieut.-Col. Robert S. Foster; 62d Ohio, Col. Francis B. Pond; 67th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Alvin C. Voris.

Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Erastus B. Tyler: 5th Ohio, Col. Samuel H. Dunning; 7th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. William R. Creighton; 29th Ohio, Col. Lewis P. Buckley; 66th Ohio, Col. Charles Candy. Brigade loss: k, 51; w, 234; m, 431 = 716.

Fourth Brigade, Col. Samuel S. Carroll: 7th Ind., Col. James Gavin; 84th Pa., Maj. Walter Barrett; 110th Pa., Col. William D. Lewis; 1st W. Va., Col. Joseph Thoburn. Brigade loss: k, 12; w, 145; m, 113 = 270.

Artillery, Col. Philip Daum: H, 1st Ohio, Capt. James F. Huntington; L, 1st Ohio, Capt. Lucius N. Robinson; A, 1st Va., Capt. John Jenks; B, 1st Va., Lieut. John V. Keeper; E, 4th U. S., Capt. Joseph C. Clark. Artillery loss: K, 4; w, 13; m, 14 = 31.

Cavalry: 1st Ohio (detachment), Capt. John H. Robinson; 1st R. I. (battalion), Maj. David B. Nelson; 1st W. Va. (detachment), Maj. Benjamin F. Chamberlain.

The loss of the Third and Fourth Brigades, three batteries of artillery, and a detachment of cavalry, which were the only troops of this division engaged at and near Port Republic, June 8th and 9th, aggregated 67 killed, 393 wounded, and 558 captured or missing = 1018. The Union loss during the entire campaign approximated 264 killed, 1146 wounded, and 3199 captured or missing = 4609. In his official report ("Official Records," Vol. XII., Pt. I., p. 688) General Shields gives his effective force in the engagement of June 9th as not exceeding 2500 men. General Tyler, who had immediate command of the troops in action, says ("Official Records," Vol. XII., Pt. I., p. 697) his force could not have exceeded 3000 men. The strength of Shields's entire division, on May 30th, is reported at 10,900 men ("Official Records," Vol. XII., Pt. III., p. 290). According to the same authority Ord's division, of McDowell's command, which remained at Front Royal during Shields's advance up the Luray Valley, numbered 9000.

THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.

FORCES AT KERNSTOWN, MARCH 23D, 1862.

Major-General Thomas J. Jackson.

Garnett's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. R. B. Garnett: 2d Va., Col. J. W. Allen; 4th Va., Lieut.-Col. Charles A. Ronald, Maj. A. G. Pendleton; 5th Va., Col. William H. Harman; 27th Va., Col. John Echols (w), Lieut.-Col. A. J. Grigsby; 33d Va., Col. Arthur C. Cummings; Va. Battery (Rockbridge Art'y), Capt. William McLaughlin; Va. Battery (West Augusta Art'y), Capt. James H. Waters; Va. Battery, Capt. Joseph Carpenter. Brigade loss: k, 40; w, 168; m, 153 = 361.

Burks's Brigade, Col. Jesse S. Burks: 21st Va., Lieut.-Col. John M. Patton, Jr.; 42d Va., Lieut.-Col. D. A. Langhorne; 1st Va. (Irish) Battalion, Capt. D. B. Bridgford; Va. Battery, Lieut. James Pleasants. Brigade loss: k, 24; w, 114; m, 39 = 167.

Fulkerson's Brigade, Col. Samuel V. Fulkerson: 23d Va., Lieut.-Col. Alex. G. Taliaferro; 37th Va., Lieut.-Col. R. P. Carson; Va. Battery (Danville Art'y), Lieut. A. C. Lanier. Brigade loss: k, 15; w, 76; m, 71 = 162.

Cavalry, 7th Va., Col. Turner Ashby; Va. Battery, Capt. R. P. Chew. Cavalry loss: k, 1; w, 17 = 18.

Total loss (March 22d and 23d): killed, 80; wounded, 375; missing, 263 = 718.

General Jackson, in his report ("Official Records," XII., Pt. I., p. 383), says: "Our number present on the evening of the battle was, of infantry, 3087, of which 2742 were engaged; 27 pieces of artillery, of which 18 were engaged. Owing to recent heavy cavalry duty and the extent of country to be protected, only 290 of this arm were present to take part in the engagement."

FORCES AT McDOWELL, VA., MAY 8TH, 1862.

Major-General Thomas J. Jackson.

ARMY OF THE VALLEY: *Second Brigade*, Col. John A. Campbell: 21st Va., Lieut.-Col. R. H. Cunningham; 42d Va., Maj. Henry Lane; 48th Va., Maj. James C. Campbell (w), Lieut. Samuel Hale; 1st Va. (Irish) Battalion, Capt. B. W. Leigh. Brigade loss: w, 9. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. William B. Taliaferro: 10th Va., Col. S. B. Gibbons (k), Lieut.-Col. E. T. H. Warren; 23d Va., Col. A. G. Taliaferro; 37th Va., Col. Samuel V. Fulkerson. Brigade loss: k, 12; w, 89 = 101.

ARMY OF THE NORTH-WEST, Brig.-Gen. Edward Johnson (w), in command on the field. Staff loss: w, 1. *First Brigade*, Col. Z. T. Conner: 12th Ga., Maj. Willis A. Hawkins; 25th Va., Col. George H. Smith (w); 31st Va., Lieut.-Col. Alfred H. Jackson, Col. John S. Hoffman. Brigade loss: k, 43; w, 223 = 266. *Second Brigade*, Col. W. C. Scott: 44th Va., Maj. Norvell Cobb; 52d Va., Col. Michael G. Harman; 58th Va., Lieut.-Col. F. H. Board. Brigade loss: k, 20; w, 102 = 122.

Total loss: killed, 75; wounded, 424 = 499.

The strength of the Confederate forces is not officially stated. Colonel Allan ("Campaign in the Valley of Virginia, 1861–62," p. 78) estimates it at about 6000.

FORCES IN THE OPERATIONS OF MAY 20TH–JUNE 10TH, 1862.

Major-General Thomas J. Jackson.

JACKSON'S DIVISION. *First Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Charles S. Winder: 2d Va., Col. J. W. Allen; 4th Va., Col. Charles A. Ronald; 5th Va., Col. W. S. H. Baylor, Lieut.-Col. J. H. S. Funk; 27th Va., Col. A. J. Grigsby; 33d Va., Col. John F. Neff. Brigade loss: Winchester, k, 10; w, 27 = 37. Port Republic, k, 13; w, 154; m, 32 = 199. *Second Brigade*, Col. J. A. Campbell (w), Col. John M. Patton: 21st Va., Col. John M. Patton, Lieut.-Col. R. H. Cunningham; 42d Va., Maj. Henry Lane (w), Capt. John E. Penn, Lieut.-Col. William Martin; 48th Va., Captain Samuel Hale (w), Maj. J. B. Moseley, Lieut.-Col. Thomas S. Garnett; 1st Va. (Irish) Battalion, Capt. B. W. Leigh, Maj. John Seddon. Brigade loss: Winchester, k, 2; w, 14 = 16. Cross Keys and Port Republic, k, 4; w, 16 = 20. *Third Brigade*, Col. Samuel V. Fulkerson, Brig.-Gen. William B. Taliaferro: 10th Va., Col. E. T. H. Warren; 23d Va., Col. A. G. Taliaferro, Lieut.-Col. George W. Curtis; 37th Va., Maj. T. V. Williams, Col. Samuel V. Fulkerson. Brigade loss: Winchester, k, 2; w, 34 = 36. Port Republic, w, 3. *Artillery*, Col. S. Crutchfield (chief of artillery of Jackson's entire command): Va. Battery, Capt. Joseph Carpenter; Va. Battery, Capt. William H. Caskie; Va. Battery (joined at Port Republic), Capt. James McD. Carrington; Va. Battery, Capt. W. E. Cutshaw (w), Lieut. John C. Carpenter; Va. Battery, Capt. William T. Poague; Va. Battery, Capt. George W. Wooding. Artillery loss: Winchester, k, 3; w, 21 = 24. Port Republic, w, 9; m, 1 = 10.

EWELL'S DIVISION, Major-General Richard S. Ewell.

Second Brigade, Col. W. C. Scott, Brig.-Gen. George H. Steuart (w), Col. W. C. Scott: 1st Md. (assigned to brigade June 6th), Col. Bradley T. Johnson; 44th Va., Col. W. C. Scott; 52d Va., Lieut.-Col. James H. Skinner; 58th Va., Col. Samuel H. Letcher. Brigade loss: Cross Keys, k, 7; w, 65 = 72. Port Republic, k, 30; w, 169 = 199. *Fourth Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Arnold Elzey (w), Col. J. A. Walker: 13th Va., Col. J. A. Walker; 31st Va., Col. John S. Hoffman; 25th Va., Lieut.-Col. Patrick B. Duffy; 12th Ga., Col. Z. T. Conner. Brigade loss: Cross Keys, k, 5; w, 62 = 67. Port Republic, k, 15; w, 80; m, 4 = 99. *Seventh Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Isaac R. Trimble: 21st N. C., Col. W. W. Kirkland (w); 21st Ga., Col. J. T. Mercer; 15th Ala., Col. James Cantey; 16th Miss., Col. Carnot Posey (w). Brigade loss: Winchester, k, 22; w, 75 = 97. Cross Keys, k, 23; w, 109; m, 6 = 138. *Eighth Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Richard Taylor: 6th La., Col. Isaac G. Seymour; 7th La., Col. H. T. Hays (w), Maj. David B. Penn; 8th La., Col. H. B. Kelly; 9th La., Col. Leroy A. Stafford; La. Battalion, Maj. C. R. Wheat. Brigade loss: Front Royal and Winchester, k, 21; w, 109; m, 3 = 133. Cross Keys, k, 1; w, 8 = 9. Port Republic, k, 33; w, 256; m, 9 = 298. *Maryland Line* (attached to Second Brigade June 6th), Brig.-Gen. George H. Steuart (assigned to command of the cavalry May 24th): 1st Infantry, Col. Bradley T. Johnson; Co. A, Cav., Capt. Ridgely Brown; Baltimore Battery, Capt. J. B. Brockenbrough. *Artillery:* Va. Battery, Lieut. J. W. Latimer, Captain A. R. Courtney; Va. Battery, Capt. John A. M. Lusk; Va. Battery, Capt. Charles I. Raine; Va. Battery. Capt. William H. Rice. Artillery loss: Cross Keys, k, 8; w, 20; m, 8 = 36.

CAVALRY, Col. Thomas S. Flournoy, Brig.-Gen. George H. Steuart, Brig.-Gen. Turner Ashby (k), Col. Thomas T. Munford: 2d Va., Lieut-Col. James W. Watts; Col. Thomas T. Munford; 6th Va., Col. Thomas S. Flournoy; 7th Va., Col. Turner Ashby (promoted Brig.-Gen. May 23d); Va. Battery, Capt. R. P. Chew. Cavalry loss: Front Royal and Winchester (partial report), k, 11; w, 15 = 26. (Other casualties in the cavalry during the campaign are not specifically stated.)

General Jackson reported his losses at Front Royal, Winchester, etc., from May 23d to 31st, as 68 killed, 329 wounded, and 3 missing = 400. At Cross Keys and Port Republic the casualties were 139 killed, 951 wounded, and 60 missing = 1150. As nearly as can be ascertained from the "Official Records," the loss in the campaign was 230 killed, 1373 wounded, and 232 captured or missing = 1878.

The strength of Jackson's command is nowhere authoritatively stated. Colonel William Allan says in his "Jackson's Valley Campaign," p. 146: "Jackson had moved against Banks, on May 19th, with a total effective force of 16,000 or 17,000 men. . . . His effective force [at Cross Keys] could not have exceeded 13,000, even if it reached that amount."

FIGHTING JACKSON AT KERNSTOWN.

BY NATHAN KIMBALL, BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. V.

EARLY in 1862 the division of the Union army afterward commanded by General James Shields was reorganized by General Frederick W. Lander, under whose lead it had taken part in the hardships of a winter campaign through the mountains and in the valleys of the upper Potomac. On the 1st of March orders were received directing General Lander to move his division from West Virginia into the valley of the Shenandoah, to unite with the divisions under General Banks in the operations already begun against "Stonewall" Jackson.[1] But the brave Lander was not again to lead us. When the order came, it found him overcome by exposures and hardships, and on the 2d of March he died, at the camp of the division, on the Great Cacapon River. The division began the movement under this order on the 5th, and on the 7th, while we were on the way, General Shields arrived from Washington and assumed command.

General Banks had already crossed the Potomac with his divisions, and with but little opposition had occupied Harper's Ferry, Charlestown, and Martinsburg, the enemy retiring toward Winchester.[2] When our division arrived at Martinsburg on the 10th, General C. S. Hamilton's had moved forward, and was then advancing near Winchester. Expecting that the enemy would resist his farther advance, General Hamilton requested General Shields to push forward to his support. General Shields, complying, sent forward, on the evening of the 11th, his First Brigade (my own), which, after a night's hard march, united, early on the morning of the 12th, with Hamilton's division, and advanced with it, and at 2 P. M. General Hamilton's troops occupied the city and its defenses without serious opposition. Jackson, having abandoned the place, retreated up the valley toward Strasburg. On the 13th, General Shields arrived with his Second and Third Brigades (Sullivan's and Tyler's), having left detachments to garrison Martinsburg, while other forces of General Banks's command remained at Harper's Ferry and Charlestown. General Hamilton, commanding the First Division, having received orders assigning him to duty elsewhere, General Banks assigned General Alpheus S. Williams to the command of that division.

Early on the morning of March 17th, Shields, under orders from General Banks to make a reconnoissance, moved out from Winchester, following the route taken by Jackson along the turnpike up the valley toward Staunton, with flanking parties of cavalry upon the Front Royal and other parallel roads.

[1] For an account of Jackson's early operations in the valley, see Vol. I., p. 111.

[2] The object of this movement under Banks was the protection of the reopening of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad west of Harper's Ferry. The region of the upper Potomac and the Shenandoah Valley was at this time included in the department under General McClellan's immediate control, comprising the field of operations of the Army of the Potomac, that is, northern Virginia. Banks's command was the Fifth Corps, Army of the Potomac, and consisted of two divisions, that of Hamilton, afterward Williams's, and Lander's, afterward Shields's. During the Peninsular campaign, Banks was given a separate command, the "Department of the Shenandoah."—EDITORS.

In the afternoon of the 17th, a force of the enemy with cavalry and artillery was met at Fisher's Hill, near Strasburg, where brisk skirmishing was commenced and continued until toward the close of the day, when Shields ordered the advance of the Second Brigade, the enemy retreated, and Shields's division encamped for the night in possession of the positions which had been held by the enemy.

On the morning of the 18th, General Shields pushed forward — meeting with but little resistance — as far as Woodstock; then, halting with his infantry, he sent his cavalry forward, following the enemy to Mount Jackson, where, having crossed the Shenandoah, he had disappeared. General Shields here discontinued the pursuit, and, returning, encamped again on the night of the 18th at Fisher's Hill and Strasburg. On the morning of the 19th, waiting until the arrival of his cavalry, — at 10 o'clock, — he marched for Winchester, where the command arrived late in the evening without loss, and without being followed by the enemy.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL FREDERICK W. LANDER.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

General Shields reported to General Banks that Jackson had fled with his army from the valley, leaving only a small force under Ashby for observation, and that he had driven this force beyond the Shenandoah at Mount Jackson.

General Banks, now satisfied that Jackson had abandoned the valley, or that his force was too small and he too cautious to return to attack, and in compliance with orders previously received, removed all of his forces from Winchester (excepting Shields's division) east of the Blue Ridge.

On the morning of the 22d, the last of his troops having moved, General Banks departed for Washington, leaving the division of Shields, the only force at and around Winchester, as the guardians of the valley. The enemy meantime had not been idle, having been kept well informed, daily and hourly, — by his friends and emissaries, — of every movement made by our forces, and also of the number and positions of the troops remaining under General Shields. Stonewall Jackson now returned, intent upon victory, the recapture of Winchester, and the possession of the beautiful valley.

At 4 P. M., March 22d, Jackson announced his appearance in our front by the guns of Ashby's artillery. Ashby, advancing from the direction of Strasburg, forced our outposts back upon their reserves, and attacked them with his cavalry. At the sound of the first gun, General Shields hurried to the front with reënforcements, returned the fire of the enemy with artillery and musketry, and, advancing his line, compelled the enemy to retire. Upon start-

ing to the front General Shields had sent an officer of his staff to me with orders directing me "to move the residue of my brigade with one battery to a point on the Strasburg turnpike, two miles south of the city, with the least practicable delay." Complying at once my command was moved rapidly forward, and within an hour reached the point indicated. Here I met the general, who was being conveyed to his quarters in the city, having been severely wounded in the recent engagement. After giving me information as to the fight and the position of the forces, he directed me to take command. Our line of infantry and artillery was advanced in front of the toll-gate and in position to the right and left of the turnpike, with cavalry upon the diverging roads and flanks. No further movement on the part of the enemy took place, and night closing in, too dark for an advance, my troops bivouacked in line to await the developments of the coming Sabbath. During the night General Shields sent me instructions directing me to move forward at the earliest light with my brigade and battery, with one squadron of cavalry, along the turnpike, and drive or capture the enemy, as the force in my front was nothing more than an observation force of Ashby's cavalry.

At daylight, on the 23d, my command was moving; so was the enemy's. Advancing with infantry from the hills in my front, he opened upon my line a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, which was promptly returned, and soon our forces were engaged in severe conflict. The enemy halting, I ordered my line forward, giving and receiving heavy volleys, the dash of our men compelling the enemy to give way. With loud cheers my soldiers pushed forward, and before 8 A. M. we had the pleasure of taking possession of the positions which the enemy had held on the high ridge overlooking the village below, his forces now retreating to their supports in the woods beyond. This engagement, though of short duration, was the beginning of the battle at Kernstown.

Seeing that the force I had thus far opposed to me had been greatly reënforced, I halted for rest, observation, and further developments on the part of the enemy. Having informed the commanding general of the result of the morning's work, I awaited further orders, which were soon received through Major Armstrong with directions to move forward at once. Colonel Sullivan, with his brigade, was within supporting distance, and the force in my front, the general thought, was not strong enough to resist me. But the enemy had by this time become active and was forming his lines, his force greatly increased by infantry. Calling Major Armstrong's attention to the movements, strength, and position already presented to view, I requested him to return to the general and request him to send me reënforcements. I was satisfied that not only was the force of Ashby present, but the entire army of Stonewall Jackson, with that general in command, in person. The position I held was good for defense, and I determined to hold it. Sullivan coming forward with his brigade and one battery, I placed them in position on a continuation of the ridge on the left of the turnpike and of my brigade, thus extending our line in that direction.

The enemy had been active, and now relieved me from the execution of the movement directed by the general, by undertaking a like movement against

me. Moving forward with infantry and artillery against Sullivan on the left and my own brigade on the right, he forced my skirmish line to retire until under cover of our main line and batteries, and still advanced until my fire compelled him to halt; then Carroll, Sawyer, and Voris were ordered forward from my lines, and their well-directed fire, with the storm of grape and canister poured from the well-managed guns of Clark's, Jenks's, and Robinson's batteries, forced the enemy to retreat to his former position. At 10 A. M., while I awaited his further movements, General Shields sent the following:

"COLONEL KIMBALL: Major Armstrong informs me that the enemy at present occupies a position on an eminence on the right flank, also another on the left flank, leaving the center unsupported, which I take to be the Strasburg turnpike. If this be the state of the case, I would recommend to push a column of cavalry, four pieces of artillery, and a body of infantry along the turnpike to advance far enough to take them in the rear when they commence to retreat. This body, however, must be preceded by active skirmishing to avoid falling into a trap. When this column advances far enough, a simultaneous charge may be made upon both batteries while the center column cuts off retreat. I leave the management of this to your own discretion, not being able to be on the ground in person. I cannot accurately describe what ought to be done. If the force before you be what I suppose it is, the only way to do is to close around them by some such move as this, or some other equally decisive move as you may deem practicable. My own opinion is that there is no force before you but that we encountered the other day."

BRIGADIER-GENERAL JAMES SHIELDS.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

Convinced that the general did not comprehend the situation, the strength of the enemy, nor the positions held by the respective forces, and satisfied that from his bed in the city five miles to the rear he could not properly conduct the movements which might be required by the exigencies of the situation, I determined to remain on the defensive and in the position now held by my line, from which I had an unobstructed view across the little valley and the enemy's lines to the front; the danger was, our force being less than his, that he might turn one or the other of our flanks. Responding to my request, General Shields sent me the desired support, with the following:

"COLONEL KIMBALL: — I have ordered the 13th Indiana, and 39th Illinois Infantry, and a battery, and will follow them with cavalry and other infantry. I hope you will keep me advised of the motions of the enemy by intelligent orderlies who can explain themselves when they come. Tyler's brigade has been ordered within supporting distance and will communicate with you. Our whole force is now in your hands. If there is a greater force of the enemy against you than I supposed, increase the strength of the center column and take them in flank."

Near 2 P. M. Jackson again moved forward to the attack with artillery and infantry, while his cavalry threatened my left flank. His advancing column came boldly forward, seemingly intent upon driving us from our position and moving directly forward to Winchester. My gallant line of skirmishers opened their fire upon the deploying column, but were forced back under cover of our main line, which once more poured its destructive fire from rifles and batteries into the ranks of the gallant enemy, and *again* compelled him to fall back to the point from which he had advanced. While making this second attempt by direct attack, Jackson was moving troops to his left, with the aim of passing beyond my right. Colonel Tyler coming to the front in person just after this last repulse of the enemy, I pointed out the unprotected condition of my right and the open and unoccupied position beyond it, and the movement of the enemy's forces in that direction, and directed him to move his brigade as quickly as possible to secure the position. I also ordered what cavalry I had to move to the right of Tyler's brigade and in support of it. When repulsed in the last attack, the enemy's troops retreated from the front of my right toward the point in the woods where Jackson had massed his forces for an attack against my extreme right, and to move around that flank. Satisfied by this and other movements from the enemy's right of his intentions, I prepared to meet him and end the contest. At 3:30 P. M. the enemy commenced his movement, announcing it by solid shot upon my line from the hills behind which his forces were moving, and advanced across the open field toward the point to which I had ordered Tyler's brigade. The enemy's skirmishers, advancing, met Tyler's just as they were emerging from the wood and checked their advance. Tyler soon deployed and, advancing, forced this line back to their main line now under protection of a stone-wall, when the enemy poured such fire from his muskets and batteries as to check Tyler's farther advance.

The enemy made frequent attempts to advance, but they were held by Tyler's gallant men to their cover, and the battle now raged in all its fury, neither line giving way. Jackson had withdrawn his brigades from his right, leaving only a small force to guard that flank. To meet his masses, now moving to force Tyler back, regiments and batteries were drawn from our left to strengthen our center. The time having come for the decisive movement, my First Brigade, with the supports from the left, and Sullivan's, were made ready. Directing Colonel Sullivan to follow the movements of forces on our right, I ordered the line forward. With a quick move at right-half-wheel, the gallant fellows, under Harrow, Patrick, Foster, Murray, and Voris, with loud cheers, dashed forward through the terrific storm of shot and shell from the enemy's stone-wall and batteries; nor did they halt or falter until the enemy was driven from his protection, and his advancing lines were checked. Our line now had the wall so long held by Jackson. But soon the sturdy foe, reënforced, advanced again to retake the position; they were met by men as gallant and as determined as themselves, and in answer to their wild "rebel yell" loud cheers were given from our line as it dashed forward. With Tyler's gallant brigade and our fearless little band of cavalry rounding his flank,

the enemy was forced back across the field to the woods, where he once more attempted to check our advancing lines. With cheers from right to left, our gallant soldiers pushed forward, and as the sun went down, the stubbornly yielding foe, who had thrice advanced to the attack, gave way, and Jackson's army was badly beaten — his shattered brigades in full retreat from the field over which they had so gallantly fought.†

Night closing in too dark for pursuit, our weary soldiers bivouacked in positions from which they had driven the enemy. Our troops had fought without food since the evening of the 22d, and it was after midnight before this want was supplied.‡ At earliest light on the morning of the 24th our troops were again on the march, in pursuit of the enemy, whose rear-guard was overtaken near Middletown. The enemy retreated across Cedar Creek to his main force, under fire from our batteries. While here skirmishing with the enemy, I had made such disposition of our



MAP OF THE BATTLE OF KERNSTOWN, VA., MARCH 23, 1862.

Based upon the maps in the "Official Records," Vol. XII., Part I., pp. 362-365. A represents the first position of Kimball's and Sullivan's brigades on the morning of March 23d. Sullivan remained to hold the Union left, while Kimball moved to the position at B, and finally to the main battle-field, F (evening of March 23d), where he joined Tyler, who had previously been in position first at C, and then at D, whence he advanced to oppose Stonewall Jackson in his flanking position at F, to which Jackson had marched by wood roads from his first position at E.— EDITORS.

† Colonel E. H. C. Cavins, of the 14th Indiana, writing under date of July 9th, 1887, says of this charge:

"The Confederates fell back in great disorder, and we advanced in disorder just as great, over stone-walls and over fences, through blackberry-bushes and undergrowth. Over logs, through woods, over hills and fields, the brigades, regiments, and companies advanced, in one promiscuous, mixed, and uncontrollable mass. Officers shouted themselves hoarse in trying to bring order out of confusion, but all their efforts were unavailing along the front line, or rather what ought to have been the front line. Yet many of the brave Virginians who had so often followed their standards to victory, lingered in the rear of their retreating comrades, loading as they slowly retired, and rallying in squads in every ravine and behind every hill — or hiding singly among the trees. They continued to make it very hot for our men in the advance."

‡ The losses at Kernstown were: Union, 118 killed, 450 wounded, 22 missing = 590; Confederate, 80 killed, 375 wounded, 263 missing = 718.

troops as I believed would result in their rout and capture of their trains, by moving up the creek with a strong flanking detachment to the back or dirt road from Winchester to Strasburg, while my other troops followed along the turnpike upon which the enemy's trains were moving. I hoped thus to head him off before he could reach Fisher's Hill beyond Strasburg. Major-General Banks, arriving as this movement was being commenced, assumed command. He deemed it prudent to await reënforcements, and our army remained in camp at Middletown and Cedar Creek that night, while the enemy escaped to Fisher's Hill.

Having been reënforced by the return of Williams's division, the army under General Banks moved forward on the morning of the 25th, and after light skirmishing occupied Strasburg and Fisher's Hill, the enemy continuing his retreat toward Woodstock and Mount Jackson. Our army remained in camp at Strasburg and Fisher's Hill, awaiting supplies, until April 1st.

On the morning of April 1st our forces moved forward, with three days' rations, but without tents or baggage, to Woodstock, the enemy having continued his retreat to Mount Jackson. Receiving additional supplies, we moved forward from Woodstock on the 8th, meeting and skirmishing with the enemy daily. On the 15th our army arrived near Mount Jackson, finding the enemy in force, and after a brisk engagement compelling him to fall back and his main force to cross the Shenandoah at Mount Jackson, beyond which he took position at Rude's Hill, covering the village and the crossings of the river.

General Banks, on the morning of the 17th, directed a forward movement to force a passage across the river. The river was much swollen by rains, rendering it impossible to ford. There being but one bridge, it became the center of contest, the enemy having failed to destroy it, although he had set fire to it. A splendid dash by a detachment of our cavalry through the bridge drove the enemy away and extinguished the flames. This gallant charge was made by two companies of the 1st Ohio, under Captains Menken and Robinson, and one company of the 1st Michigan, led by a little corporal. Dismounting, they put out the fire, carrying water from the river in their old slouched hats for the purpose. (The name of this dashing corporal was George R. Maxwell, who afterward, by his gallantry and daring achievements, rose to the command of his regiment and brigade under the heroic Sheridan.) The bridge secured, our army moved forward under a heavy fire from the enemy's line and batteries. By 11 A. M. the crossing was completed, and the enemy, forced from his position, retreated beyond New Market toward Harrisonburg and Port Republic, and our forces encamped in positions in advance of New Market.

In this engagement our forces captured one company of cavalry, and inflicted other heavy losses upon the enemy, our loss being light. For his success General Banks received that night the thanks of the President.

On the 19th and 20th our forces, under General Williams, advanced and occupied Harrisonburg, while Shields's division held the roads to Luray, the crossings of the Shenandoah, and New Market. General Banks, in "General Orders, No. 20," dated New Market, Virginia, April 21st, 1862, congratulated



BATTLE-FIELD OF KERNSTOWN, VA. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1885.

On this side of the stone-wall Jackson formed his line of battle, March 23, 1862.—See F on map, p. 307.

"the troops under his command upon the success of their achievement, and the permanent expulsion of the rebel army from the valley of Virginia."

General Shields, who had remained out of the field on account of wounds received in the engagement of the 22d of March with Ashby's cavalry in front of Winchester, now arrived, and in "General Orders, No. 28," dated New Market, April 30th, 1862, relieving me from command of the division, said:

"The general commanding the division, having so far recovered from his wounds as to be able to serve in the field with his brave troops, desires to make it known to them that he places himself again at their head. Brigadier-General Kimball will rejoin the First Brigade, and again resume command of it. And, thus directing, the general cannot suffer the occasion to pass without expressing to that gallant officer and his staff his grateful acknowledgments for the efficient manner in which they managed the division and directed its affairs while he was compelled by his condition to be absent from the field. His special thanks are due to General Kimball for his devotion to the interests and honor of the command and the signal service he has rendered it in this emergency."

With a commission, now as brigadier-general (for my victory over Stonewall Jackson at Kernstown), I resumed command of my gallant old brigade, rejoiced to be freed from the greater responsibilities, gratified with the success attending me while in command of the division, and grateful to the Government for the recognition of my services.

Stonewall Jackson, although out of the valley, was still immediately in our front. He was daily increasing in strength by reënforcements, and was active in demonstrations. On the 1st of May, Jackson's army made movements threatening our right at Harrisonburg, and our left near the crossing of the Shenandoah toward Luray. Under cover of these a part of the force under Edward Johnson moved, on the 7th, to prevent the capture of Staunton by

Milroy. Meeting General Milroy at McDowell and checking Milroy's advance, Jackson again returned to our front. Both sides claimed success in the affair at McDowell on the 8th of May [see p. 286].

The operations against "Stonewall Jackson" were successful, with the valley of Virginia in our possession, and Jackson's army held in check beyond the Shenandoah by Banks and Shields. General McDowell, with his army, held Fredericksburg and the line of the Rappahannock, General Frémont moving toward Staunton from the west, and General McClellan, with the Army of the Potomac, was advancing up the peninsula, confronting the Confederate army under Johnston. Thus was Washington protected, and the ruin of the Confederacy imminent, when a blunder in the management of our armies in Virginia was made. The order directing Shields's division to join General McDowell's army at Fredericksburg was most unfortunate. The divisions were indignant in contemplation of the results, knowing the situation as they did. On receipt of the order General Banks said:

"Results are not for us to consider, and orders are received to be obeyed. I regret it because I feel that the policy of which this order is a part is to end in allowing the grand army of the rebels to escape unharmed from Virginia, and add another year to the war. It is impossible to anticipate what work lies before us; I feel the imperative necessity of making preparations for the worst."

And by this order the worst came, and the opportunity was given to Stonewall Jackson for the display of his peculiar strategic ability.

On the 12th of May General Shields moved from New Market for Falmouth, and General Banks moved down the valley to Strasburg, thus opening the way for Jackson [see map, p. 284]. With Shields's division far away at Fredericksburg,\ and Frémont beyond the Shenandoah mountains, Jackson, on the 23d, with his army of about 1500, dashed down upon Banks's 9000, mostly stationed in detachments at Strasburg and Front Royal, nearly 20 miles apart, by the route Banks was forced to take.

But not until after three days of hard fighting did he force the heroic soldiers of Banks's division from the valley. ☆ With the information of this

\ Colonel Franklin Sawyer, in his history of the 8th Ohio, of Kimball's brigade, records the following incident, which took place at Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg:

"Kimball's brigade was ordered into a newly fenced field for its camp, and no sooner were the men dismissed from ranks than the entire fence disappeared. General King, who was in command at this place, seeing this *movement* from his quarters at the Phillips Mansion, sent down an aide-de-camp to arrest all of our officers, and compel the men to rebuild the fence. Officers laughed and the men jeered at him. The rails were soon on fire, and our dinners cooking. King called up his adjutant, Major Barstow, who had been General Lander's adjutant when he commanded us, and ordered him to detail sufficient troops to arrest our whole division, exclaiming: 'Who are these vandals?' 'Why,' said Barstow, 'they are Lander's old troops from Western Virginia; you had better keep your guards here at headquarters, for you'll be devilish lucky if they don't steal your house-roof before morning!' King was dumfounded, but his fence was never rebuilt." EDITORS.

☆ Jackson made his attack at Front Royal on the 23d, and, after a stubborn resistance, captured the command of Colonel John R. Kenly, composed of the 1st Maryland, 2 companies of the 29th Pennsylvania, and a section of Knaps's Pennsylvania Battery, acting as guard to Banks's communications. The latter says in his report:

"The extraordinary force of the enemy could no longer be doubted. It was apparent also that they had a more extended purpose than the capture of the brave little band at Front Royal. This purpose could be nothing less than the defeat of my own command or its possible capture by occupying Winchester, and by this movement intercepting supplies or reënforcements, and cutting off all possibility of retreat. . . . It was determined, therefore, to enter the lists with the enemy in a race or a battle, as he should choose, for the possession of Winchester, the key of the valley, and for us the position of safety."

Jackson pushed his advance rapidly from Front Royal to Middletown, and on the 24th intercepted Banks's column, meeting, however, with repulse. At Newtown another Confederate force was met and driven off by Banks; his rear-guard also repulsed an attack near Kernstown.

reverse came the order directing Shields's division to move back to the Shenandoah, while Frémont crossed the mountains to strike the army of Jackson before it could retreat from the valley. On the 25th Shields's division commenced its return, and, without halting, reached Rectortown on the evening of the 28th, where we stopped for rest and to await supplies. At 4 P. M. of the 29th the following order was received: "COLONEL KIMBALL, commanding First Brigade: You will march immediately; leave your teams and wagons, take only ambulances, ammunition-wagons, and provisions, as much as on hand in haversacks. SHIELDS, Brigadier-General commanding."

At 6 P. M. my command was moving for Front Royal. Marching all night (save 2½ hours for rest and refreshment at Manassas Gap), we arrived and took position at 11:30 A. M., May 30th, upon the ridge east of and overlooking the village, before our presence was known to the enemy. Having only one company (30 men) of cavalry, my infantry was sent to surround the Confederates, but before this could be accomplished the attempt was discovered. The enemy, setting fire to the depots, warehouses, and railroad freight trains, made away in retreat under rapid firing from our battery. My cavalry pushed forward fearlessly after the enemy, closely followed by a portion of my infantry, to the junction of the Strasburg and Middletown roads, beyond the branches of the river; here, being completely exhausted, my troops halted, the enemy having gone from view in the direction of Strasburg and Winchester. That portion of our command left in the village had saved the loaded freight trains, but the warehouses and depots were completely destroyed, with most of their contents. General Shields came up at 5 P. M. with the other brigades of the division, and the town and the captures were left to his direction.‖ With the regiments of my brigade and the 4th, Colonel Carroll's, I returned to the front and encamped in line for the night.

On the 31st the enemy appeared in considerable force in our front. I directed Carroll to move out with his command and attack them, which was promptly done, and after a sharp conflict the enemy was forced back, Carroll taking several prisoners and one piece (11-pounder) of artillery. The enemy having retreated and night having set in, Carroll returned to his position.

Our command was aroused from its slumbers early on the morning of the 1st of June by the roar of cannon away to our left toward Strasburg. Frémont had passed over the mountains and attacked Jackson's forces at Fisher's Hill. General Shields, at Front Royal, was informed of the fight going on at Strasburg and came to the front, but declined to send our forces to join in the fight, and directed us to remain in our position to await the arrival of General Irvin McDowell and Ord's (Ricketts's) division.

General McDowell arrived on the evening of June 1st. Ord's division

At Winchester, another stand was made on the 25th. General Banks says: "I determined to test the substance and strength of the enemy by actual collision, and measures were promptly taken to prepare our troops to meet them." The Confederates were held in check several hours, and that night Banks's retreat was continued toward Martinsburg. See p. 288.—EDITORS.

‖ The captures at Front Royal were: 1 piece of artillery, 3 heavily laden trains with stores, and 8 wagons, with teams, retreating with commissary stores, and 160 prisoners, including Miss Belle Boyd, a famous spy in the service of the Confederates. We also recaptured many comrades of Banks's division, captured during the fight of a few days before.—N. K.

relieved ours in front, and Bayard's cavalry was sent to aid Frémont. Our division returned to Front Royal and encamped two miles south on the road to Luray.

By the wisdom (?) of Generals McDowell and Shields, our division was sent up the Luray valley, east of the south branch of the Shenandoah and Massanutten mountain, while Jackson's army, pursued by Frémont, was moving up the valley, along the Staunton turnpike. Jackson had destroyed all bridges and other means of crossing the Shenandoah, from Front Royal to Port Republic, rendering it impossible for Shields's division either to strike Jackson or communicate with Frémont. Shields's division reached Luray June 4th, after having marched 1150 miles in forty-three days, fighting one severe battle and many lesser engagements. Forty per cent. of the command were now without shoes, two per cent. without trousers, and other clothing was deficient. And now, without any supplies, officers and men were well-nigh worn out.

BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL NATHAN KIMBALL. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

On the 5th, Carroll's brigade, now partially supplied, moved with only 1200 men and 1 battery, by order of General Shields, for Port Republic, to secure and hold the bridge at that crossing, if it should not already be destroyed. On the 6th, Tyler's brigade of 2000 men and 1 battery followed to support Carroll. Ferry's brigade was at Columbia crossing, 8 miles south, and mine was 6 miles north of Luray. Frémont's and Jackson's guns were distinctly heard beyond the river and mountain, but we were powerless to render assistance to our friends because of the impassable river. On the 7th, Frémont forced the enemy from Mount Jackson, and pursued him to New Market and Harrisonburg, but failed to bring him to battle.

On the 8th, Carroll reached the bridge at Port Republic with Tyler yet fifteen miles in rear. My brigade, under orders for Stanardsville, passed Luray and encamped with Ferry's, and on the 9th moved forward, leaving Ferry in his position.

On the 8th, Frémont brought Jackson to bay, and engaged him in battle at Cross Keys. ⁂ Jackson, being hard pressed, prepared to save his army by retreat. Sending one brigade, with artillery, to secure a crossing for his army at Port Republic, he met Carroll, and, forcing him back, secured the bridge. That night, Jackson's entire force fled from Frémont, crossed the bridge, burned it, and was free from the destruction that had threatened him.

Jackson, on the morning of the 9th, with his army, attacked the now united detachments of Tyler and Carroll, and with his overwhelming force com-

⁂ See pp. 291–293 for details of the engagements at Port Republic and Cross Keys.

pelled the retreat of our small but gallant command. Jackson's own old Stonewall Brigade was first repulsed by Carroll's, and Jackson himself was compelled to rally and lead them back to the contest; then, with "Dick" Taylor's and other brigades and batteries, he forced our men from the field.†

On the 9th, at sundown, Shields, now with me, received by the gallant Myles W. Keogh‡ news from Tyler of his disaster. My brigade was ordered at once to move forward, to be followed by Ferry's, then ten miles in my rear. At 10 o'clock on the morning of the 10th, after a terrible night's march, we reached Conrad's store, some six miles below the field of action, where I met our worn and defeated comrades of Tyler's and Carroll's commands; and here I formed a new line, and in position awaited the expected attack from Jackson, and the arrival of Ferry's brigade.

Ferry came with our supports, but Jackson, having been severely handled by a small detachment, although he had defeated it, was satisfied, now that he was free from Frémont, not to try conclusions with the division, united, that had defeated him at Kernstown.

In the afternoon General Frémont succeeded in communicating with General Shields, and arranging for the crossing of his army. It was the intention, thus united, to follow Jackson, now retreating toward Gordonsville to join Lee's army near Richmond, but before the morning of the 11th Shields received peremptory orders, directing him to return with his command to Front Royal, where we arrived on the 16th of June.

† See pp. 291–293 for details of the engagements at Port Republic and Cross Keys.

‡ As captain in the 7th United States Cavalry, Keogh was killed in the massacre, by the Sioux, of Custer's command, June 25th, 1876, on a branch of the Little Big Horn River, Montana.— EDITORS.

THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE SEVEN DAYS' BATTLES.

June 25th – July 1st, 1862.

The composition, losses, and strength of each army as here stated give the gist of all the data obtainable in the Official Records. K stands for killed; w for wounded; m w for mortally wounded; m for captured or missing; c for captured.

THE UNION FORCES.

Army of the Potomac, Major-General George B. McClellan.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS: *Provost Marshal's and Hdq'rs Guard*, Brig.-Gen. Andrew Porter: 2d U. S. Cavalry (7 co's), and McClellan (Ill.) Dragoons (2 co's), Maj. Alfred Pleasonton; 93d N. Y. (4 co's), and Sturges (Ill.) Rifles, Maj. Granville O. Haller; 8th U. S. Inf. (2 co's), Capt. Royal T. Frank and Lieut. Eugene Carter. *Escort:* 4th U. S. Cav. (2 co's), and Oneida (N. Y.) Cavalry, Capt. James B. McIntyre. *Volunteer Engineer Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Daniel P. Woodbury: 15th N. Y., Col. J. McLeod Murphy; 50th N. Y., Col. Charles B. Stuart. Brigade loss: m, 12. *Battalion U. S. Engineers*, Capt. James C. Duane. Loss: w, 2; m, 9 = 11. *Casey's Command* (at White House), Brig.-Gen. Silas Casey: 4th Pa. Cav. (squadron), Capt. William Shorts; 11th Pa. Cav. (5 co's), Col. Josiah Harlan; F, 1st N. Y. Arty., Capt. Wm. R. Wilson; 93d N. Y. (6 co's), Col. Thos. F. Morris.

SECOND CORPS, Brig.-Gen. E. V. Sumner. Staff loss: w, 1.

Cavalry: D, F, H, and K, 6th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Duncan McVicar.

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Israel B. Richardson.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John C. Caldwell: 5th N. H., Lieut.-Col. Samuel G. Langley, Capt. Edward E. Sturtevant; 7th N. Y., Col. George W. von Schack; 61st N. Y., Col. Francis C. Barlow; 81st Pa., Col. Charles F. Johnson (w), Lieut.-Col. Eli T. Conner (k), Maj. H. Boyd McKeen. Brigade loss: k, 61; w, 356; m, 137 = 554. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Thomas F. Meagher, Col. Robert Nugent, Brig.-Gen. Thomas F. Meagher: 29th Mass., Col. Ebenezer W. Peirce (w), Lieut.-Col. Joseph H. Barnes; 63d N. Y., Col. John Burke (w), Lieut.-Col. Henry Fowler, Capt. Joseph O'Neill; 69th N. Y., Col. Robert Nugent; 88th N. Y., Col. Henry M. Baker, Maj. James Quinlan. Brigade loss: k, 34; w, 227, m, 232 = 493. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. William H. French: 2d Del., Lieut.-Col. William P. Baily, Capt. D. L. Stricker; 52d N. Y., Col. Paul Frank; 57th N. Y., Col. Samuel K. Zook; 64th N. Y., Col. Thomas J. Parker; 66th N. Y., Col. Joseph C. Pinckney; 53d Pa., Col. John R. Brooke. Brigade loss: k, 3; w, 43; m, 162 = 208. *Artillery*, Capt.

George W. Hazzard (m w): B, 1st N. Y., Capt. Rufus D. Pettit; A and C, 4th U. S., Capt. George W. Hazzard, Lieut. Rufus King, Jr. Artillery loss: w, 19; m, 10 = 29.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. John Sedgwick.

First Brigade, Col. Alfred Sully: 15th Mass., Lieut.-Col. John W. Kimball; 1st Minn., Lieut.-Col. Stephen Miller; 1st Co. Mass. Sharp-shooters, Capt. John Saunders; 34th N. Y., Col. James A. Suiter; 82d N. Y., Col. Henry W. Hudson; 2d Co. Minn. Sharp-shooters, Capt. William F. Russell. Brigade loss: k, 12; w, 82; m, 152 = 246. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. William W. Burns (w): 69th Pa., Col. Joshua T. Owen; 71st Pa., Lieut.-Col. William G. Jones; 72d Pa., Col. De Witt C. Baxter; 106th Pa., Col. Turner G. Morehead. Brigade loss: k, 40; w, 193; m, 172 = 405. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. N. J. T. Dana: 19th Mass., Col. Edward W. Hinks (w), Capt. Edmund Rice, Lieut.-Col. Arthur F. Devereux; 20th Mass., Col. William R. Lee; 7th Mich., Col. Ira R. Grosvenor; 42d N. Y., Col. Edmund C. Charles (w and c), Lieut.-Col. James J. Mooney. Brigade loss: k, 51; w, 262; m, 153 = 466. *Artillery*, Col. Charles H. Tompkins: A, 1st R. I., Capt. John A. Tompkins; I, 1st U. S., Lieut. Edmund Kirby. Artillery loss: w, 12; m, 4 = 16.

RESERVE ARTILLERY: G, 1st N. Y., Capt. John D. Frank; B, 1st R. I., Capt. Walter O. Bartlett; G, 1st R. I., Capt. Charles D. Owen. Reserve artillery loss: w, 6; m, 2 = 8.

THIRD CORPS, Brig.-Gen. S. P. Heintzelman. *Cavalry:* 3d Pa., Col. William W. Averell. Loss: k, 6; w, 2; m, 3 = 11.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Joseph Hooker.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Cuvier Grover: 1st Mass., Col. Robert Cowdin; 11th Mass., Col. William Blaisdell; 16th Mass., Col. Powell T. Wyman (k), Lieut.-Col. George A. Meacham (w), Maj. Daniel S. Lamson; 2d N. H., Col. Gilman Marston; 26th Pa., Lieut.-Col. George D. Wells. Brigade loss: k, 25; w, 214; m, 116 = 355. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Daniel E. Sickles: 70th N. Y., Maj. Thomas Holt; 71st N. Y., Col. George B. Hall; 72d N. Y., Col. Nelson Taylor; 73d N. Y., Capt. Alfred A. Donalds; 74th N. Y., Col. Charles K. Graham. Brigade loss: k, 26; w, 173; m, 109 = 308. *Third Brigade*, Col. Joseph B. Carr: 5th N. J., Maj. John Ramsey; 6th N. J., Col. Gershom Mott; 7th N. J., Col. Joseph W. Revere, Capt. Henry C. Bartlett; 8th N. J., Maj. William A. Henry; 2d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. William A. Olmsted. Brigade loss: k, 4; w, 24; m, 31 = 59. *Artillery:* D, 1st N. Y., Capt. Thomas W. Osborn; 4th N. Y., Lieut. Joseph E. Nairn; H, 1st U. S., Capt. Charles H. Webber. Artillery loss: w, 1; m, 7 = 8.

THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Philip Kearny.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John C. Robinson: 20th Ind., Col. William L. Brown; 87th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Richard A. Bachia; 57th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Elhanon W. Woods; 63d Pa., Col. Alexander Hays; 105th Pa., Col. Amor A. McKnight, Lieut.-Col. William W. Corbet, Capt. Calvin A. Craig. Brigade loss: k, 56; w, 310; m, 161 = 527. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. David B. Birney: 3d Me., Lieut.-Col. C. A. L. Sampson, Maj. Edwin Burt; 4th Me., Col. Elijah Walker; 38th N. Y., Col. J. H. H. Ward; 40th N. Y., Col. Thomas W. Egan; 101st N. Y., Col. Enrico Fardella. Brigade loss: k, 10; w, 53; m, 185 = 248. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Hiram G. Berry: 2d Mich., Maj. Louis Dillman, Capt. William Humphrey; 3d Mich., Lieut.-Col. Ambrose A. Stevens; Maj. Byron R. Pierce; 5th Mich., Maj. John D. Fairbanks (m w), Capt. Judson S. Farrer; 1st N. Y., Col. Garrett Dyckman; 37th N. Y., Col. Samuel B. Hayman. Brigade loss: k, 28; w, 225, m, 176 = 429. *Artillery:* E, 1st R. I., Capt. George E. Randolph; G, 2d U. S., Capt. James Thompson. Artillery loss: k, 2; w, 16; m, 5 = 23.

RESERVE ARTILLERY, Capt. Gustavus A. De Russy: 6th N. Y., Capt. Walter M. Bramhall; 2d N. J., Capt. John E. Beam (k), Lieut. John B. Monroe; K, 4th U. S., Lieut. Francis W. Seeley. Loss: k, 1; w, 3; m, 1 = 5.

FOURTH CORPS, Brig.-Gen. Erasmus D. Keyes. *Cavalry:* 8th Pa., Col. David McM. Gregg.

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Darius N. Couch.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Albion P. Howe: 55th N. Y., Lieut. Col. Louis Thourot; 62d N. Y., Col. David J. Nevin; 93d Pa., Capt. John S. Long; 98th Pa., Col. John F. Ballier; 102d Pa., Col. Thomas A. Rowley. Brigade loss: k, 27; w, 148; m, 33 = 208. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. John J. Abercrombie: 65th N. Y. (1st U. S. Chasseurs), Lieut.-Col. Alexander Shaler; 67th N. Y. (1st Long Island), Lieut.-Col. Nelson Cross; 23d Pa., Col. Thomas H. Neill; 31st Pa., Col. David H. Williams; 61st Pa., Lieut.-Col. Frank Vallee. Brigade loss: k, 19; w, 168; m, 16 = 203. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Innis N. Palmer: 7th Mass., Col. David A. Russell; 10th Mass., Maj. Ozro Miller (m w), Capt. Frederick Barton; 36th N. Y., Maj. James A. Raney; 2d R. I., Col. Frank Wheaton. Brigade loss: k, 23; w, 194; m, 48 = 265. *Artillery:* C, 1st Pa., Capt. Jeremiah McCarthy; D, 1st Pa., Capt. Edward H. Flood.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. John J. Peck.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry M. Naglee: 11th Me., Col. Harris M. Plaisted; 56th N. Y., Col. Charles H. Van Wyck; 100th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Phineas Staunton; 52d Pa., Lieut.-Col. Henry M. Hoyt; 104th Pa., Lieut.-Col. John W. Nields. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Henry W. Wessells: 81st N. Y., Col. Edwin Rose; 85th N. Y., Col. Jonathan S. Belknap; 92d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Hiram Anderson, Jr.; 96th N. Y., Col. James Fairman; 98th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Charles Durkee; 85th Pa., Col. Joshua B. Howell; 101st Pa., Capt. Charles W. May; 103d Pa., Col. Theodore F. Lehmann. Brigade loss: k, 1; w, 2; m, 121 = 124. *Artillery:* H, 1st N. Y., Lieut. Charles E. Mink; 7th N. Y., Capt. Peter C. Regan.

RESERVE ARTILLERY, Maj. Robert M. West: 8th N. Y., Capt. Butler Fitch; E, 1st Pa., Capt. Theodore Miller; H, 1st Pa., Capt. James Brady; M, 5th U. S., Capt. James McKnight.

FIFTH CORPS, Brig.-Gen. Fitz John Porter. Staff loss: m, 1.

Cavalry: 8th Ill., Col. John F. Farnsworth. Loss: k, 3; w, 9; m, 3 = 15.

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. George W. Morell.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John H. Martindale: 2d Me., Col. Charles W. Roberts; 18th Mass. (detached with Stoneman's command), Col. James Barnes; 22d Mass., Col. Jesse A. Gove (k), Maj. William S. Tilton (w and c), Capt. Walter S. Sampson, Capt. D. K. Wardwell; 1st Mich., Col. Horace S. Roberts; 13th N. Y., Col. Elisha G. Marshall, Maj. Francis A. Schœffel; 25th N. Y., Maj. Edwin S. Gilbert (c), Captain Shepard Gleason; 2d Co. Mass. Sharp-shooters, Lieut. Charles D. Stiles. Brigade loss: k, 114; w, 443; m, 329 = 886. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Charles Griffin: 9th Mass., Col. Thomas Cass (m w), Lieut.-Col. Patrick R. Guiney; 4th Mich., Col. Dwight A. Woodbury (k), Lieut.-Col. Jonathan W. Childs (w), Capt. John M. Randolph; 14th N. Y., Col. James McQuade; 62d Pa., Col. Samuel W. Black (k), Lieut.-Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer (w and c), Capt. James C. Hull. Brigade loss: k, 182; w, 772; m, 199 = 1153. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Daniel Butterfield: 12th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Robert M. Richardson; 17th N. Y. (detached with Stoneman's command), Col. Henry S. Lansing; 44th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. James C. Rice; 16th Mich., Col. T. B. W. Stockton (c), Lieut.-Col. John V. Ruehle; 83d Pa., Col. John W. McLane (k), Capt. Hugh S. Campbell (w); Brady's Co. Mich. Sharp-shooters, Capt. Kin S. Dygert. Brigade loss: k, 166; w, 546; m, 269 = 981. *Artillery*, Capt. William B. Weeden: 3d Mass., Capt. Augustus P. Martin; 5th Mass., Lieut. John B. Hyde; C, 1st R. I., Lieut. Richard Waterman; D, 5th U. S., Lieut. Henry W. Kingsbury. Artillery loss: k, 9; w, 38; m, 9 = 56. *Sharpshooters:* 1st U. S., Col. Hiram Berdan. Loss: k, 8; w, 35; m, 13 = 56.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. George Sykes.

First Brigade, Col. Robert C. Buchanan: 3d U. S., Maj. Nathan B. Rossell (k), Capt. Thomas W. Walker, Capt. John D. Wilkins; 4th U. S., Maj. Delozier Davidson (c), Capt. Joseph B. Collins; 12th U. S., Maj. Henry B. Clitz (w and c), Capt. John G. Read, Capt. Matthew M. Blunt; 14th U. S., Captain John D. O'Connell. Brigade loss: k, 89; w, 297; m, 181 = 567. *Second Brigade*, Lieut.-Col. William Chapman, Maj. Charles S. Lovell: 2d U. S., Capt. Adolphus F. Bond, Lieut. John S. Poland; 6th U. S., Capt. Thomas Hendrickson; 10th U. S., Maj. Charles S. Lovell, Maj. George L. Andrews; 11th U. S., Maj. De

Lancey Floyd-Jones; 17th U. S., Maj. George L. Andrews. Brigade loss: k, 38; w, 228; m, 93=359. *Third Brigade*, Col. Gouverneur K. Warren: 5th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Hiram Duryée; 10th N. Y., Col. John E. Bendix. Brigade loss: k, 47; w, 154; m, 85=286. *Artillery*, Capt. Stephen H. Weed: L and M, 3d U. S., Capt. John Edwards; I, 5th U. S., Capt. S. H. Weed. Artillery loss: k, 4; w, 24; m, 4=32.

THIRD DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. George A. McCall (c), Brig.-Gen. Truman Seymour. Staff loss: k, 1; w, 1; m, 1=3.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John F. Reynolds (c), Col. Seneca G. Simmons (k), Col. R. Biddle Roberts: 1st Pa. Res., Col. R. Biddle Roberts, Maj. Lemuel Todd; 2d Pa. Res., Lieut.-Col. William McCandless; 5th Pa. Res., Col. Seneca G. Simmons, Lieut.-Col. Joseph W. Fisher; 8th Pa. Res., Col. George S. Hays; 13th Pa. Res. (1st Rifles—6 co's), Maj. Roy Stone. Brigade loss: k, 109; w, 497; m, 403=1009. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. George G. Meade (w), Col. Albert L. Magilton: 3d Pa. Res., Col. Horatio G. Sickel; 4th Pa. Res., Col. Albert L. Magilton; 7th Pa. Res., Col. Elisha B. Harvey; 11th Pa. Res., Col. Thomas F. Gallagher (c), Capt. Daniel S. Porter. Brigade loss: k, 107; w, 284; m, 1009=1400. (The wounded of the 11th Reserves at Gaines's Mill are counted among the captured or missing.) *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Truman Seymour, Col. C. Feger Jackson: 6th Pa. Res. (detached with Casey's command), Col. William Sinclair; 9th Pa. Res., Col. C. Feger Jackson, Capt. John Cuthbertson (w); 10th Pa. Res., Col. James T. Kirk; 12th Pa. Res., Col. John H. Taggart. Brigade loss: k, 78; w, 339; m, 142=559. *Artillery:* A, 1st Pa., Capt. Hezekiah Easton (k), Lieut. Jacob L. Detrich, Lieut. John G. Simpson; B, 1st Pa., Capt. James H. Cooper; G, 1st Pa., Capt. Mark Kerns (w), Lieut. Frank P. Amsden; C, 5th U. S., Capt. Henry V. De Hart (m w), Lieut. Eben G. Scott. Artillery loss: k, 21; w, 42; m, 11=74. *Cavalry:* 4th Pa., Col. James H. Childs. Cavalry loss: k, 2; w, 13; m, 7=22.

ARTILLERY RESERVE, Col. Henry J. Hunt. *First Brigade* (Horse Artillery), Lieut.-Col. William Hays: A, 2d U. S., Capt. John C. Tidball; B and L, 2d U. S., Capt. James M. Robertson; M, 2d U. S., Capt. Henry Benson; C and G, 3d U. S. (detached with Casey's command), Capt. Horatio G. Gibson. Brigade loss: w, 6; m, 2=8. *Second Brigade*, Lieut.-Col. George W. Getty: E and G, 1st U. S., Lieut. Alanson M. Randol; K, 1st U. S., Lieut. Samuel S. Elder; G, 4th U. S., Lieut. Charles H. Morgan; A, 5th U. S., Lieut. Adelbert Ames; K, 5th U. S., Capt. John R. Smead. Brigade loss: k, 7; w, 29; m, 6=42. *Third Brigade*, Maj. Albert Arndt: A, 1st Battalion N. Y., Capt. Otto Diederichs; B, 1st Battalion N. Y., Capt. Adolph Voegelee; C, 1st Battalion N. Y., Capt. John Knieriem; D, 1st Battalion N. Y., Capt. Edward Grimm. Brigade loss: k, 4; w, 11; m, 4=19. *Fourth Brigade*, Maj. Edward R. Petherbridge: A, Md., Capt. John W. Wolcott; B, Md., Capt. Alonzo Snow. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 22; m, 1=25. *Fifth Brigade*, Capt. J. Howard Carlisle: 5th N. Y. (dismounted and officers and men attached elsewhere), Capt. Elijah D. Taft; E, 2d U. S., Capt. J. Howard Carlisle; F and K, 3d U. S., Capt. La Rhett L. Livingston. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 5=7. SIEGE TRAIN: 1st Conn. Heavy Artillery, Col. Robert O. Tyler. Loss: k, 2; w, 4; m, 29=35.

SIXTH CORPS, Brig.-Gen. William B. Franklin. *Cavalry:* 1st N. Y., Col. Andrew T. McReynolds.

FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Henry W. Slocum.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. George W. Taylor: 1st N. J., Lieut.-Col. Robert McAllister, Col. A. T. A. Torbert; 2d N. J., Col. Isaac M. Tucker (k), Maj. Henry O. Ryerson (w), Lieut.-Col. Samuel L. Buck; 3d N. J., Col. Henry W. Brown; 4th N. J., Col. James H. Simpson (c). Brigade loss: k, 116; w, 380; m, 582=1078. *Second Brigade*, Col. Joseph J. Bartlett: 5th Me., Col. Nathaniel J. Jackson (w), Lieut.-Col. William S. Heath (k), Capt. Clark S. Edwards; 16th N. Y., Col. Joseph Howland (w), Maj. Joel J. Seaver; 27th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Alexander D. Adams; 96th Pa., Col. Henry L. Cake. Brigade loss: k, 69; w, 400; m, 68=546. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. John Newton: 18th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. George R. Myers, Maj. John C. Meginnis; 31st N. Y., Col. Calvin E. Pratt (w), Maj. Alexander Raszewski; 32d N. Y., Col. Roderick Matheson; 95th Pa., Col. John M. Gosline (m w), Lieut.-Col. Gustavus W. Town. Brigade loss: k, 40; w, 279; m, 114=433. *Artillery*, Capt. Edward R. Platt: 1st Mass., Capt. Josiah Porter; 1st N. J., Capt. William Hexamer; D, 2d U. S., Lieut. Emory Upton. Artillery loss: k, 1; w, 13; m, 4=18.

SECOND DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. William F. Smith.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Winfield S. Hancock: 6th Me., Col. Hiram Burnham; 43d N. Y., Col. Francis L. Vinton; 49th Pa., Col. William H. Irwin; 5th Wis., Col. Amasa Cobb. Brigade loss: k, 9; w, 93; m, 98=200. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. W. T. H. Brooks (w): 2d Vt., Col. Henry Whiting; 3d Vt., Lieut.-Col. Wheelock G. Veazey; 4th Vt., Col. Edwin H. Stoughton; 5th Vt., Lieut.-Col. Lewis A. Grant; 6th Vt., Col. Nathan Lord, Jr. Brigade loss: k, 45; w, 271; m, 139=455. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. John W. Davidson; 7th Me., Col. Edwin C. Mason; 20th N. Y., Col. Francis Weiss; 33d N. Y., Col. Robert F. Taylor; 49th N. Y., Col. Daniel D. Bidwell; 77th N. Y., Col. James B. McKean. Brigade loss: k, 12; w, 23; m, 87=122. *Artillery*, Capt. Romeyn B. Ayres: E, 1st N. Y., Capt. Charles C. Wheeler; 1st N. Y., Capt. Andrew Cowan; 3d N. Y., Capt. Thaddeus P. Mott; F, 5th U. S., Capt. Romeyn B. Ayres. Artillery loss: k, 3; w, 4; m, 15=22. *Cavalry:* I and K, 5th Pa., Capt. John O'Farrell. Loss: k, 1.

CAVALRY RESERVE, Brig.-Gen. P. St. George Cooke. *First Brigade:* 6th Pa., Col. Richard H. Rush; 5th U. S. (5 co's), Capt. Charles J. Whiting (c), Capt. Joseph H. McArthur. *Second Brigade*, Col. George A. H. Blake: 1st U. S. (4 co's), Lieut.-Col. William N. Grier; 6th U. S. (with Stoneman's command), Capt. August V. Kautz. Cavalry Reserve loss: k, 14; w, 55; m, 85=154.

[Brig.-Gen's George Stoneman and William H. Emory operated on the right flank of the army with a mixed command of infantry, cavalry, and artillery.]

Total loss of the Army of the Potomac: 1734 killed, 8062 wounded, and 6053 captured or missing=15,849.

The "present for duty equipped," or effective force of this army (exclusive of Dix's command at and about Fort Monroe), on June 20th, 1862, was 1511 engineers, 6513 cavalry, 6446 artillery, and 90,975 infantry, in all 105,445. See "Official Records," XI., Pt. III., p. 238.

THE CONFEDERATE FORCES.

Army of Northern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee.

JACKSON'S COMMAND, Maj.-Gen. T. J. Jackson.

Cavalry: 2d Va., Col. Thomas T. Munford.

WHITING'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. William H. C. Whiting. Staff loss: k, 1; w, 1=2.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John B. Hood: 18th Ga., Lieut.-Col. S. Z. Ruff; 1st Tex., Col. A. T. Rainey (w); 4th Tex., Col. John Marshall (k), Capt. W. P. Townsend; 5th Tex., Col. J. B. Robertson; Hampton (S. C.) Legion, Lieut.-Col. M. W. Gary. Brigade loss: k, 92; w, 526; m, 5=623. *Third Brigade*, Col. E. McIver Law: 4th Ala., Lieut.-Col. O. K. McLemore (w), Capt. L. H. Scruggs; 2d Miss., Col. J. M. Stone; 11th Miss., Col. P. F. Liddell; 6th N. C., Lieut.-Col. I. E. Avery (w), Maj. R. F. Webb. Brigade loss: k, 66; w, 482; m, 5=553. *Artillery:* Va. Battery (Staunton Arty.), Capt. W. L. Balthis (w); N. C. Battery (Rowan Arty.), Capt. James Reilly. Artillery loss: w, 16.

JACKSON'S DIVISION.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Charles S. Winder: 2d Va., Col. J. W. Allen (k), Lieut.-Col. Lawson Botts; 4th Va., Col. Charles A. Ronald; 5th Va., Col. William S. H. Baylor; 27th Va., Col. A. J. Grigsby (w), Capt. G. C. Smith;

33d Va., Col. John F. Neff; Va. Battery (Alleghany Arty.), Lieut. John C. Carpenter; Va. Battery (Rockbridge Arty.), Capt. William T. Poague. Brigade loss: k, 30; w, 149=179. *Second Brigade*, Lieut.-Col. R. H. Cunningham, Jr., Brig.-Gen. J. R. Jones (w), Lieut.-Col. R. H. Cunningham, Jr.: 21st Va., Maj. John B. Moseley, Lieut.-Col. R. H. Cunningham, Jr., Maj. John B. Moseley; 42d Va., Lieut.-Col. William Martin; 48th Va., Capt. John M. Vermillion; 1st Va. (Irish) Battalion, Capt. B. W. Leigh; Va. Batty. (Hampden Arty.), Capt. William H. Caskie. Brigade loss: k, 1; w, 15=16. *Third Brigade*, Col. S. V. Fulkerson (m w), Col. E. T. H. Warren, Brig.-Gen. Wade Hampton: 10th Va., Col. E. T. H. Warren; 23d Va., Capt. A. V. Scott; 37th Va., Maj. T. V. Williams; Va. Battery (Danville Arty.), Capt. George W. Wooding. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 15; m, 1=18. *Fourth Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Alexander R. Lawton: 13th Ga., Col. Marcellus Douglass; 26th Ga., Col. E. N. Atkinson; 31st Ga., Col. C. A. Evans (w); 38th Ga., Lieut.-Col. L. J. Parr (w), Capt. William H. Battey; 60th Ga., Lieut.-Col. W. H. Stiles; 61st Ga., Col. John H. Lamar. Brigade loss: k, 115; w, 452=567.

EWELL'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Richard S. Ewell.

Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Arnold Elzey (w), Col. James A. Walker, Brig.-Gen. Jubal A. Early: 12th Ga., Capt. James G. Rodgers; 13th Va., Col. James A. Walker; 25th Va., Lieut.-Col. John C. Higginbotham; 31st Va., Col. John S. Hoffman; 44th Va., Lieut.-Col. Norvell Cobb; 52d Va., Lieut.-Col. J. H. Skinner; 58th Va., Col. F. H. Board. Brigade loss: k, 52; w, 229; m, 3=284. *Seventh Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Isaac R. Trimble: 15th Ala., Col. James Cantey; 21st Ga., Maj. T. W. Hooper (w); 16th Miss., Col. Carnot Posey; 21st N. C., Lieut.-Col. W. W. Kirkland; 1st N. C. Battalion Sharp-shooters, Maj. Rufus W. Wharton; Va. Battery, Capt. A. R. Courtney. Brigade loss: k, 71; w, 280; m, 49=400. *Eighth Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Richard Taylor, Col. I. G. Seymour (k), Col. Leroy A. Stafford: 6th La., Col. I. G. Seymour; 7th La., Lieut.-Col. David B. Penn; 8th La., Col. Henry B. Kelly; 9th La., Col. Leroy A. Stafford; 1st La. Special Battalion, Maj. C. R. Wheat (k); Va. Battery (Charlottesville Arty.), Capt. J. McD. Carrington. Brigade loss: k, 56; w, 236=292. *Maryland Line:* 1st Inf., Col. Bradley T. Johnson; A, Cav., Capt. Ridgely Brown; Balto. Battery, Capt. J. B. Brockenbrough. Maryland line loss: k, 3; w, 8=11.

HILL'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Daniel H. Hill.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Robert E. Rodes, Col. John B. Gordon: 3d Ala., Lieut.-Col. Charles Forsyth, Maj. Robert M. Sands; 5th Ala., Col. C. C. Pegues (m w), Maj. E. L. Hobson; 6th Ala., Col. John B. Gordon, Maj. B. G. Baldwin; 12th Ala., Col. B. B. Gayle; 26th Ala., Col. E. A. O'Neal; Va. Battery (King William Arty.), Capt. Thomas H. Carter. Brigade loss: k, 112; w, 458=570. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. George B. Anderson (w), Col. C. C. Tew: 2d N. C., Col. C. C. Tew; 4th N. C., Col. E. A. Osborne; 14th N. C., Lieut.-Col. William A. Johnston; 30th N. C., Col. Francis M. Parker; Ala. Battery, Capt. R. A. Hardaway. Brigade loss: k, 159; w, 704=863. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Samuel Garland, Jr.: 5th N. C., Col. D. K. McRae; 12th N. C., Col. Benjamin O. Wade; 13th N. C., Col. Alfred M. Scales; 20th N. C., Col. Alfred Iverson (w), Lieut.-Col. Franklin J. Faison (k), Maj. William H. Toon; 23d N. C., Col. Daniel H. Christie (w), Lieut. I. J. Young (w); Ala. Battery (Jeff Davis Arty.), Capt. J. W. Bondurant. Brigade loss: k, 192; w, 637; m, 15=844. *Fourth Brigade*, Col. Alfred H. Colquitt: 13th Ala., Col. Birkett D. Fry; 6th Ga., Lieut.-Col. J. M. Newton; 23d Ga., Col. Emory F. Best; 27th Ga., Col Levi B. Smith; 28th Ga., Col. T. J. Warthen. Brigade loss: k, 75; w, 474; m, 5=554. *Fifth Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Roswell S. Ripley: 44th Ga., Col. Robert A. Smith (m w), Capt. John W. Beck; 48th Ga., Col. William Gibson; 1st N. C., Col. M. S. Stokes (k), Capt. H. A. Brown, Lieut.-Col. William P. Bynum; 3d N. C., Col. Gaston Meares (k), Lieut.-Col. William L. De Rosset. Brigade loss: k, 171; w, 707; m, 30=908. *Artillery:* Va. Battery (Hanover Arty.), Capt. G. W. Nelson. (See, also, Jones's Battalion in Reserve Artillery, temporarily attached to this division.)

MAGRUDER'S COMMAND, Maj.-Gen. J. B. Magruder.

JONES'S DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. David R. Jones. Staff loss: w, 1.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Robert Toombs: 2d Ga., Col. Edgar M. Butt (w), Lieut.-Col. William R. Holmes; 15th Ga., Col. William M. McIntosh (m w), Lieut.-Col. William T. Millican, Maj. T. J. Smith, Capt. S. Z. Hearnsberger; 17th Ga., Col. Henry L. Benning; 20th Ga., Col. J. B. Cumming. Brigade loss: k, 44; w, 380; m, 6=430. *Third Brigade*, Col. George T. Anderson: 1st Ga. (regulars), Col. William J. Magill; 7th Ga., Lieut.-Col. W. W. White (w), Maj. E. W. Hoyle (w), Capt. George H. Carmical; 8th Ga., Col. L. M. Lamar (w and c), Capt. George O. Dawson; 9th Ga., Col. R. A. Turnipseed; 11th Ga., Lieut.-Col. William Luffman. Brigade loss: k, 64; w, 327; m, 46=437. *Artillery*, Maj. John J. Garnett: Va. Battery (Wise Arty.), Capt. James S. Brown; S. C. Battery (Washington Arty.), Capt. James F. Hart; La. Battery (Madison Arty.), Capt. George V. Moody; Va. Battery, Capt. W. J. Dabney. Artillery loss: k, 3; w, 11=14.

MCLAWS'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Lafayette McLaws.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Paul J. Semmes: 10th Ga., Col. Alfred Cumming (w), Capt. W. C. Holt; 53d Ga., Col. L. T. Doyal; 5th La., Col. T. G. Hunt; 10th La., Lieut.-Col. Eugene Waggaman (w and c); 15th Va., Col. T. P. August (w); 32d Va., Lieut.-Col. William R. Willis; N. C. Battery, Capt. Basil C. Manly. Brigade loss: k, 31; w, 121; m, 63=215. *Fourth Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw: 2d S. C., Col. John D. Kennedy, Maj. F. Gaillard; 3d S. C., Colonel James D. Nance; 7th S. C., Col. D. Wyatt Aiken; 8th S. C., Col. John W. Henagan; Va. Battery (Alexandria Arty.), Capt. Del Kemper. Brigade loss: k, 70; w, 349; m, 38=457.

MAGRUDER'S DIVISION.

Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Howell Cobb: 16th Ga., Col. Goode Bryan; 24th Ga., Col. Robert McMillan; Ga. Legion (Cobb's)——; 2d La., Col. J. T. Norwood (m w); 15th N. C., Col. Henry A. Dowd (w); Ga. Battery (Troup Arty.), Capt. Henry H. Carlton. Brigade loss: k, 66; w, 347; m, 2=415. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Richard Griffith (m w), Col. William Barksdale: 13th Miss., Col. William Barksdale, Lieut.-Col. J. W. Carter (w), Maj. Kennon McElroy; 17th Miss., Col. W. D. Holder (w), Lieut.-Col. John C. Fiser; 18th Miss., Col. Thomas M. Griffin (w), Lieut.-Col. William H. Luse; 21st Miss., Col. Benjamin G. Humphreys, Lieut.-Col. W. L. Brandon (w), Capt. William C. F. Brooks; Va. Battery (1st Richmond Howitzers), Capt. E. S. McCarthy. Brigade loss: k, 91; w, 434=525.

ARTILLERY, Lieut.-Col. Stephen D. Lee: Ga. Battery (Pulaski Arty.), Capt. J. P. W. Read; Va. Battery (James City Arty.), Capt. L. W. Richardson; Va. Battery (Magruder Arty.), Capt. T. Jeff. Page, Jr.

LONGSTREET'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. James Longstreet (also in command of A. P. Hill's division), Brig.-Gen. Richard H. Anderson.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. James L. Kemper: 1st Va., Capt. G. F. Norton; 7th Va., Col. W. T. Patton; 11th Va., Capt. K. Otey; 17th Va., Col. M. D. Corse; 24th Va., Lieut.-Col. Peter Hairston; Va. Battery (Loudoun Arty.), Capt. Arthur L. Rogers. Brigade loss: k, 44; w, 205; m, 165=414. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Richard H. Anderson, Col. Micah Jenkins: 2d S. C. (Rifles), Col. J. V. Moore; 4th S. C. (Battalion), Maj. C. S. Mattison; 5th S. C., Lieut.-Col. A. Jackson; 6th S. C., Col. John Bratton; Palmetto (S. C.) Sharp-shooters, Col. Micah Jenkins, Lieut.-Col. Joseph Walker. Brigade loss: k, 136; w, 638; m, 13=787. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. George E. Pickett (w), Col. John B. Strange, Col. Eppa Hunton, Col. John B. Strange: 8th Va., Col. Eppa Hunton; 18th Va., Col. R. E. Withers (w); 19th Va., Col. John B. Strange; 28th Va., Col. Robert C. Allen; 56th Va., Col. W. D. Stuart. Brigade loss: k, 72; w, 563; m, 19=654. *Fourth Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox: 8th Ala., Lieut.-Col. Y. L. Royston (w); 9th Ala., Maj. J. H. J. Williams, Capt. J. H. King (w); 10th Ala., Col. J. J. Woodward (k), Maj. J. H. Caldwell (w); 11th Ala., Lieut.-Col. S. F. Hale (w), Capt. George Field (w); Va. Battery (Thomas Arty.), Captain Edwin J. Anderson. Brigade loss: k, 229; w, 806; m, 20=1055. *Fifth Brigade*, Brig.-

Gen. Roger A. Pryor: 14th Ala., Lieut.-Col. D. W. Baine (k); 2d Fla., Col. E. A. Perry; 14th La., Col. Z. York; 1st La. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. G. Coppens, 3d Va., Lieut.-Col. J. V. Scott (w); La. Battery (Donaldsonville Arty.), Capt. Victor Maurin. Brigade loss: k, 170; w, 681; m, 11 = 862. *Sixth Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Winfield S. Featherston (w); 12th Miss., Maj. W. H. Lilly (w), Capt. S. B. Thomas; 19th Miss., Maj. John Mullins (w); 2d Miss. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. John G. Taylor (k); Va. Battery (3d Richmond Howitzers), Capt. Benjamin H. Smith, Jr. Brigade loss: k, 115; w, 543; m, 9 = 667. *Artillery:* Lieut. Battalion (Washington Arty.), Col. J. B. Walton; Va. Battery (Lynchburg Arty.), Capt. James Dearing; Va. Bat'y (Dixie Arty.), Capt. W. H. Chapman.

HUGER'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Benjamin Huger.

Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. William Mahone: 6th Va., Col. G. T. Rogers; 12th Va., Col. D. A. Weisiger; 16th Va., Lieut.-Col. Joseph H. Ham; 41st Va., Lieut.-Col. William A. Parham (w); 49th Va., Col. William Smith; Va. Battery (Portsmouth Artillery), Capt. Carey F. Grimes; Va. Battery, Capt. M. N. Moorman. Brigade loss: k, 66; w, 274; m, 124 = 464. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Ambrose R. Wright: 44th Ala., Col. James Kent; 3d Ga., Maj. J. R. Sturges (k), Capt. R. B. Nisbet; 4th Ga., Col. George Doles; 22d Ga., Col. R. H. Jones, Maj. Joseph Wasden; 1st La., Lieut.-Col. W. R. Shivers (w), Capt. M. Nolan; Va. Battery, Capt. Frank Huger. Brigade loss: k, 93; w, 483; m, 90 = 666. *Fourth Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Lewis A. Armistead: 9th Va., Lieut.-Col. James S. Gilliam; 14th Va., Col. James G. Hodges; 38th Va., Col. E. C. Edmonds; 53d Va., Capt. William R. Aylett, Maj. George M. Waddill, Capt. R. W. Martin, Col. H. B. Tomlin; 57th Va., Lieut.-Col. Waddy T. James; 5th Va. Battalion, Capt. William E. Alley; Va. Battery (Fauquier Arty.), Capt. Robert M. Stribling; Va. Battery, Capt. William H. Turner. Brigade loss: k, 51; w, 281; m, 69 = 401.

HILL'S (LIGHT) DIVISION (attached to Longstreet's command June 29th–July 1st), Maj.-Gen. Ambrose P. Hill.

First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Charles W. Field: 40th Va., Col. J. M. Brockenbrough; 47th Va., Col. Robert M. Mayo; 55th Va., Col. Francis Mallory; 60th Va., Col. William E. Starke (w), Lieut.-Col. B. H. Jones, Col. William E. Starke, Maj. J. C. Summers. Brigade loss: k, 78; w, 500; m, 2 = 580. *Second Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Maxcy Gregg: 1st S. C., Col. D. H. Hamilton; 1st S. C. (Rifles), Col. J. Foster Marshall; 12th S. C., Col. Dixou Barnes (w); 13th S. C., Col. O. E. Edwards; 14th S. C., Col. Samuel McGowan. Brigade loss: k, 152; w, 773; m, 4 = 929. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Joseph R. Anderson (w), Col. Edward L. Thomas: 14th Ga., Lieut.-Col. Robert W. Folsom (w); 35th Ga., Col. Edward L. Thomas (w); 45th Ga., Col. Thomas Hardeman (w); 49th Ga., Col. A. J. Lane (w); 3d La. Battalion, Lieut.-Col. Edmund Pendleton. Brigade loss: k, 62; w, 300; m, 2 = 364 (estimated). *Fourth Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. L. O'B. Branch: 7th N. C., Col. Reuben P. Campbell (k), Lieut.-Col. E. Graham Haywood (w), Maj. J. L. Hill; 18th N. C., Col. Robert H. Cowan; 28th N. C., Col. James H. Lane; 33d N. C., Lieut.-Col. Robert F. Hoke; 37th N. C., Col. Charles C. Lee (w), Lieut.-Col. William M. Barbour. Brigade loss: k, 105; w, 706; m, 28 = 839. *Fifth Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. James J. Archer: 5th Ala. Battalion, Capt. A. S. Van de Graaf (w); 19th Ga., Lieut.-Col. Thomas C. Johnson (k); 1st Tenn., Lieut.-Col. J. C. Shackelford (k); 7th Tenn., Col. John F. Goodner (w); 14th Tenn., Col. W. A. Forbes. Brigade loss: k, 92; w, 443 = 535. *Sixth Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. William D. Pender: 2d Ark. Battalion, Maj. W. N. Bronaugh (k); 16th N. C., Lieut.-Col. John S. McElroy; 22d N. C., Col. James Conner (w), Lieut.-Col. R. H. Gray; 34th N. C., Col. Richard H. Riddick (w); 38th N. C., Col. William J. Hoke (w); 22d Va. Battalion, Capt. J. C. Johnson. Brigade loss: k, 130; w, 692 = 822 (approximate). *Artillery*, Lieut.-Col. Lewis M. Coleman: Md. Battery, Capt. R. Snowden Andrews; S. C. Battery (German Arty.), Capt. William K. Bachman; Va. Battery (Fredericksburg Arty.), Capt. Carter M. Braxton; Va. Battery, Capt. William G. Crenshaw; Va. Battery (Letcher Arty.), Capt. Greenlee Davidson; Va. Battery, Capt. Marmaduke Johnson; Masters's Battery, Capt. L. Masters; S. C. Battery (Pee Dee Arty.), Capt. D. G. McIntosh; Va. Battery (Purcell Arty.), Capt. W. J. Pegram. Artillery loss: k, 12; w, 96 = 108.

HOLMES'S DIVISION, Maj.-Gen. Theophilus H. Holmes.

Second Brigade (temporarily attached to Huger's division), Brig.-Gen. Robert Ransom, Jr.: 24th N. C., Col. William J. Clarke; 25th N. C., Col. Henry M. Rutledge; 26th N. C., Col. Z. B. Vance; 35th N. C., Col. M. W. Ransom (w), Lieut.-Col. O. C. Petway (k); 48th N. C., Col. Robert C. Hill; 49th N. C., Col. S. D. Ramseur (w). Brigade loss: k, 95; w, 453; m, 76 = 624. *Third Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. Junius Daniel: 43d N. C., Col. T. S. Kenan; 45th N. C., Lieut-Col. J. H. Morehead; 50th N. C., Col. M. D. Craton; Va. Cavalry Battalion, Maj. Edgar Burroughs. Brigade loss: k, 2; w, 22 = 24. *Fourth Brigade*, Brig.-Gen. John G. Walker, Col. Van H. Manning: 3d Ark., Col. Van H. Manning; 2d Ga. Battalion, Maj. George W. Ross; 27th N. C., Col. John R. Cooke; 46th N. C., Col. E. D. Hall; 30th Va., Col. A. T. Harrison; Va. Cavalry Company, Capt. Edward A. Goodwyn. Brigade loss: w, 12. *Artillery*, Col. James Deshler: Va. Battery, Capt. James R. Branch; N. C. Battery, Capt. T. H. Brem; Va. Battery, Capt. David A. French; Va. Battery, Capt. Edward Graham. Artillery loss: w, 17.

WISE'S COMMAND (temporarily attached to Holmes's Division), Brig.-Gen. Henry A. Wise: 26th Va., Col. P. R. Page; 46th Va., Col. R. T. W. Duke; Va. Battery, Capt. W. G. Andrews; Va. Battery, Capt. J. H. Rives.

RESERVE ARTILLERY, Brig.-Gen. William N. Pendleton. *First Va. Artillery*, Col. J. Thompson Brown: Williamsburg Artillery, Capt. John A. Coke; Richmond Fayette Arty., Lieut. William I. Clopton; Watson's Battery, Capt. David Watson. Loss: w, 1.

JONES'S BATTALION (temporarily attached to D. H. Hill's Division), Maj. Hilary P. Jones: Va. Battery, Capt. P. H. Clark; Va. Battery (Orange Arty.), Lieut. C. W. Fry; S. C. Bat'y, Capt. A. Burnet Rhett. Loss: k, 5; w, 24 = 29.

First Battalion (Sumter), Artillery, Lieut.-Col. A. S. Cutts: Ga. Battery, Capt. James Ap Blackshear; Ga. Battery, Capt. John Lane; Ga. Battery, Capt. John V. Price; Ga. Battery, Capt. H. M. Ross; Ga. Battery (Regulars), Capt. S. P. Hamilton. Loss: k, 3; w, 6 = 9. *Second Battalion*, Maj. Charles Richardson: Va. Battery (Fluvanna Arty.), Capt. John J. Ancell; Ga. Battery, Capt. John Milledge, Jr.; Va. Battery (Ashland Arty.), Lieut. James Woolfolk. Loss: k, 1; w, 4 = 5. *Third Battalion*, Maj. William Nelson: Va. Battery (Fluvanna Arty.), Capt. Charles T. Huckstep; Va. Battery (Amherst Arty.), Capt. Thomas J. Kirkpatrick; Va. Battery (Morris Arty.), Capt. R. C. M. Page. Loss: k, 1; w, 1 = 2.

CAVALRY, Brig.-Gen. James E. B. Stuart: 1st N. C., Lieut.-Col. James B. Gordon, Col. Lawrence S. Baker; 1st Va., Col. Fitzhugh Lee; 3d Va., Col. Thomas F. Goode; 4th Va, Capt. F. W. Chamberlayne; 5th Va., Col. Thomas L. Rosser; 9th Va., Col. W. H. F. Lee, 10th Va., Col. J. Lucius Davis; Ga. Legion, Col. Thomas R. R. Cobb; 15th Va. Battalion, Maj. J. Critcher; Hampton (S. C.) Legion (squadron), Capt. Thomas E. Screven; Jeff Davis (Miss.) Legion, Lieut.-Col. W. T. Martin; Stuart Horse Artillery, Capt. John Pelham. Cavalry loss (incomplete): k, 5; w, 26; m, 40 = 71.

Total Confederate loss (approximate): 3286 killed, 15,909 wounded, and 940 captured or missing = 20,135.

The strength of the Confederates is not officially stated, but it probably ranged from 80,000 to 90,000 effectives.



FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN EARLY IN 1885.

RUSH'S LANCERS — THE 6TH PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY. FROM A SKETCH MADE IN 1862.

HANOVER COURT HOUSE AND GAINES'S MILL.

BY FITZ JOHN PORTER, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. V.

UNDER the direction of General McClellan certain measures for the protection of the right flank of the army in its advance upon Richmond were put in my hands, beginning simultaneously with the march of the army from the Pamunkey.[1] Among these were the clearing of the enemy from the upper Peninsula as far as Hanover Court House or beyond, and, in case General McDowell's large forces, then at Fredericksburg, were not to join us, the destruction of railroad and other bridges over the South and Pamunkey rivers, in order to prevent the enemy in large force from getting into our rear from that direction, and in order, further, to cut the Virginia Central Railroad, the one great line of the enemy's communications between Richmond and Northern Virginia.

A portion of this duty had been accomplished along the Pamunkey as far as was deemed prudent by Colonel G. K. Warren's forces, posted at Old Church, when on the 26th of May, preparatory to an immediate advance upon Richmond, General McClellan directed me to complete the duty above specified, so that the enemy in Northern Virginia, then occupying the attention of McDowell, Banks, and Frémont, could not be suddenly thrown upon our flank and rear nor otherwise strengthen the enemy in Richmond. I was allowed to adopt my own plans, and to select such additional forces as I deemed necessary.

[1] The army left its camp at White House Landing, on the Pamunkey, May 17th to 20th. The 6th Corps, under Franklin, advanced along the north bank of the Chickahominy, and on the 23d and 24th Davidson's brigade of Smith's division occupied Mechanicsville after a brief encounter with a Confederate column of Magruder's command, under General Paul J. Semmes. — EDITORS.

At 4 A. M. on the 27th General G. W. Morell, commanding the division consisting of J. H. Martindale's, Daniel Butterfield's, and James McQuade's brigades, marched from New Bridge preceded by an advance-guard of two regiments of cavalry and a battery of artillery under command of General W. H. Emory. At the same hour Colonel Warren with his brigade moved from Old Church. Cavalry under General George Stoneman and regular infantry under General George Sykes followed at a later hour, to protect our left flank and rear. The first two commands were to fall upon the enemy, who I had reason to believe were camped in strong force near Hanover Court House. The first command, under my immediate direction, was to take the enemy in front, while Colonel Warren, taking the road along the Pamunkey, was to fall upon him in flank and rear. In a pelting storm of rain, through deep mud and water for about 14 miles, the command struggled and pushed its way to Peake's Station on the Virginia



MAP OF THE UPPER CHICKAHOMINY AND NEIGHBORING COUNTRY. [FOR HANOVER COURT HOUSE, SEE MAP, P. 272.]

During the battles of Mechanicsville and Gaines's Mill, the Union army, except Porter's corps and the cavalry engaged in protecting McClellan's right flank and communications, was posted on the south side of the Chickahominy behind the line of intrenchments here shown. The divisions of Longstreet and the two Hills who had confronted McClellan were withdrawn, in order to unite with Jackson's three divisions (coming from the Shenandoah) in the attack in force upon Porter's corps at Gaines's Mill. Magruder's and Huger's divisions were left to engage the attention of Sumner, Keyes, Heintzelman, and Franklin. The attack of Lee's six divisions fell upon Porter's corps, which was reënforced during the battle by Slocum's three brigades of Franklin.

Central Railroad, 2 miles from Hanover Court House, where we came in presence of the enemy.

At once a force of infantry (Colonel C. A. Johnson's 25th New York Volunteers and Berdan's Sharp-shooters), protected by artillery, was sent forward to hold the enemy in check, pending the arrival of Morell, who was slowly pushing along the swampy roads. Cavalry and artillery were sent to the left along the Ashland road, to guard



PROFESSOR T. S. C. LOWE OBSERVING THE BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES FROM HIS BALLOON "INTREPID," ON THE NORTH SIDE OF THE CHICKAHOMINY.



REPLENISHING THE GAS OF PROFESSOR LOWE'S MILITARY BALLOON "INTREPID." FROM PHOTOGRAPHS. ☆

our flank and destroy the railroad and telegraph at the crossing. On Martindale's arrival he was sent in support of this force, and with it soon became engaged with very persistent opponents. Butterfield was sent to the front, where, deploying in line, he moved rapidly upon the enemy, put them to flight, and captured many prisoners and one cannon and caisson.

As the enemy gave way, the troops were pushed on toward Hanover Court House in pursuit of the fleeing foe and to strike their camp, which I had been informed was near by, but which was found abandoned. Suddenly the signal officers notified me of a large force attacking our flank and rear, and especially the troops under Martindale. At once the infantry were faced about, and at double-quick step hastened to the aid of their imperiled comrades. McQuade's brigade, on arriving opposite the contending forces, moved in line to the attack. Butterfield, now in rear as faced

☆ Colonel Auchmuty, of New York City, who made many ascensions by this balloon from the camp near Doctor Gaines's before the battle, says that the Confederates had a Whitworth gun at Mrs. Price's, on the south side of the Chickahominy, with which they would fire at the balloon. The usual height of observation was 1000 feet; and when lower than 300 feet high the balloon was within range of this gun. General Porter made no fewer than a hundred such ascensions.— EDITORS.

CONFEDERATE RETREAT THROUGH MECHANICSVILLE BEFORE THE ADVANCE OF McCLELLAN'S ARTILLERY, MAY 24TH. FROM A WAR-TIME SKETCH.

The view is from the east, and the retreat is in the direction of the Mechanicsville Bridge.

about, pushed his brigade through the woods and fell with vigor upon the enemy's flank. The united attack quickly routed the enemy, inflicting heavy losses in killed and wounded and prisoners.⚓

Warren, greatly delayed by muddy roads, swollen streams, and the work of building bridges, arrived about 3 P. M., at the close of the first battle, and was sent northward in pursuit of the enemy, and to destroy bridges and boats on the Pamunkey. He, with Rush of the 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry, captured a company of North Carolina infantry just before reaching the wagon road bridge, which they destroyed. Night put an end to the contest.

The succeeding day was occupied in gathering in the results of our victory and in pushing the troops to Ashland, destroying two of the enemy's railroad trains, abandoned camps, and railroad and other bridges over the Pamunkey and South Anna, and injuring the railroad tracks — it having been decided at Washington that McDowell was not to join us, and that a large portion of his command had been ordered to Northern Virginia in pursuit of Jackson, then on a raid into the Shenandoah Valley. Our movement had caused the rapid retreat to Richmond of General Joseph R. Anderson's command, thereby releasing McDowell's command for active operations in Northern Virginia, as well as opening the way for him to join us. The destruction of the railroad bridges was accomplished by Major Lawrence Williams, 6th U. S. Cavalry, who, while on the South Anna, fell in with some of McDowell's scouts, who were hourly looking for the advance of their corps.

McClellan joined me on the battle-field, and was well pleased with the results of our labors. Besides the destruction of the bridges, trains, etc., we were in possession of a large number of arms and one cannon, of some 730 prisoners,

⚓ The affair at Hanover Court House was with the brigade of General L. O'B. Branch, who says in his report that he contended against odds in the hope that Confederate troops would come to his assistance. His loss was 73 killed and 192 wounded.— EDITORS.

and had buried some 200 killed. By General McClellan's directions we returned to our camp on the 29th of May.

This was the first occasion that the corps had had to show its good qualities, all being in action at once. The behavior of the officers and men showed the benefit of the good training before Washington, during the fall and winter of 1861, given by their brigade and regimental commanders. The regiments, without exception, behaved most gallantly.

On our return to camp all rejoiced at the success of our mission in securing for a reasonable time our flank from injury and preparing the whole army for a rapid advance on Richmond, and also by rendering McDowell's presence unnecessary for the defense of Washington, giving the War Department the opportunity of sending his corps by water to join us. If that had been done, none of the enemy could have been detached from Richmond to threaten Washington, and his forces in Northern Virginia would have been called to defend Richmond. But a mightier power interfered, and through years of trial and sufferings delayed the happy victory we then hoped was in our hands.†

After the battle of Fair Oaks, during the greater part of the month of June, 1862, the Army of the Potomac, under General McClellan, and the Army of Northern Virginia, under General Lee, confronted each other, east of Richmond. The two armies were of nearly equal strength. [See foot-note, p. 187.] McClellan's forces, divided by the Chickahominy, were extended south of that

† The Union loss at Hanover Court House was 62 killed; 223 wounded; 70 missing = 355.— EDITORS.



UNION ARTILLERY AT MECHANICSVILLE SHELLING THE CONFEDERATE WORKS SOUTH OF THE CHICKAHOMINY.

This sketch was made several days before the beginning of the Seven Days' Battles. The road to Richmond crosses the stream by the Mechanicsville Bridge, the half-dozen houses composing the town being to the left of the ground occupied by the battery. It was by this road that the troops of D. H. Hill's and Longstreet's division crossed to join Jackson and A. P. Hill in the attack upon the right of McClellan's army.

stream, from New Bridge to White Oak Swamp, leaving north of the river only the Fifth Army Corps. The Confederate troops faced the Federal army throughout its length, from White Oak Swamp to New Bridge, and thence up the right bank of the Chickahominy, covering the important crossings at Mechanicsville and Meadow Bridge, north of the city.

South of the Chickahominy each army was secured against surprise in flank or successful attack in front by that swollen stream; by marshy lands and muddy roads; by redoubts studded with artillery and rifle-pits well manned, all flanked or covered by swamps, tangled thickets, and slashed timber. Notwithstanding the apparent quiet, both armies were actively engaged in the erection of those defensive works which permit large forces to be detached, at opportune moments, for aggressive action, or for the defense of menaced positions. These preparations for offensive and defensive action, known to both commanders, plainly impressed on each the necessity of guarding against any errors in position, and the importance of preparing promptly to take advantage of any opening in his opponent's line which promised results commensurate with the risks involved.

It was apparent to both generals that Richmond could only be taken in one of two ways: by regular approaches, or by assault. An assault would require superior forces, supported by ample reserves. It was equally apparent that an attack could readily be made from Richmond, because that city's well armed and manned intrenchments would permit its defense by a small number of men, while large forces could be concentrated and detached for offensive operations.

The faulty location of the Union army, divided as it was by the Chickahominy, was from the first realized by General McClellan, and became daily an increasing cause of care and anxiety to him; not the least disturbing element of which was the impossibility of quickly reënforcing his right wing or promptly drawing it to the south bank. That this dilemma was known to so intelligent and vigilant a commander as General Lee could not be doubted; and that it was certainly demonstrated to him by General J. E. B. Stuart's dashing cavalry raid around the Union army, on June 14th, was shown in many ways. [See page 271.] One evidence of it was his immediate erection of field-works on his left, and his increasing resistance to the efforts of Union scouts to penetrate into the roads leading to Richmond from the north. This indicated that Lee was preparing to guard against the reënforcement of McClellan's right, and also against information reaching us of Confederate reënforcements from the north.

McClellan had been forced into this faulty position on the Chickahominy and held there by the oft-repeated assurances that McDowell's corps of 40,000 men, then at Fredericksburg, would be advanced to Richmond and formed on his immediate right, which would make that wing safe. ‖ On the 27th of May, under promise that McDowell would join him at once, McClellan cleared his front of all opposition to his rapid march, by operations at Hanover Court

‖ See Stanton's letter of May 18th: "You are instructed to coöperate so as to establish this communication as soon as possible, by extending your right wing to the north of Richmond."—F. J. P.

House. If McDowell had joined McClellan then, it would have resulted in the capture of Richmond. That junction could also easily have been brought about immediately after the battle of Fair Oaks, and even then Richmond could have been taken. But the Confederate authorities so skillfully used Jackson, in the Valley of Virginia, as to draw off McDowell; while the fears of the Administration, then aroused for the safety of Washington, together with a changed policy, caused him to be held back from the Army of the Potomac; and, although orders were several times issued requiring McDowell to unite with McClellan, and assurances were given as late as June 26th that he would so unite, yet he never arrived, and the right wing of McClellan's army, then left exposed, became the object of attack. McClellan saw the coming storm, and guarded against it as best he could. Realizing the faultiness of his position, resulting from McDowell's withdrawal to the north, he desired to correct the error by changing his base from York River to the James, where he could be easily reënforced, and from which point his communications would be safe. This change could not be made so long as McDowell's advance was to be expected, nor in any event could it be effected without great risk to the safety of his own army in the face of a vigilant and active foe, and without seriously jeopardizing the success of the cause to which he was devoting all his energies. He, however, secured by careful examination full information of the roads and the character of the country over which he would be obliged to move, if circumstances or policy should require a change of base, and as early as June 18th sent vessels loaded with supplies to the James River.

In the middle of June General McClellan intrusted to me the management of affairs on the north bank of the Chickahominy, and confided to me his plans as well as his hopes and apprehensions. His plans embraced defensive arrangements against an attack from Richmond upon our weak right flank. We did not fear the results of such an attack if made by the forces from Richmond alone; but if, in addition, we were to be attacked by Jackson's forces, suspicions of whose approach were already aroused, we felt that we should be in peril. But as Jackson had thus far prevented McDowell from joining us, we trusted that McDowell, Banks, and Frémont, who had been directed to watch Jackson, would be able to prevent him from joining Lee, or, at least, would give timely warning of his escape from their front and follow close upon his heels.

With McClellan's approval, my command was distributed as follows:

General Geo. G. Meade's brigade of General Geo. A. McCall's division of Pennsylvania Reserves was posted at Gaines's house, protecting a siege-battery controlling New Bridge; Generals John F. Reynolds's and Truman Seymour's brigades held the rifle-pits skirting the east bank of Beaver Dam Creek and the field-works covering the only crossings near Mechanicsville and Ellerson's Mill. These field-works, well armed with artillery, and the rifle-pits, well manned, controlled the roads and open fields on the west bank of that creek, and were concealed by timber and brush from an approaching foe. The infantry outposts from the same division, and their supports,

west of Mechanicsville to Meadow Bridge, were instructed, if attacked or threatened by superior forces, to fall back by side approaches to the rear of Reynolds, at the upper crossing, thus leaving the main approaches open to the fire of their artillery and infantry defenders.

North from Meadow Bridge to the Pamunkey Federal cavalry pickets kept vigilant watch, and protected detachments who were felling timber in order to obstruct the roads against the rapid march of any force upon the flank or rear of the right wing.

Cooke's cavalry, near Cold Harbor, guarded the right rear and scouted toward Hanover Court House, while Morell's and Sykes's divisions were conveniently camped so as to cover the bridge-crossings and to move quickly to any threatened point.

Such was the situation on the 24th of June, when, at midnight, General McClellan telegraphed me that a pretended deserter, whom I had that day sent him, had informed him that Jackson was in the immediate vicinity, ready to unite with Lee in an attack upon my command. Though we had reason to suspect Jackson's approach, this was the first intimation we had of his arrival; and we could obtain from Washington at that time no further confirmation of our suspicions, nor any information of the fact that he had left the front of those directed to watch him in Northern Virginia.

Reynolds, who had special charge of the defenses of Beaver Dam Creek and of the forces at and above Mechanicsville, was at once informed of the situation. He prepared to give our anticipated visitors a warm welcome. The infantry division and cavalry commanders were directed to break camp at the first sound of battle, pack their wagons and send them to the rear, and, with their brigades, to take specified positions in support of troops already posted, or to protect the right flank.

On the 25th the pickets of the left of the main army south of the Chickahominy were pushed forward under strong opposition, and, after sharp fighting, gained considerable ground, so as to enable the Second and Third Corps (Sumner's and Heintzelman's) to support the attack on Old Tavern which it was intended to make next day with the Sixth Corps (Franklin's). The result of the fighting was to convince the corps commanders engaged that there had been no reduction of forces in their front to take part in any movement upon our right flank.

Early on the 26th I was informed of a large increase of forces opposite Reynolds, and before noon the Confederates gave evidence of their intention to cross the river at Meadow Bridge and Mechanicsville, while from our cavalry scouts along the Virginia Central Railroad came reports of the approach from the north of large masses of troops.

Thus the attitude of the two armies toward each other was changed. Yesterday, McClellan was rejoicing over the success of his advance toward Richmond, and he was confident of reënforcement by McDowell. To-day, all the united available forces in Virginia were to be thrown against his right flank, which was not in a convenient position to be supported. The prizes now to be contended for were: on the part of McClellan, the safety of his right wing,



THE UNION DEFENSES AT ELLERSON'S MILL. FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

protection behind his intrenchments with the possibility of being able to remain there, and the gain of sufficient time to enable him to effect a change of base to the James; on the part of Lee, the destruction of McClellan's right wing, and, by drawing him from his intrenchments and attacking him in front, the raising of the siege of Richmond.

The morning of Thursday, June 26th, dawned clear and bright, giving promise that the day would be a brilliant one. The formation of the ground south of the Chickahominy opposite Mechanicsville, and west to Meadow Bridge, largely concealed from view the forces gathered to execute an evidently well-planned and well-prepared attack upon my command. For some hours, on our side of the river, all was quiet, except at Mechanicsville and at the two bridge-crossings. At these points our small outposts were conspicuously displayed for the purpose of creating an impression of numbers and of an intention to maintain an obstinate resistance. We aimed to invite a heavy attack, and then, by rapid withdrawal, to incite such confidence in the enemy as to induce incautious pursuit.

In the northern and western horizon vast clouds of dust arose, indicating the movements of Jackson's advancing forces. They were far distant, and we had reason to believe that the obstacles to their rapid advance, placed in their way by detachments sent for that purpose, would prevent them from making an attack that day. As before stated, we did not fear Lee alone; we did fear his attack, combined with one by Jackson on our flank; but our fears were allayed for a day.

General McClellan's desire to make the earliest and quickest movements at that time possible, and his plans for the accomplishment of that desire, as

expressed to me, were substantially conveyed in the following dispatch of June 23d from his chief-of-staff:

"Your dispositions of your troops are approved by the commanding general. . . . If you are attacked, be careful to state as promptly as possible the number, composition, and position of the enemy. The troops on this side will be held ready either to support you directly or to attack the enemy in their front. If the force attacking you is large, the general would prefer the latter course, counting upon your skill and the admirable troops under your command to hold their own against superior numbers long enough for him to make the decisive movement which will determine the fate of Richmond."

The position selected on Beaver Dam Creek for our line of defense was naturally very strong. The banks of the valley were steep, and forces advancing on the adjacent plains presented their flanks, as well as their front, to the fire of both infantry and artillery, safely posted behind intrenchments. The stream was over waist-deep and bordered by swamps. Its passage was difficult for infantry at all points, and impracticable for artillery, except at the bridge-crossing at Ellerson's Mill, and at the one above, near Mechanicsville.



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF BEAVER DAM CREEK, JUNE 26.

a, a, a, Approach of D. H. Hill and Longstreet from Richmond; *b, b, b,* Approach of A. P. Hill; *c, c, c,* Route of D. H. Hill to Old Cold Harbor, the day after the battle, to join Jackson's attack on Union right; *d, d, d,* Route of A. P. Hill to New Cold Harbor, to attack Union center; *e, e, e,* Route of Longstreet to Dr. Gaines's, to attack Union left. Of the five Confederate brigades engaged in this battle, one (Ripley's) was attached to the division of D. H. Hill and came up as a reënforcement to Pender, who, with Field, Archer, and Anderson, were part of the division of A. P. Hill, his other two divisions, Gregg and Branch, being held in reserve. The losses in their hopeless attack fell chiefly upon Archer, who made the first advance about 5 P. M., and later upon Pender and Ripley. Pegram's battery was badly cut up, losing forty-seven men and many horses. On the Union side, Martindale, Griffin, and Meade came up after the battle had begun, reënforcing Reynolds and Seymour. When firing ceased, about 9 P. M., Porter's troops held their position; but Jackson's approach on their right flank compelled its evacuation early in the morning.— EDITORS.

Quite early in the day I visited General Reynolds, near the head of the creek, and had the best reasons not only to be contented, but thoroughly gratified, with the admirable arrangements of this accomplished officer, and to be encouraged by the cheerful confidence of himself and his able and gallant assistants, Seymour on his left, at Ellerson's Mill, and Colonel Seneca G. Simmons and Major Roy Stone in his front. Each of these officers commanded a portion of the Pennsylvania Reserves — all under the command of the brave and able veteran, McCall. These troops were about to engage in their first battle, and bore themselves then, as they did on trying occasions immediately following, with the cheerful spirit of the volunteer and the firmness of the

veteran soldier — examples inspiring emulation in these trying "seven days' battles."

Part of the general details previously adopted was then ordered to be followed, and subsequently was enforced as near as practicable in all the battles in which my corps engaged: that under no circumstances should the men expose themselves by leaving their intrenchments, or other cover, merely to pursue a repulsed foe; nor, except in uneven ground which would permit the fire of artillery to pass well over their heads, was infantry or cavalry to be posted in front of a battery, or moved so as to interfere with its fire. Bullet, shot, and shell were to be relied upon for both repulse and pursuit.

Sitting for hours near the telegraph operator at my quarters, prior to the attack, I listened to the constant and rapid "ticking" of his instrument, and was kept informed, by the various intercommunicating messages at the headquarters of the army, of the condition of affairs in front of the three corps farthest to the left. Reports often came from them that the enemy's camps seemed to be largely deserted, confirming the information that the enemy had gathered in front of Franklin and myself. Yet, the following day, when I called for aid to resist the forces of Lee and Jackson at Gaines's Mill, known to be immensely superior to mine, the commanders of these three corps expressed the belief that they were about to be attacked by bodies larger than their own, and objected to detaching any part of their troops. [See foot-note, p. 180.]

From the cavalry scouts of Colonel John F. Farnsworth, Stoneman, and General P. St. George Cooke, whose forces stretched, in the order named, from Meadow Bridge north to the Pamunkey, reports came that Jackson was advancing slowly upon my flank. ⚓ I was also informed that the departure of Jackson from Northern Virginia was suspected, but not positively known, at Washington; but that at this critical moment no assistance whatever could be expected from that vicinity.

Perhaps at this time the Administration had been crippled by its own acts, and could not respond to General McClellan's calls for aid. About April 1st, when our army began active operations in the field and recruiting should have been encouraged, the enrollment of troops was ordered to be stopped. The War Governor of Pennsylvania [Andrew G. Curtin] notably disregarded this order. His foresight was afterward recognized at Antietam, where he was able to render valuable assistance. In the month of June, however, the policy had begun to change, and the troops in Northern Virginia were being placed in charge of an officer [General John Pope] called to Washington "to take command of Banks and Frémont, perhaps McDowell, take the field against Jackson, and eventually supersede McClellan." At the day the order

⚓ The outposts at Meadow Bridge, the extreme western front of Porter's line, were attacked by Confederates advancing from Richmond under A. P. Hill, about noon on the 26th, and during the afternoon the columns under Jackson encountered the cavalry pickets on the Hanover Court House road, six miles north of Mechanicsville, and at Hundley's Corner, at the crossing of Totopotomoy Creek. The cavalry under General Cooke and Colonel Farnsworth moved with the main army, and the force under Stoneman, consisting of cavalry and infantry, retired down the Pamunkey to White House Landing, and joined the force there under General Casey.— EDITORS.

of assignment was issued, June 27th, however, there was no enemy confronting that officer — Jackson having disappeared from Northern Virginia, and being in my front at Gaines's Mill.

About 2 o'clock P. M., on the 26th, the boom of a single cannon in the direction of Mechanicsville resounded through our camps. This was the signal which had been agreed upon, to announce the fact that the enemy were crossing the Chickahominy. The curtain rose; the stage was prepared for the first scene of the tragedy. At once tents were struck, wagons packed and sent to the rear to cross to the right bank of the Chickahominy. The several divisions were promptly formed, and took the positions to which they had previously been assigned. General McCall assumed command at Beaver Dam Creek; Meade joined him, taking position behind Seymour; Martindale and General Charles Griffin, of Morell's division, went, respectively, to the right and rear of Reynolds; Butterfield was directed to support General Cooke's, and subsequently Martindale's right, while Sykes was held ready to move wherever needed. Reynolds and Seymour prepared for action and concealed their men.

About 3 o'clock the enemy, under Longstreet, D. H. and A. P. Hill, in large bodies commenced rapidly to cross the Chickahominy almost simultaneously at Mechanicsville, Meadow Bridge, and above, and pushed down the left bank, along the roads leading to Beaver Dam Creek. In accordance with directions previously given, the outposts watching the access to the crossings fell back after slight resistance to their already designated position on the east bank of Beaver Dam Creek, destroying the bridges as they retired.

After passing Mechanicsville the attacking forces were divided, a portion taking the road to the right to Ellerson's Mill, while the larger body directed their march to the left into the valley of Beaver Dam Creek, upon the road covered by Reynolds. Apparently unaware, or regardless, of the great danger in their front, this force moved on with animation and confidence, as if going to parade, or engaging in a sham battle. Suddenly, when half-way down the bank of the valley, our men opened upon it rapid volleys of artillery and infantry, which strewed the road and hill-side with hundreds of dead and wounded, and drove the main body of the survivors back in rapid flight to and beyond Mechanicsville. So rapid was the fire upon the enemy's huddled masses clambering back up the hill, that some of Reynolds's ammunition was exhausted, and two regiments were relieved by the 4th Michigan and 14th New York of Griffin's brigade. On the extreme right a small force of the enemy secured a foothold on the east bank, but it did no harm, and retired under cover of darkness.

The forces which were directed against Seymour at Ellerson's Mill made little progress. Seymour's direct and Reynolds's flank fire soon arrested them and drove them to shelter, suffering even more disastrously than those who had attacked Reynolds. Late in the afternoon, greatly strengthened, they renewed the attack with spirit and energy, some reaching the borders of the stream, but only to be repulsed with terrible slaughter, which warned them not to attempt a renewal of the fight. Little depressions in the ground

shielded many from our fire, until, when night came on, they all fell back beyond the range of our guns. Night put an end to the contest.

The Confederates suffered severely. All night the moans of the dying and the shrieks of the wounded reached our ears. Our loss was only about 250 of the 5000 engaged, while that of the Confederates was nearly 2000 out of some 10,000 attacking.¦

General McClellan had joined me on the battle-field at an early hour in the afternoon. While we discussed plans for the immediate future, influenced in our deliberations by the gratifying results of the day, numerous and unvarying accounts from our outposts and scouts toward the Pamunkey warned us of the danger impending on the arrival of Jackson, and necessitated a decision as to which side of the Chickahominy should be held in force. He left me late at night, about 1 A. M. (June 27th), with the expectation of receiving information on his arrival at his own headquarters from the tenor of which he would be enabled to decide whether I should hold my present position or withdraw to a well-selected and more advantageous one east of Gaines's Mill, where I could protect the bridges across the Chickahominy, over which I must retire if compelled to leave the left bank. He left General Barnard, of the Engineers, with me, to point out the new line of battle in case he should decide to withdraw me from Beaver Dam Creek. The orders to withdraw reached me about 3 o'clock A. M., and were executed as rapidly as possible.

The position selected for the new stand was east of Powhite Creek, about six miles from Beaver Dam Creek. The line of battle was semicircular, the extremities being in the valley of the Chickahominy, while the intermediate portion occupied the high grounds along the bank of a creek and curved around past McGehee's to Elder Swamp. Part of the front was covered by the ravine of the creek. The east bank was lined with trees and underbrush, which afforded concealment and protection to our troops and artillery.

From the point where the line of the creek turns suddenly to the east, the front was a series of boggy swamps covered extensively with tangled brush. Near McGehee's and beyond, the ground, elevated and drier, was filled with ravines swept by our artillery and infantry, who were covered by depressions in the ground. The high land embraced within the semicircle was cleared ground, but undulating, and often, with the aid of fences and ditches, giving concealment and cover, breast-high, to both infantry and artillery.

Before sunrise of the 27th the troops were withdrawn from Beaver Dam Creek and sent to their new position east of Powhite Creek, destroying the bridges across it after them.

Some batteries and infantry skirmishers, left as a ruse at Beaver Dam Creek, by their fire so fully absorbed the attention of the foe that our purpose

¦ Union forces engaged, 11 regiments, 6 batteries. Confederate forces engaged, 21 regiments, 8 batteries.—F. J. P.

According to the official returns the total Union loss at Mechanicsville was 361, but little more than that of the 44th Georgia alone (335). The Confederate loss, exclusive of Field's and Anderson's brigades and of the batteries, is reported at 1589. General Longstreet is quoted by William Swinton as authority for putting the aggregate at "between three and four thousand." ("Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac," p. 145.)—EDITORS.



THE BATTLE OF GAINES'S MILL. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH OF THE PAINTING BY THE PRINCE DE JOINVILLE, 1862, MADE FROM PERSONAL OBSERVATION.

Persons represented: 1. Gen. F. J. Porter; 2. Gen. G. W. Morrell; 3. Gen. George G. Meade (on horseback in the distance), and the following aides-de-camp: 4, Comte de Paris; 5. Colonel Radowitz; 6. Major Hammerstein; 7. Duc de Chartres; 8. Captain Mason.

The view is from the left of the Federal position, looking in a north-westerly direction up the Chickahominy, shown at the left. The outbuildings (on the right) belonged to the Watts house, which, during the thick of the fight, was the headquarters of General Fitz John Porter. The wooded ravine in the middle of the picture was the point of contact of this part of the opposing lines. The horsemen in the swampy bottom-lands are intended to represent Cooke's Union cavalry. General Longstreet's extreme right did not extend out of the woods; his left reached to a point about two-thirds across the picture, where it joined A. P. Hill's and, later, Whiting's division.

suddenly and rapidly to abandon the intrenchments seemed unsuspected. But when they discovered our withdrawal, their infantry pressed forward in small detachments, the main body and the artillery being delayed to rebuild the bridges. Seymour's brigade, the last to start, under its skillful commander, with Captain John C. Tidball's and Captain James M. Robertson's well-managed horse batteries on its flanks, kept the enemy at a respectful distance and enabled all, horse, foot, and artillery, wagons and wounded, to reach, with little loss, their designated posts in the new position; my brave and efficient aide, Lieutenant S. M. Weld, however, was taken prisoner.

The siege guns were safely removed by hand from the works overlooking New Bridge and taken to the south bank of the Chickahominy, where, protected by Frank-

lin's corps, they were posted and used with damaging effect upon the enemy as they advanced that afternoon to attack the left of our line.

Our new line of battle was well selected and strong, though long and requiring either more troops to man it than I had, or too great a thinning of my line by the use of the reserves. The east bank of the creek, from the valley of the Chickahominy to its swampy sources, was elevated, sloping, and timbered. The bed of the stream was nearly dry, and its west bank gave excellent protection to the first line of infantry posted under it to receive the enemy descending the cleared field sloping to it. The swampy grounds along the sources of the creek were open to our view in front for hundreds of yards, and were swept by the fire of infantry and artillery. The roads from Gaines's Mill and Old Cold Harbor, along which the enemy were compelled to advance, were swept by artillery posted on commanding ground.

MAJOR-GENERAL FITZ JOHN PORTER.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

Along the ground thus formed and close to its border were posted the divisions of Morell and Sykes,—the latter on the right; Captain A. P. Martin's Massachusetts battery between,—each brigade having in reserve, immediately in its rear, two of its regiments. Sections or full batteries of the division artillery were posted to sweep the avenues of approach, and the fields on which these avenues opened. Wherever possible and useful, guns were placed between brigades and on higher ground, in front or rear, as judgment dictated. The unemployed guns were in reserve with their divisions. Batteries of Hunt's Artillery Reserve were in rear of the left, covered by timber from view of the enemy, but ready to move at a moment's call, or from their stand to pour their irresistible fire into the enemy's face in case they broke our line.

McCall's division formed a second line, near the artillery in reserve, in rear of Morell, and immediately behind the woods on the left. Reynolds, the first to leave Beaver Dam Creek, had gone to Barker's Mill to cover the approaches from Cold Harbor and Dispatch Station to Grapevine Bridge; but, hearing the battle raging on our left, and having no enemy in his front, while Emory, of Cooke's cavalry, with artillery, was near at hand to do the duty assigned to him, he hastened to join McCall, arriving opportunely in rear of Griffin's left.

General Cooke was instructed to take position, with cavalry, under the hills in the valley of the Chickahominy — there, with the aid of artillery, to guard our left flank. He was especially enjoined to intercept, gather, and hold all stragglers, and under no circumstances to leave the valley for the purpose of



MAP OF THE BATTLE-FIELD OF GAINES'S MILL, SHOWING APPROXIMATELY THE POSITIONS OF INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY ENGAGED. (THE TOPOGRAPHY FROM THE OFFICIAL MAP.)

Confederate brigades: A, A, Anderson (R. H.); B, Wilcox; C, Featherston; D, Pryor; E, Pickett; Z, Kemper; F, G, H, J, L, Y, line of A. P. Hill's six brigades at the opening of the battle, as follows: Archer, Field, Anderson (J. R.), Branch, Gregg, Pender; I, K, Hood and Law (Whiting's division of Jackson's corps), replacing Archer, Field, Anderson; M, N, O, P, Jackson's old division, as follows: Fulkerson (3d Va.), Cunningham (2d Va.), Lawton, and Winder; Q, R, S, Seymour, Trimble, and Elzey; T, U, V, W, X, line at first: Ripley, Colquitt, Rodes, Anderson (G. B.), Garland. General directions of approach are indicated by dotted lines.

Union batteries: 1, Allen; 2, 3, Weeden; 4, Martin; 5, 5, 5, 5, Edwards; 6, Weed; 7, Tidball; 8, Kingsbury; 9, Hexamer; 10, Upton; 11, 12, 13, 14, Kerns, Easton, De Hart, Cooper; 15, Diederichs, Knieriem, and Tyler; also Voegelee, Snead, Porter, and Robertson. Total, 124 guns.

Confederate batteries: 16, 17, 18, Longstreet's artillery; 19, Braxton; 20, Pegram; 21, Johnson; 22, Crenshaw; 23, Pelham; 24, Brockenbrough; 25, Carrington; 26, Courtney; 27, Boudurant; also other guns not here indicated.

At 2 o'clock P. M., after a sharp engagement between Gaines's Mill and New Cold Harbor, A. P. Hill made the first severe attack on the Union center and left, and after two hours' fighting was repulsed in such disorder that Longstreet was ordered up to relieve the pressure by a feint on the right, which he converted into an attack in force. Thus, up to 4 o'clock, the Confederate assault was mainly on the Union left center and left. About this hour D. H. Hill's division got fully into action, and Jackson's corps (consisting of Ewell's, Whiting's, and Jackson's divisions) was thrown in where needed from the direction of Old Cold Harbor. Major Dabney, Jackson's chief-of-staff, in a letter to General Hill, thus describes the movements of Jackson's corps: "The column," he says, "came on the eastern extension of Gaines's Mill road at Old Cold Harbor, and, passing the old tavern a little way, soon ran afoul of McClellan's right wing, with infantry and artillery in position. Your division had taken the lead, and became, therefore, the left of our whole line of battle. Jackson put Ewell in position on your right. He seemed to think that A. P. Hill was to drive the enemy into his corps. But in a

coming upon the hill held by our infantry, or pass in front of our line on the left. Stoneman's detachment of cavalry and infantry, miles to the north, was no longer available. Fearing it might be cut off by Jackson, I sent Stoneman word to make his way as best he could to White House, and in proper time to rejoin the army — wherever it might be.

Believing my forces too small to defend successfully this long line, I asked General Barnard, when he left me, to represent to General McClellan the necessity of reënforcements to thicken and to fill vacant spaces in my front line. He himself promised me axes. This was my first request for aid, but none came in response. The axes did not arrive till near dark, and were useless; but with the few obtained early in the day from the artillery, and in the little time at command, trees were felled along a small portion of our front, and barriers were erected, which were filled in with rails and knapsacks.

While withdrawing from Beaver Dam, I had seen, to my delight, General H. W. Slocum's division of Franklin's corps crossing the river to my assistance. McClellan had promised to send it, and I needed it; it was one of the best divisions of the army. Its able, experienced, and gallant commander and his brave and gifted subordinates had the confidence of their well-trained soldiers. They were all worthy comrades of my well-tried and fully trusted officers, and of many others on that field, subsequently honored by their countrymen. But to our disappointment, through some misunderstanding, the division was almost immediately recalled to Franklin. In response, however, to a later call, it returned at a time when it was greatly needed, and rendered invaluable services.

I fixed my headquarters at first at the Adams house; but early in the battle that locality became a hospital, and I advanced to the Watts house, on more elevated ground, whence I could see the greater part of the field and communicate readily with all parts of it.

Thus far, it will be seen, all plans were defensive; I had reason to believe that the enemy largely outnumbered me — three to one. Evidently it was their plan and their policy to crush me, if possible. Their boldness and

little while the state of the firing convinced him that Porter 'didn't drive worth a cent,' and he bestirred himself to let out his full strength. Then it was that, after ordering Ewell's advance, he wheeled on me and began to give instructions about putting in his six other brigades, which were then standing idle in the road by which we had come. I sent them in from left to right *en échelon*, each brigade to support its left-hand neighbor, and to move to the sound of the firing. The strangest divergencies, however, took place in consequence of the coppices and woods and lack of guides. Law and Hood kept the proper relation to Ewell's right, and thus helped A. P. Hill's beaten division, attacked the enemy's center or left center, and about 6 P. M. drove it in. But Lawton, bearing too much by his own left, unwittingly crossed Hood's line of march and reënforced Ewell — a most timely providence, for Ewell's line was about done for. The 2d Virginia brigade seems to have borne as much too far to the right, and at last, near sunset, found themselves behind Longstreet's extreme right, — the brigade of R. H. Anderson, whom they assisted in driving the enemy. The 3d Virginia brigade brought up behind Longstreet's left, passing near Gaines's Mill, and near sunset participated in the victory. The Stonewall brigade, under Winder, bore too much to the left and entered the fight on your right. Pickett's brigade, headed by the 'Old Ironsides' (18th Virginia), broke Porter's line just west of the Watts house." With regard to this break, General Law, in a letter to the Editors, says: "Whiting's division covered the ground on which J. R. Anderson's, Archer's, and Field's brigades had previously attacked. We passed over some of these men as we advanced to the assault. We carried the Federal line in our front, and Longstreet on our right, bringing up his reserves, again attacked and carried his front." At the last and successful advance the line from left to right was: Longstreet (Anderson, Pickett), Whiting (Hood and Law), Jackson (Winder and Lawton), Ewell (one or two brigades), and D. H. Hill (Rodes, Anderson, and Garland). General Porter thinks the first break in his line was made by Hood from the direction indicated on the map by an arrow. Of the Union reserves, McCall's division was put in on the line of Morell, — except a part of Reynolds's brigade, which went to the assistance of Warren; Slocum's division also went to the left, — except Bartlett's brigade, which was sent to the right of Sykes around the McGehee house.

NOTE. — The map is incorrect in one regard: Longstreet's right did not extend so far south as Morell's left.

EDITORS.

confidence, I might add incaution, if not imprudence and rashness in exposure and attack, confirmed my belief that at first they deemed the task an easy one.

I, however, determined to hold my position at least long enough to make the army secure. Though in a desperate situation, I was not without strong hope of some timely assistance from the main body of the army, with which I might repulse the attack and so cripple our opponents as to make the capture of Richmond by the main body of the army, under McClellan, the result of any sacrifice or suffering on the part of my troops or of myself. I felt that the life or death of the army depended upon our conduct in the contest of that day, and that on the issue of that contest depended an early peace or a prolonged, devastating war—for the Union cause could never be yielded. Our brave and intelligent men of all grades and ranks fully realized this, and thousands of them freely offered up their lives that day to maintain the sacred cause which they had voluntarily taken up arms to defend to the last extremity.

UNIFORM OF THE 83D PENNSYLVANIA OF BUTTERFIELD'S BRIGADE, MORELL'S DIVISION, FIFTH CORPS.

The Confederates, under Longstreet and A. P. Hill, following us from Mechanicsville, moved cautiously by the roads leading by Dr. Gaines's house to New Cold Harbor, and by 2 P. M. had formed lines of battle behind the crest of the hills east of Powhite Creek. These lines were parallel to ours, and extended from the valley of the Chickahominy through New Cold Harbor around Morell's front, so as nearly to reach Warren's brigade—the left of Sykes's division. At Gaines's Mill, Colonel Thomas Cass's gallant 9th Massachusetts Volunteers of Griffin's brigade obstinately resisted A. P. Hill's crossing, and were so successful in delaying his advance, after crossing, as to compel him to employ large bodies to force the regiment back to the main line. This brought on a contest which extended to Morell's center and over Martin's front—on his right—and lasted from 12:30 to near 2 o'clock—Cass and his immediate supports falling back south of the swamps. This persistent and prolonged resistance gave to this battle one of its well-known names. ⚓

Another column of the enemy, D. H. Hill's, from Beaver Dam Creek, and Jackson's column, from Northern Virginia, with which it had united, came opposite my right front from the direction of Old Cold Harbor and deployed, connecting with A. P. Hill's on the left and extending to our right beyond McGehee's. The advance column of these troops came a little earlier than those under Longstreet and A. P. Hill, but were more cautious and for some hours not so aggressive. Believing that they were passing on down the river to intercept our communications, and thinking that I might strike them to good advantage while in motion, I asked permission to follow,

⚓ All the severe battles in this campaign began after noon: Seven Pines, 1 o'clock; Beaver Dam Creek, 3 to 4; Gaines's Mill at 12:30; Savage's Station at 4; White Oak Swamp, 12 to 1; Frayser's Farm, 3 to 4; Malvern Hill after 1.—EDITORS.

intending to attack with Sykes's division and Emory of Cooke's cavalry, leaving Morell and McCall to hold the other lines in check. Information, however, soon poured in, convincing me that this force was larger than any I could use against them, and that still larger forces were forming to attack our left and center. This compelled me to keep my troops united and under cover, and also again to ask aid from the south bank of the Chickahominy. My first message to General McClellan was not delivered, as already stated; my second one was responded to by the speedy arrival of Slocum.†

Soon after 2 P. M., A. P. Hill's force, between us and New Cold Harbor, again began to show an aggressive disposition, independent of its own troops on its flanks, by advancing from under cover of the woods, in lines well formed and extending, as the contest progressed, from in front of Martin's battery to Morell's left. Dashing across the intervening plains, floundering in the swamps, and struggling against the tangled brushwood, brigade after brigade seemed almost to melt away before the concentrated fire of our artillery and infantry; yet others pressed on, followed by supports as dashing and as brave as their predecessors, despite their heavy losses and the disheartening effect of having to clamber over many of their disabled and dead, and to meet their surviving comrades rushing back in great disorder from the deadly contest. For nearly two hours the battle raged, extending more or less along the whole line to our extreme right. The fierce firing of artillery and infantry, the crash of the shot, the bursting of shells, and the whizzing of bullets, heard above the roar of artillery and the volleys of musketry, all combined was something fearful.

Regiments quickly replenished their exhausted ammunition by borrowing from their more bountifully supplied and generous companions. Some withdrew, temporarily, for ammunition, and fresh regiments took their places ready to repulse, sometimes to pursue, their desperate enemy, for the purpose of retaking ground from which we had been pressed and which it was necessary to occupy in order to hold our position.

The enemy were repulsed in every direction. An ominous silence reigned. It caused the inference that their troops were being gathered and massed for a desperate and overwhelming attack. To meet it, our front line was concentrated, reënforced, and arranged to breast the avalanche, should it come. I again asked for additional reënforcements. French's and Meagher's brigades, of Sumner's corps, were sent forward by the commanding general, but did not arrive till near dark.

At 2 P. M., when I took my station beyond the Watts house, my anxieties and responsibilities had been substantially relieved, at least so far as related to the establishment of a line of battle, in which all engaged felt their power to resist attack. At that time the practicability of our defensive position, in charge of troops having implicit confidence in each other, had been demonstrated by the successful resistance for nearly two hours against the strong

†The forces in this battle were: Union, 50 regiments, 20 batteries (several not engaged), in all about 30,000 fighting men; Confederate, 129 regiments, 19 batteries, in all about 65,000 men.—F. J. P.



CAPTURE OF ABANDONED UNION GUNS AT THE BATTLE OF GAINES'S MILL. FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

and persistent attacks upon our center and right. The troops were well shielded, with their reserves within immediate call. Commanders of divisions, of brigades, and of batteries were in the midst of their men, all confident and determined to hold their posts to the utmost, to resist and drive back the enemy, prepared to call up their reserves, replenish ammunition, and communicate to me such needs as they could not fill, and furnish all necessary information for my action. They had been left to their own judgment and energy, to determine in what manner they could accomplish the best results with the means at their command and with the least exposure.

From my post in advance of the Watts house, the field in front of Sykes was visible, and it was easily understood, by the sound of battle in the woods and by the fire of the enemy in his advance and repulse, that the center and left still remained solid and undisturbed. All available means were used by which I could be kept informed so that I could provide, in the best possible manner, for the many rapid changes and wants suddenly springing up. The Prince de Joinville and his two nephews — the Comte de Paris and Duc de Chartres — and Colonels Gantt, Radowitz, and Hammerstein, from the commanding general's staff, joined me as volunteer aides. Each of these, with my own staff, Locke, Kirkland, Mason, Monteith, and McQuade, exposed themselves to danger, not only quickly and cheerfully carrying every message, but often voluntarily throwing themselves where needed, to direct, to lead, to encourage, and to rally.

During the greater part of the afternoon, D. H. Hill's troops, in detachments, were more or less aggressive on the right. The silence which followed the repulse, already referred to, lasted but a short time. The renewed attacks raged with great fierceness and fury, with slight intermission, along the most

of our front, till after five o'clock. Large and numerous bodies of infantry from the direction of Old Cold Harbor, under cover of artillery, directed their attacks upon Sykes's division and Martin's battery; others, from the west side of Powhite Creek, were hurled in rapid succession against Martindale and Butterfield. These furious attacks were successfully repelled, but were immediately renewed by fresh troops. McCall's Pennsylvania Reserves, as needed, were pushed as rapidly as possible into the woods, in support of Martindale and Griffin, whose brigades for a long time bore the brunt of the attacks and whose regiments were relieved as soon as their ammunition was expended. All our positions were held against enormous odds, and the enemy was driven back by our fresh troops, successively thrown into action. At each repulse they advanced new troops upon our diminishing forces, and in such numbers and so rapidly that it appeared as though their reserves were inexhaustible. The action extended along our entire line. At 4 o'clock, when Slocum arrived, all our reserves were exhausted. His brigades were necessarily separated and sent where most needed. Newton's brigade, being in advance, was led to the right of Griffin, there to drive back the enemy and retake ground only held by the enemy for an instant. Taylor's brigade filled vacant spaces in Morell's division, and Bartlett's was sent to Sykes, just in time to render invaluable service, both in resisting and attacking.

On the right, near McGehee's, the enemy captured one of our batteries, which had been doing them great damage by enfilading their lines and preventing their advance. They gained thereby a temporary foothold by advancing some infantry; but, prompt to act, Sykes directed its recapture, and the 16th New York,[1] with arms shifted to the right shoulder, and moving at a double-quick, was soon in possession of the prize, which again renewed its fire.

At times, the enemy on the right would gain an advantage, but in such a case our infantry, supported by the fire of artillery, would move immediately at a rapid gait and regain the lost ground. This occurred frequently in Sykes's command and in the brigades serving near it, all of which were, more or less, in exposed ground. Not less deserving of praise were the divisions of McCall, Morell, and Slocum in their stubborn resistance to the oft-repeated and determined onslaughts of their assailants, who vastly outnumbered them.

About 6:30, preceded by a silence of half an hour, the attack was renewed all along the line with the same apparent determination to sweep us by the force of numbers from the field, if not from existence. The result was evidently a matter of life or death to our opponent's cause. This attack, like its predecessors, was successfully repulsed throughout its length. The sun had sunk below the horizon, and the result seemed so favorable that I began to cherish the hope that the worst that could happen to us would be a withdrawal after dark, without further injury — a withdrawal which would be forced upon us by the exhausted condition of our troops, greatly reduced by casualties, without food and with little ammunition.

[1] The men of this regiment wore on this field, for the first time in battle, the white straw hats which made them so conspicuous during the "Seven Days." These hats were presented by Mrs. Joseph Howland, wife of the colonel. As the hats drew upon them the particular attention of the enemy, they were discarded after the retreat to the James River.— EDITORS.

As if for a final effort, as the shades of evening were coming upon us, and the woods were filled with smoke, limiting the view therein to a few yards, the enemy again massed his fresher and re-formed regiments, and threw them in rapid succession against our thinned and wearied battalions, now almost without ammunition, and with guns so foul that they could not be loaded rapidly. In preparation for defeat, should it come, I had posted artillery in large force just in rear of our center and left, ready for any emergency — and especially to be used against a successful foe, even if his destruction involved firing upon some of our own retreating troops, as might have been necessary. The attacks, though coming like a series of apparently irresistible avalanches, had thus far made no inroads upon our firm and disciplined ranks. Even in this last attack we successfully resisted, driving back our assailants with immense loss, or holding them beyond our lines, except in one instance, near the center of Morell's line, where by force of numbers and under cover of the smoke of battle our line was penetrated and broken; this at a point where I least expected it. This was naturally the weakest point of our line, owing to the closer proximity of the woods held by the enemy. Under his cover they could form, and with less exposure in time and ground than elsewhere, and launch their battalions in quick succession upon our men. I believed I had guarded against the danger by strongly and often reënforcing the troops holding this part of the line. Here the greater part of McCall's and Slocum's forces were used. Just preceding this break, to my great surprise, I saw cavalry, Rush's Lancers, which I recognized as ours, rushing in numbers through our lines on the left, and carrying off with sudden fright the limbers of our artillery, then prepared to pour their irresistible fire into a pursuing foe. With no infantry to support, and with apparent disaster before them, such of the remainder of these guns as could be moved were carried from the field; some deliberately, others in haste, but not in confusion.

In no other place was our line penetrated or shaken. The right, seeing our disaster, fell back united and in order, but were compelled to leave behind two guns, the horses of which had been killed. The troops on the left and center retired, some hastily, but not in confusion, often turning back to repulse and pursue the advancing enemy.[\] All soon rallied in rear of the Adams house behind Sykes and the brigades of French and Meagher sent to our aid, and who now, with hearty cheers, greeted our battalions as they retired and re-formed. We lost in all twenty-two cannon; some of these broke down while we were withdrawing, and some ran off the bridges at night while we were crossing to the south bank of the Chickahominy. The loss of the guns was due to the fact that some of Cooke's cavalry which had been directed

[\] We are informed by Colonel Auchmuty, then assistant adjutant-general of Morell's division, that there was no running or panic when the line broke. The men fell back in small groups, turning and firing as they went, and carrying many of the wounded with them. On the crest of the hill in the rear of the line of battle a stand was made, and from that point regimental organizations were preserved. Near the close of the war General Griffin said to Colonel Auchmuty that he regarded Gaines's Mill as the hardest-fought battle in his experience.

The same officer informs us that after the line of battle had been formed in the morning, and while the attack was momentarily expected, the mail arrived from the North, and the newsboys went along the line crying the New York and Philadelphia papers.— EDITORS.



RUINS OF GAINES'S MILL, LOOKING EAST. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH MADE IN THE SPRING OF 1885.

At the time of the battle, this building was of five stories, and was, it is said, one of the finest grist-mills in Virginia. The wooden structure, dovetailed into the ruins, now covers but one pair of burrs. The mill was not injured in the fight, but was burned by Sheridan's cavalry in May, 1864, the fire extending to a dwelling-house which stood just beyond the mill. The main conflict was a mile farther to the south-east, but the ridge shown in the picture was the scene of a most gallant resistance to the Confederate advance by the 9th Massachusetts regiment, acting as a rear-guard to Porter's corps. The road to New Cold Harbor and the battle-ground runs to the right. The mill-stream runs into Powhite Swamp, and thence into the Chickahominy.

to be kept, under all circumstances, in the valley of the Chickahominy, had been sent to resist an attack of the enemy upon our left. The charge, executed in the face of a withering fire of infantry and in the midst of our heavy cannonading, as well as that of the enemy, resulted, as should have been expected, in confusion. The bewildered and uncontrollable horses wheeled about, and, dashing through the batteries, satisfied the gunners that they were charged by the enemy. To this alone I always attributed the failure on our part longer to hold the battle-field and to bring off all our guns, with few exceptions, in an orderly retreat. Most unaccountably this cavalry was not used to cover our retreat or gather the stragglers, but was peremptorily ordered to cross to the south bank of the river.☆ I never again saw their commander.

At night I was called to General McClellan's headquarters, where the chiefs of corps, or their representatives, were gathered. The commanding general, after hearing full reports, was of the opinion that the final result would be disastrous if we undertook longer to hold the north bank of the

☆See "Official Records," Vol. XI., Part II., pp. 43, 223, 273, 282.—F. J. P.

river with my command in the condition in which it was left by a hard fight and the loss of rest for two nights. In this opinion all concurred; and I was then instructed to withdraw to the south bank and destroy the bridges after me. The plans to move to the James River were then explained, together with the necessity for the movement, and the orders were given for their execution.‖

BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL PHILIP ST. GEORGE COOKE. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

My command was safely withdrawn to the south bank of the river, and the bridges were destroyed soon after sunrise on the 28th.⁂

The Prince de Joinville and his two nephews, the Comte de Paris and the Duc de Chartres, were on the field as volunteer aides-de-camp, actively engaged in encouraging the men, carrying messages, and performing other duties of aides. Each of these officers was in the midst of flying musket-balls, and was liable to be struck at any moment [see p. 184]. At one time the Comte de Paris, regardless of himself, begged me to send his uncle to General McClellan with a message which would at once and permanently remove him from the dangers of the battle, since the family interests at stake were too important to permit him to be so exposed. I had shortly before asked Colonel Thomas L. Gantt, another of McClellan's aides, to hasten to that general and hurry up reënforcements, as our lines would soon be broken. The danger was now imminent, and I asked the Prince to carry the same message, telling him that he was selected because of the speed of his horse. He turned as if to go, and I went to attend to the field. Soon the Count returned, with tears in his eyes, and with choking utterance, expressive of his care and affection, begged me again to send away his uncle. This also I did. Scarcely had the Prince left the second time when our cavalry fell back on us as I have related, our line was broken, and our artillery rendered unserviceable. The Prince and Colonel Gantt afterward told me that they did not leave, as I had directed, because all seemed favorable to us, and they

‖ At Gaines's Mill the Union loss was: Killed, 894; wounded, 3107; missing, 2836,—total, 6837. On the Confederate side the losses of Jackson, Ewell, Whiting, and D. H. Hill were: Killed, 589; wounded, 2671; missing, 24,—total, 3284. Of these, Whiting (*i. e.*, Hood's and Law's brigades) lost 1017. The losses of A. P. Hill and Longstreet for this battle are not reported separately, but a safe estimate from their losses in the campaign would probably bring the total considerably beyond the Union loss, that of the killed and wounded certainly much higher. Almost the whole of two Union regiments, the 11th Pennsylvania Reserves and the 4th New Jersey, were captured.—EDITORS.

⁂ The landing at White House and the railroad south from Tunstall's station were abandoned, the infantry and artillery embarking for Fort Monroe, and the cavalry marching to Yorktown.—EDITORS.

thought I could not be in earnest or that I had greatly misjudged the situation. This shows how suddenly the tide may turn in battle and on what little incidents success may depend.

The forces arrayed against us, and especially those which had thus far been launched upon my command, were the chosen of Southern manhood from Maryland to Texas. No braver or more spirited body of men was to be found among the Confederates, or any who more strongly believed in their own invincibility.⚓ Their general officers, from the chief down, had been selected for earnest devotion to their cause, and well-earned reputation for intelligent and energetic performance of duty in other fields. With few exceptions they had been my personal friends, and many of them my intimate associates. In the varied relations to them as subaltern, as instructor, as academical and regimental comrade, in social life, as competitor for honor in war and in garrison life, and engaged in watching those performing trying duty in Kansas, Utah, and elsewhere, I learned to know them well and to respect their decision under conviction of duty, when, to my regret, they left the cause of the Union. Notwithstanding my friendship, my personal regard for these old friends and former comrades, which never varied, it was my duty to oppose them, when arrayed against the Union, to the utmost. At the earliest moment, when separation was attempted, and afterward, my efforts were continuously directed against the success of their cause. One of the results of those efforts was manifested on this battle-field. I was enabled, after great labor and care, to meet these friends and comrades in command of men, than whom there could be none more intelligent, better disciplined, braver, more confiding in each other, and more determined on success. They embraced soldiers from Maine, Michigan, Illinois, Pennsylvania, New York, and all New England—together with all the regular army, then at the East, from all parts of the country. Their commanders were not excelled by those in any other corps in ability or experience; they had the highest confidence in each other, in the army, and in their own men, and were fully competent to oppose their able adversaries.

I have said we did not fear Lee alone at Beaver Dam Creek. Nor, though anxious, did we fear the combined attack of Lee and Jackson at Gaines's Mill. Defeat to us was necessarily great damage to them. Our flanks were secure and could not be turned; though fewer in numbers, the advantages of our position, combined with the firm discipline of our own brave men, overcame the odds. Our adversaries were forced to meet us face to face. All day they struggled desperately for success, and near night, after fearful destruction, broke our line at one point, just at a time when a most unforeseen mismanagement on our part aided to crown their labors with possession of the field. Still, our confidence was not broken; and, as we shall see in a succeeding paper, under like circumstances victory crowned our arms with success against the same opponents, strongly reënforced, at Malvern Hill.

⚓ The known presence of President Davis and General Lee, to oversee, direct, encourage, and urge, was another influential power in favor of the Confederates in this movement.— F. J. P.

THE CHARGE OF COOKE'S CAVALRY AT GAINES'S MILL.

BY PHILIP ST. GEORGE COOKE, BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. A.

IN "The Century" for June, 1885, there is an article on the battle of Gaines's Mill, signed by Fitz John Porter, in which appear singular errors of statement regarding the action of the "Cavalry Reserve," affecting also the conduct and reputation of its commander. He says [see p. 340 of the present volume]:

"We lost in all twenty-two cannon; some of these broke down while we were withdrawing, and some ran off the bridges at night while we were crossing to the south bank of the Chickahominy. The loss of the guns was due to the fact that some of Cooke's cavalry, which had been directed to be kept, under all circumstances, in the valley of the Chickahominy, had been sent to resist an attack of the enemy upon our left. The charge, executed in the face of a withering fire of infantry and in the midst of our heavy cannonading as well as that of the enemy, resulted, as should have been expected, in confusion. The bewildered and uncontrollable horses wheeled about, and, dashing through the batteries, satisfied the gunners that they were charged by the enemy. To this alone I always attributed the failure on our part longer to hold the battle-field, and to bring off all our guns [with few exceptions][1] in an orderly retreat. Most unaccountably this cavalry was not used to cover our retreat or gather the stragglers, but was peremptorily ordered to cross to the south bank of the river." [Footnote: "See 'Official Records,' Vol. XI., Part II., pp. 43, 223, 273, 282.— F. J. P."]

To silence forever the injurious statements and insinuation of the last sentence, I give here evidence of two witnesses who were present, and whose high character is known to all. Major-General Wesley Merritt, colonel Fifth Cavalry, superintendent United States Military Academy, writes me, April 8th, 1885:

"The cavalry remained, with you in immediate command, on that portion of the field, until after midnight on the 27th of June, 1862. It provided litter-bearers and lantern-bearers for our surgeons who went over the field of battle, succoring and attending the wounded. . . . The cavalry was the last force to leave the field and to cross the Chickahominy,[2] and the bridge on which it crossed, between 12 midnight on the 27th and 2 A. M. on the 28th of June, was, I think, rendered impassable by your order."

Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel J. P. Martin, assistant adjutant-general United States Army, wrote me from Fort Leavenworth, April 30th, 1885:

"The artillery did not drive the enemy from his front; the enemy was not driven from his front, but the charge of your cavalry did *stop the advance* of the enemy, and this enabled Porter's troops to get off the field. I am by no means alone in the belief that the charge of the cavalry at Gaines's Mill, on June 27th, 1862, *saved Fitz John Porter's corps from destruction*. . . . You *did not* direct your command at once to cross the river. There were no frightened men in your vicinity. All the frightened men were far to your right; you could not have reached the retiring crowd; and if *you* could have stopped them, you could have done more than Porter himself did do, and he was amidst them, for I saw him. Your command, at least a part of it, was the very last to cross the river."

It should be observed that in the short extract from "The Century," above, General Porter repeats the assertion that the cavalry caused the loss of the (22) guns,—emphasizes, makes plainer, the meaning of the opening sentence: to the charge "*alone* I always attributed the failure on our part to longer hold the battle-field and to bring off *all* our guns in an orderly retreat."

Captain W. B. Weeden, commanding Battery C, 1st Rhode Island Artillery, reports, Vol. XI., Pt. II., p. 282, "Official Records," the loss of a section by stress of the enemy's attacks; the two other sections "held in support in rear of Griffin's brigade" opened fire; "The smoke had filled the whole field to the woods, and it was impossible to direct the fire. The batteries were limbering to the *rear* in good order" when, he says, the cavalry fugitives ran through them, but he only lost one more piece "mired in the woods." But General Griffin reports that the artillery "opened fire upon the enemy advancing upon our left; but it was too late; our infantry had already begun to fall back, and nothing being left to give confidence to the artillerymen, it was impossible to make them stand to their work." And that was just when the cavalry did go in and give confidence to the three batteries on the left, and the saving work was done.

I have examined the "Official Records" and found reports of about twenty batteries engaged in the battle, and the above is the only mention of the cavalry fugitives to be found in them; their losses are attributed to other causes. Here I will give the account of the loss of whole batteries:

General Truman Seymour reports, p. 402, of Captain Easton, "This gallant gentleman fell and his battery was lost with him."

[1] Insertion by General Porter in the revision of his article for the present work.— EDITORS.

[2] Major William H. Powell, of the 4th Regular Infantry, wrote to the Editors on September 8th, 1885: "Probably not much credit attaches to the particular organized force which was the last to cross the Chickahominy River after the battle of Gaines's Mill; but in order to settle the question I desire to state that the cavalry was not the last to cross the river — even if they did leave at the time General Merrill states. The 4th United States Infantry was the last organization which crossed, and that regiment passed over about *two hours after daylight* on the morning of the 28th, and a bridge had to be partly relaid to enable it to do so. This regiment was posted on the extreme right flank of the army at the battle of Gaines's Mill, and was ordered to support Weed's battery. Weed was afterward reënforced by Tidball's battery, and the 4th Infantry held its position from the commencement of the engagement (about 11 A. M.) until twilight of the 27th, without receiving an order or stirring from its position until Weed reported that he had no more ammunition, and retired from the field by way of the Cold Harbor road, covered by the 4th Infantry. Night came upon the regiment as it was retiring on this road. It went into bivouac in line of battle, in the Chickahominy Valley, on the road by which it retired from the field. When daylight came we expected orders to renew the engagement, and took up our march to return to the battle-field, about a mile and a half distant. It was then that some wounded were met, who informed us that all the army had crossed during the night. We then marched from Grapevine Bridge to Alexander's Bridge, in sight of the enemy's pickets, and when we arrived on the south side we were astonished to find that it was thought we had been captured. We learned afterward that orders had been sent to the 4th Infantry during the action, but the officer who started with them was killed; another who took them was wounded before they could be delivered, and an orderly who was subsequently dispatched with them did not arrive at his destination, and was never heard of afterward."

Captain Mark Kerns was wounded, but "loaded and fired the last shots himself, and brought *four* of the guns off the field." Of another battery he reports, "No efforts could now repel the rush of a successful foe, under whose fire rider and horse went down, and guns lay immovable on the field."

Captain J. H. Cooper, Battery B, 1st Pennsylvania Artillery, reports, p. 410:

"The remaining infantry falling back, we were compelled to retire from our guns. The charge being too sudden and overpowering, it was impossible to remove them, many of the horses being killed by the enemy's fire."

Was General Porter prevented from bringing off *all these* guns by the cavalry charge?

General Porter says, p. 322:

"Just *preceding* this break" (in Morell's line) "I saw cavalry, which I recognized as ours, rushing in numbers through our lines on the left."

All the evidence goes to disprove this very deliberate statement, and that all the infantry on the left had broken and was fast disappearing before the first advance of the cavalry. Again he says:

"General Cooke was instructed to take position, with cavalry, under the hills in the valley of the Chickahominy — there with the aid of artillery to guard our left flank. He was especially enjoined to intercept, gather, and hold all stragglers, and under no circumstances to leave the valley for the purpose of coming upon the hill held by our infantry, or pass in front of our line on the left."

What strange folly of self-contradiction is betrayed between this order "to guard our left flank" and the violent condemnation in the first extract, which we have been considering, of the march "to resist an attack of the enemy on our left, . . ." in a "charge executed in the face of a withering fire of infantry, and in the midst of our heavy cannonading as well as that of the enemy." Could a poet laureate say more?

> "Cannon to right of them,
> Cannon to left of them
> Volley'd and thundered —
> . . . . . .
> Then they rode back —

Ay, there's the rub.

When I reported to General Porter before the battle, I remember that he proposed that I should take post in the narrow open meadow on the extreme left. I urged that the flank of the army was virtually covered by the Chickahominy; that, moreover, it was covered by three reserve batteries and 3 29-pounder batteries on the opposite side of the river; while the position I had taken on the hill-slope was within view, and also within cavalry striking distance. If I had gone there, I should not have been able, when the time came, to *face*, and, with artillery aid, to stop the enemy in the flush of his success. To some such objections which I made General Porter evidently yielded, instead of "enjoining" me; for the cavalry *remained* quite near his first station, Adams's house; and I was there with him repeatedly. An order "under no circumstances to leave the valley for the purpose of coming on the hill" would have been to a general officer not only unprecedented, but insulting.

How strange, to military ears, would sound an order "to intercept, gather, and hold all stragglers" on the extreme front and flank! — and the warning not to "pass in *front* of our line on the left!" Such extravagance of action — marching, with no earthly object, between two lines of fire — is seldom thus forestalled! Seriously, this passes the bounds of sanity. But it is emphasized by his map, which represents my cavalry as actually making a flank march between the lines of battle,— Morell's and Longstreet's.

It seems necessary to add the statements of eye-witnesses, from different points of view,— men of well-known high character,— to corroborate my assertions and my corrections of the misrepresentations of the part played by the cavalry and myself in the battle, as found in "The Century" article.

Next morning, at Savage's Station, the Prince de Joinville approached me with both hands extended, saying with *empressement*, "I saw you make your *charge* yesterday"; and next day he wrote to the Duc d'Aumale [see "New York Times," August 13th, 1862]:

. . . "Those fresh troops rush in good order upon our left, which falters, flies, and passing through the artillery draws on in disorder the troops of our center. The enemy advances rapidly. The fusillade and cannonade are so violent that the projectiles striking the ground raise a permanent cloud of dust. At that moment General Cooke charged at the head of his calvary; but that movement does not succeed, and his horsemen on their return only increase the disorder. He makes every effort, aided by all who felt a little courage, to stop the panic, but in vain."

The Comte de Paris wrote to me, February 2d, 1877:

. . . "I was with De Hart's battery on the crest of the hill when you advanced on our left. . . . The sacrifice of some of the bravest of the cavalry certainly saved a part of our artillery; as did, on a larger scale, the Austrian cavalry on the evening of Sadowa. . . . The main fact is, that with your cavalry you did all that cavalry could do to stop the rout."

General W. Merritt wrote me, February 2d, 1877:

"I thought at the time, and subsequent experience has convinced me, that your cavalry and the audacity of its conduct at that time, together with the rapid firing of canister at short range by the battery mentioned, did much, if not everything, toward preventing the entire destruction of the Union army at Gaines's Mill. The circumstances were these:

"The enemy had emerged from a wood, where his ranks were more or less disorganized, into an open field. Instead of finding the way clear before him he was met by a determined charge of cavalry and a heavy artillery fire. In his mind a new line of fresh troops were before him. It was but natural, at that stage of our military experience, that he should hesitate and halt, to prepare for a new emergency. He did so; and that night the cavalry bivouacked as near the scene of these events as the enemy did."

Brevet Lieut.-Colonel J. P. Martin wrote to me, March 24th, 1870:

"It is my opinion that but for the charge of the 5th Cavalry on that day, the loss in the command of General Fitz John Porter would have been immensely greater than it was; indeed, I believe that the charge, more than any other thing, was instrumental in saving that part of the army on the north bank of the Chickahominy.

"You were the last general officer of General Porter's command on the field on the left, General Porter himself leaving before you did; you had, therefore, an excellent opportunity of seeing what was going on."

Colonel G. A. H. Blake, United States Army, wrote me, June 16th, 1879:

"About sundown you advanced the brigade under a warm fire and I deployed the 5th and 1st Cavalry in two lines, and a little to the rear of (the interval of) reserve batteries of artillery, which had opened a rapid fire. The infantry of the left wing had then disappeared from the top of the hill. You then rode off to a battery further to the left, where Rush's Lancers had been ordered. The 5th Cavalry soon charged, and I saw no more of them. You had ordered me to support them; there was a warm fire, and the smoke and dust made everything obscure. I saw none of the 5th, after it was broken, pass through the battery, which was very near. It was soon forced to retire, and was followed by the 1st in its rear."

Finally, General William N. Grier, United States Army, wrote me, July 19th, 1879:

"The reserve was stationed on the hill, . . . in full view of the slopes of the hill, down to the timber through which the enemy debouched in large numbers. The United States batteries were on the slope of the hill, a little to our right front. You ordered the 5th to make a charge, directing me to make a second charge after the 5th would rally. I never saw that regiment again on that day, after it was enveloped in a cloud of dust, making the charge — but soon after saw a battery or two emerge from the dust, . . . withdrawing from the contest. I then wheeled my squadrons into column of fours, at a trot along the top of the hill, until getting in rear of the batteries — receiving the enemy's fire at a loss of an officer and many men and horses — and, as I then supposed, saving the batteries from further loss."

The orders actually given were to support the batteries to the last moment, and then charge, if necessary, to save them.

DETROIT, June, 1885.

RECOLLECTIONS OF A PARTICIPANT IN THE CHARGE.

BY THE REV. W. H. HITCHCOCK.

REMEMBERING clearly the incidents connected with the cavalry charge, I wish to clear up a point in regard to that charge, so far as the regiment (the 5th Regular Cavalry) with which I had the honor of being connected was concerned.

The battle did not begin till noon. We were stationed on the left of our position. As the hours passed, the battle became more and more furious. About 5 P. M. we were moved up near to the crest of the hill on our left, and within some 20 rods of the 5 or 6 batteries planted on the crest of the hill.

It was something marvelous to watch those brave men handle their guns; never a man flinched or was dismayed, though a most withering fire of musketry and artillery was poured upon them.

Just before dark, when we could tell, by the sound of the musketry fire and by the constantly advancing yells of the charging foe, that he was getting near the guns in our front, General Philip St. George Cooke, commanding the cavalry, rode to our front. I was on the right of the front line of the first squadron, and I heard his order to Captain Whiting, commanding the five companies of our regiment that were present on the field. He said, "Captain, as soon as you see the advancing line of the enemy rising the crest of the hill, charge at once, without any further orders, to enable the artillery to bring off their guns." General Cooke then rode back around the right of our squadron.

Captain Whiting turned to us and said, "Cavalry! Attention! Draw saber!" then added something to the effect, "Boys, we must charge in five minutes." Almost immediately, the bayonets of the advancing foe were seen, just beyond our cannon, probably not fifty rods from us. Captain Whiting at once gave the order, "Trot! March!" and as soon as we were fully under way he shouted, "Charge!"

We dashed forward with a wild cheer, in solid column of squadron front; but our formation was almost instantly broken by the necessity of opening to right and left to pass our guns. So furiously were our brave gunners fighting that I noticed this incident: The gun directly in my front had just been loaded; every man had fallen before it could be fired. As I bore to the right to pass this gun, I saw the man at the breech, who was evidently shot through the body, drawing himself up by the spokes of the wheel, and reaching for the lanyard, and I said, "He will fire that gun," and so kept to the right, and almost immediately felt the shock of the explosion. Then I closed in to re-form the line, but could find no one at my left, so completely had our line been shattered by the musketry fire in front and the artillery fire in our rear. I rushed on, and almost instantly my horse reared upright in front of a line of bayonets, held by a few men upon whom I had dashed. My horse came down in front of the line, and ran away partly to our rear, perfectly uncontrollable. I dropped my saber, which hung to my wrist by the saber-knot, and so fiercely tugged at my horse's bit as to cause the blood to flow from her mouth, yet could not check her. The gun I had passed, now limbered up, was being hauled off at a gallop. I could direct my horse a little to right or left, and so directed her toward the gun. As she did not attempt to leap the gun, I gained control of her, and at once turned about and started back upon my charge. After riding a short distance I paused. The firing of artillery and infantry behind and of infantry in front was terrific. None but the dead and wounded were around me. It hardly seemed that I could drive Lee's battle-scarred veterans alone, and so I rode slowly off the field. The regiment had only about 250 men in action. Our commissioned officer was the only one not wounded, except some who were captured. Only about 100 returned from that bloody field for duty the next day. Some were captured, but a large number fell in that terrible charge, and sleep with the many heroes who on that day gave their lives for the Union. So far as those of the 5th Regular Cavalry present in this charge were concerned, we certainly did our whole duty, just as we were ordered. We saved *some* guns, and tried to save all.

FAIRVIEW, ILL., June 13th, 1885.

LEE'S ATTACKS NORTH OF THE CHICKAHOMINY.

BY DANIEL H. HILL, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL, C. S. A.



"W'AT WAR DEY FIGHTIN' 'BOUT?"

While encamped, about noon on Monday, the 23d of June, 1862, on the Williamsburg road, about a mile from the battle-field of Seven Pines, in command of a division of the Confederate army, I received an order from General Lee to report immediately at his quarters on the Mechanicsville road. On approaching the house which the general occupied, I saw an officer leaning over the yard-paling, dusty, travel-worn, and apparently very tired. He raised himself up as I dismounted, and I recognized General Jackson, who till that moment I had supposed was confronting Banks and Frémont far down the Valley of Virginia. He said that he had ridden fifty-two miles since 1 o'clock that morning, having taken relays of horses on the road. We went together into General Lee's office. General Jackson declined refreshments, courteously tendered by General Lee, but drank a glass of milk. Soon after, Generals Longstreet and A. P. Hill came in, and General Lee, closing the door, told us that he had determined to attack the Federal right wing, and had selected our four commands to execute the movement. He told us that he had sent Whiting's division to reënforce Jackson, and that at his instance the Richmond papers had reported that large reënforcements had been sent to Jackson "with a view to clearing out the Valley of Virginia and exposing Washington." He believed that General McClellan received the Richmond papers regularly, and he (Lee) knew of the nervous apprehension concerning Washington.[1] He then said that he would retire to another room to attend to some office work, and would leave us to arrange the details among ourselves. The main point in his mind seemed to be that the crossings of the Chickahominy should be uncovered by Jackson's advance down the left bank, so that the other three divisions might not suffer in making a forced passage.

During the absence of General Lee, Longstreet said to Jackson: "As you have the longest march to make, and are likely to meet opposition, you had better fix the time for the attack to begin." Jackson replied: "Daylight of the 26th." Longstreet then said: "You will encounter Federal cavalry and roads blocked by felled timber, if nothing more formidable: ought you not to give yourself more time?" When General Lee returned, he ordered

[1] I do not know how far the Federals were deceived by the announcement of reënforcements sent to Jackson, but during the Seven Days' battles I read in a Northern paper a letter from Strasburg, Va., of the 25th of June, stating that they were expecting Stonewall Jackson there, and were so well fortified that they would give him a warm reception. Jackson's corps was then at Ashland, within twelve miles of Richmond. He certainly had slipped off without observation.—D. H. H.

A. P. Hill to cross at Meadow Bridge, Longstreet at the Mechanicsville Bridge, and me to follow Longstreet. The conference broke up about nightfall.

It may be of interest to the student of history to know how Jackson managed to slip off so often and so easily. His plan was to press his infantry as near as possible to the enemy, without bringing on a general engagement; then to occupy these advanced points with dismounted cavalry pickets, and to start his "foot cavalry" in the other direction with all possible speed. His stealthy marches to the rear were made without consulting his highest officers, and even without their knowing his destination.‡

It was characteristic of Jackson to select for his chief-of-staff, not a military man, but a Presbyterian minister, a professor in a theological seminary, and to clothe him with the power of carrying out his mysterious orders when he was temporarily absent. Jackson's confidence was well bestowed, and he found in the Rev. R. L. Dabney, D. D., a faithful, zealous, and efficient staff-officer. To him, now a professor in the State University of Texas, I am indebted for the following account of the unexpected appearance of Jackson on the Federal right wing before Richmond:

"General Jackson's forced march from Mount Meridian, in the neighborhood of the Port Republic battle-field, began in earnest on Wednesday, June 18th, the general and a few of the troops having left the evening before. About midday on Thursday, the 19th, we were at Mechum's River Station, about ten miles west of Charlottesville, with the head of the column. The general called me into a room in the hotel, locked the door, and told me that he was about to go in advance of his corps by rail to Richmond to see the commander-in-chief; that the corps was going to Richmond to join in a general attack upon McClellan, but that he would return to his command before we got there; that I was to march the corps toward Richmond, following the line of railroad, as near as the country roads would permit, by Charlottesville and Gordonsville, General Ewell's division to form the head of the column with which I was personally to proceed; that strict precautions of secrecy were to be observed—which he then dictated to me. He then got on an express train and left us. I dined that day with General Ewell, and I remember that he complained to me with some bitterness of General Jackson's reserve, saying, 'Here, now, the general has gone off on the railroad without intrusting to me, his senior major-general, any order, or any hint whither we are going; but [Major J. A.] Harman, his quartermaster, enjoys his full confidence, I suppose, for I hear that he is telling the troops that we are going to Richmond to fight McClellan.'

"'You may be certain, General Ewell,' I replied, 'that you stand higher in

‡ This was a source of annoyance to Loring in '61, and later on to Ewell. When Jackson's corps was so strangely left at Winchester after the battle of Sharpsburg, or Antietam, and General Lee had gone to the Rappahannock (we were making a feint every day of holding the gaps in the Blue Ridge, with strict orders not to bring on an engagement), I said to Jackson one day: "I am the next in rank, and should you be killed or captured in your many scouts around, I would not know what the corps was left for, or what it was expected to do." He then told me that he had suggested to General Lee, who had to move back to protect Richmond, that he could remain and remove our wounded and stores, and that his presence on McClellan's flank and rear would keep him from attacking Lee. In case of any casualty to himself, the removal was to go on till completed.—D. H. H

CONFEDERATE SKIRMISH-LINE DRIVEN IN BY THE UNION ADVANCE.
The original sketch for this picture was made from personal observation. It describes an incident of McClellan's advance up the Peninsula.

General Jackson's confidence than any one else, as your rank and services entitle you. As for Major Harman, he has not heard a word more than others. If he thinks that we are going to Richmond, it is only his surmise, which I suppose every intelligent private is now making.'

"The column reached Gordonsville, Saturday, June 21st, about noon. To my surprise, on riding into town, I got an order to go to the general—at a private house, where he was lodging. On reaching Gordonsville, Thursday afternoon, he had been met by news which alarmed the outpost there: that a heavy Federal force was on the Rapidan, about sixteen miles away. He therefore had postponed going to Richmond until he could effectually clear up this rumor. The chief mode adopted was characteristic: it was to send out by night an intelligent private citizen, thoroughly acquainted with the Rapidan people and country, as his scout. This gentleman came back, after thorough inquiry, with the news that the rumor was unfounded. About half an hour before sunset on Saturday, the general got into an express car with no one but me and the conductor, and came to Frederick's Hall Station in the county of Louisa, arriving about dawn on Sunday, the 22d. We spent the Sabbath there at the house of Mr. N. Harris, attending camp-preaching in the afternoon. At this house were General W. H. C. Whiting and General Hood, then commanding a Texas brigade. At 1 o'clock that night General Jackson arose, took an orderly whom I had selected for him as trustworthy and well acquainted with the road, and started for Richmond with impressed horses.

He had me wake up General Whiting and make *him* sign a pass and an impressment order (which no one under the rank of major-general had a right to do). He had about fifty-two miles to ride to Richmond; to the Nine-mile bridge, near which General Lee was in person, I suppose the distance was as great, so that the ride occupied him, with the time lost in impressing relays of horses, about ten hours. He must have reached his rendezvous with General Lee and his three major-generals about noon on the 23d. If he rode into the city first, the meeting would have been a few hours later. He rejoined his corps at Beaver Dam Station on Tuesday (24th), and assembled the whole of it around Ashland Wednesday night, the 25th. About two hours by sun on the 26th we came into collision with McClellan's outposts. We were much mystified at first to know why the general should put a battery in position and cannonade the bushes furiously for ten minutes only to drive away a picket. We found out afterward this was his signal to you [General D. H. Hill], and in a little while the distant sound of your guns at Ellerson's mill told us that the ball had opened."

It will be seen from the narrative of Major Dabney that General Jackson, who fought some of his most desperate battles on Sunday, would not start to Richmond till Sunday had passed. He had the pass and impressment order from General Whiting that he might not be known on the road; he wore no insignia of rank, and as he would have been known in Richmond he did not go to that city. It was 3 P. M. on the 23d when I saw him at General Lee's headquarters. Major Dabney is mistaken in saying that the signal-guns were intended for me. A. P. Hill was farther up the Chickahominy, and he was to cross first, and, being nearer to Jackson, could hear his guns better

EXTERIOR LINE OF DEFENSES OF RICHMOND ON THE MECHANICSVILLE ROAD (LOOKING SOUTH-EAST). FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME OF McCLELLAN'S ADVANCE.



MECHANICSVILLE FROM THE NORTH-WEST — SCENE OF THE OPENING OF THE SEVEN DAYS' BATTLES.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN THE SPRING OF 1885.

The cross-roads (Mechanicsville proper) are indicated by the two houses at the extreme right. The woods in the left distance show the line of Beaver Dam Creek at the crossing of the upper road from the town. A. P. Hill advanced from Meadow Bridge and along the road in the foreground, his troops deploying at this point on both sides of the road about 4 P. M. The house at the left center (Horn's) marks the location of the Union battery which opened upon Hill's troops as they came along this road, from which the Confederate artillery (McIntosh's and Pegram's) replied as they advanced. Anderson's brigade was sent to the left to flank the Union guns, which, together with the single regiment left in the town by General Porter, withdrew before the enemy to the strong position beyond the creek.
EDITORS.

than those of us lower down the stream. On the 25th there was a brisk fight about King's school-house on the Williamsburg road, between Hooker's division and parts of the divisions of Generals T. H. Holmes and Benjamin Huger. That night my division marched across to the neighborhood of Mechanicsville Bridge. To conceal the movement our camp-fires were freshly lighted up by a detachment after the troops had left, and a company was sent some miles down the Charles City road to send up rockets, as though signaling an advance in that direction. General Lee's order, issued on the 24th of June, says:

"At 3 o'clock Thursday morning, the 26th instant, General Jackson will advance on the road leading to Pole Green Church, communicating his march to General Branch [seven miles above Meadow Bridge], who will immediately cross the Chickahominy and take the road leading to Mechanicsville. As soon as the movements of these columns are discovered, General A. P. Hill, with the rest of his division, will cross the Chickahominy near Meadow Bridge. . . . The enemy being driven from Mechanicsville, and the passage across the bridge opened, Gen-

eral Longstreet, with his division and that of General D. H. Hill, will cross the Chickahominy at or near that point — General D. H. Hill moving to the support of General Jackson, and General Longstreet supporting General A. P. Hill — the four divisions keeping in communication with each other, and moving *en échelon* on separate roads, if practicable; the left division in advance, with skirmishers and sharp-shooters extending their front, will sweep down the Chickahominy, and endeavor to drive the enemy from his position above New Bridge, General Jackson bearing well to his left, turning Beaver Dam Creek, and taking the direction toward Cold Harbor, etc."

General Jackson was unable to reach the point expected on the morning of the 26th. General A. P. Hill says: "Three o'clock P. M. having arrived, and no intelligence from Jackson or Branch, I determined to cross at once, rather than hazard the failure of the whole plan by longer deferring it."

Heavy firing was heard at 3 P. M. at Meadow Bridge, and the Federal outposts were seen fleeing toward Mechanicsville, pursued by A. P. Hill. We could see a line of battle drawn up at that village ready to receive Hill. My division being nearest the bridge, Longstreet ordered me to cross first. Some delay was made in repairing the bridge, and A. P. Hill became hotly engaged before we could get to his relief. At this time President Davis and staff hurried past us, going "to the sound of the firing." Ripley's brigade was pushed forward to the support of three batteries of artillery of Major H. P. Jones's battalion, and the two under Captains R. A. Hardaway and J. W. Bondurant. The five batteries soon silenced the Federal artillery, and the whole plateau about Mechanicsville was abandoned to the Confederates, the Federals retiring across Beaver Dam Creek, which was strongly fortified. Our engineers seem to have had little knowledge of the country, and none of the fortifications on the creek. The maps furnished the division commanders were worthless. At a request from General W. D. Pender, who had been roughly handled in attacking works on the creek, Brigadier-General Ripley, of my division, was directed to coöperate with him, and the attack was made about dark. The enemy had intrenchments of great strength and development on the other side of the creek, and had lined the banks with his magnificent artillery. The approach was over an open plain exposed to a murderous fire of all arms, and across an almost impassable stream. The result was, as might have been foreseen, a bloody and disastrous repulse. Nearly every field-officer in the brigade was killed or wounded. It was unfortunate for the Confederates that the crossing was begun before Jackson got in rear of Mechanicsville. The loss of that position would have necessitated the abandonment of the line of Beaver Dam Creek, as in fact it did, the next day. We were lavish of blood in those days, and it was thought to be a great thing to charge a battery of artillery or an earth-work lined with infantry. "It is magnificent, but it is not war," was the sarcastic remark of the French general as he looked on at the British cavalry charge at Balaklava. The attacks on the Beaver Dam intrenchments, on the heights of Malvern Hill, at Gettysburg, etc., were all grand, but of exactly the kind of grandeur which the South could not afford.

A brisk cannonade was kept up on the morning of the 27th for an hour or more from the Federal artillery along the line of Beaver Dam, which was held by a thin line of skirmishers, the main force having retreated to Gaines's

CHARGE OF CONFEDERATES UNDER RIPLEY AND PENDER AT BEAVER DAM CREEK, JUST ABOVE ELLERSON'S MILL.

Mill and New Cold Harbor. A. P. Hill's division was ordered to pursue on to the mill, and my division to take the Bethesda Church road to join Jackson. The works on that road were turned by my division, and some sixty or seventy prisoners holding them were captured. Major Dabney says:

"General Jackson continued his march on the morning of the 27th. When I overtook him he was dismounted in the turnpike road with his cap off before a gentleman sitting on a cedar-stump, who was speaking to him in a suppressed voice. An old acquaintance whom I met told me that this gentleman was General Lee. The conference soon ended, and the march was resumed — deflecting strongly to the east."

General Lee's object in pressing down the Chickahominy was to unmask New Bridge, and thus to establish close communication between the forces defending Richmond and the six divisions attacking the Federal right. A. P. Hill, who marched close to the Chickahominy, succeeded in driving off the Federal troops defending the creek at Gaines's Mill, and advanced until he developed their full line of battle at New Cold Harbor, half a mile beyond. After waiting till 2:30 P. M. to hear from Longstreet, ☆ he advanced his division without support to the attack of the intrenched position of the Federals. He kept up a struggle for two hours, was repulsed and driven back, and in turn repulsed his pursuers. His report says:

"From having been the attacking I now became the attacked; but stubbornly and gallantly was the ground held. My division was thus engaged full two hours before assistance was received. We failed to carry the enemy's lines, but we paved the way for the successful attacks afterward, in which attacks it was necessary to employ the whole of our army on that side of the Chickahominy."

☆ General Lee in his official report says: "The arrival of Jackson on our left was momentarily expected, and it was supposed that his approach would cause the extension of the enemy's line in that direction. Under this impression, Longstreet was held back until this movement should commence."— EDITORS.

OLD COLD HARBOR TAVERN. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH MADE IN 1885.

This view is from the south, from the road by which the Confederate left under Stonewall Jackson and D. H. Hill advanced to attack Porter's right. Five roads meet at this point. Old Cold Harbor consists of one or two houses and a smithy. During the battle of Gaines's Mill the tavern was within the Confederate lines. Two years later, during the bloody engagement of General Grant's campaign, it was within the Union lines. The name is sometimes written Cool Harbor, Coal Harbor, or Cool Arbor; but Mr. Burnet, the present owner of the tavern, says that family tradition admits only Cold Harbor.— EDITORS.

Longstreet came into action after 4 o'clock. He thus describes the difficulties before him:

"In front of me the enemy occupied the wooded slope of Turkey Hill, the crest of which is fifty or sixty feet higher than the plain over which my troops must pass to make an attack. The plain is about a quarter of a mile wide; the farther side was occupied by sharp-shooters. Above these, and on the slope of the hill, was a line of infantry behind trees, felled so as to form a good breastwork. The crest of the hill, some forty feet above the last line, was strengthened by rifle-trenches and occupied by infantry and artillery. In addition to this the plain was enfiladed by batteries on the other side of the Chickahominy. I was, in fact, in the very position from which the enemy wished us to attack him."

All was done that mortals could do by the two gallant divisions struggling against such disadvantages, but nothing decisive could be effected until the full Confederate forces could be brought into action. In the meanwhile, Jackson moved forward on what we afterward found to be the Grapevine Bridge road, my division in advance. A few squads of Federal stragglers were picked up, and some wagons and ambulances were captured. One sutler, in his desperate desire to save his fancy stock, tried to dash his wagon through J. R. Anderson's brigade. He paid no attention to the orders to halt, or to the presented bayonets. Fortunately for him, his horses did not have so much at stake as he had in canned fruits and vegetables, and were quite willing to surrender. Some poor ragged graybacks got toothsome delicacies then, from which they had been long debarred, and of which before nightfall they had no need forever.

About 2 P. M. we reached the neighborhood of McGehee's house, an elevated knoll, which was the Federal right, and from which a dense and tangled swamp extended westward in an irregular curve to Gaines's Mill. Bondurant's battery

was brought up to feel the position. Jackson remained with it for a time after the firing began. The battery was badly crippled, and was withdrawn by my order when I perceived the superiority of the enemy's artillery— always the most effective arm of his service. So little was known of the condition of the battle and of the roads, that Jackson posted my division in the woods to the left of the road, and facing toward the firing at Gaines's Mill, in order to intercept the forces that Longstreet and A. P. Hill might drive in that direction! Jackson's report says:

"Hoping that Generals A. P. Hill and Longstreet would soon drive the Federals toward me, I directed General D. H. Hill to move his division to the left of the road, so as to leave between him and the wood on the right of the road an open space, across which I hoped that the enemy would be driven. . . . But it soon becoming apparent from the direction and sound of the firing that General A. P. Hill was hard pressed, I ordered a general advance of my entire corps, which began with General D. H. Hill on the left and extending to the right, through Ewell's, Jackson's, and Whiting's divisions . . . in the order named."

The swamp was to be gotten through, filled with sharp-shooters, and obstructed with felled timber and choked with brushwood. The report continues:

"In advancing to the attack, General D. H. Hill had to cross this swamp densely covered with tangled undergrowth and young timber. This caused some confusion and a separation of regiments. On the farther edge of the swamp he encountered the enemy. The conflict was fierce and bloody. The Federals fell back from the wood under the protection of a fence, ditch, and hill. Separated now from them by an open field, some four hundred yards wide, he promptly determined to press forward. Before doing so, however, it was necessary to capture a battery on his left which could enfilade his line upon its advance. . . ↓ Again pressing forward, the Federals again fell back, but only to select a position for a more obstinate defense, when at dark, under the pressure of our batteries,— which had then begun to play with marked effect upon the left,— of the other concurring events of the field, and of the bold and dashing charge of General Hill's infantry, in which the troops of Brigadier-General C. S. Winder joined, the enemy yielded the field and fled in disorder."

I have always believed that this was the first break in the Federal line; it disposed of Sykes's division of regulars who had been so stubborn and so troublesome all day. The Comte de Paris says of their retreat: "Fearfully reduced as they are, they care less for the losses they have sustained than for the mortification of yielding to volunteers." The general advance of our whole line and their intrepid onset everywhere made the defeat of the regulars possible, but credit should be given to the troops that did it. We discovered that our line

↓ The words of Jackson's report, omitted in the quotation, are as follows:

"The battery was captured with severe loss and held for a short time — sufficiently long, however, to enable the division to move on free from its terrific fire, when it was again retaken by the enemy."

This refers to the battle around the McGehee house, the right of Porter's line under command of General George Sykes. The latter gives an account of the contest with Hill differing from that of the Confederate generals. He says:

"It was now 5:30 P. M. The enemy still continued to pour in fresh troops against 4500 men who had baffled him at every point since 11 o'clock in the morning. The excess of strength compelled the 12th and 14th [Regulars] to occupy the crest of a secondary ridge somewhat in rear of the position they had previously won. . . . Previous to this a brigade of volunteers, under Colonel J. J. Bartlett, consisting of the 16th and 27th New York, 5th Maine, and 96th Pennsylvania volunteers, and Kingsbury's battery Regular Artillery, joined my command. Under my direction, Colonel Bartlett posted the regiments of his brigade with great daring in front of and around the McGehee house, and firmly maintained himself until the center of Porter's army was pierced, the troops in his front driven in, his left flank exposed, and his position no longer tenable."

General Bartlett states in his report that he maintained his ground at the McGehee farm until after dark. See also pp. 339, 340. EDITORS.

overlapped that of the Federal forces, and saw two brigades (afterward ascertained to be under Lawton and Winder) advancing to make a front attack upon the regulars. Brigadier-Generals Samuel Garland and G. B. Anderson, commanding North Carolina brigades in my division, asked permission to move forward and attack the right flank and rear of the division of regulars.



THE BATTLE-FIELD OF BEAVER DAM CREEK AT ELLERSON'S MILL. AFTER A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1885.

This view is taken from the left of the Union position on the east slope, looking up-stream, the ruins of Ellerson's Mill being shown in the middle-ground. The house at the left is Dr. Catlin's. The road past the mill, bending at the bridge over the creek, follows the bed of an old mill-dam (not in use at the time of the fight) for a quarter of a mile, and turns again to the left to Mechanicsville, which is three-quarters of a mile farther; and, from the observer's point of view, directly beyond the Catlin house. The Confederate advance from Mechanicsville was by this road, and by another which strikes the creek nearly a mile farther up. The Union position at this point was held by General Seymour, of McCall's division, with artillery intrenchments, rifle-pits, and abatis. The Confederates came across the open hills and down the slope and along the road (offering their flank to the Union artillery) to the line of the creek (shown by the trees below the bridge), but did not cross it. Their loss in this engagement was frightful. Dr. Catlin's son says that the slope of the hill was fairly covered with dead and wounded. The Catlin farm was occupied chiefly by Ripley's brigade of D. H. Hill's division, and by Pender's brigade of A. P. Hill's. The 44th Georgia alone lost 335 killed and wounded, and its efforts to reform in the rear without officers are described as pathetic. "Good heavens!" said the spectators, "is this all of the 44th Georgia?"

The only difficulty in the way was a Federal battery with its infantry supports, which could enfilade them in their advance. Two regiments of Elzey's brigade, which had got separated in going across the swamp, were sent by me, by way of my left flank, to the rear of the battery to attack the infantry supports, while Colonel Alfred Iverson, of the 20th North Carolina, charged it in front. The battery was captured and held long enough for the two brigades to advance across the open plain. "The effect of our appearance," says Garland's official report, "at this opportune juncture [upon the enemy's flank], cheering and charging, decided the fate of the day. The enemy broke and retreated, made a second brief stand, which induced my immediate command to halt under good cover of the bank on the roadside and return their fire, when, charging forward again, they broke and scattered in every direction." Their retreat was to the woods between the field and the river. Swinton gives credit

to Hood and Law for making the first break in the Federal line, and quotes from Jackson's report: "Dashing on with unfaltering step in the face of those murderous discharges of canister and musketry, General Hood and Colonel E. M. Law at the head of their respective brigades rushed to the charge with a yell. Moving down a precipitous ravine, leaping ditch and stream, clambering up a difficult ascent, and exposed to an incessant and deadly fire from the intrenchments, these brave and determined men pressed forward, driving the enemy from his well-selected and fortified position. In this charge, in which upward of a thousand men fell killed and wounded before the fire of the enemy, and in which fourteen pieces of artillery and nearly a regiment were captured, the 4th Texas, under the lead of General Hood, was the first to pierce these strongholds and seize the guns." It is evident that Jackson means to compliment Hood for being the first to pierce the intrenchments on the Federal left. But the word "first" has been misleading as to the point where the break was first made in the Federal line.

General Lawton in his official report stated that after the forces were broken in front of him on our left, a staff-officer rode up and called for assistance to charge a battery on the left, and that after marching two or three hundred yards by the *right* flank, "the shouts of victory from our friends announced that the last battery had been taken and the rout complete." In a letter to me just received, General Lawton says: "I do believe that the first break was on the right of the Federal line, and I moved against that line in front. My knowledge of the position of the battery to be charged was derived solely from the lips of a staff-officer, who rode up to me at full speed on the field, and returned immediately to his chief. My recollection is, that very promptly after I heard the shouts of victory from our friends, the same messenger came again to request me to halt. . . . I cannot feel that my memory fails me when I say that you struck the enemy in flank, while Winder's command and mine moved directly on his front. The effect of these several attacks was promptly felt, and soon became conspicuous."

It was now quite dark, and I took the responsibility of halting all the troops on our left. General Winder thought that we ought to pursue into the woods, on the right of the Grapevine Bridge road; but, not knowing the position of our friends, nor what Federal reserves might be awaiting us in the woods, I thought it advisable not to move on. General Lawton concurred with me. I had no artillery to shell the woods in advance, as mine had not got through the swamp. No Confederate officer on the field knew that the Federals had but one bridge over which to retreat, else all the artillery that could have been collected would have opened fire upon the Federal masses crowded into a narrow space in the woods, and there would have been a general advance of our line under cover of this fire. Winder was right; even a show of pressure must have been attended with great results. I made my headquarters at McGehee's house, and ordered my artillery and infantry to occupy the hill around it. The artillery, however, did not get into position until sunrise next morning. Before the infantry was in place, we heard huzzaing on the bridge road, and understood by that that reënforcements had come to cover up the Federal

CHARGE OF A SUTLER UPON J. R. ANDERSON'S BRIGADE AT GAINES'S MILL.

retreat. They took up their position across the road and showed a determined front, but might have been broken by an artillery fire from our elevated plateau; unfortunately for us, there was no artillery to do this work.

Between 9 and 10 o'clock General Lawton and myself walked out alone to examine the line of battle across the road, afterward discovered to be Meagher's Irish brigade. We got within thirty yards of the Federals, and must have been seen, but we were not fired upon, probably because we were mistaken for a party of their own men sent up to get water at McGehee's well. We met the party going back, and saw them go into their own lines. Not a word was spoken by them or by us. At such times "Silence is golden."[1]

[1] After this paper appeared in "The Century" magazine, I received a letter from William H. Osborne, of East Bridgewater, Mass., of which the following is a part:

"I read your article on the battle of Gaines's Mill, Va. I was especially interested in the circumstances related by you concerning the water party sent out from the Irish Brigade to McGehee's well, and the adventure of yourself and General Lawton. I remember the incident with great vividness, as I was one of the party. I was a member of Company "C," 29th Regiment, Massachusetts Volunteers, which was a part of the brigade referred to, but I have always supposed, till I read your article, that

In his attack upon General McClellan's right wing General Lee had 50,000 men.\ General Fitz John Porter, who commanded the Federals at Cold Harbor, handled his 40,000 men with an ability unsurpassed on any field during the war. He had greatly the advantage in position, and he had improved this superiority with intrenchments, log breastworks, rifle-pits, and abatis. He had an immense preponderance in artillery, and that of the most superb character. Many of our field-batteries did not get across the swamp at all, and those which did get over were inferior in range and power to General Porter's. Artillery seems to have been a favorite arm with General McClellan, and he had brought it to the highest point of efficiency.

I do not know how much of our infantry straggled in the swamp. Ripley got lost, and his fine brigade was not in action at all. Of Colquitt's brigade, the 6th and 27th Georgia regiments were engaged; the other three regiments in coming out of the swamp found themselves behind Jackson's corps and were not engaged. Rodes, Garland, and Anderson kept their brigades well in hand and did brilliant service. (These three splendid officers were all killed, subsequently, in battle.) I do not know how many men the other five divisions lost by the difficulties of the swamp.

Riding in advance of his skirmish-line through the swamp attended by a few staff-officers, General Jackson found himself in the presence of fifteen or twenty Federal soldiers on outpost duty. He judged it the part of prudence to assume the offensive and charge upon them before they fired upon him. I am indebted to Major T. O. Chestney, then assistant adjutant-general of Elzey's brigade, for the following account:

"As Elzey's brigade was pressing forward to the line held by the Confederates at the bloody battle of Gaines's Mill, a squad of fifteen or twenty soldiers were encountered on their way to the rear. A tall fellow at the head of the little party drew special attention to himself by singing out to us at the top of his voice with an oath, 'Gentlemen, we had the honor of being captured by Stonewall Jackson himself,'— a statement which he repeated with evident pride all along the line, as our men tramped past. We subsequently learned that his story was true. General Jackson, having ridden some distance in advance, had come suddenly upon the blue-coats, and with his characteristic impetuosity had charged among them and ordered them to surrender, which they made haste to do."

One of the saddest things connected with the miserable fratricidal war was the breaking up of ties of friendship and of blood. The troops opposing mine on that murderous field that day were the regulars of General George Sykes, a Southerner by birth, and my room-mate at West Point,—a man admired by all for his honor, courage, and frankness, and peculiarly endeared to me by his social qualities. During the negotiations of the cartel for the exchange of prisoners, intrusted to General Dix and myself, I sent word to General Sykes, through Colonel N. B. Sweitzer, of General McClellan's staff, that

it was later in the night when we started. I have also always supposed that in going for water we went inside the Confederate lines. I remember that several times during the night we approached very near your lines, on one occasion actually seeing your men gathered about a smoldering camp-fire in the woods. I suppose you will not blame me for saying that we should all have esteemed it a great honor if we had made your acquaintance that night."

D. H. H.

\ Dabney, in his "Life of Jackson," puts the Confederate force at 40,000. Swinton estimates Porter's forces at 30,000 and Lee's at 70,000— an under and an over estimate respectively, I think.—D. H. H.

General Porter (see foot-note, p. 337) estimates his fighting strength at 30,000, and that of the Confederates at 65,000.—EDITORS.



"CAPTURED BY STONEWALL JACKSON HIMSELF." (SEE P. 359.)

"had I known that he was in front of me at Cold Harbor, I would have sent some of my North Carolina boys up to take him out of the *cold*." He replied through the same source: "I appreciate the sarcasm, but our time will be next and the tables will be turned." Alas! it was a true prophecy. About 9 P. M. on the 27th, Major H. B. Clitz was brought into my room at the McGehee house, headquarters for the night, wounded in the leg, and a prisoner. He was very young and boyish-looking when he entered West Point, and was a very great favorite with us of maturer years. It flashed upon my mind how, in the Mexican war, as his regiment filed past, I had almost a fatherly fear lest he should be struck; and now he was here, wounded by one of my own men! He was tenderly cared for by my medical director, Doctor Mott, and I was delighted to learn that he would not lose his leg. The next morning General John F. Reynolds was brought in as a prisoner. He had been my messmate in the old army for more than a year, and for half that time my tent-mate. Not an unkind word had ever passed between us. General Reynolds seemed confused and mortified at his position. He sat down and covered his face with his hands, and at length said: "Hill, we ought not to be enemies." I told him that there was no bad feeling on my part, and that he ought not to fret at the fortunes of war, which were notoriously fickle. He was placed in my ambulance and sent over to Richmond, declining a loan of Confederate money. General Reynolds had gone to sleep in the woods between the battle-ground and

the Chickahominy, and when he awoke, his troops were gone and the bridge was broken down.

Winder, Anderson, and Garland, probably the most promising of all our young brigadiers, fell fighting for the cause they loved. Reynolds, one of the noblest of mankind, fell doing his duty on his side at Gettysburg. Sykes, as the friend of McClellan, never received the recognition which his knightly qualities demanded. Worst of all, Porter, who commanded on the field the most creditable to the Federal arms, received that condemnation so much worse than death from the country he had served ably and loyally.

In these battles, the great want with the Confederates, strange as it may seem, was accurate knowledge of the country in their front. The map furnished me (and I suppose the six other major-generals had no better) was very full in regard to everything within our own lines; but a red line on the east side of the Chickahominy and nearly parallel to it, without any points marked on it, was our only guide to the route on which our march was to be made.] None of us knew of the formidable character of the works on Beaver Dam. The blood shed by the Southern troops there was wasted in vain, and worse than in vain; for the fight had a most dispiriting effect on our troops. They could have been halted at Mechanicsville until Jackson had turned the works on the creek, and all that waste of blood could have been avoided. Ripley's brigade was sent to the assistance of Pender, by the direct order, through me, of both Mr. Davis and General Lee. They both felt pressing upon them the vast importance of keeping near Richmond, and of opening up communications with it as soon as possible. The crossing of the river by General A. P. Hill before hearing from Jackson precipitated the fight on the first day; and it having begun, it was deemed necessary to keep it up, without waiting for Jackson. The same necessity compelled Lee on the second day to attack his antagonist on his own strong and well-chosen position. Lee knew that McClellan depended upon the York River Railroad for his supplies, and by moving upon that road he could have compelled the battle upon his own selected ground, with all the advantages thereof. The lack of transportation, and the fear of the capture of Richmond while he was making this détour to the Federal rear, constrained him to surrender the advantage of position wisely chosen by the Federals and skillfully arranged for defense.

During Lee's absence Richmond was at the mercy of McClellan; but

] General E. M. Law, writing on this point in the "Southern Bivouac," says:

"The real trouble was that the Confederate officers, even those in high command, knew little or nothing of the topography of the country in which they were operating. An accurate map in the hands of each division commander would have saved many valuable lives at Gaines's mill as well as at Ellerson's, and time enough would have been gained to have brought the whole Confederate force upon the field at the former place several hours before it actually reached there. If Porter's lines had been broken at 4 o'clock instead of at half-past 6, he would not have had the cover of night to withdraw his routed troops, and his whole command could have been captured or destroyed in attempting the passage of the Chickahominy. There was no reason why this was not done, except the one given. The Federals, on the other hand, knew the country thoroughly; they had occupied it for several weeks, and during that time their engineer officers had inspected it carefully. . . . There was no earthly reason why the Confederate authorities should not have been possessed of the same information. The Federal Government had been all the previous winter preparing for the advance upon Richmond. McClellan was a long time getting from Yorktown to his position on the Chickahominy, and all his movements indicated the probable position he would take up in front of Richmond. There was no lack of time, therefore, to map the locality accurately, and no lack of warning that it would be of the most vital importance. To undertake the defense of a city, without attempting to learn the topography of the country around it, was a new principle in modern warfare." EDITORS.

Magruder was there to keep up a "clatter," as Swinton expresses it. No one ever lived who could play off the Grand Seignior with a more lordly air than could "Prince John," as Magruder was called.[1] During the absence of Lee he kept up such a clatter that each of McClellan's corps commanders was expecting a special visit from the much-plumed cap and the once-gaudy attire of the master of ruses and strategy. He put on naturally all those grand and imposing devices which deceive the military opponent.

The fortifications around Richmond at that time were very slight. McClellan could have captured the city with very little loss of life. The want of supplies would have forced Lee to attack him as soon as possible, with all the disadvantages of a precipitated movement. But McClellan seems to have contemplated nothing of the kind; and as he placed the continuance of the siege upon the hazard of Cold Harbor, he was bound to put every available man into that fight.

Just before we crossed the Chickahominy, I asked General Garland if he remembered what Napoleon said at Austerlitz when one of his marshals had begged permission to attack a column of the Austro-Russian army which was making a flank movement. Garland replied: "I, too, was just thinking that McClellan was saying to his officers, as Napoleon did, 'When your enemy is making a false movement, do not strike him till he has completed it'; and it may be that he will gobble up Richmond while we are away."

While we were lying all day idle on the 28th, unable to cross the Chickahominy, the clouds of smoke from the burning plunder in the Federal camps and the frequent explosions of magazines indicated a retreat; but Whiting kept insisting upon it that all this was but a *ruse de guerre* of McClellan preparatory to a march upon Richmond. I made to him some such reply as that once made to General Longstreet, when a cadet at West Point, by Professor Kendrick. The Professor asked Longstreet, who never looked at his chemistry, how the carbonic acid of commerce was made. Longstreet replied: "By burning diamonds in oxygen gas." "Yes," said Professor Kendrick, "that will do it; but don't you think it would be a *leetle* expensive?"[2] "Don't you think," I said to Whiting, "that this *ruse* of McClellan is a leetle expensive?" The old West Point yarn had a very quieting effect upon his apprehensions.

[1] In ante-bellum days (so the old army story used to run) Magruder was a lieutenant of artillery at Rouse's Point. There his mess entertained some British officers, two of whom were scions of nobility. The visit having been expected, the mess had borrowed or rented gold plate and silver plate, cut-glass ware, rich furniture, and stylish equipages for conveying the noble guests. Prince John assured them that these were but the débris of the former splendor of the regimental mess. "Only the débris, my lord; the schooner bringing most of the mess plate from Florida was wrecked." On the second day of the festival one of the dazzled noblemen said to Prince John: "We do not wish to be inquisitive, but we have been so much impressed with this magnificence that we are constrained to believe that American officers must be paid enormously. What is your monthly pay?" Assuming an indifferent air, Prince John said: "Damned if I know"; then, turning to his servant, "Jim, what is my monthly pay?" The servant was discreetly silent, it may be from a wink, or it may be that to remember $65 was too heavy a tax upon his memory also.—D. H. H.

[2] The professor would never contradict any one. The following is a specimen of his style of questioning. X. Y. Z. (whose name is now a household word) was on examination: Professor K. "What is its color?" X. Y. Z. "White, sir." Professor K. "Yes, you mean a kind of grayish white. In fact, you might call it coal-black, might you not?" X. Y. Z. "Yes, sir, that's it."—D. H. H.

ON THE CONFEDERATE RIGHT AT GAINES'S MILL.}

BY E. M. LAW, MAJOR-GENERAL, C. S. A.

BY 5 o'clock on the 27th of June the battle of Gaines's Mill was in full progress all along the line. Longstreet's and A. P. Hill's men were attacking in the most determined manner, but were met with a courage as obstinate as their own by the Federals who held the works. After each bloody repulse the Confederates only waited long enough to re-form their shattered lines or to bring up their supports, when they would again return to the assault. Besides the terrific fire in front, a battery of heavy guns on the south side of the Chickahominy was in full play upon their right flank. There was no opportunity for manœuvring or flank attacks, as was the case with D. H. Hill on our extreme left. The enemy was directly in front, and he could only be reached in that direction. If he could not be driven out before night it would be equivalent to a Confederate disaster, and would involve the failure of General Lee's whole plan for the relief of Richmond. . . . It was a critical moment for the Confederates, as victory, which involved the relief or the loss of their capital, hung wavering in the balance. Night seemed about to close the account against them, as the sun was now setting upon their gallant, but so far fruitless efforts.

While matters were in this condition Whiting's division, after crossing with much difficulty the wooded and marshy ground below Gaines's Mill, arrived in rear of that portion of the line held by the remnants of A. P. Hill's division. When Whiting advanced to the attack a thin and irregular line of General Hill's troops were keeping up the fight, but, already badly cut up, could effect nothing, and were gradually wasting away under the heavy fire from the Federal lines. From the center of the division to the Chickahominy swamp on the right the ground was open; on the left were thick woods. The right brigade (Law's) advanced in the open ground, the left (Hood's) through the woods.

As we moved forward to the firing we could see the straggling Confederate line lying behind a gentle ridge that ran across the field parallel to the Federal position. We passed one Confederate battery in the edge of the field badly cut to pieces and silent. Indeed, there was no Confederate artillery then in action on that part of the field. The Federal batteries in front were in full play. The fringe of woods along the Federal line was shrouded in smoke, and seemed fairly to vomit forth a leaden and iron hail. General Whiting rode along his line and ordered that there should be no halt when we reached the slight crest occupied by the few Confederate troops in our front, but that the charge should begin at that point in double-quick time, with trailed arms and without firing. Had these orders not been strictly obeyed the assault would have been a failure. No troops could have stood long under the withering storm of lead and iron that beat into their faces as they became fully exposed to view from the Federal lines. As it was, in the very few moments it took them to pass over the slope and down the hill to the ravine, a thousand men were killed or wounded.

Law's brigade advanced to the attack in two lines, the 11th Mississippi regiment (Colonel Liddell) and the 4th Alabama (Lieutenant-Colonel McLemore) forming the first line, and the 2d Mississippi (Colonel Stone) and the 6th North Carolina (Colonel Avery) the second. Hood had a similar formation on our left, but just as we came under fire, and before reaching the slope where the charge began, General Hood passed rapidly across my rear at the head of the 4th Texas regiment, closely followed by the 18th Georgia, both of his brigade. They came up on my right, extending our line in that direction. The 1st and 5th Texas regiments and the Hampton Legion of the same brigade remained on the left in the woods. Passing over the scattering line of Confederates on the ridge in front, the whole division "broke into a trot" down the slope toward the Federal works. Men fell like leaves in an autumn wind, the Federal artillery tore gaps in the ranks at every step, the ground in rear of the advancing column was strewn thickly with the dead and wounded; not a gun was fired in reply; there was no confusion, and not a step faltered as the two gray lines swept silently and swiftly on; the pace became more rapid every moment; when the men were within thirty yards of the ravine, and could see the desperate nature of the work in hand, a wild yell answered the roar of Federal musketry, and they rushed for the works. The Confederates were within ten paces of them when the Federals in the front line broke cover, and, leaving their log breastworks, swarmed up the hill in their rear, carrying away their second line with them in their rout. Then we had our "innings." As the blue mass surged up the hill in our front, the Confederate fire was poured into it with terrible effect. The target was a large one, the range short, and scarcely a shot fired into that living mass could fail of its errand. The debt of blood contracted but a few moments before was paid, and with interest.

Firing as they advanced, the Confederates leaped into the ravine, climbed out on the other side, and over the lines of breastworks, reaching the crest of the hill beyond with such rapidity as to capture all of the Federal artillery (fourteen pieces) at that point. We had now reached the high plateau in rear of the center of General Porter's position, his line having been completely cut in two, and thus rendered no longer tenable. From the flanks of the great gap where Whiting's division had torn through, the Federal lines gave way in both directions. R. H. Anderson's brigade, till then

} This description of the fighting in front of Morell's line is from an extended paper on "The Fight for Richmond in 1862," which appeared in "The Southern Bivouac" for April, 1887.—EDITORS.

in reserve, passed through on the right, and led the way for Longstreet's division, while on the left the roll of musketry receded toward the Chickahominy, and the cheering of the victorious Confederates announced that Jackson, Ewell, and D. H. Hill were sweeping that part of the field.

The battle was won; the Federal infantry was in full flight toward the swamps of the Chickahominy and the bridges in their rear, leaving a large portion of their artillery in the hands of the Confederates. But the fighting was not all over. Several Federal batteries, posted in reserve on the further side of the plateau which the Confederates had gained, opened a rapid but rather ineffective fire, with the view of covering the retreat of their infantry. The 4th Texas and 18th Georgia regiments of Hood's, and the 11th Mississippi and 4th Alabama of Law's brigade, continued their advance across the plateau directly upon these batteries. And here occurred an incident of the battle which has been a subject of much acrimonious dispute among Federal officers, especially Generals Porter and Philip St. George Cooke, the latter commanding the cavalry on Porter's extreme left next to the Chickahominy. In order to protect the guns upon which Law and Hood were advancing, General Cooke withdrew a portion of his command from the low grounds near the river and ordered a charge by a battalion of the 5th United States Cavalry upon the advancing Confederates. Our line was ragged and irregular, as every soldier knows will be the case after such fighting as it had passed through, and the opportunity seemed favorable to check its farther advance and save the batteries from capture. The charge was directed upon the center of the Confederate line, which was halted and partly re-formed to receive it. Though delivered in most gallant style, it was repulsed with heavy loss, including all but *one* of the officers who entered it. This episode consumed scarcely more time than it takes to write it. In the meantime, those of the cavalry who escaped retreated through the artillery they were attempting to save, and in the confusion of the retreat most of the guns were captured.

General Porter represents this charge as having been made on his extreme left (Longstreet's right), and beyond the stream along which his infantry line was originally formed, and severely censures General Cooke, charging him with throwing the artillery into confusion by retreating through it and preventing it from checking the Confederate advance. His statement as to the locality of the cavalry attack and his charges against General Cooke cannot be reconciled; for, had Cooke's cavalry attacked where General Porter says it did, it would have been utterly impossible for its line of retreat to have passed anywhere near the position of the batteries, and its flight after the repulse could have had no effect whatever upon the loss of the guns. Hood's and Law's line of advance was directly across the plateau from the left center of Porter's original line, where they had broken in, passing south of and near the Watts house on the plateau; and as the cavalry charge was made upon *them*, and *they* captured the guns, it follows that the charge could only have been made *there*, and *not* half a mile nearer the Chickahominy, where it would have been objectless, and indeed ridiculous. I speak positively on this point, as I was an eye-witness of the whole affair, commanded the troops who received the charge, and was engaged in the capture of the guns. Whatever may be said to the contrary, it is certain that the batteries, having no infantry supports, did not check our advance for a moment. The diversion by the cavalry, on the other hand, did delay their capture for the short period it took to repulse it, and gave time for the artillerists to save some of their guns.

While these events were taking place on the plateau, heavy firing was going on immediately upon the left of the gap in the Federal line through which we had passed, now some distance in our rear. As the front was clear, my brigade was halted and re-formed. This had scarcely been done when a Confederate cheer rose from the woods in the direction of the firing, and a large body of Federals rushed out upon the plateau on our left and rear, retreating rapidly and in great confusion. Part of them passed to our left, while the greater portion were running across our rear in the attempt to escape to the Chickahominy swamp in that direction. My rear rank was faced about, and they were called on to surrender. No attention was paid to the first summons, and a few shots were fired into our ranks. A volley from our rear rank, which now faced them, induced them to listen to reason, and they at once threw down their arms in token of surrender.☆ The 1st and 5th Texas regiments and the Hampton Legion (Hood's brigade), which it will be remembered were on the left of Law's brigade in the original line of

☆ These troops were the 11th Pennsylvania Reserves, of McCall's division, and the 4th New Jersey, Sloeum's division. The 11th lost 50 killed, and 634, including wounded, were made prisoners.

Colonel J. H. Simpson, of the 4th New Jersey, explains the circumstances of the capture in a letter written from the military prison, Richmond, Va., July 8th, 1862, in which he says:

"To relieve my friends of all apprehension about my safety, I write to say that I am now here a prisoner of war, with a large portion of my regiment, and in good health and spirits. My regiment was posted in the wood to sustain the center in the battle near Gaines's Mill, on Friday, June 27th, and nobly did it hold its ground till about an hour after the right and left wings of the army had fallen back. Mine (4th New Jersey) and Colonel Gallagher's 11th Pennsylvania Reserve were the last to leave the front, and only did so when we found that the rest of the army had given way, and we were literally surrounded by the infantry and batteries of the Confederate forces.

"Being in the woods, and trusting to our superior officers to inform us when to retreat, and not being able to see on account of the woods what was going on toward our right and left, we continued fighting probably an hour after every other regiment had left the ground. The consequence was inevitable. We were surrounded by ten times our number, and though we could have fought till every man of us was slain, yet humanity, and, as I think, wisdom, dictated that we should at last yield. . . . Our casualties, so far as known, were: killed, 38; wounded, 111,—total 149,—besides 75 missing, of whom a number probably was killed and wounded. Considering the great jeopardy in which we were, I look upon it as a great mercy we all were not shot down." EDITORS.

attack, had not driven the Federal line in their front at the same time with the rest of the division; but they had now forced it, and were closely following the fugitives. The prisoners, about 800 in number, were turned over to the 5th Texas regiment, which was close on their heels.

THE CAUSE OF A SILENT BATTLE.[1]

BY PROFESSOR JOHN B. DE MOTTE, DE PAUW UNIVERSITY, IND.

REFERENCE has been made to the supposed effect of the wind in preventing, as in the case of the heavy cannonading between the *Merrimac* and *Congress*, the transference of sound-waves a distance of not over three and one-half miles over water; and at another time, during the bombardments of the Confederate works at Port Royal, a distance of not more than two miles. "The day was pleasant," says the writer, "and *the wind did not appear unusually strong.*" Yet "people living in St. Augustine, Florida, told me afterward that the Port Royal cannonade was heard at that place, 150 miles from the fight." ⚓

It occurs to me that the effect of the wind is greatly exaggerated in these instances. How an ordinary breeze could "carry all sounds of the conflict away from people standing within plain sight of it" and yet carry the same sound 150 miles in the opposite direction, is rather too strongly opposed to scientific fact to remain on record undisputed.

In all of these cases, is it not probable that the varying density of the air had much more to do with this strange acoustic opacity than the wind?

These statements call to mind the prevalent belief that fog, snow, hail, and rain, indeed, any conditions of the atmosphere that render it optically opaque, render it also acoustically opaque; which, up to the time of Mr. Tyndall's experiments in the English Channel, off Dover, had scarcely been questioned. His tests made in 1873–74 proved conclusively, as is now well known, that on clear days the air may be composed of differently heated masses, saturated in different degrees with aqueous vapors, which produce exactly the deadening effects described above.

I submit as a case in point a similar effect, and its explanation as furnished by Mr. R. G. H. Kean to Professor Tyndall, and considered by the latter of sufficient value to find a place in his published works:

"On the afternoon of June 27th, 1862, I rode, in company with General G. W. Randolph, then Secretary of War of the Confederate States, to Price's house, about nine miles from Richmond. The evening before General Lee had begun his attack on McClellan's army, by crossing the Chickahominy about four miles above Price's, and driving in McClellan's right wing.

"The battle of Gaines's Mill was fought the afternoon to which I refer. The valley of the Chickahominy is about one and a half miles wide from hill-top to hill-top. Price's is on one hill-top, that nearest to Richmond; Gaines's farm, just opposite, is on the other, reaching back in a plateau to Cold Harbor.

"Looking across the valley, I saw a good deal of the battle, Lee's right resting in the valley, the Federal left wing the same. My line of vision was nearly in the line of the lines of battle. I saw the advance of the Confederates, their repulse two or three times, and in the gray of the evening the final retreat of the Federal forces. I distinctly saw the musket-fire of both lines, the smoke, individual discharges, the flash of the guns. I saw batteries of artillery on both sides come into action and fire rapidly. Several field-batteries on each side were plainly in sight. Many more were hid by the timber which bounded the range of vision.

"Yet looking for nearly two hours, from about 5 to 7 P. M. on a midsummer afternoon, at a battle in which at least 50,000 men were actually engaged, and doubtless at least 100 pieces of field-artillery, through an atmosphere optically as limpid as possible, *not a single sound of the battle* was audible to General Randolph and myself. I remarked it to him at the time as astonishing.

"Between me and the battle was the deep, broad valley of the Chickahominy, partly a swamp shaded from the declining sun by the hills and forest in the west (my side). Part of the valley on each side of the swamp was cleared: some in cultivation, some not. Here were conditions capable of providing several belts of air, varying in the amount of watery vapor (and probably in temperature), arranged like laminæ at right angles to the acoustic waves as they came from the battle-field to me." ⸸

[1] For references to the phenomena of irregular transmission of sound at the battles on the Chickahominy, see the articles of Generals Joseph E. Johnston, Gustavus W. Smith, and Wm. B. Franklin, pp. 213, 244, and 368, respectively. In Vol. I., p. 713, General R. E. Colston, mentions the interesting fact about the engagement between the *Congress* and *Merrimac*, at the mouth of the James River, March 8th, 1862.

⚓ The Port Royal incident was related in a communication to "The Century" magazine by Mr. S. H. Prescott, of Concord, N. H., in part as follows: "At the bombardment of the Confederate works at Port Royal, South Carolina, in November, 1861, the transport my regiment was on lay near enough inshore to give us a fine view of the whole battle; but only in some temporary lull of the wind could we hear the faintest sound of firing. The day was a pleasant one, and the wind did not appear to be unusually strong; but I noticed then and afterward that a breeze on the coast down that way was very different from the erratic gusts and flaws I had been used to in the New England States, the whole atmosphere seeming to move in a body, giving sound no chance to travel against it, but carrying it immense distances to the leeward. People living at St. Augustine, Florida, told me afterward that the Port Royal cannonade was heard at that place, 150 miles from where the fight took place. A portion of the siege-batteries at Morris Island, South Carolina, were not more than two miles from our camp, but at times the firing from them and the enemy's replies could only be heard very faintly even at that short distance, while at others, when the wind blew from the opposite direction, the sounds were as sharp and distinct as if the battle were taking place within a few rods of us."

⸸ General E. M. Law, of Lee's army, in the "Southern Bivouac" for May, 1887, speaks as follows of the "silent battle" of Gaines's Mill: "To the troops stationed near the river, on the Richmond side, the action at Gaines's Mill was plainly visible, that part of it, at least, which took place in the open ground. I have been told by an eye-witness that from Price's house, on the opposite side, he could distinctly see the Confederate lines advancing to the attack through the open ground beyond the Chickahominy swamp, and could distinguish the direction of the lines of battle by the volume of smoke arising from the woods farther to the Confederate center and left. But it was all like a pantomime; not a sound could be heard, neither the tremendous roar of the musketry nor even the reports of the artillery. As they saw our assaulting lines recoil from the onset, as they were several times compelled to do early in the fight, the anxiety of our friends 'over the river' to help was intense; but the enemy was in their front also, and their time for action would soon come." EDITORS.

REAR-GUARD FIGHTING DURING THE CHANGE OF BASE.

BY WILLIAM B. FRANKLIN, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. V.



UNIFORM OF THE 72D PENNSYLVANIA, BAXTER'S FIRE ZOUAVES.

THE positions of the troops holding the Union line on the south side of the Chickahominy on the 26th of June, 1862 (the day before the battle of Gaines's Mill), were the following: General W. F. Smith's division of my corps, the Sixth, held the right of the line, its right resting on the hill overlooking the Chickahominy [two miles north of Fair Oaks station], and my other division, General Slocum's, was next on the left. Going toward the left, General Sumner's corps came next, then General Heintzelman's, and then, on the extreme left reaching to White Oak Swamp, General Keyes's corps.† On the 26th an epaulement was thrown up by the troops of the Sixth Corps in a wheat-field in front of our lines on Golding's farm, which was ready for guns on the morning of the 27th. During the night of the 26th five batteries of the Artillery Reserve, under the command of Colonel (now General) G. W. Getty, were collected in rear of the epaulement, ready to take position in it and commence a heavy artillery fire on the enemy's line opposite. [See map, p. 384.] Golding's is near the Chickahominy on the extreme right of the Union intrenched line. Five days' rations, cold tea in the canteens, etc., etc., had been issued, so that everything was ready to follow up the projected bombardment, which it was presumed would commence on the morning of the 27th. But on the evening of the 26th the fight at Beaver Dam Creek occurred, and General McClellan called at my headquarters on his way to confer with General Porter as to his operations of the next day. I was then absent at General Slocum's headquarters, conferring with him in regard to the attack we were expecting to make, and therefore missed General McClellan, so that I received no word from him until the next morning.

About daylight on the 27th I received orders to send General Slocum's division across the Chickahominy to report to General Porter. This order was countermanded a short time after the division had started by way of Woodbury's Bridge, and it returned to its station. About 10:30 o'clock in the morning the enemy opened on our artillery with theirs, doubtless unaware of

† General Heintzelman's corps, the 3d, advanced to the positions held by its outposts on the 26th, after a sharp engagement along the whole line on the 25th, known as Oak Grove, or King's School House. Oak Grove was the first of the Seven Days' battles. The Union loss was 67 killed, 504 wounded, 55 missing. The Confederate reports show a total loss of 441. (For the strategy of this movement see General McClellan's article, page 179.) The ground secured by this action varied in front of the different brigades, and was from a quarter of a mile to one mile in advance of the line that had been held by the Third Corps since the battle of Seven Pines.—EDITORS.

UNION TROOPS BUILDING THE CORDUROY APPROACHES TO GRAPEVINE BRIDGE. FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.
It was mainly by this bridge that the Union troops were withdrawn the night after the battle of Gaines's Mill.

the five batteries of reserve artillery mentioned above. The fire was kept up for an hour, and as theirs slackened, so did ours, until both sides ceased firing. Two hours before the bombardment began I received orders not to do anything to bring on a general engagement, and after the cessation of the artillery fire everything was quiet in our front for several hours. At 2 o'clock I was ordered again to send General Slocum's division to report to General Porter. The division went, became engaged at once in the battle of Gaines's Mill, where it lost very heavily, and did not return to its station until after nightfall.

During the afternoon several of the heavy guns with us were used with effect on columns of the enemy on the north side of the Chickahominy moving against General Porter, causing them to fall back and seek some other route of attack. The range was about two and one-half miles. About sundown General Hancock's brigade, which held the extreme right of General Smith's line, was attacked furiously by the enemy. It was nearly dark when the fight began, and the combatants were not fifty yards apart; but General Hancock was, as usual, equal to the occasion, and the enemy was driven back. This fight was preceded by a severe artillery fire from the enemy, which, however, was soon silenced. This day's operations of Smith's division were known as "The Action at Golding's [or Garnett's] Farm."

The position held by General Smith's division was about one and one-half miles from the Gaines's Mill field; and, possibly because the interval was

THE RETREAT FROM THE CHICKAHOMINY. FROM A SKETCH MADE ON THE FIELD AT THE TIME.

The scene is near McClellan's headquarters at Dr. Trent's farm, before daylight on Sunday, June 29th; the Sixth Corps (Franklin's) is falling back; the fires are from the burning of commissary stores and forage; the artillery in position covers the approaches from the Chickahominy, the artillerymen resting underneath the guns. The regiment in the middle-ground is the 16th New York, who wore straw hats in this campaign, and were, partly in consequence, such conspicuous targets for the enemy that in the Seven Days' fighting they lost 228 men.—EDITORS.

filled with dense timber, not a gun of the Gaines's Mill battle was heard by the troops in our vicinity.

The next morning, the 28th of June, General Smith's division was moved to the rear and left of the clearing of Golding's farm; General Slocum's division remaining to the rear and right of Smith, where it had taken position the night before. During this retrograde movement the enemy kept up a lively cannonade from the left, front, and right, but did remarkably little harm. A sharp infantry attack, however, was made upon the 49th Pennsylvania regiment, Colonel Irwin, and the 33d New York regiment, Colonel Taylor, who were the last to evacuate the position. The time of the attack was about the middle of the afternoon, and the attacking force was the 7th and 8th Georgia regiments. It was handsomely repulsed, and Colonels Lamar and Towers of the Georgia regiments with 50 officers and men were taken prisoners, and more than 100 were killed and wounded. [This action of the 28th, as also that of the 27th,—see p. 367,—is known as Golding's and Garnett's Farms.]‡ That evening the corps commanders were assembled at General McClellan's headquarters at the Trent house. The commanding general announced to us his purpose to begin a movement to the James River on the next day, and each corps commander was furnished with a map on which were laid down the positions that the respective corps were to hold until the next evening, when all the troops remaining near their present positions were to move across the White Oak Swamp *en route* for the James. The assembly broke up about 2 o'clock in the morning, each corps commander having received all the information necessary to determine his action for the 29th, should nothing unforeseen occur.



DR. TRENT'S FARM-HOUSE, McCLELLAN'S HEADQUARTERS.
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1885.

General McClellan's tents were under the two trees at the right. The Chickahominy lies to the left behind the house, and is a little more than half a mile distant.

The relative position of the Sixth Corps was not changed. Smith's division was still to have its right on the Chickahominy, extending down the river, where it was to touch the left of McCall's division (that crossed the Chickahominy during the night of the 27th), which, however, played no part in holding the line on June 29th, as it crossed White Oak Swamp early in the day.

‡ Also on the 28th a detachment of Cobb's Georgia Legion (cavalry) had a skirmish at Dispatch Station with the pickets of the 8th Illinois Cavalry.—EDITORS.



THE BATTLE OF SAVAGE'S STATION. FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

The 2500 sick and wounded in the field-hospitals, and their attendants, were left behind when the army fell back from Savage's Station, during the night following the engagement. The explosion on the railway is of a Union ordnance train. Other ordnance trains were set on fire and were run back to Bottom's bridge, where they plunged into the Chickahominy, as shown in the picture on the next page.

General Slocum's division was to be at Savage's Station, in reserve. Then came Sumner's corps and Heintzelman's. Keyes's corps was to cross the White Oak Swamp at once. Porter's corps had already crossed the swamp, and was under orders to press forward to a position on the James River.

This new line was about two miles nearer the White Oak Bridge than the intrenched line in front of Fair Oaks and Golding's farm (described above), and was nearly parallel. It was much shorter than the old line, its left reaching nearly to the swamp, and its right to the brink of the Chickahominy hills. This second line was about three-quarters of a mile in front of Savage's Station on the York River Railroad, which had been the depot for unloading and storing supplies for the troops that held the old line, and where had been gathered in tents 2500 sick and wounded, most of the latter from Gaines's Mill.

General Slocum's and General Smith's divisions both moved to their new positions before daylight of Sunday, the 29th of June — the day of the fighting at Savage's Station. As General Slocum's division had suffered so severely in the battle of Gaines's Mill, and had not yet recovered from its exhaustion, General McClellan ordered it to cross White Oak Swamp at once, and it accordingly left its position. Through some inadvertence I was not informed

of this change of plan; so when I joined General Smith early in the morning, I found him in his proper position, but with an interval of more than a mile between him and the troops on the left. It was soon learned, by sending out cavalry, that General Sumner had not moved from the position that he held the day before, and was, at the very time we learned this fact, engaged with the enemy at Allen's farm.[1] It was also apparent that straggling parties of the enemy were in front of the interval already mentioned. These circumstances showed an alarming state of things, and General Smith and I rode over to Savage's Station to learn something of the positions of other troops. We found no troops in the vicinity except General Meagher's brigade and the 15th Massachusetts Infantry, which had been sent to the station to destroy the stores that had to be abandoned. I at once wrote General Sumner, describing the situation, and informing him that I should move General Smith's division to Savage's Station, the vicinity of which offered a good fighting position, and advising him to bring his corps to that place. He answered the note at once, telling me that he was then engaged with the enemy, and that as soon as things were quiet he would join me with his corps. Soon after I had sent to General Sumner General Heintzelman rode up, and I told him what I had done. He approved, and said that he would also join us at the station with his corps. He afterward changed his mind, however, and instead of halting in the wood in front of the station, as we naturally supposed he would, he marched off toward White Oak Bridge, hidden from us by the woods, and crossed the swamp, so that we saw him no more that day, supposing, nevertheless, until we were attacked by the enemy, that his troops were in position on a part of our front.[2] General Smith's division arrived at the station about noon or shortly after, and took position on the left in a wood. General Sumner's corps, consisting of General John Sedgwick's and General Israel B. Richardson's divisions, arrived about 2 P. M.



RUNNING AMMUNITION TRAINS INTO THE CHICKAHOMINY.

There was a cleared field of several acres on the north side of the railroad, filled with hospital tents laid out in rows, each tent containing fifteen or

[1] Sumner's corps, retiring, left the works at Fair Oaks at daylight and halted for bivouac on Allen's farm, between the Williamsburg road and the railroad. The Confederates of Magruder's command opened on the troops at 9 A. M. with musketry and artillery, and a spirited fight was kept up until 11 o'clock. This engagement is known also as the Peach Orchard.— EDITORS.

[2] General Heintzelman in his report says: "The whole open space near Savage's was crowded with troops — more than I supposed could be brought into action judiciously." He then states that an aide of the commanding general was with him to point out the road for his crossing. "I ordered the whole of my corps to take this road, with the exception of Osborn's and Bramhall's batteries." These were turned over to General Smith's division.— W. B. F.



VIEW OF SAVAGE'S STATION FROM THE NORTH SIDE OF THE RAILROAD. FROM A SKETCH MADE BEFORE THE BATTLE.

The railroad passes close to the south side of Savage's house. In the foreground are shown burial trenches, and in the peach orchard the graves of officers. The negro cabins on the left were used by the Sanitary Commission; the barn, on the right, was a hospital, but most of the wounded were sheltered in the tents.

twenty men on comfortable, clean beds, with the necessary surgeons and attendants. South of the railroad, and between it and the Williamsburg road, was another clearing, east of which was a ravine running obliquely across the railroad, its edges skirted by trees, and the ravine itself filled with undergrowth. This clearing was nearly square, and was about one-third or one-half mile in length and breadth. In front of the ravine were some small hills which made good shelter for the troops; and west of the clearing was timber, where we supposed General Heintzelman's troops to be; on the left of the Williamsburg road was timber also, and General Smith's division was in position therein. Sumner's corps took position in the clearing between the Williamsburg road and the railroad. Burns's brigade of Sedgwick's division was in front, Sedgwick's other two brigades being just behind. The three brigades of Richardson's division, Meagher having joined him, were farther to the rear, but more to the right. Three batteries of field-artillery, Hazzard's, Pettit's, and Osborn's, were posted toward the left, near the front of the ravine.

The day was hot and sultry and wore away slowly as we waited either to be attacked or at nightfall to start for White Oak Bridge. Large quantities of all kinds of quartermasters' and other stores, partly in cars, were burning at the station, and at intervals shells would burst as the fire reached them, jarring the nerves of the tired and expectant men.

Shortly before 4 o'clock General Sedgwick and I rode over to the hospital to visit some of our wounded friends, whose condition was found to be as comfortable as could be expected under the circumstances. From the hospital we

started to make a call upon General Heintzelman, whose supposed position has already been described. As we rode over the open field we saw a group of men come out of a wood on the north of the railroad, but some distance from the place where we expected to find Heintzelman. I thought they were our men, but General Sedgwick looked at them more closely, stopped, and exclaimed: "Why, those men are rebels!" We then turned back in as dignified a manner as the circumstances would permit. But we had hardly started when they opened on us with a field-piece, keeping up a lively and uncomfortable fire. A second piece soon joined the first, and they kept up the fire until they were silenced by our batteries. This ludicrous incident prevented what might have been a disastrous surprise for our whole force. A few minutes afterward, before we had reached our troops, the signal-officers reported the approach of a force of infantry and a railroad car upon which was a rifled cannon, from the direction of Richmond. This artillery car halted in a cut of the railroad a little distance in front of the station, and at once began to shell the troops in the open field, and so about 5 o'clock the fight was begun. I immediately sought General Sumner, to inform him of the situation and get instructions. He had been fighting at the head of his corps during the morning [at the peach orchard], and, being much exhausted, was asleep when I reached his headquarters. I awoke him, and in a short time he had ordered two regiments of General Burns's brigade to attack at a point in the timber in front near the Williamsburg road, where the enemy's infantry had by this time appeared. These regiments entered the wood, and before they became engaged were joined by the 1st Minnesota Regiment. General Burns extended his line to the vicinity of the railroad, so that its center was necessarily weak. During this movement the enemy's artillery played with effect upon our troops, but was answered and finally silenced by the three batteries on our side already mentioned.

The enemy made the infantry attack with great fury, and pierced the center of General Burns's line. General Burns was wounded, but remained on the field. At this time General Sumner placed himself in front of two regiments and waved his hat. With a cheer they moved forward at double time to the endangered place in General Burns's line, enabling him to rectify it and drive the enemy from his front. Several other regiments joined General Burns's line at about the same time, but the fight was over not long after the charge, and the enemy was driven from the wood. A Confederate battery placed near the Williamsburg road was compelled to withdraw in haste. On the left General Brooks's brigade of General Smith's division, Sixth Corps, moved forward, with its right on the Williamsburg road, against a force of the enemy that was moving south of that road in the wood skirting the open field. It steadily drove back the enemy, meeting with heavy loss, particularly in the 5th Vermont Regiment. Darkness ended the fight. General Brooks was wounded in the leg, but did not leave the field. Hancock's and Davidson's brigades [Smith's division] were posted some distance to the rear to repel an anticipated attack from the right and rear, but were not engaged. When the fight



PLAN OF THE BATTLE AT SAVAGE'S STATION.

The order in which the Union troops entered the fight is thus described by General William W. Burns, in a letter dated Governor's Island, May 10th, 1885:

"The enemy appearing in the woods west of Savage's Station, General Sumner sent me forward to occupy the space between the Williamsburg road and the railroad. Thinking that two regiments of my brigade would suffice, I led them forward to the fences, at the edge of the woods on the west side of the clearing, about five hundred yards distant from the ravine on the east side of the clearing. General Sumner had his headquarters east of this wooded ravine and could not observe what was occurring on the west side of the open field.

"When I reached the fences I sent skirmishers through the belt of trees, and found the enemy advancing on the Williamsburg road and on the railroad, where General Lee's famous railroad monitor was slowly approaching. I had to throw back the right company of the right regiment, the 72d Pennsylvania, to rake the monitor. Then I found my two regiments not enough to extend across between the Williamsburg road and the railroad. I sent an aide in haste after my other two regiments, informing General Sumner of the situation. The 1st Minnesota, of Gorman's brigade, being most handy, was first sent, my two reserve regiments following. While placing the 1st Minnesota on the left to extend across the Williamsburg road, the battle began. My right flank swept the railroad monitor, which had advanced to the edge of the woods, and it ran back. The battle moved to my left, and I discovered that our works east of Seven Pines had been evacuated by Heintzelman. I threw back the left flank of the 1st Minnesota across the Williamsburg road and sent the 69th Pennsylvania of my brigade to prolong the left, to prevent the turning movement of the enemy; at the same time informing General Sumner of the conditions in front. He would not believe that Heintzelman had withdrawn until I sent my last mounted man, urging and demanding reinforcements. The 71st Pennsylvania (also called the 1st California), of my brigade, arriving, I placed it behind the center of my line where a gap had been made by extending the 1st Minnesota to the left. General Franklin sent General Brooks's brigade to the left of my line to check the turning movement of the enemy, and Sumner, when he realized that Heintzelman had withdrawn, sent Gorman's and Dana's brigades to my support in front.

"General Sumner formed the 88th New York, of Meagher's brigade, and the 5th New Hampshire, of Caldwell's brigade, for a charge. A mass of men came up in my rear in full yell. I halted the crowd and asked for their commander. 'I am Captain McCartan of the 88th New York, sir,' exclaimed an officer. I got them into line (about 250 men), facing up the Williamsburg road, which was raked by the grape and canister of the enemy's batteries. I gave the command, double quick—charge! They went in with a hurrah, and the enemy's battery fell back. General McClellan mistakenly gave the credit of that gallant charge to the 69th New York. It seems that the 5th New Hampshire halted before the charge which General Sumner had put in motion reached me.

"I was shot in the face with a minie-ball at the time the enemy broke through the gap in the center. There we had a hand-to-hand encounter, which determined the day in our favor. At nightfall I relieved the first line, its ammunition being exhausted, with the 71st Pennsylvania, the 15th and 20th Massachusetts, and the 82d New York. My report of the Seven Days' fighting was made at Harrison's Bar in hot July. I was prostrated with my wound, malaria, and twenty-eight days of constant strain, and was unable to write or to collect my thoughts. The battle at Glendale on the 30th of June, the next day after that of Savage's Station, was saved by my brigade, which kept the enemy from piercing the center of the Army of the Potomac; but, like the instance above, history has given the credit to 'General Misunderstanding,' who, in history, fights most battles."

Parts of Hazzard's, Pettit's, and Osborn's batteries were engaged on the Union side.

The Confederate infantry north of the railroad (Cobb's, Toombs's, and Anderson's brigades) did not take an active part in the battle. Anderson's brigade is not shown, its position being outside the northern bounds of the map.

The Confederate artillery engaged comprised Kemper's battery, two guns of Hart's battery, and Lieutenant Barry's "32-pounder rifled gun mounted on a rail-car, and protected from cannon-shot by a sloping roof, in front, covered with plates of iron, through which a port-hole had been pierced."

EDITORS.

was over, our troops held the contested ground. Their behavior throughout the fight had been admirable.[1]

The Confederate force engaged in this fight was commanded by General J. B. Magruder, and consisted of Semmes's and Kershaw's brigades, Kemper's battery, and two regiments of Barksdale's brigade opposite our left. Cobb's division and two guns of Hart's battery were north of the railroad to the right of our line. Cobb's infantry was not engaged.

About a half-hour after the fight was ended, I suggested to General Sumner that if he had no objection I would carry out the commanding general's orders, so far as I was concerned, and cross the White Oak Swamp with General Smith's division. We were then on the field. His answer was, "No, General, you shall not go, nor will I go—I never leave a victorious field. Why! if I had twenty thousand more men, I would crush this rebellion." I then told him that I would show him a dispatch from General McClellan directing that all of the troops should cross during that night. With some difficulty a candle was found and lighted, and the general read the dispatch. After reading it he exclaimed, with some excitement, "General McClellan did not know the circumstances when he wrote that note. He did not know that we would fight a battle and gain a victory." I was at my wit's end. I knew that General McClellan's arrangements did anticipate a fight exactly like that just over, and that unless the whole force was on the other side of the swamp by the next morning, his movement might be seriously delayed. Moreover, I believed that if we staid where we were, the enemy would be upon us in force enough to defeat us utterly on the next morning, endangering the remainder of the army. Yet by all military usage I was under General Sumner's orders. At this juncture General Smith asked me to introduce Lieutenant Mathew Berry, his aide-de-camp, to General Sumner. After the introduction, Lieutenant Berry told General Sumner that he had seen General McClellan only a short time before, that he knew there had been a fight, and fully expected that all of the troops would cross the swamp that night. General Sumner was convinced by this statement, and with great reluctance permitted me to continue the movement toward the swamp, he following immediately after.

General Smith's division crossed the White Oak Bridge about 3 o'clock on the morning of June 30th, and went into position on the left of the road leading from the bridge toward the James River. The batteries of the division were already there in position. It faced about so that its left rested upon the road, the division bearing southward from the road. At the same time I reported to McClellan at his headquarters.

The rear of Sumner's corps, Richardson's division, crossed the bridge at 10 o'clock in the morning, destroyed it, and took position some distance on Smith's left, nearly in line with him. Both divisions guarded the crossing.

After the fight at Savage's Station was over, Hazzard's battery of Richard-

[1] General E. M. Law says in the "Southern Bivouac" for May, 1887: "The battle of Savage's Station, although a 'drawn fight' as far as the possession of the field was concerned, was practically a victory for the Federals. Though their loss was three times as great as that of the Confederates, they accomplished the main purpose of the battle, which was to gain time for the passage of trains, artillery, and troops across White Oak Swamp."

son's division was unhitched, its captain not supposing there was to be any further movement that night, and the men and horses went to sleep, as usual when there was opportunity, which was not often in those days. The division, as has been told, moved off, and by accident no notice of the movement was sent to Captain Hazzard. On the next morning he heard reveille sounded by drums and trumpets from positions that he knew our troops did not hold the evening before. Everything in his vicinity was quiet. He took in the situation at once. He had been left behind, and the enemy might be upon him at any moment. He had the battery quietly hitched up, sent the caissons off in advance, and, bringing up the rear with two guns ready to open on a pursuing force, started off at a walk. When he was clear of the field he ordered the battery to trot. He arrived without harm at the White Oak Bridge at that pace just as General Richardson was on the point of destroying it. He found on the road many stragglers who were coolly wandering along with no suspicion that they were behind everybody, and by his warning was the means of saving many soldiers from a Richmond prison. The pluck and coolness shown in this exploit of Captain Hazzard were admirable. He was killed the next day while doing excellent work with his battery.

As the result of the dispositions made by the commanding general of the troops (a part of whose operations has just been described) a whole day was gained in getting a large part of the army to the James River without serious opposition, and into a proper defensive position; the enormous trains and heavy artillery had been given a start of twenty-four hours, insuring their safe arrival at the river. The rear of the army also had crossed White Oak Swamp, leaving the way clear to the James River, while at the same time a strong force was ready to protect the movement during its completion.

On the enemy's side, the slowness of Jackson in getting his force to the south side of the Chickahominy (he only arrived at Savage's Station at 3 o'clock on the morning of June 30th) had prevented us from being defeated in the fight of June 29th. The 28th and 29th had been occupied by Jackson in disposing of the dead and wounded at Gaines's Mill and in repairing Grapevine Bridge.

On the north (the enemy's) side of White Oak Swamp, the road for more than a quarter of a mile approaches the White Oak Bridge through low ground, open to artillery fire from the south side. [See map, p. 384.] On the right of the enemy, looking to the rear, there were hills covered with thick woods approaching the road, forming good cover for artillery, and making it possible for a large force to gather in the wood unseen from our side. The same range of hills continues up the stream, and approaches quite near it at Brackett's Ford, about one mile above White Oak Bridge. Both of these crossings were passable for artillery, but the bridges had been destroyed by our troops in the morning, after everything had crossed and before the appearance of the enemy.

On our side of the swamp, the ground rises from the bridge, and the road passes along the right, or east, of a ravine and joins the Long Bridge road about one and a quarter miles from the swamp. On the left of the ravine was a cleared space about a half-mile long in the direction of the swamp and

running back about the same distance. At the swamp the clearing was fringed with trees and underbrush, and about half-way up the clearing to the left of the ravine were a small farm-house and some slight out-buildings. On the right of the ravine was a similar clearing, extending from the swamp about a furlong back. All other ground in the vicinity was covered with timber and underbrush. (The troops were disposed as shown on the map, p. 470.)

The cleared space at this time had in it many wagons of the train, and Colonel R. O. Tyler's 1st Connecticut Heavy Artillery, which I ordered to the rear at once. Glad enough would I have been to keep this accomplished officer, with his gallant regiment and heavy guns, but we both knew that he was needed at the James River. At about 10:30 in the morning, as near as I can now recollect, I accompanied General McClellan to the intersection of the Charles City and Quaker roads, about two miles from the White Oak Bridge. I found General Slocum's division posted somewhat in rear of the intersection of those roads, and in front of the road leading from Brackett's Ford. A small portion of his infantry and one gun were posted near Brackett's Ford. His division formed the right of the force which later in the day fought the battle of Glendale or Frayser's farm. The small force at Brackett's Ford defeated an attack at that point, some time during the day.

MAJOR-GENERAL WILLIAM B. FRANKLIN.
From a photograph taken in August, 1862, when General Franklin was temporarily at home on sick leave.

At the junction of the Charles City and Quaker roads General McClellan had a conference with the corps commanders (Sumner, Heintzelman, and Franklin), and when it was ended he went toward the James River. A short time afterward I received an order directing me to take charge of the force guarding the White Oak Bridge, and I immediately started back. I had gone but a short distance when a bombardment commenced in the

direction of the bridge, the severity of which I had never heard equaled in the field. The wood through which I was riding seemed torn to pieces with round shot and exploding shells. But the danger was really greater from falling branches than from the shot, which did small damage.

It appears that Jackson, having left Savage's Station early in the morning, arrived at the vicinity of White Oak Bridge about noon, without exciting suspicion of his presence on our part, the whole movement being hidden by the woods. Here, masked by the trees, he massed about thirty guns, which opened simultaneously on the troops in the clearings, and on the rear part of the wagon train, which had not yet started from the clearing where it had passed the night. The troops immediately got under cover of the wood, except Caldwell's brigade [Richardson's division], which was guarding the batteries. It remained in the open ground, and lost many men, but the effect of the firing was otherwise small, except on the wagon train, which was thrown into some confusion, many of the wagons not being hitched up. These were at first abandoned by the drivers, but nearly all got away during the day. One field-piece was dismounted. The batteries were, however, soon in position to return the enemy's fire, which they did with such effect that many of his guns were silenced. It was here that Captain Hazzard, already mentioned, was mortally wounded, ending a brilliant career with a glorious death. Captain (afterward General) Romeyn B. Ayres, who commanded the artillery of Smith's division, used his guns with excellent effect. One of the enemy's batteries came into view near the bridge, but was forced to retire almost immediately. The bombardment lasted with great severity for about a half-hour, when it slackened and gradually fell off, opening again at intervals during the day, but never with its original vigor. A cavalry force which was sent over by the enemy just after the bombardment had reached its height was forced to retire much faster than it advanced.

The development of our defense of the crossing convinced General Jackson that it would be impossible for him to force it. At any rate, he made no attempt during the day to cross his infantry, unless sending sharp-shooters across to pick off our pickets may be so considered. The fight at White Oak Bridge was entirely with artillery, there being little musketry firing.

About 4 o'clock the enemy made a movement to our left, threatening Brackett's Ford, where I knew we were very weak. This was met by Dana's and Colonel Alfred Sully's brigades of Sedgwick's division, which were sent by General Sumner upon information of the danger. There was no further movement in that direction after these troops appeared, and they were returned to General Sumner about 5 o'clock, in time to do good service at Glendale. Toward sundown, at the request of General Sumner, Caldwell's and Meagher's brigades of Richardson's division were also sent to reënforce him.

No other movement was made by General Jackson's force during the day. Our artillery fired at whatever could be seen on the other side, and was answered by theirs in what seemed a reluctant manner. When the bombardment began, the mules belonging to an engineer ponton-train were being watered at the swamp. The noise stampeded them, and they rushed to the

rear, going through one of the regiments of Meagher's brigade, and disabling more men than were hurt in the brigade during the remainder of the day. The mules were seen no more, and the ponton-train was deserted. Captain (afterward General) M. T. McMahon, of my staff, volunteered to burn the train about 5 o'clock. It was a plucky thing to do, for the train was under the guns of the enemy, who knew its value as well as we did, and the presumption was that he would open his guns on it. But Captain McMahon got ten volunteers, and the train was soon in flames. He found four mules already harnessed, and brought off in triumph the most valuable wagon with this team.

In the house which has been described as about the middle of the left clearing lived an old man with a young wife and a child about two years old. He came to me about 10 o'clock and asked if I thought there would be a fight there that day. I told him that there certainly would be. He then asked when I thought it would begin. I thought in about half an hour. "Then," said he, "I will have time to take my wife and child to my brother, who lives about half a mile down the swamp, and get back before it begins."

"Yes," said I, "but why come back at all?"

"Why," said he, "if I don't your men will take all my chickens and ducks."

So he departed with his wife and child and in a little while returned. General Smith's headquarters were near this house, so it was a fair target for the enemy. Several shots went through it, and one of them took off the leg of the poor old man, who bled to death in a few minutes. He had sacrificed himself for his poultry.

One of the brigadier-generals of the command during a lull in the firing came to my headquarters, leaving his brigade to take care of itself. Finding his stay too long, I had him sent back to his post, and a short time afterward I was informed that he had been carried off the field on a stretcher, wounded. I thought it my duty to go to the brigade and find how things were going with it, and asked General Smith to accompany me. We started out, and almost at once the enemy opened on us with great vigor. I looked back, and found to my horror that all my own and General Smith's staff were following us, and that a large cavalry escort belonging to headquarters was also in the procession. The enemy had evidently taken us for a cavalry regiment. Getting rid of them all, we finally arrived at the right of the brigade, unharmed. Making inquiry of a staff-officer about the general, he replied, "Oh, no, sir, he is not wounded, he felt unwell and has gone to the wood to lie down and will soon be back." I turned off in great disgust to return, when another officer, looking as neat and clean as if he had just joined the army, stepped up with the air of a private secretary of some grand official, and, touching his hat, said, "Who shall I say called, sir?" General Smith and I did not hear the last of that expedition for a long time.

During the day a staff-officer of General Smith had explored a road toward James River about two miles in rear of that which the troops at Glendale were to take, and found it practicable. About 10 in the evening, assuming that my instructions to hold the crossing until nightfall had been obeyed, I sent word to General Heintzelman and General Sumner that I should move

THE REAR-GUARD AT WHITE OAK SWAMP—SHOWING GENERAL W. F. SMITH'S DIVISION. DRAWN BY JULIAN SCOTT AFTER HIS PAINTING OWNED BY THE UNION LEAGUE CLUB, NEW YORK.

to the James River by that road. General Richardson, with French's brigade, was instructed to remain, to deceive the enemy as to our movements by firing field-pieces in the direction of the bridge, and then, after an hour, to march. General Henry M. Naglee was to follow Smith's division. These instructions were carried out, and the command arrived at the James about daylight. The discovery of this road made the concentration of the troops at Malvern Hill a completed manœuvre by noon of the 1st of July, and was due to the fertile brain of General Smith, who ordered the exploration.

The military results of the defense of White Oak Bridge and the battle of Glendale were: (1) The enemy was repulsed at all points, except in the single case of McCall's division at Glendale, which was overpowered by numbers, after it had captured three of the enemy's colors; (2) The trains and heavy artillery arrived in safety at the James River (except those wagons which were destroyed by the bombardment at White Oak Bridge, not exceeding fifty out of more than four thousand), the road along which they passed not having been molested by the enemy; (3) The troops arrived in good time at the river, so that they were all in the positions desired by the commanding general, to await the attack at Malvern Hill, long before that attack was made.

General Jackson in his report intimates that his whole command, consisting of three divisions and D. H. Hill's division of five brigades, were all at White Oak Bridge on the 30th of June. He says: "It was soon seen that the enemy occupied such a position beyond a thick intervening wood on the right of the road as enabled him to command the crossing. Captain Wooding's battery was consequently recalled." General Lee says: "Jackson having been unable to force the passage of White Oak Swamp, Longstreet and A. P. Hill were without the expected support" at the battle of Glendale. It must be evident to any military reader that Jackson ought to have known of the existence of Brackett's Ford, only one mile above White Oak Bridge, and ought to have discovered the weakness of our defense at that point. He had troops enough to have attacked the ford and the bridge with forces at both points exceeding ours at the bridge, and the two attacks, to say the least, would have embarrassed us exceedingly. Had he made two attacks simultaneously, the result of the day at Glendale and White Oak Bridge might have been different. There may be reasons for his inaction in this matter that I do not understand, but, as the record now shows, he seems to have been ignorant of what General Lee expected of him, and badly informed about Brackett's Ford. When he found how strenuous was our defense at the bridge, he should have turned his attention to Brackett's Ford also. A force could have been as quietly gathered there as at the bridge; a strong infantry movement at the ford would have easily overrun our small force there, placing our right at Glendale, held by Slocum's division, in great jeopardy, and turning our force at the bridge by getting between it and Glendale. In fact, it is likely that we should have been defeated on that day had General Jackson done what his great reputation seems to make it imperative that he should have done.

A short time after I separated from General McClellan (as mentioned above) at the junction of the Charles City and Quaker roads, I bade farewell to the

Prince de Joinville, who told me that he and his nephews were about to leave us and return to Europe. He had always been very friendly, and now expressed many good wishes for my future. Holding my hand in his, he said, with great earnestness, "General, advise General McClellan to concentrate his army at this point, and fight a battle to-day; if he does, he will be in Richmond to-morrow." I was much impressed by his manner and by what he said, and from the purely military point of view the advice may have been good; but it was impracticable for me to adopt the suggestion. General McClellan was then well on his way to the James River, and I had no right to leave my command. It was impossible to concentrate the army there that day early enough to give battle, and had it been possible to risk a general engagement there, it would have been contrary to General McClellan's views as to his responsibility connected with the safety of the army, views which were actuating him in the very movement then taking place. It is likely from what we know now, that had it been possible to follow the prince's advice, his military forecast might have proved correct. But no one at that hour could have predicted the paralysis of Jackson's large force in our rear for the whole of that day, nor General Lee's ignorance of McClellan's intentions. Had a general engagement taken place, and had we been defeated, the army would have reached the James River, it is true, but instead of getting there as it did, with its *morale* unharmed, and with slight damage to its men and material, it would have been a disorganized mob, and as an army would have perished miserably. General McClellan believed that the destruction of the Army of the Potomac at that time would have been ruin to our cause, and his actions, for which he alone is responsible, were guided by that belief and by the conviction that at any sacrifice the preservation of that army, *at that time*, was paramount to every other consideration.

I cannot finish without a word as to the conduct of the men. My experience during the period generally known as "the Seven Days" was with the Sixth and Second Corps. During the whole time between June 26th and July 2d, there was not a night in which the men did not march almost continually, nor a day on which there was not a fight. I never saw a skulker during the whole time, nor heard one insubordinate word. Some men fell by the wayside, exhausted, and were captured; but their misfortune was due to physical inability to go on. They had no food but that which was carried in their haversacks, and the hot weather soon rendered that uneatable. Sleep was out of the question, and the only rest obtained was while lying down awaiting an attack, or sheltering themselves from shot and shell. No murmur was heard; everything was accepted as the work for which they had enlisted. They had been soldiers less than a year, yet their conduct could not have been more soldierly had they seen ten years of service. No such material for soldiers was ever in the field before, and their behavior in this movement foreshadowed their success as veterans at Appomattox.

F.W.